Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour最新文献

This paper introduces the concept of “borderline institution” to characterize an institution in which actors push upstream the boundary between the normal and the pathological and find downstream ways of systematically taking advantage of this push ex-post. This happens for example when actors make decisions based on predictions; and are simultaneously allowed by vertical concentration to manage conflicts generated by the consequences of these decisions when these predictions fail. A theory of how to identify a borderline institution based on this vertical concentration uses bankruptcy proceedings at the Commercial Court of Paris as an example, relying on Karl Polanyi's concept of double movement and Margaret Archer's concept of double morphogenesis. In this court, bankers as lay judges can control both credit-related predictions at the bank, and bankruptcy proceedings at the court. Enabling conditions for borderline institutional entrepreneurs as “vertical linchpins” in this multilevel context explain how they concentrate enough power to reach a position from which to drive such dynamics. The conclusion asks whether societies promote new borderline institutions to face contemporary and urgent existential challenges.

As Petter Naess observes, some specifically prominent voices within CR have expressly denied our ability to predict much in the social domain while others express great caution about endorsing any such ability. In print, Naess has been the most prominent CR voice defending predictability, but there are others of us critical realists who share Naess's view. The purpose of this paper is to further defend the view that critical realists have no special problem with predicting events. We just do not grant prediction the same status that positivists do. The argument here is parallel to Porpora's that critical realists can and do run regressions but without granting them the same explanatory status as positivism.

To understand social issues and practices such as those related to climate change and technological change that are clearly future-oriented – collectively experienced events that are “not yet” – and co-constructed by different actors, we need nuanced conceptualizations of how people think about, negotiate and co-create futures that allow us to understand not only what people (can) think and do about future-related issues but also how that happens, what for and with which implications. However, so far, one of the key theoretical approaches that has conceptualised how people make meaning in situations of change and uncertainty – the socio-psychological social representations theory (SRT) – has not often engaged with the future or with different forms of temporality. By contrast, the French pragmatic sociology of engagements and critique (PS) has engaged with these notions, conceptualising them in relation to materiality and a plurality of moral orientations – two dimensions often seen as key to how collective futures are made and imagined. To offer a more nuanced and systematic conceptualization of how people represent the future and with what consequences, this paper will present, compare and synthesise SRT and PS, as a first step towards an interdisciplinary research agenda on social change and representations of the future.

The article argues that social catastrophes are the product of networks of unsaturated social relations that lead to the exponential spread of a social evil (pandemic, poverty, desertification, etc.). In the exponential curve of catastrophe there is an inflection point where, if unsaturated social relations are saturated, the catastrophe can be halted and ultimately avoided. The inflection point can be conceived as a generative relational complex in which both necessity and contingency of social relations are at work. Necessity is due to constitutive mechanisms that are automatic and, therefore, to some extent mathematically predictable. Contingency refers to non-automatic, in principle unpredictable relational mechanisms. However, contingency can be of two kinds. It can mean “dependence on” other factors, which can have some degree of predictability, or can be understood as the possibility of “being otherwise”, which is less predictable in its outcomes, but can also open up new opportunities to change the catastrophic trend. The reduction of the exponential curve to logistics can be expected if the networks of relationships at the inflection point are saturated in one way or another. This can be achieved by managing the contingent factors of both types in order to steer the morphogenetic processes of the social networks that configure the inflection point as a relational complex.

In this article I examine and criticize some mainstream views of the future within scholarly debates, mainly in social science. The goal is to review the strategies sociology is following to include the future as a theme of its own reflections. Such strategies also reveal relevant aspects of the society in which they are developed. The main argument revolves around some tensions concerning the relationship of contemporary societies to their future. The key points can be summarized as follows: in contemporary complex societies, where change is believed to be the only constant, social science seems to have abandoned the future as a theme of its reflections, while at the same time prediction and forecast are increasingly necessary. Future studies are, therefore, mainly an enterprise for managers and engineers, taking place in either government or corporate environments and far from the academy. Why is this happening? And is it necessarily so? What does sociology know about "the future(s)? Could prediction still be the form of the argument sociology can make about the future? And if this cannot be, then what exactly is its possible contribution – if any? Are these embarrassing questions a reflection of the way things really are, or of a wrong attitude sociology has taken to future studies? The main thesis is that insofar as sociology still occupies the field of future studies, it is undergoing a process of hybridization, which leads to mix its representational and performative function in a new way, and that can possibly escape confusion with old and new forms of utopian thinking. Such a thesis is illustrated introducing one particular analytic tool deployed in social scientific oriented future studies, namely scenarios, and comparing its inherent logic with that of the morphogenetic approach to sociological research. I attempt to examine the rationale of such a tool, and how it can serve the purpose of sociological analysis, constituting some kind of reflexive morphogenesis of sociological theory of the future

The subject of this special forum is contingency and the openness of the future, and in this essay we take a route not often travelled in regard of these and focus first on philosophy of time. We contrast static and dynamic theory of time in order to (eventually) acquire some traction on the meaning of both contingency and the open future. We suggest critical realism presupposes dynamic theory and that critical realism provides various conceptualizations that might contribute to dynamic theory.

This paper introduces the original research articles that constitute the present Forum issue on unpredictability, contingency and catastrophe. In doing so, it also identifies and discusses the specificity of realist approaches to the above questions. It is argued that attentiveness to the ontological dimension of (un)predictability opens promising avenues for reflexive approaches to social science and collective action.

Major paradigms in sociology and social sciences usually embrace either individualism or anti-individualism as fundamental worldview. This paper explores a third way between individualism and anti-individualism developed by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann in his systems theory. Luhmann treats actors or individuals as psychic systems and he distinguishes them from social systems. In a nutshell, social systems produce communication, whereas psychic systems produce consciousness. In line with anti-individualism, Luhmann therefore argues that social systems are irreducible to psychic systems and their actions. On the other hand, Luhmann joins ranks with individualism to assert that psychic systems are not rigorously constrained by social systems. Ultimately, Luhmann explains that social systems and psychic systems are part of each other's environment and that each type of systems provides the ecological conditions that the other type depends on to emerge and grow. To discuss this third way between individualism and anti-individualism, the paper examines more specifically two central points in Luhmann's theory: (1) how social systems and psychic systems are separated from each other, and (2) how social systems and psychic systems are coevolving.

Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post-Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience.

This article addresses the problem of whether we can speak of personal identity in cases of infants or elderly with cognitive disabilities as hydrocephaly or dementia, lives that could be considered borderline in terms of personal identity because they lack certain characteristics normally considered indispensable for personal life. Taking as a reference recent discussions on personal identity, particularly the narrative theories of Hilde Lindemann, Françoise Baylis and Marya Schechtman, the article analyses in what sense, under what assumptions, and in what way such a thing could be defended. Finally, some problems and objections to these approaches are considered.