Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour最新文献

Determining the human activity that social processes consist in is a central task for the philosophy of the social sciences. This paper asks: which conception of agency arising from contemporary action theory is the most suitable for social science explanation? It is argued that a movement-centered, Davidsonian picture of agency is not suitable for explaining certain social processes such as strikes and boycotts because, instead of intentional bodily movements, they are explained by the intentional omissions of agents. I propose that instead of intentional bodily movements, social processes are better explained by phenomena in which an agent is taking an active relation both to her mental or bodily processes as well as to what is happening around her. Thus, to fully explain social processes, a comprehensive theory of agency that can account for intentional actions and intentional omissions and a conception of agency that includes both materialist and volitionalist aspects is needed.

As field change is often explained by recourse to agentic efforts of a few or revolutionary turbulence of many, this paper provides a complementary explanation of change grounded in the quotidian dynamics of physical objects and settings. Using the culinary and mountaineering fields, we demonstrate how attending to the materiality of objects and settings offers analytical leverage into the ways fields conflict and change. More specifically, we argue field instability is normal because, at the level of social action, mass and energy are inherently finite. As a result, actors responding to effects from distal fields may nevertheless collide over the objects and settings in which they are compelled to act.

Akrasia, otherwise known as ‘weakness of will’, is a state of mind whereby people act deliberately against their better judgment. This paper aims to provide a conceptual framework for understanding akrasia from psychosocial perspectives that assume the self is multiple and strongly interconnected with the relational flow of which it is a part. Drawing on key ideas from Dialogical Self Theory, we analyze the main dialogical dynamics that can generate akratic episodes with reference to how individuals organize their personal position repertoire, and to the relational and socio-cultural setting in which the actions are taken. The discussion enables us to identify some indicators to frame the tendency to betray one's good intentions, and to offer some suggestions on how to reduce the occurrence of the various forms of akrasia analyzed.

In this work, we intend to present a reading of current society as the extinction society. Extinction society here means the characterization, both social and individual, of a highly developed reality, especially in terms of personal freedom, unable to face global collective threats, first of all the climate disaster. This involves the risk, within a few generations, of the extinction of both the type of society that at least in the West we have been accustomed to for a few hundred years, and in the apocalyptic perspective of the species. The attempt to represent this question is addressed here by referring to some recent authors of cultural studies and sociology, to try and understand the principles of this extinction process. Following the analysis of what is in fact a process of individual liberation, that is, of increasingly advanced individualization, we proceed by looking at the macro-themes of consumption, politics and psyche. This is in order to understand the possible outcomes of this process and the overall sense of an extinction of the current society if not of the species.

This essay explores the concept of the self in the philosophies of Nagarjuna and Merleau-Ponty by examining how it is that, according to them, the self is empty and only conventionally real rather than intrinsically so. By analyzing the similarities between their philosophies, the essay aims to shed light on new ways of understanding perception, ethics, and our relationships with others. It will include an analysis of the no-self and the emptiness of entities, as well as an analysis of Merleau-Ponty's writings and philosophy to see how it is that, according to him, in order to better understand ourselves, we must understand the reality of our intersubjectivity and intertwining with the world. It will clearly be shown that Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology and the Madhyamikan school of thought coincide and offer powerful moral philosophies, while seeing the world as being completely separate from the self, distorts both our notions of ourselves and the world we are interconnected with. Virtue must be sought in samsara (perpetually being born into the world) and sunyata (emptiness that is itself empty of inherent existence), for samsara and nirvana (the end of karma) are one.

[Correction added on 03 April 2023, after the first online publication: First two sentences of the Abstract have been modified.]

A serious consideration of pain has largely been absent in sociology, especially physical pain's close neurobiological relative, social pain. Social pain is the process by which rejection and exclusion recruits similar neural circuits as physical pain, generating an affectual response that mirrors the response one feels from physical trauma. Pain is essential to any sociological analysis of motivation and action because, like many affective responses, it is a necessary ingredient in cognition and behavior; and, in many cases, it preconsciously commands and even controls how we think and act. While exploring this concept, it becomes apparent that sociology has an entire set of distantly related concepts that can be classified as different processes of social pain that reveal the structural, cultural, and situational conditions shaping the distribution of social pain. The paper concludes by thinking through the implications social pain portends for neuroscience and sociology.

Robert Michels and Alfred Schutz might not seem to have much in common. Michels was a political sociologist and Schütz was a philosopher of phenomenology, but they shared one crucial thing: they were both strangers in foreign countries. Michels left Germany for Italy and Switzerland because he was not permitted to complete the second degree necessary to teach at the university level while Schutz was compelled to leave Austria for France and the United States because of his Jewish background. Their experiences of trying to adapt in a foreign country prompted them to reflect on what it means to be “the stranger” (“Der Fremde”). Michels wrote “Materialien zu einer Soziologie des Fremden” in 1925 and Schutz published “The Stranger: An Essay in Social Psychology” in 1944. While Schutz’ article has been repeatedly cited, there does not seem to be a study devoted to it. Michels' article remains among his most neglected writings. However, both works offer a theoretical and contextual account of the obstacles the stranger encounters when trying to understand and to acclimate oneself to a new environment. As Schutz noted, the stranger is a person “without a past”, and Michels suggested, is also a person with an uncertain future.

In recent years, critical realists have increasingly engaged with the thought of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), the founder of the American pragmatist tradition. But the engagement has been mostly narrow in focus and at times misinformed. This paper examines points of continuity between Peircean thought and critical realism with respect to causation, ontology, and truth. Its purpose is to lay the groundwork for further and more fruitful engagement between the traditions by bringing attention to some things critical realists may not have known, and to correct some inaccurate things they thought they knew, about Peirce's philosophy.

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of Self-Determination Theory (SDT) and its claims regarding human autonomy. Self-determination theorists have advanced a form of self-regulated, engaged behavior (i.e., autonomy), founded upon on a consilient account of human motivation that assumes multiple, hierarchical levels of organization and causation (e.g., biological, psychological, and social). Autonomy, from this perspective, is taken to emerge from underlying biological mechanisms, but also able to exert its own causal effects in the world as a unique psychological phenomenon. We contend that in theorizing this way, self-determination theorists have invoked a mixed discourse of mechanism and autonomy that leaves important questions unanswered, perhaps most importantly those concerning how autonomy as a kind of volition can fit coherently in the mechanistic account of world that they advocate. We then offer an alternative perspective based upon the work of various hermeneutic-phenomenological thinkers in philosophy and psychology. This alternative perspective conceptualizes human phenomena such as autonomy and motivation in agentic terms, emphasizing meaningful participation in possibility-laden contexts of everyday practices.