The main purpose of this paper is to study η-Ricci–Yamabe solitons (η-RYS) and *{*}-η-Ricci–Yamabe solitons (*{*}-η-RYS) in Lorentzian para-Kenmotsu n-manifolds (briefly, (LPK)n{(mathrm{LPK})_{n}}). We study the curvature condition R.S=0{R.S=0}
本文的主要目的是研究η-里奇-山边孤子（η-RYS）和* {*} -η-Ricci-Yamabe 孤子（* {*} -η-Ricci-Yamabe solitons）。 -η-Ricci-Yamabe 孤子 ( * {*}) -η-RYS）的洛伦兹副肯莫特n-manifolds（简言之，( LPK ) n {(mathrm{LPK})_{n}} ）。 ).我们研究曲率条件 R . S = 0 {R.S=0} 和 ( LPK ) n {(mathrm{LPK})_{n}} 中接纳 η-RYS 的循环平行里奇张量。此外，我们还研究了M-投影平坦和准M-投影平坦洛伦兹准肯莫特流形，这些流形接纳* {*}. -η-RYS。最后，我们给出了两个洛伦兹准肯莫特流形接纳η-RYS和* {*} -η-RYS 的例子。 -η-RYS的两个例子来验证我们的一些结果。
{"title":"η-Ricci--Yamabe and *-η-Ricci--Yamabe solitons in Lorentzian para-Kenmotsu manifolds","authors":"Rajendra Prasad, A. Haseeb, Vinay Kumar","doi":"10.1515/anly-2023-0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/anly-2023-0039","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 <jats:p>The main purpose of this paper is to study η-Ricci–Yamabe solitons (η-RYS) and <jats:inline-formula id=\"j_anly-2023-0039_ineq_9999\">\u0000 <jats:alternatives>\u0000 <m:math xmlns:m=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\">\u0000 <m:mo>*</m:mo>\u0000 </m:math>\u0000 <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic/j_anly-2023-0039_eq_0305.png\" />\u0000 <jats:tex-math>{*}</jats:tex-math>\u0000 </jats:alternatives>\u0000 </jats:inline-formula>-η-Ricci–Yamabe solitons (<jats:inline-formula id=\"j_anly-2023-0039_ineq_9998\">\u0000 <jats:alternatives>\u0000 <m:math xmlns:m=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\">\u0000 <m:mo>*</m:mo>\u0000 </m:math>\u0000 <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic/j_anly-2023-0039_eq_0305.png\" />\u0000 <jats:tex-math>{*}</jats:tex-math>\u0000 </jats:alternatives>\u0000 </jats:inline-formula>-η-RYS) in Lorentzian para-Kenmotsu <jats:italic>n</jats:italic>-manifolds (briefly, <jats:inline-formula id=\"j_anly-2023-0039_ineq_9997\">\u0000 <jats:alternatives>\u0000 <m:math xmlns:m=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\">\u0000 <m:msub>\u0000 <m:mrow>\u0000 <m:mo stretchy=\"false\">(</m:mo>\u0000 <m:mi>LPK</m:mi>\u0000 <m:mo stretchy=\"false\">)</m:mo>\u0000 </m:mrow>\u0000 <m:mi>n</m:mi>\u0000 </m:msub>\u0000 </m:math>\u0000 <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic/j_anly-2023-0039_eq_0295.png\" />\u0000 <jats:tex-math>{(mathrm{LPK})_{n}}</jats:tex-math>\u0000 </jats:alternatives>\u0000 </jats:inline-formula>). We study the curvature condition <jats:inline-formula id=\"j_anly-2023-0039_ineq_9996\">\u0000 <jats:alternatives>\u0000 <m:math xmlns:m=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\">\u0000 <m:mrow>\u0000 <m:mi>R</m:mi>\u0000 <m:mo>.</m:mo>\u0000 <m:mrow>\u0000 <m:mi>S</m:mi>\u0000 <m:mo>=</m:mo>\u0000 <m:mn>0</m:mn>\u0000 </m:mrow>\u0000 </m:mrow>\u0000 </m:math>\u0000 <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic/j_anly-2023-0039_eq_0325.png\" />\u0000 <jats:tex-math>{R.S=0}</jats:tex-math>\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140379964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are 1,000 of us and one victim. We each increase the level at which a ‘discomfort machine’ operates on the victim – leading to great discomfort. Suppose that consecutive levels of the machine are so similar that the victim cannot distinguish them. Have we acted permissibly? According to the ‘no-difference argument’ the answer is ‘yes’ because each of our actions was guaranteed to make the victim no worse off. This argument is of interest because, if it is sound, similar arguments threaten intuitive moral verdicts about many cases in which a large number of individual choices cumulatively make a great difference, while each choice seems to make no difference on its own. But the argument is not sound, as is shown by a simple objection based on a plausible dominance principle – an objection that avoids challenges that have been brought against previous criticisms of the no-difference argument.
