Topics in Cognitive Science最新文献

Amnesia is a frequent claim in major crimes, and it is estimated that the complete or partial absence of memory following a crime ranges from 25% to 50% of total cases. Although some cases may constitute a genuine form of amnesia, due to organic-neurological defects or psychological causes, and possibly combined with a dissociative or repressive coping style after an extreme experience, malingering is still fairly common in offenders. Therefore, one of the main goals in medico-legal proceedings is to find methods to determine the credibility of crime-related amnesia. At present, a number of lie and memory detection techniques can assist the forensic assessment of the reliability of declarative proof, and have been devised and improved over the past century: for example, modern polygraphs, event-related potentials, thermal imaging, functional magnetic resonance imaging, kinematic, and facial analysis. Other ad hoc psychological tests, such as the so-called Symptom Validity Test (SVT) and Performance Validity Test (PVT), as well as the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT), can also be used. To date, however, there is little evidence or case reports that document their real usefulness in forensic practice. Here, we report two cases of crime-related amnesia, whereby both defendants, who were found guilty of homicide, appeared to exhibit dissociative amnesia but where the application of SVTs, PVTs, and aIAT detected a malingered amnesia.

The expression "repressed memory" was introduced over 100 years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked-yet the term "repressed memory" seems to remain. In this paper, I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this theoretical term as well as an argument to question its scientific status by comparing it to other cases of theoretical terms that have either survived scientific change-such as "atom" or "gene"-or that have perished, such as "black bile." Ultimately, I argue that "repressed memory" is more like "black bile" than "atom" or "gene" and, thus, recommend its demotion from our scientific vocabulary.

In this paper, we explore the role of emotion in the interpretation and memory of sexual encounters. We consider situations likely to generate negative emotions during sex, and the mechanisms through which the experience of negative emotions can lead to false memories of coercion and mislabeling of an encounter as sexual assault. Specifically, we consider the role of emotion in directing attention during a sexual encounter and the effects of emotion as context for interpretation at the time of the encounter, and for retrieval and interpretation when the encounter is later recalled and reported. Our intent is to provide a greater understanding of the processes of interpretation and memory through which false claims of sexual assault might arise, if and when they do arise.

The Think/No-Think (T/NT) task was designed to test whether the deliberate avoidance of retrieving a memory (i.e., suppression) hinders the subsequent recall of that memory. Forgetting effects obtained with the T/NT-task (Suppression-Induced Forgetting) are thought to result from memory inhibition: the deactivation of the representation of the to-be-suppressed memory. Memory inhibition can be specifically inferred from decreased performance on a test using Independent Probes-cues that are unrelated to the initial study phase in the T/NT-procedure. The present contribution explores the evidence for the idea that Suppression-Induced Forgetting obtained with such Independent Probes may provide a viable model for repression. A review of the literature on Suppression-Induced Forgetting with Independent Probes (SIF-IP) suggests that reliable estimates of the overall effect size are unavailable, that the extent to which the literature suffers from publication bias is unknown and that reporting bias may obstruct a clear view of the percentage of studies that find a statistically significant effect. In addition, it is difficult to study SIF-IP in autobiographical memories, due to their complexity and idiosyncrasy. All in all, it seems questionable whether suppression-induced forgetting obtained with independent probes provides a viable model of repression.

Languages are neither designed in classrooms nor drawn from dictionaries-they are products of human minds and human interactions. However, it is challenging to understand how structure grows in these circumstances because generations of use and transmission shape and reshape the structure of the languages themselves. Laboratory studies on language emergence investigate the origins of language structure by requiring participants, prevented from using their own natural language(s), to create a novel communication system and then transmit it to others. Because the participants in these lab studies are already speakers of a language, it is easy to question the relevance of lab-based findings to the creation of natural language systems. Here, we take the findings from a lab-based language emergence paradigm and test whether the same pattern is also found in a new natural language: Nicaraguan Sign Language. We find evidence that signers of Nicaraguan Sign Language may show the same biases seen in lab-based language emergence studies: (1) they appear to condition word order based on the semantic dimension of intensionality and extensionality, and (2) they adjust this conditioning to satisfy language-internal order constraints. Our study adds to the small, but growing literature testing the relevance of lab-based studies to natural language birth, and provides convincing evidence that the biases seen in the lab play a role in shaping a brand new language.

It is widely believed that play and curiosity are key ingredients as children develop models of the world. There is also an emerging consensus that children are Bayesian learners who combine their structured prior beliefs with estimations of the likelihood of new evidence to infer the most probable model of the world. An influential school of thought within developmental psychology, rational constructivism, combines these two ideas to propose that children learn intuitive theories of how the world works in part by engaging in play activities that allow them to gather new information for testing their theories. There are still, however, at least two pieces missing from rational constructivist theories of development. First, rational constructivism has so far devoted little attention to explaining why children's preferred form of learning, play, feels so fun, enjoyable, and rewarding. Rational constructivism may suggest that children are curious and like to play because reducing uncertainty and learning better theories of the causal workings of the world is enjoyable. What remains unclear, however, is why reducing uncertainty in play is interesting, fun, and joyful, while doing so in other forms of learning can be frustrating or boring. Second, rational constructivism may have overlooked how children, during play, will take control of and manipulate their environment, sometimes in an effort to create ideal niches for surprise-extraction, sometimes for developing strategies for making the world fit with their predictions. These missing elements from rational constructivism can be provided by understanding the contribution of play to development in terms of predictive processing, an influential framework in cognitive neuroscience that models many of the brain's cognitive functions as processes of model-based, probabilistic prediction.

