Topics in Cognitive Science最新文献

Engraved portable objects from Upper Palaeolithic and earlier sites are argued to be cognitive tools designed to store information for the purposes of calculation, record-keeping, or communication. This paper reviews the surprisingly long intellectual history of comparisons between these ancient objects and message sticks: marked graphic devices traditionally used for long-distance communication in Indigenous Australia. I argue that, while such comparisons have often been misguided, more cautious applications of ethnographic analogy may yield useful insights. A systematic analysis of historical observations together with more recent fieldwork, indicate that Australian message sticks are primarily tools of social cognition, as opposed to cognition tout court, and rely on orality and other context to become meaningful. Further, the practice of message stick communication may help clarify ongoing problems in the interpretation of Upper Palaeolithic objects including their possible role in aggregation activities, the distinction between decoration and notation, and the interplay between graphic sequences and speech.

About 30 years ago, the Dynamical Hypothesis instigated a variety of insights and transformations in cognitive science. One of them was the simple observation that, quite unlike trial-based tasks in a laboratory, natural ecologically valid behaviors almost never have context-free starting points. Instead, they produce lengthy time series data that can be recorded with dense-sampling measures, such as heartrate, eye movements, EEG, etc. That emphasis on studying the temporal dynamics of extended behaviors may have been the trigger that led to a rethinking of what a "representation" is, and then of what a "cognitive agent" is. This most recent and perhaps most revolutionary transformation is the idea that a cognitive agent need not be a singular physiological organism. Perhaps a group of organisms, such as several people working on a joint task, can temporarily function as one cognitive agent - at least while they're working adaptively and successfully.

This is a commentary for a special issue on predictive processing and rational constructivist models of development. Mainly I use the opportunity to ask a bunch of questions about what these theoretical frameworks show us (and what they do not) and mostly where the open questions still are. To get meta for a moment, I thought these questions were the best way to maximize the value of my commentary: They have the highest probability of leading to the most uncertainty reduction for our field in the long term. Please read in that spirit.

Past research suggests that Working Memory plays a role in determining relative clause attachment bias. Disambiguation preferences may further depend on Processing Speed and explicit memory demands in linguistic tasks. Given that Working Memory and Processing Speed decline with age, older adults offer a way of investigating the factors underlying disambiguation preferences. Additionally, older adults might be subject to more severe similarity-based memory interference given their larger vocabularies and slower lexical access. Nevertheless, memory interference and sentence disambiguation have not been combined in studies on older adults before. We used a self-paced reading paradigm under memory load interference conditions. Older (n = 30) and Younger (n = 35) readers took part in the study online; reading times were recorded and measures of comprehension accuracy and load recall were collected. This setup allowed for the implicit measurement of attachment biases and memory interference effects interactively. Results show that similarity-based interference affected both age groups equally, but was more pronounced in NP2-biased structures, which took participants generally longer to read. Attachment preferences did not differ by group and were unaffected by Working Memory span. However, accuracy on recall prompts was predicted by Working Memory span in both groups. Findings of greater interference in syntactically dispreferred structures support unified processing models where parsing constraints naturally interact. The lack of age differences on our measures further aligns with research finding age-invariant implicit language processing.

This paper attempts to reconcile the claims that the mind is both flat (Chater, 2018) and highly rational (Oaksford & Chater, 2020). According to the flat mind hypothesis, the mind is a mass of inconsistent and contradictory fragments of experience. However, standard accounts of rationality from formal epistemology argue that to be rational, our beliefs must be consistent, and we must believe all the logical consequences of our beliefs. A social account of rationality is developed based on Brandom's (1994) logical expressivism, in which respecting the norms of logic and probability theory is still central but where these standards apply to our public commitments in social dialogical contexts rather than to our individual belief systems (Skovgaard-Olsen, 2017). According to this account, even if someone's individual beliefs are inconsistent, they cannot be condemned as irrational if they acknowledge the inconsistency and seek to resolve it. It is shown how this approach interacts with people's fragmented and shallow world knowledge, and its social distribution yields some counterintuitive consequences, such as it sometimes being rational individually not seeking to resolve contradictions. Other consequences of this social expressivist approach are considered, including for dual process theories of reasoning, our view of beliefs, the status of logic, and Fodor's (1983) view of central systems. It is concluded that people can have flat minds and yet be highly rational.

