Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour最新文献

The article examines the nature of bank money on two complementary levels. The first level deals with theoretical considerations. Here, the departure point is Social Positioning Theory, which provides a framework to investigate the nature of money. Within the theory, the paper situates bank money in credit-debt relations, that are themselves integral part of a wider productive-consumptive nexus of the economy. In this perspective, bank money is the relation, accounting economic positions of participating members, resulting from their economic activities realized within the context of the overall society. The second level uses the methods of Oral History and Memory Studies and, through semi-structured interviews, provides empirical material illustrating ideas about the nature of money in a specific historical form. The article thus explores the contrasting experiences of banking in the context of a centrally planned economy and banking in the transformation to a market economy. These two contrasting episodes are illustrative because of the significant change in the form of bank money, which brings to light various aspects of its nature. Moreover, the article utilizes interviews that present the lived experience of bankers with years of involvement in the sector, enriching the perspective on the issue under study.

Anti-dualistic social ontologies, those highlighting the intrinsic interdependency of agency and structure as two sides of the same coin, are sometimes criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of autonomous – capable and free – agency, or even denying the reality of such agency. This paper contests these claims, arguing that anti-dualistic ontologies only conflict with autonomous agency when the latter is understood in a highly voluntaristic sense, whose ideational roots go to what philosophers of free will call “incompatibilist” intuitions of freedom. Those intuitions suggest that actions (intentions, decisions) ultimately determined by extrinsic causes lack the kind of freedom presupposed by moral responsibility, so when agentive autonomy is presumed to involve such freedom, it does indeed cohere poorly with the anti-dualistic picture of intrinsically structured agency. Herein, however, an alternative, “compatibilist” notion of autonomy is advanced, such that does not conflict with extrinsic determination and is therefore congruent with anti-dualistic social ontologies.

According to Roy Bhaskar, social science can derive values from social facts by a process called “explanatory critique.” Bhaskar offers two different versions of explanatory critique: a belief-based version and a need-based version. Both versions are faced with a difficult objection. They seem either to employ an invalid inference or to assume the values that they are attempting to derive. I argue that at least the need-based version of Bhaskar's explanatory critique falls to the objection, and that the belief-based version on its own is insufficient. Bhaskar anticipates the objection and offers a defense. I show that his defense is unsuccessful. I also suggest a Baskar-inspired alternative explanatory critique.

Researchers have been observing a complexification of interpersonal relationships in contemporary societies. However, current theoretical perspectives on relationships fall short of comprehensively grasping increasingly diverse and fluid relationship types (e.g., friends with benefits, polyamory, living-apart-together, coparenting, etc.) and patterns of change. In an attempt to meet the need for more integrative and interdisciplinary theorizing, this paper introduces a first outline of relationship course theory to better comprehend the complexity of relationships. In contrast to previous theoretical perspectives that conceptualize relationships as a single trajectory, I posit that the course of a relationship is composed of multiple intertwined trajectories, each of which stemming from differentiated domains such as sexuality, friendship, love, family, domesticity, and occupation. These relationship domains constitute a metatypology from which to examine the multiple sets of meanings and temporalities that intertwine throughout the course of a relationship. I propose that relationships are defined based on the combination of relationship domains, with different iterations and permutations of these domains producing various relationship configurations. Furthermore, the theory defines three levels of relationship courses: Sociocultural (i.e., stories that circulate about relationships in given sociocultural contexts), interpersonal (i.e., stories that individuals co-construct about the particular relationships they experience), and life courses (i.e., stories that individuals co-construct about themselves as relational beings). This proposition will hopefully stimulate the theoretical conversation on the complexity of relationships and foster dialogue between researchers from different theoretical and disciplinary affiliations.

Social positioning theory, or an account of the human individual that it grounds, qualifies as a quantum social theory. This is an assessment that I explain and defend in the paper. It is of interest in that, in a world where increasing numbers are seeking to construct quantum social theories, it serves to help demonstrate that this goal can be achieved without giving up on meeting criteria like explanatory intelligibility or power or discarding real-world notions like human (and other) entities. As it turns out, a central feature of the account defended and a core element of the ‘standard’ interpretation of quantum mechanics are found to stand in an interesting, unanticipated and suggestive relation to each other.

The term function currently features prominently in outlines of social positioning theory but a sustained account of the view of function informing social positioning theory has yet to be supplied. In the absence of a fuller articulation of the theory's underlying view of function confusion and misinterpretation are likely to be encouraged especially among those committed to one or other of the numerous alternative accounts of function available. In this paper key features of the concept of function as it now appears in social positioning theory are identified and the similarities and differences between it and selected other views of function explored.

