Abstract How is the validity of our consent, and others’ moral permission to act on our consent affected by coercion? Everyone agrees that in cases of two-party coercion—when X coerces Y to do something with or for X—the consent of the coerced is invalid, and the coercer is not permitted to act upon the consent they receive. But coercers and the recipients of consent are not always identical. Sometimes a victim, Y, agrees to do something to, with, or for Z because they are being coerced by X. Recently, several philosophers have argued that consent under third-party coercion can be fully valid. We argue that this view has troubling implications. We develop a novel view of consent in third-party coercion cases, which we call the partial validity account. The core idea is that, under severe coercion, Y’s consent is at most partially valid—it reduces the strength of, but does not completely dissolve, Z’s consent-sensitive duties. We argue that the partial validity account gets the right results in important cases and explains the moral factors at play better than alternative accounts.
{"title":"Consenting Under Coercion: The Partial Validity Account","authors":"Sameer Bajaj, Patrick Tomlin","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad092","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How is the validity of our consent, and others’ moral permission to act on our consent affected by coercion? Everyone agrees that in cases of two-party coercion—when X coerces Y to do something with or for X—the consent of the coerced is invalid, and the coercer is not permitted to act upon the consent they receive. But coercers and the recipients of consent are not always identical. Sometimes a victim, Y, agrees to do something to, with, or for Z because they are being coerced by X. Recently, several philosophers have argued that consent under third-party coercion can be fully valid. We argue that this view has troubling implications. We develop a novel view of consent in third-party coercion cases, which we call the partial validity account. The core idea is that, under severe coercion, Y’s consent is at most partially valid—it reduces the strength of, but does not completely dissolve, Z’s consent-sensitive duties. We argue that the partial validity account gets the right results in important cases and explains the moral factors at play better than alternative accounts.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136279418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Recently, many normative theories of democracy have taken an epistemic turn. Rather than focus on democracy's morally desirable features, they argue that democracy is valuable (at least in part) because it tends to produce correct political decisions. I argue that these theories place epistemic demands on citizens that conflict with core democratic commitments. First, I discuss a well-known challenge to epistemic arguments for democracy that I call the ‘deference problem’. I then argue that framing debates about this deference problem in terms of work on epistemic defeat reveals a structurally similar but more serious challenge for epistemic arguments for democracy. Succinctly put, the problem is that if democracy tends to produce correct political decisions, then those in the minority might be required to suspend beliefs about political matters; however, this requirement conflicts with the pivotal democratic principle of self-government. Call this the ‘suspension problem’.
{"title":"The Suspension Problem for Epistemic Democracy","authors":"Miguel Egler","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad091","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recently, many normative theories of democracy have taken an epistemic turn. Rather than focus on democracy's morally desirable features, they argue that democracy is valuable (at least in part) because it tends to produce correct political decisions. I argue that these theories place epistemic demands on citizens that conflict with core democratic commitments. First, I discuss a well-known challenge to epistemic arguments for democracy that I call the ‘deference problem’. I then argue that framing debates about this deference problem in terms of work on epistemic defeat reveals a structurally similar but more serious challenge for epistemic arguments for democracy. Succinctly put, the problem is that if democracy tends to produce correct political decisions, then those in the minority might be required to suspend beliefs about political matters; however, this requirement conflicts with the pivotal democratic principle of self-government. Call this the ‘suspension problem’.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136235987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this article, I offer a detailed examination of Margaret Macdonald's response to the Cartesian sceptical argument from dreaming. I show that Macdonald's views were not well understood by her contemporaries, and I suggest that this misunderstanding has led to her omission from subsequent discussions of this subject. I end with a brief demonstration of the fact that Macdonald's central claims have re-emerged in contemporary epistemology.
{"title":"Margaret Macdonald on the Argument from Dreaming","authors":"Oliver Thomas Spinney","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad093","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, I offer a detailed examination of Margaret Macdonald's response to the Cartesian sceptical argument from dreaming. I show that Macdonald's views were not well understood by her contemporaries, and I suggest that this misunderstanding has led to her omission from subsequent discussions of this subject. I end with a brief demonstration of the fact that Macdonald's central claims have re-emerged in contemporary epistemology.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136375563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals.
{"title":"Are Humans the Only Rational Animals?","authors":"Giacomo Melis, Susana Monsó","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad090","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136376029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Philosophers struggle to explain why human beings with deep cognitive impairments have a higher moral status than certain non-human animals. Modal personism promises to solve this problem. It claims that humans who lack the capacities of “personhood” and the potential to develop them nonetheless could have been persons. I argue that modal personism has poor prospects because it's hard to see how we could offer a plausible account of modal personhood. I search for an adequate understanding of modal personhood by considering existing accounts and sketching new ones. But each account fails, either because it objectionably excludes some deeply cognitively impaired humans from the class of modal persons or because it makes modal personhood doubtfully relevant to moral status. And the modal personist cannot solve this problem by appealing to the misfortune suffered by modal persons.
