Topics in Cognitive Science最新文献

Phenomenal experiences of immaterial spiritual beings-hearing the voice of God, seeing the spirit of an ancestor-are a valuable and largely untapped resource for the field of cognitive science. Such experiences, we argue, are experiences of the mind, tied to mental models and cognitive-epistemic attitudes about the mind, and thus provide a striking example of how, with the right combination of mental models and cognitive-epistemic attitudes, one's own thoughts and inner sensations can be experienced as coming from somewhere or someone else. In this paper, we present results from a large-scale study of U.S. adults (N = 1779) that provides new support for our theory that spiritual experiences are facilitated by a dynamic interaction between mental models and cognitive-epistemic attitudes: A person is more likely to hear God speak if they have the epistemic flexibility and cultural support to shift, temporarily, away from a mundane model of mind into a more "porous" way of thinking and being. This, in turn, lays the foundation for a meditation on how mental models and cognitive-epistemic attitudes might also interact to facilitate other phenomena of interest to cognitive science, such as fiction writing and scientific discovery.

How we judge the similarity between stimuli in the world is connected ultimately to how we represent them. Because of this, decisions about how we model similarity, either in terms of human behavior or patterns of neural activity, can provide key insights into how representations are structured and organized. Despite this, psychology and cognitive neuroscience continue to be dominated by a narrow range of similarity models, particularly those that characterize similarity as distance within "cognitive space." Despite the appeal of such models, their topological nature places fundamental constraints on their ability to capture relationships between objects and events in the world. To probe this, we created a stimulus set in which the predicted similarity relationships (based on an alternative model of similarity) could not be simply embedded within Euclidean space. This approach revealed that the spatial model distorts these predictions, and the perceived similarities of human observers. These findings indicate that cognitive spaces-that underlie much recent work probing both visual and conceptual representations in cognitive neuroscience-are limited in fundamental ways that restrict their theoretical and practical utility.

This article discusses the intricacies of species identification, using a real-life case of mushroom poisoning as a focal point. Two individuals had fallen seriously ill after having consumed mushrooms presumed to belong to the Leccinum group and the Boletus edulis complex. An interdisciplinary team of experts including the author attempted to diagnose the cause and to develop effective treatment. Leveraging expertise in psychology and mycology, the article highlights cognitive factors, such as the suggestibility of eyewitness memory, alongside biological factors, such as complexities of fungal taxonomy, that jointly hamper species identification. The case also sparked discussions among mycologists on the potential toxicity of ostensibly safe mushrooms. The article stresses the imperative for continual updates in mycological knowledge and emphasizes broader implications of cultural conceptions and the dynamic nature of species boundaries in the context of mushroom identification, with the tragic outcome of the incident underscoring the urgency of addressing these issues across both cognitive science and mycology.

There is a sense in which the symbols used in mathematical expressions and formulas are arbitrary. After all, arithmetic would be no different if we would replace the symbols ' $+$ ' or '8' by different symbols. Nevertheless, the shape of many mathematical symbols is in fact well motivated in practice. In the case of symbols that were introduced a long time ago, the original motivations remain mostly inaccessible to us. Accordingly, motivations that are discussed in the literature are only ascribed retrospectively and should be considered as post-hoc rationalizations. For more recent introductions of new symbols (e.g., in symbolic logic), however, we sometimes do have first-hand accounts by the authors that inform us of the reasons behind their notational choices. In this paper, I present a systematic overview of possible motivations for the design of mathematical symbols, which include practical (such as ease of writing and reuse of previously used symbols) as well as cognitive aspects (such as indicating relations to other symbols or to their intended meanings).

While some aspects of pragmatic competence are known to decline with age, for metaphor skills the evidence is inconclusive, possibly due to heterogeneity in the assessment tools. Furthermore, the previous literature on age-related changes in pragmatic skills has rarely considered the role of Theory of Mind (ToM), which is described as one of the main factors affecting metaphor across theoretical and experimental studies in children and clinical populations. This study aimed at elucidating age-related differences in metaphor understanding and the interplay between metaphor skills and ToM in middle-aged and older adults with a fine-grained approach. Participants (n = 201, age range 54-93) completed tasks assessing ToM and metaphor understanding. On the one side, we used the Physical and Mental Metaphors task, to distinguish between different types of metaphor (physical, such as "Lifeguards are lizards," meaning that they lie in the sun, vs. mental, such as "Adolescents are pendulums," meaning that they are emotionally unstable) and different aspects of metaphor understanding, namely, accuracy in finding a link between topic and vehicle versus type of interpretation (from physical to psychological). On the other side, we analyzed two aspects of ToM skills: the accuracy in mental state understanding and the intentionality, defined as the degree of mental state attribution, assessed with the Strange Stories and the Animated Social Triangles task, respectively. Structural equation models indicated a decline in metaphor skills with advancing age. Furthermore, we found that ToM is involved in metaphor understanding in a specific fashion. While higher ToM accuracy explained better metaphor accuracy, higher ToM intentionality explained better performance in the interpretation of mental, but not physical, metaphors. These findings suggest that age-related differences in pragmatics extend to metaphor skills and that ToM plays a role in metaphor comprehension in older age, with a division of labor where the ability to understand what others think is key to spotting a metaphorical link, but the greater tendency to attribute mental states is what specifically helps when it comes to grasping the psychological nuances of a metaphor.