Mao (2023) presents a unified theory of language acquisition and processing which aims to bridge the gap between nativist and constructionist views on pragmatic competence. Mao argues that autism comprises a specific population which reveals how an Integrative Model of Pragmatic Competence works given apparent autistic difficulties in pragmatic competence but intact grammatical and lexical systems. Mao concludes that features perceived to be indicative of all autistic people (egocentrism and a lack of theory of mind) do not prevent linguistic competence. It is possible for internal modular components of language to function without recourse to intersubjective sociocultural engagement. It is argued this ultimately supports a nativist view over a constructionist view in relation to language acquisition, thus Mao proposes subsequent research should focus on neurobiological aspects of language acquisition and processing.

Our commentary will not focus on the broader linguistic debate about reconciling the positions between nativism and constructionism. Rather, we wish instead to focus specifically on the assumption Mao puts forward that autistic people constitute a homogenous category for studying the basic properties of human language. This assumption underscores theoretical problems within the linguistic ideas proposed which will be discussed below. It also has important moral and ethical implications in light of the way autistic people have been historically misrepresented as being entirely egocentric and unable to partake in authentic sociocultural life (Heasman & Gillespie, 2018; Ochs et al., 2004). Indeed, a more precise application of the double empathy theory (i.e., that there is a gap in understanding between autistic and non-autistic people due to two-way dispositional differences), highlights how double empathy is a relational construct and functions to critically examine how autism knowledge is produced. Thus, the double empathy theory can help to guard against the risks of unintentionally perpetuating overgeneralised deficit-framed stereotypes of autism. We therefore raise five issues with Moa's theory and suggest that a pathway forward to strengthen the theory would be to shift focus away from the complex label of autism and instead define populations for study based on specific linguistic measures relevant to the research question at hand.

First, Mao acknowledges that the label of autism describes a wide range of linguistic abilities from lacking functional language to competent verbal abilities. Such extremes in linguistic competence presents problems for the ambitious aim of developing a model of human language and its use that could resolve the divergent beliefs between constructionism and nativism. The problem is that while autistic people may demonstrate a range of linguistic abilities, the reasons why are multifaceted, as autism is not a linguistic diagnosis, it is a comple

Social scientific work on argumentation is yet to address the perennial tension between social cognition and social constructionism. Moreover, argumentation-based qualitative analysis protocols are needed for interview and textual data. Nonetheless, argumentation models remain too complex to reflect everyday argumentation and are not necessarily reflective of underlying cognitive processes. This presents the need for further theorising social behaviour, with a view to formulating a model of argumentation that (a) is parsimonious, and (b) aligns with the literature on joint projects, due to the fact that in social cognition terms, argumentation is for doing. In this paper, we draw upon interdisciplinary literature on argumentation, noting convergences among different approaches. We then proceed to consider the socio-cognitive bedding provided by Lay Epistemic Theory, to present our Minimal Model of Argumentation (MMA). In MMA, interlocutors are held to make claims concerning an issue of concern, and defend them using warrants, evidence and qualifiers. We end by providing empirical examples supporting the utility of our model in qualitative research.

This article examines Durkheim's relationship to realism. I argue that there is enough prima facie evidence of realist commitments in his work that our task should be to consider what kind of realist Durkheim was. I discuss, first of all, Durkheim's epistemics and follow that analysis with a discussion of metaphysical realism in his texts. The first part of the paper covers a wide range of his work; the second part focuses primarily on The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. In a final concluding section, I go on to consider how his epistemic arguments and his philosophical realism might work together to support important parts of his general sociology. Realism is not often brought to bear on Durkheim's work. When it has been, Durkheim has been identified as a naïve realist. These interpretations of Durkheim do not recognize the sophistication of contemporary realism, which does not reduce to naïve representationalism. This paper will sort out Durkheim's realist commitments in his texts, and in light of the variety of realisms consistent with “sophisticated” (that is, non-naïve) realism.

This paper argues that anti-social behaviour, in the context of homelessness, ought to be seen as acts of civil disobedience. Firstly, I identify public space as a hostile space for people experiencing homelessness. Secondly, I detail how this reveals a default interpretation of them as anti-social through their mere presence. Thirdly, I explore how this de-politicises. I go onto define and examine civil disobedience theory, as a counter narrative to anti-social behaviour. I then argue how acts of disruption by people experiencing homelessness in public space can qualify as civil disobedience. I acknowledge this as a wicked problem but claim that flipping the default framing of homelessness in this way has normative gain, undoing the de-politicising othering that anti-social behaviour narratives have caused.