Crispin Wright and Filippo Ferrari have accused relativism of not accounting for ‘parity’ – the idea that, when we argue over matters of taste, we take our opponents’ opinions to be ‘as good as ours’ from our own committed perspective. In this paper, I show that (i) explaining parity has not been taken to be a desideratum by relativists and thus they cannot be accused of failing to fulfil a promise; (ii) Wright’s and Ferrari’s reasons for claiming that parity should be a desideratum are unconvincing.
{"title":"Parity, faultlessness and relativism: A response to Wright and Ferrari","authors":"Dan Zeman","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad107","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Crispin Wright and Filippo Ferrari have accused relativism of not accounting for ‘parity’ – the idea that, when we argue over matters of taste, we take our opponents’ opinions to be ‘as good as ours’ from our own committed perspective. In this paper, I show that (i) explaining parity has not been taken to be a desideratum by relativists and thus they cannot be accused of failing to fulfil a promise; (ii) Wright’s and Ferrari’s reasons for claiming that parity should be a desideratum are unconvincing.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141679551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent literature on social movements assigns a central role to the imagination. One way for activists to further their aims is through dramatic, confrontational acts of protest. I argue that transcendent imagining is key to understanding what protest does qua act of speech. A common approach to protest sees it as a speech act of condemning some feature of the socio-political world and appealing for change. While this is a helpful general template for what vocal dissent is, it is insufficient to explain what gives protests their political power. Specifically, it overlooks the fact that effective protests usually create a theatrical spectacle of norm breaking. Displays of defiance lift a constraint on how we imagine our socio-political world, and so allow us to begin reshaping it.
{"title":"The role of imagination in protest","authors":"Megha Devraj","doi":"10.1093/analys/anae005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent literature on social movements assigns a central role to the imagination. One way for activists to further their aims is through dramatic, confrontational acts of protest. I argue that transcendent imagining is key to understanding what protest does qua act of speech. A common approach to protest sees it as a speech act of condemning some feature of the socio-political world and appealing for change. While this is a helpful general template for what vocal dissent is, it is insufficient to explain what gives protests their political power. Specifically, it overlooks the fact that effective protests usually create a theatrical spectacle of norm breaking. Displays of defiance lift a constraint on how we imagine our socio-political world, and so allow us to begin reshaping it.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141347858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Part III of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick presents what he calls ‘the model of possible worlds’ (307) to examine the formal properties of utopia, defined as ‘the best of all possible worlds’ (298). The basic idea is that each person is given the power to create any possible world and its inhabitants by imagining them. Two definitions of stability have been proposed: (a) the non-circular definition according to which a world is stable if and only if nobody can imagine a better world and (b) the circular definition according to which a world is stable if and only if nobody can imagine a better world that is also stable. In this paper, we prove four theorems (namely, the indeterminacy theorem, the stable dystopia theorem, the nobody’s utopia theorem and the redundancy theorem) that provide us with decisive reasons to reject the circular definition and opt for the non-circular definition of stability to analyse Nozick’s theory of utopia.
{"title":"Stable dystopia: a critique of the circular definition of stability in Nozick’s model of utopia","authors":"Susumu Cato, Hun Chung","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad091","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In Part III of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick presents what he calls ‘the model of possible worlds’ (307) to examine the formal properties of utopia, defined as ‘the best of all possible worlds’ (298). The basic idea is that each person is given the power to create any possible world and its inhabitants by imagining them. Two definitions of stability have been proposed: (a) the non-circular definition according to which a world is stable if and only if nobody can imagine a better world and (b) the circular definition according to which a world is stable if and only if nobody can imagine a better world that is also stable. In this paper, we prove four theorems (namely, the indeterminacy theorem, the stable dystopia theorem, the nobody’s utopia theorem and the redundancy theorem) that provide us with decisive reasons to reject the circular definition and opt for the non-circular definition of stability to analyse Nozick’s theory of utopia.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141357577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that there is a simple derivation of triviality with very few assumptions involving the formula that the negated conditional entails the antecedent of the conditional.