This work provides an overview of research on sign language changes observed in healthy aging signers. We first consider the effects of age on cognition, and the changes to neural structures and organization during aging, as both can be viewed as the processes underlying age-related language changes in both sign and speech. We then review observational and experimental data on sign language processing in aging signers, where some of the more robust findings include reliance on the more canonic syntactic and lexical structures, as opposed to structures produced at the syntax-pragmatics or semantics-morphology interfaces. These findings are reviewed through the lens of several theories of brain aging, as we review the predictions that different frameworks make with respect to sign language, and discuss how sign language data can inform understanding of language change in healthy aging.

Susan Goldin-Meadow is the 2021 Recipient of the Rumelhart Prize. Goldin-Meadow's body of research addresses the roles of gesture in language creation, communication, learning, and cognition. In one major strand of her research, Goldin-Meadow has studied gestures in children who are not exposed to any structured language input, specifically, deaf children of hearing parents who do not expose their children to sign language. These children create a highly structured, language-like system with their hands-a homesign. In another major strand, Goldin-Meadow has focused on the gestures that people produce along with speech. She has examined how gestures contribute to producing and comprehending language at the moment of speaking or signing, how gestures contribute to learning language and to learning other concepts and skills, and how gestures may actually constitute and change people's thinking. This topic collection is made up of papers that represent and extend these strands of Goldin-Meadow's work. This introductory article provides a brief biography of Goldin-Meadow, and it highlights ways in which the contributions to the topic collection exemplify several notable characteristics of Goldin-Meadow's body of work, including (1) a focus on multiple timescales of behavior and behavior change; (2) use of diverse methods, approaches, and populations; and (3) considerations of equity and inclusion, both in research and in educational and clinical practice.

In this volumed, Randall Beer and Joanna Rączaszek-Leonardi have opened an important discussion of what is further needed to enhance the reach of dynamical approaches to cognition. Focusing on issues concerning the nature of language and developments in language technology, we have attempted, in this brief contribution, to place their proposals in a larger philosophical framework that suggests lines of inquiry that we believe will yield fruitful outcomes. In particular, we suggest that the adoption of a process metaphysics suggests that dynamic approaches appropriately conceived within the context of current scientific advances are at basis adequate as a framework; however, the more profound implications of its adoption have not yet been sufficiently explored.

People's choices of food and drink, the attitudes they express, and the beliefs that they state are influenced by their political and other identities. At the same time, people's everyday choices depend on the context of available options in ways that are difficult to explain in terms of the choosers' preferences and beliefs. Such phenomena provoke various questions. Do partisans or conspiracy theorists really believe what they are saying? Given the systematic inconsistency of their choices, in what sense do consumers prefer the items they purchase? More generally, how "flat" is the mind-do we come to decision-making and choice with pre-existing preferences, attitudes, and beliefs, or are our explanations for our behavior mere post-hoc narratives? Here, we argue that several apparently disparate difficulties are rooted in a failure to separate psychologically different types of preferences, attitudes, and beliefs. We distinguish between underlying, inferred, and expressed preferences. These preferences may be expressed in different coordinate spaces and hence support different types of explanatory generalizations. Choices that appear inconsistent according to one type of preference can appear consistent according to another, and whether we can say that a person "really" prefers something depends on which type of preference we mean. We extend the tripartite classification to the case of attitudes and beliefs, and suggest that attributions of attitudes and beliefs may also be ambiguous. We conclude that not all of the mental states and representations that govern our behavior are context-dependent and constructed, although many are.

Recent theoretical work has argued that moral psychology can be understood through the lens of "resource rational contractualism." The view posits that the best way of making a decision that affects other people is to get everyone together to negotiate under idealized conditions. The outcome of that negotiation is an arrangement (or "contract") that would lead to mutual benefit. However, this ideal is seldom (if ever) practical given the resource demands (time, information, computational processing power) that are required. Instead, the theory proposes that moral psychology is organized around a series of resource-rational approximations of the contractualist ideal, efficiently trading off between more resource-intensive, accurate mechanisms and less. This paper presents empirical evidence and a cognitive model that test a central claim of this view: when the stakes of the situation are high, then more resource-intensive processes are engaged over more approximate ones. We present subjects with a case that can be judged using virtual bargaining-a resource-intensive process that involves simulating what two people would agree to-or by simply following a standard rule. We find that about a third of our participants use the resource-rational approach, flexibly switching to virtual bargaining in high-stakes situations, but deploying the simple rule when stakes are low. A third of the participants are best modeled as consistently using the strict rule-based approach and the remaining third as consistently using virtual bargaining. A model positing the reverse resource-rational hypothesis (that participants use more resource-intensive mechanisms in lower stakes situations) fails to capture the data.