Ancient Roman "technical memory" is not (as much of the modern specialist literature would have it) a generative technology of association. Rather it is (as a literal reading of the texts would suggest) a specialized tool for precise serial recall. Modern experimental evidence both confirms the fitness for the purpose of the technique and shows why that purpose is not trivial, as some have suggested. While the mechanism(s) by which the technique operates are not fully understood, a review of the current literature suggests that it would have had the advantage over other mnemonic techniques by virtue of recruiting a variety of cognitive capacities. These likely include spatial/navigational mechanisms and possibly visual/imagery-based ones as well. Finally, small differences between the method as recorded in the ancient texts and similar methods that have been the subject of laboratory experiments are used to suggest possible directions for further experimentation.

Cognitive models that represent individuals provide many benefits for understanding the full range of human behavior. One way in which individual differences emerge is through differences in knowledge. In dynamic situations, where decisions are made from experience, models built upon a theory of experiential choice (instance-based learning theory; IBLT) can provide accurate predictions of individual human learning and adaptivity to changing environments. Here, we demonstrate how an instance-based learning (IBL) cognitive model, implemented in a cognitive architecture (Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational), can be used to model an individual's decisions in a cybersecurity defense task, accounting for both population average and individual variances. The same IBL model structure with identical architectural parameters generates the full range of human behavior through stochastic memory retrieval processes operating over and contributing to unique experiences. Recurrence quantification analyses allow us to look beyond average behavior between and within individuals to sequential patterns of trial-to-trial behavior. We show how model-tracing and knowledge-tracing techniques can be used to align the model to an individual in real time to drive adaptive and personalized signaling algorithms for a cybersecurity defense system. We also present a method for introspecting into the cognitive model to gain further insight into the cognitive salience of features factored into individual decisions. The combination of techniques provides a blueprint for personalized modeling of individuals. We discuss the results and implications of this adaptive and personalized method for cybersecurity defense and more generally for intelligent artifacts tailored to individual differences in domains such as human-machine teaming.

How do teachers' gestures influence students' learning? This article reviews research investigating the role of gestures in communication, focusing on teachers' communication with their students, primarily in mathematics and science instruction. We first briefly consider gesture's role in communication more generally as a backdrop for considering teaching as a special context for communication. We then describe teachers' spontaneous gesturing in teaching contexts, and we consider how teachers' spontaneous gestures might influence students' learning. We then consider experimental studies that provide causal support for the effects of teachers' gestures on students' learning. We conclude by discussing future directions and implications for educational practice.

Our hands are always with us and are used for communication all over the world. When children do not have an established language model to learn from, they use their hands to gesture, and these gestures take on the forms of language. In this role, the hands reveal the fundamental properties of the mind that give shape to language. When children do learn an established language, they again use their hands to gesture. These gestures do not look like language but form an integrated system with language. In this role, the hands can convey ideas not found in the language they accompany. In both contexts, gesture provides a clear view of the mind hidden in our hands.

People often have difficulties remembering prior episodes of remembering, a phenomenon known as the forgot-it-all-along (FIA) effect. Although the effect was first discovered among victims of spontaneously recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse, laboratory paradigms of the FIA have shown that difficulties in remembering "remembering" can be elicited when the memory was previously recalled in a different context. Although much attention has been paid to establishing the robustness of the FIA phenomenon, little emphasis has been placed on the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effect. The goal of the present review is, therefore, to organize the literature surrounding the FIA effect and to discuss cognitive mechanisms that may explain the effect: source monitoring errors, the Encoding Specificity principle, and dating inaccuracies. By providing a brief overview of the literature surrounding the FIA phenomenon, this review can serve as a guide for how future studies may approach the FIA effect in the context of recovered memories.