Topics in Cognitive Science最新文献

Dissociative amnesia is a diagnosis category that implies a proposed mechanism (often called dissociation) by which amnesia is caused by psychogenic means, such as trauma, and that amnesia is reversible later. Dissociative amnesia is listed in some of the most influential diagnostic manuals. Authors have noted the similarities in definition to repressed memories. Dissociative amnesia is a disputed category and phenomenon, and here I discuss the plausibility that this cognitive mechanism evolved. I discuss some general conditions by which cognitive functions will evolve, that is, the relatively continuous adaptive pressure by which a cognitive ability would clearly be adaptive if variation produced it. I discuss how adaptive gene mutations typically spread from one individual to the whole species. The article also discusses a few hypothetical scenarios and several types of trauma, to examine the likely adaptive benefits of blocking out memories of trauma, or not. I conclude that it is unlikely that dissociative amnesia evolved, and invite further development of these ideas and scenarios by others.

Self-reported lost memory of child sexual abuse (CSA) can be mistaken for "repressed memory." Based on our longitudinal studies of memory and disclosure in child maltreatment victims who are now adults, we discuss findings relevant to "repressed memory cases." We examined relations between self-report of temporarily lost memory of CSA (subjective forgetting) and memory accuracy for maltreatment-related experiences (objective memory). Across two studies involving separate samples, we find evidence for memory suppression rather than repression: (1) Most adults who claimed temporary lost memory of CSA reported memory suppression and clarified that they could have remembered the event if asked; (2) subjective forgetting was positively associated with accurate objective memory for maltreatment-related experiences. Subjective forgetting was also related to increased adult trauma symptoms and related to childhood non-disclosure of CSA. Moreover, trauma-related psychopathology mediated the relation between non-disclosure and subjective forgetting. Implications for psychological theory and repressed memory cases are discussed.

Research suggests that stress has immediate and long-term effects on attention and memory. Rather than disrupting memory formation and consolidation, acute stress has been shown to shift attention processes resulting in a tradeoff between prioritized and nonprioritized information. Both arousal and stress result in cognitive and neurobiological shifts that often support memory formation. When an acute stressor occurs, it can distort immediate attentional focus, increasing processing for high-priority features while reducing processing for extraneous features. The downstream cognitive consequences for this shift in attention are better memory for some features and poorer memory for others when compared to conditions of low stress. However, individual differences (e.g., sex, age, basal stress response, and stress reactivity) all impact the relationship between the acute stress response and memory. Although acute stress generally benefits memory formation, we suggest that forgetting and later recovery of stressful memories can better be understood by examining factors that influence the subjective experience of stress and stress reactivity.

This article discusses the possibility of practitioners who mistake organic memory loss for dissociative amnesia. It starts with the case of a young man with complete retrograde amnesia due to a traumatic head injury. Because he did not show any gross neurological abnormalities, a neurologist thought his amnesia had a psychological origin. An extensive neuropsychological examination revealed that the man did have an organic reason for his amnesia. Next, the existence of dissociative memory loss as well as isolated organic retrograde amnesia is considered. While cases of organic memory loss are well-documented, there is hardly any evidence for dissociative amnesia. It is argued that organic memory loss might be mistakenly taken for dissociative amnesia. In line with the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, practitioners are advised to rule out the possibility of organic memory loss, before diagnosing a patient with dissociative amnesia.

The controversy over alleged repressed and recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) was among the most contentious ever to embroil psychology and psychiatry. Adapting paradigms from cognitive psychology, my research group tested hypotheses pertinent to repressed memory and false memory interpretations of recovered memories. We tested adults who: (1) report recovering memories of CSA after not having thought about their abuse for years; (2) report never having forgotten their CSA; (3) believe they harbor "repressed" memories of CSA; and (4) deny having been sexually abused. We tested hypotheses about mechanisms that might figure in the inability to recall memories of one's abuse and those that might render one susceptible to developing false memories of abuse. The purpose of this article is to summarize this work. Finally, I draw on the work of Lionel Penrose to speculate about why the popularity of the concept of repressed memories of trauma-or its synonym, dissociative amnesia for trauma-may be rising today.