This study investigates the role of locality (a task/material-related variable), demographic factors (age, education, and sex), cognitive capacities (verbal working memory [WM], verbal short-term memory [STM], speed of processing [SOP], and inhibition), and morphosyntactic category (time reference and grammatical aspect) in verb-related morphosyntactic production (VRMP). A sentence completion task tapping production of time reference and grammatical aspect in local and nonlocal configurations, and cognitive tasks measuring verbal WM capacity, verbal STM capacity, motor SOP, perceptual SOP, and inhibition were administered to 200 neurotypical Greek-speaking participants, aged between 19 and 80 years. We fitted generalized linear mixed-effects models and performed path analyses. Significant main effects of locality, age, education, verbal WM capacity, motor SOP, and morphosyntactic category emerged. Production of time reference and aspect did not interact with any of the significant factors (i.e., age, education, verbal WM capacity, motor SOP, and locality), and locality did not interact with any memory system. Path analyses revealed that the relationships between age and VRMP, and between education and VRMP were partly mediated by verbal WM; and the relationship between verbal WM and VRMP was partly mediated by perceptual SOP. Results suggest that subject-, task/material- and morphosyntactic category-specific factors determine accuracy performance on VRMP; and the effects of age, education, and verbal WM on VRMP are partly indirect. The fact that there was a significant main effect of verbal WM but not of verbal STM on accuracy performance in the VRMP task suggests that it is predominantly the processing component (and not the storage component) of verbal WM that supports VRMP. Lastly, we interpret the results as suggesting that VRMP is also supported by a procedural memory system whose efficiency might be reflected in years of formal education.

Recent studies suggest that learners who are asked to predict the outcome of an event learn more than learners who are asked to evaluate it retrospectively or not at all. One possible explanation for this "prediction boost" is that it helps learners engage metacognitive reasoning skills that may not be spontaneously leveraged, especially for individuals with still-developing executive functions. In this paper, we combined multiple analytic approaches to investigate the potential role of executive functions in elementary school-aged children's science learning. We performed an experiment that investigates children's science learning during a water displacement task where a "prediction boost" had previously been observed-children either made an explicit prediction or evaluated an event post hoc (i.e., postdiction). We then considered the relation of executive function measures and learning, which were collected following the main experiment. Via mixed effects regression models, we found that stronger executive function skills (i.e., stronger inhibition and switching scores) were associated with higher accuracy in Postdiction but not in the Prediction Condition. Using a theory-based Bayesian model, we simulated children's individual performance on the learning task (capturing "belief flexibility"), and compared this "flexibility" to the other measures to understand the relationship between belief revision, executive function, and prediction. Children in the Prediction Condition showed near-ceiling "belief flexibility" scores, which were significantly higher than among children in the Postdiction Condition. We also found a significant correlation between children's executive function measures to our "belief flexibility" parameter, but only for children in the Postdiction Condition. These results indicate that when children provided responses post hoc, they may have required stronger executive function capacities to navigate the learning task. Additionally, these results suggest that the "prediction boost" in children's science learning could be explained by increased metacognitive flexibility in the belief revision process.

What is the nature of lexical meanings such that they can both compose with others and also appear boundless? We investigate this question by examining the compositional properties of for-time adverbial as in "Ana jumped for an hour." At issue is the source of the associated iterative reading which lacks overt morphophonological support, yet, the iteration is not disconnected from the lexical meanings in the sentence. This suggests an analysis whereby the iterative reading is the result of the interaction between lexical meanings under a specific compositional configuration. We test the predictions of two competing accounts: Mismatch-and-Repair and Partition-Measure. They differ in their assumptions about lexical meanings: assumptions that have implications for the possible compositional mechanisms that each can invoke. Mismatch-and-Repair assumes that lexical meaning representations are discrete, separate from the conceptual system from which they originally emerged and brought into sentence meaning through syntactic composition. Partition-Measure assumes that lexical meanings are contextually salient conceptual structures substantially indistinguishable from the conceptual system that they inhabit. During comprehension, lexical meanings construe a conceptual representation, in parallel, morphosyntactic and morphophonological composition as determined by the lexical items involved in the sentence. Whereas both hypotheses capture the observed cost in the punctual predicate plus for-time adverbial composition (e.g., jump (vs. swim) for an hour), their predictions differ regarding iteration with durative predicates; for example, swim for a year (vs. for an hour). Mismatch-and-Repair predicts contrasting processing profiles and nonoverlapping activation patterns along punctuality differences. Partition-Measure predicts overlapping processing and cortical distribution profiles, along the presence of iterativity. Results from a self-paced reading and an functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies bear out the predictions of the Partition-Measure account, supporting a view of linguistic meaning composition in line with an architecture of language whereby combinatoriality and generativity are distributed, carried out in parallel across linguistic and nonlinguistic subsystems.