{"title":"Against the no-difference argument","authors":"A. Elga","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad085","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There are 1,000 of us and one victim. We each increase the level at which a ‘discomfort machine’ operates on the victim – leading to great discomfort. Suppose that consecutive levels of the machine are so similar that the victim cannot distinguish them. Have we acted permissibly? According to the ‘no-difference argument’ the answer is ‘yes’ because each of our actions was guaranteed to make the victim no worse off. This argument is of interest because, if it is sound, similar arguments threaten intuitive moral verdicts about many cases in which a large number of individual choices cumulatively make a great difference, while each choice seems to make no difference on its own. But the argument is not sound, as is shown by a simple objection based on a plausible dominance principle – an objection that avoids challenges that have been brought against previous criticisms of the no-difference argument.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140382257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Should We Think about Espionage?","authors":"Youngjae Lee","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad092","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140241837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Susan Schneider on Artificial Consciousness and Moral Standing","authors":"A. Vaidya, R. Krishnaswamy","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad079","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140253029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For philosophers, rights against the world are equivalent to rights in rem. Contrary to what Hart thought, however, this does not make them equivalent to general rights. Rights in rem contrast with rights in personam, whereas general rights contrast with special rights. As I explain, rights against the world can be either general rights or special rights. My explanation follows Waldron’s strategy of exhibiting property rights as justified by Locke’s theory of property as a case of rights in rem that are also special rights. Moreover, despite what ‘in rem’ means in Latin, rights against the world include more than property rights. For example, they also include moral human rights. With moral human rights and property rights alike, the correlative duties are borne by ‘everyone’, understood in a dynamic sense I undertake to specify.
对哲学家来说，针对世界的权利等同于物权。然而，与哈特的想法相反，这并没有使它们等同于一般权利。物权与对人权相对应，而一般权利与特殊权利相对应。正如我所解释的，对世权利既可以是一般权利，也可以是特殊权利。我的解释遵循了沃尔德伦的策略，即洛克的财产理论所证明的财产权是物权的一种情况，同时也是特殊权利。此外，尽管 "物权 "在拉丁语中的意思是 "in rem"，但对世界的权利不仅仅包括财产权。例如，它们还包括道德人权。无论是道德人权还是财产权，"每个人 "都要承担相应的义务，我将从动态的角度对其进行阐述。
{"title":"Rights against the world","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad067","url":null,"abstract":"For philosophers, rights against the world are equivalent to rights in rem. Contrary to what Hart thought, however, this does not make them equivalent to general rights. Rights in rem contrast with rights in personam, whereas general rights contrast with special rights. As I explain, rights against the world can be either general rights or special rights. My explanation follows Waldron’s strategy of exhibiting property rights as justified by Locke’s theory of property as a case of rights in rem that are also special rights. Moreover, despite what ‘in rem’ means in Latin, rights against the world include more than property rights. For example, they also include moral human rights. With moral human rights and property rights alike, the correlative duties are borne by ‘everyone’, understood in a dynamic sense I undertake to specify.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140037236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Probability and the Open Future","authors":"Sam Baron","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad078","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140433022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: The Hinge of History Hypothesis: Reply to MacAskill","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/analys/anae013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139961087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The experience machine poses the most important problem for hedonist theories of well-being. I argue that desire satisfactionism faces a similar problem: the desire machine. Upon entering this machine, your desires are altered through some minor neurosurgery. In particular, the machine causes you to desire everything that actually happens. The experience machine constructs a simulated world that matches your preexisting desires. The desire machine reconstructs your conative state to match the preexisting world. Desire satisfactionism recommends entering the desire machine because you will then have more satisfied desires, but this is unintuitive. In this paper, I consider how desire satisfactionists might avoid the result that entering the desire machine increases one’s well-being. First, I further motivate why this problem arises. Second, I consider coherence-based norms of rational desire change. Finally, I argue that introducing a substantive account of fitting desire is the only plausible solution, but that this response requires abandoning pure subjectivism about well-being.
{"title":"The desire machine","authors":"Paul Forrester","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad061","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The experience machine poses the most important problem for hedonist theories of well-being. I argue that desire satisfactionism faces a similar problem: the desire machine. Upon entering this machine, your desires are altered through some minor neurosurgery. In particular, the machine causes you to desire everything that actually happens. The experience machine constructs a simulated world that matches your preexisting desires. The desire machine reconstructs your conative state to match the preexisting world. Desire satisfactionism recommends entering the desire machine because you will then have more satisfied desires, but this is unintuitive. In this paper, I consider how desire satisfactionists might avoid the result that entering the desire machine increases one’s well-being. First, I further motivate why this problem arises. Second, I consider coherence-based norms of rational desire change. Finally, I argue that introducing a substantive account of fitting desire is the only plausible solution, but that this response requires abandoning pure subjectivism about well-being.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139858710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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