我们证明，三段论的推导很简单，只需很少的假设，涉及否定条件蕴含条件前件的公式。
{"title":"Should the negated conditional entail its antecedent?","authors":"Hitoshi Omori","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad089","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We show that there is a simple derivation of triviality with very few assumptions involving the formula that the negated conditional entails the antecedent of the conditional.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141378776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the standard theory of deontic modals, ‘ought’ is understood as expressing a propositional operator. However, this view has been called into question by Almotahari and Rabern’s puzzle about deontic ‘ought’, according to which the ethical principle that one ought to be wronged by another person rather than wrong them is intuitively coherent but the standard theory makes it incoherent. In this paper, I take up Almotahari and Rabern’s challenge and offer a refinement of the standard theory to handle the puzzle. I propose that ‘ought’ is evaluated relative to contextual parameters (e.g. Kratzer’s conversational backgrounds, Finlay and Snedegar’s alternative sets) and those contextual parameters are sensitive to agents as well as possible worlds.
{"title":"On the agent-relativity of ‘ought’","authors":"Junhyo Lee","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad088","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the standard theory of deontic modals, ‘ought’ is understood as expressing a propositional operator. However, this view has been called into question by Almotahari and Rabern’s puzzle about deontic ‘ought’, according to which the ethical principle that one ought to be wronged by another person rather than wrong them is intuitively coherent but the standard theory makes it incoherent. In this paper, I take up Almotahari and Rabern’s challenge and offer a refinement of the standard theory to handle the puzzle. I propose that ‘ought’ is evaluated relative to contextual parameters (e.g. Kratzer’s conversational backgrounds, Finlay and Snedegar’s alternative sets) and those contextual parameters are sensitive to agents as well as possible worlds.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141385407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The vividness of mental imagery is epistemically relevant. Intuitively, vivid and intense memories are epistemically better than weak and hazy memories, and using a clear and precise mental image in the service of spatial reasoning is epistemically better than using a blurry and imprecise mental image. But how is vividness epistemically relevant? I argue that vividness is higher-order evidence about one’s epistemic state, rather than first-order evidence about the world. More specifically, the vividness of a mental image is higher-order evidence about the amount of first-order information one has about its subject matter. When vividness is sufficiently low, it can give one reason to doubt the epistemic basis of the mental image and thereby act as a defeater. This account has important implications for theorizing about the epistemic roles of memory, imagination, mental imagery and phenomenal consciousness.
{"title":"The epistemic role of vividness","authors":"Joshua Myers","doi":"10.1093/analys/anae002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The vividness of mental imagery is epistemically relevant. Intuitively, vivid and intense memories are epistemically better than weak and hazy memories, and using a clear and precise mental image in the service of spatial reasoning is epistemically better than using a blurry and imprecise mental image. But how is vividness epistemically relevant? I argue that vividness is higher-order evidence about one’s epistemic state, rather than first-order evidence about the world. More specifically, the vividness of a mental image is higher-order evidence about the amount of first-order information one has about its subject matter. When vividness is sufficiently low, it can give one reason to doubt the epistemic basis of the mental image and thereby act as a defeater. This account has important implications for theorizing about the epistemic roles of memory, imagination, mental imagery and phenomenal consciousness.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141387366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the disadvantages of redistributive taxation is that it reduces people’s financial incentives to increase national wealth and benefit others by engaging in productive activities. It is natural to suppose that the severity of this disadvantage will be proportional to the socially prevailing level of human selfishness. Thus several advocates of redistribution (G.A. Cohen, Ha-Joon Chang among others) have argued that this disadvantage of redistribution need not be as severe as critics often suggest, because human beings need not be so selfish. My aim in this paper is to argue that, even in a society entirely composed of unselfish and impartially beneficent individuals, redistributive taxation would still discourage activities that contribute to national wealth, because differing individuals have different views about what counts as benefiting themselves and others. I also relate my discussion to G.A. Cohen’s influential ‘camping trip’ argument for socialism (from Why Not Socialism?).