{"title":"Morality, Modality, and Humans with Deep Cognitive Impairments","authors":"William Gildea","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad081","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Philosophers struggle to explain why human beings with deep cognitive impairments have a higher moral status than certain non-human animals. Modal personism promises to solve this problem. It claims that humans who lack the capacities of “personhood” and the potential to develop them nonetheless could have been persons. I argue that modal personism has poor prospects because it's hard to see how we could offer a plausible account of modal personhood. I search for an adequate understanding of modal personhood by considering existing accounts and sketching new ones. But each account fails, either because it objectionably excludes some deeply cognitively impaired humans from the class of modal persons or because it makes modal personhood doubtfully relevant to moral status. And the modal personist cannot solve this problem by appealing to the misfortune suffered by modal persons.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135148644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper explores William Ockham's account of memory with a view to understanding its implications for his account of the nature and persistence of human beings. I show that Ockham holds a view according to which memory (i) is a type of self-knowledge and (ii) entails the existence of an enduring psychological subject. This is significant when taken in conjunction with his account of the afterlife. For, Ockham holds that during the interim state—namely, after bodily death, but prior to bodily resurrection—we retain and recall our embodied experiences. This entails that the subject of our embodied psychological states can survive in a disembodied state and continue to engage in characteristic rational activities—a claim that appears to run against Ockham's own commitment to a hylomorphic conception of human beings (as essentially material). A central aim of this paper is to explore the prospects for reconciling Ockham's account of interim memory with his account of human beings.
{"title":"Ockham on Memory and the Metaphysics of Human Persons","authors":"Susan Brower Toland","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad079","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper explores William Ockham's account of memory with a view to understanding its implications for his account of the nature and persistence of human beings. I show that Ockham holds a view according to which memory (i) is a type of self-knowledge and (ii) entails the existence of an enduring psychological subject. This is significant when taken in conjunction with his account of the afterlife. For, Ockham holds that during the interim state—namely, after bodily death, but prior to bodily resurrection—we retain and recall our embodied experiences. This entails that the subject of our embodied psychological states can survive in a disembodied state and continue to engage in characteristic rational activities—a claim that appears to run against Ockham's own commitment to a hylomorphic conception of human beings (as essentially material). A central aim of this paper is to explore the prospects for reconciling Ockham's account of interim memory with his account of human beings.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135394465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Critical Notice: The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False Get access The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False. By Todd Patrick. (Oxford: OUP, 2021. Pp. xi + 212.) Stephan Torre Stephan Torre University of Aberdeen, UK https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2296-839X Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad086, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad086 Published: 15 September 2023 Article history Received: 23 August 2023 Published: 15 September 2023
期刊文章关键提示:开放的未来:为什么未来的偶然事件都是假的获取开放的未来:为什么未来的偶然事件都是假的。托德·帕特里克著。(牛津:牛津大学，2021年。Pp. xi + 212)Stephan Torre Stephan Torre英国阿伯丁大学https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2296-839X查找作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者哲学季刊，pqad086, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad086出版日期:2023年9月15日文章历史收稿日期:2023年8月23日出版日期:2023年9月15日
{"title":"Critical Notice: The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False","authors":"Stephan Torre","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad086","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Critical Notice: The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False Get access The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False. By Todd Patrick. (Oxford: OUP, 2021. Pp. xi + 212.) Stephan Torre Stephan Torre University of Aberdeen, UK https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2296-839X Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad086, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad086 Published: 15 September 2023 Article history Received: 23 August 2023 Published: 15 September 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135395512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations Get access Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations. By Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever. (Oxford: OUP, 2021. Pp. viii + 175. Price £34.99.) Nikhil Mahant Nikhil Mahant Central European University, Vienna, Austria https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0007-6406 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad088, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad088 Published: 13 September 2023 Article history Received: 26 August 2023 Accepted: 31 August 2023 Published: 13 September 2023
期刊文章Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations获取Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations。赫尔曼·卡佩伦和乔希·德弗著。(牛津:牛津大学，2021年。p. viii + 175。价格£34.99)。Nikhil Mahant Nikhil Mahant中欧大学，奥地利维也纳https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0007-6406搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者哲学季刊，pqad088, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad088发布:2023年9月13日文章历史接收:2023年8月26日接收:2023年8月31日发布:2023年9月13日
{"title":"Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations","authors":"Nikhil Mahant","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad088","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations Get access Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations. By Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever. (Oxford: OUP, 2021. Pp. viii + 175. Price £34.99.) Nikhil Mahant Nikhil Mahant Central European University, Vienna, Austria https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0007-6406 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad088, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad088 Published: 13 September 2023 Article history Received: 26 August 2023 Accepted: 31 August 2023 Published: 13 September 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135785727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Critical Notice: The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk Get access The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk. By Fabrizio Cariani. (Cambridge: CUP, 2021. Pp. xxv + 292.) Patrick Todd Patrick Todd University of Edinburgh, Scotland Lund University, Sweden Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad087, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad087 Published: 13 September 2023 Article history Received: 25 August 2023 Accepted: 31 August 2023 Published: 13 September 2023
{"title":"Critical Notice: The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk","authors":"Patrick Todd","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad087","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Critical Notice: The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk Get access The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk. By Fabrizio Cariani. (Cambridge: CUP, 2021. Pp. xxv + 292.) Patrick Todd Patrick Todd University of Edinburgh, Scotland Lund University, Sweden Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad087, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad087 Published: 13 September 2023 Article history Received: 25 August 2023 Accepted: 31 August 2023 Published: 13 September 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135785726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence.
{"title":"Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit","authors":"Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, Olle Risberg","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad082","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135982385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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