Debates surrounding the origin of recovered memories of child abuse have traditionally focused on two conflicting arguments, namely that these memories are either false memories or instances of repressed memories (i.e., reflecting the idea that people can unconsciously block traumatic autobiographical experiences and eventually regain access). While scientific evidence for the first is clearly established, the second is the subject of a controversy in the academic, clinical, and legal fields. This controversy rages on today. In this introductory article to our topic "Beyond Repressed Memory: Current Alternative Solutions to the Controversy," we present alternative and more parsimonious explanations for repressed memories that we sorted into three categories: cognitive, motivational, and biological factors. Our aim is to provide a timely overview to help clinical and legal professionals, academics, and the general public to move beyond the idea that traumatic memories can be unconsciously repressed.

One of the most heated debates in psychological science concerns the concept of repressed memory. We discuss how the debate on repressed memories continues to surface in legal settings, sometimes even to suggest avenues of legal reform. In the past years, several European countries have extended or abolished the statute of limitations for the prosecution of sexual crimes. Such statutes force legal actions (e.g., prosecution of sexual abuse) to be applied within a certain period of time. One of the reasons for the changes in statutes of limitations concerns the idea of repressed memory. We argue that from a psychological standpoint, these law reforms can be detrimental, particularly when they are done to endorse unfounded psychological theories. The validity of testimonies is compromised many years after the alleged facts, and abolishing the statute of limitations increases the chance that even more (false) recovered memories of abuse might enter the courtroom. We propose solutions to these changes such as establishing an independent expert committee evaluating claims of sexual abuse.

The existence or questionability of "repressed memories" can be discussed as being a matter of definition. It seems, however, far-fetched to consider all "lost" memories as caused by encoding problems, brain damage, forgetfulness, failure to disclose events, and so on. We argue that dissociative amnesia (DA) (or "psychogenic amnesia," or "functional amnesia," or, as we favor to call it, "mnestic block syndrome") is caused by psychic alterations, but ultimately they can be traced to changes in the physiology of the brain, as we are of the opinion that all memory processes-positive or negative-alter brain functions, sometimes more permanently, sometimes transiently. We have proven this idea using functional imaging techniques, in particular fluoro-deoxy-d-glucose positron emission tomography. Having investigated dozens of patients with severe and long-lasting DA conditions, we believe it to be disrespectful to many (but not to all) of the affected patients to question their disease condition, which can be proven to be not caused by feigning, malingering, or direct brain damage.

Amnesia is a frequent claim in major crimes, and it is estimated that the complete or partial absence of memory following a crime ranges from 25% to 50% of total cases. Although some cases may constitute a genuine form of amnesia, due to organic-neurological defects or psychological causes, and possibly combined with a dissociative or repressive coping style after an extreme experience, malingering is still fairly common in offenders. Therefore, one of the main goals in medico-legal proceedings is to find methods to determine the credibility of crime-related amnesia. At present, a number of lie and memory detection techniques can assist the forensic assessment of the reliability of declarative proof, and have been devised and improved over the past century: for example, modern polygraphs, event-related potentials, thermal imaging, functional magnetic resonance imaging, kinematic, and facial analysis. Other ad hoc psychological tests, such as the so-called Symptom Validity Test (SVT) and Performance Validity Test (PVT), as well as the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT), can also be used. To date, however, there is little evidence or case reports that document their real usefulness in forensic practice. Here, we report two cases of crime-related amnesia, whereby both defendants, who were found guilty of homicide, appeared to exhibit dissociative amnesia but where the application of SVTs, PVTs, and aIAT detected a malingered amnesia.

The expression "repressed memory" was introduced over 100 years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked-yet the term "repressed memory" seems to remain. In this paper, I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this theoretical term as well as an argument to question its scientific status by comparing it to other cases of theoretical terms that have either survived scientific change-such as "atom" or "gene"-or that have perished, such as "black bile." Ultimately, I argue that "repressed memory" is more like "black bile" than "atom" or "gene" and, thus, recommend its demotion from our scientific vocabulary.