{"title":"Redistribution and selfishness","authors":"Harry R Lloyd","doi":"10.1093/analys/anae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 One of the disadvantages of redistributive taxation is that it reduces people’s financial incentives to increase national wealth and benefit others by engaging in productive activities. It is natural to suppose that the severity of this disadvantage will be proportional to the socially prevailing level of human selfishness. Thus several advocates of redistribution (G.A. Cohen, Ha-Joon Chang among others) have argued that this disadvantage of redistribution need not be as severe as critics often suggest, because human beings need not be so selfish. My aim in this paper is to argue that, even in a society entirely composed of unselfish and impartially beneficent individuals, redistributive taxation would still discourage activities that contribute to national wealth, because differing individuals have different views about what counts as benefiting themselves and others. I also relate my discussion to G.A. Cohen’s influential ‘camping trip’ argument for socialism (from Why Not Socialism?).","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141100611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses a puzzle raised by Sharon Berry, published in Analysis. The question in the background of this puzzle is how we should deal with seemingly plausible possibility judgements that commit us to counterfactual truths that find no basis in reality. Three answers to this question and their corresponding solutions to the puzzle will be discussed. The last answer provides a way to make sense of the claim that it is in some cases indeterminate whether a proposition is possible and offers an account of indeterminate modal status.
{"title":"Counterfactuals and indeterminate possibility","authors":"Jonas Werner","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad095","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper discusses a puzzle raised by Sharon Berry, published in Analysis. The question in the background of this puzzle is how we should deal with seemingly plausible possibility judgements that commit us to counterfactual truths that find no basis in reality. Three answers to this question and their corresponding solutions to the puzzle will be discussed. The last answer provides a way to make sense of the claim that it is in some cases indeterminate whether a proposition is possible and offers an account of indeterminate modal status.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141106673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we give the matrix version of Horn’s hypergeometric function and their confluent cases. We also discuss the regions of convergence, system of matrix differential equations of bilateral type, differential formulae and infinite summation formulae satisfied by these hypergeometric matrix functions. With the study of these 23 matrix functions, matrix generalization of Horn’s list of 34 hypergeometric series will be completed.
{"title":"A study of Horn matrix functions and Horn confluent matrix functions","authors":"Ravi Dwivedi, Ashish Verma","doi":"10.1515/anly-2023-0057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/anly-2023-0057","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we give the matrix version of Horn’s hypergeometric function and their confluent cases. We also discuss the regions of convergence, system of matrix differential equations of bilateral type, differential formulae and infinite summation formulae satisfied by these hypergeometric matrix functions. With the study of these 23 matrix functions, matrix generalization of Horn’s list of 34 hypergeometric series will be completed.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140963526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The modular fuzzy b-metric space is defined in this study, and we are interested in proving a general common fixed point theorem for a pair of multi-valued mappings in Hausdorff modular fuzzy b-metric spaces. The work generalizes the findings in [H. Kerim, W. Shatanawi, A. Tallafha and T. A. M. Shatnawi, Fixed point theorems on modular fuzzy metric spaces, Politehn. Univ. Bucharest Sci. Bull. Ser. A Appl. Math. Phys. 84 2022, 1, 47–58] and produce additional specific findings that are supported by examples. An application to prove the existence of an integral inclusion equation’s solution is shown to demonstrate the importance of our result.
本研究定义了模块模糊 b-metric空间，我们有兴趣证明 Hausdorff 模块模糊 b-metric空间中一对多值映射的一般公共定点定理。这项工作概括了 [H. Kerim, W. Shathema] 中的发现。Kerim, W. Shatanawi, A. Tallafha and T. A. M. Shatnawi,Fixed point theorems on modular fuzzy metric spaces,Politehn.Univ. Bucharest Sci.A Appl.84 2022, 1, 47-58]，并通过实例得出更多具体结论。通过证明积分包容方程解的存在性的应用，证明了我们结果的重要性。
{"title":"A common fixed point result for multi-valued mappings in Hausdorff modular fuzzy b-metric spaces with application to integral inclusions","authors":"Noureddine Makran, O. Hammouti, S. Taarabti","doi":"10.1515/anly-2023-0081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/anly-2023-0081","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The modular fuzzy b-metric space is defined in this study, and we are interested in proving a general common fixed point theorem for a pair of multi-valued mappings in Hausdorff modular fuzzy b-metric spaces. The work generalizes the findings in [H. Kerim, W. Shatanawi, A. Tallafha and T. A. M. Shatnawi,\u0000Fixed point theorems on modular fuzzy metric spaces,\u0000Politehn. Univ. Bucharest Sci. Bull. Ser. A Appl. Math. Phys. 84 2022, 1, 47–58] and produce additional specific findings that are supported by examples. An application to prove the existence of an integral inclusion equation’s solution is shown to demonstrate the importance of our result.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140975689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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