Topics in Cognitive Science最新文献

Studies of homesigns have shed light on the human capacity for language and on the challenging problem of language acquisition. The study of homesign has evolved from a perspective grounded in gesture studies and child development to include sign language linguistics and the role of homesigns in language emergence at the community level. One overarching finding is that homesigns more closely resemble sign languages used by linguistic communities than they resemble the gestures produced by hearing people along with spoken language. Homesigns may not exhibit all of the linguistic properties of community languages, but the properties they do exhibit are language properties, and for the people who use them, homesigns are their language. Further, the linguistic structures in homesigns are innovated by the deaf people who use them and are imperfectly learned by their hearing communication partners. I close with a call to action: We cannot celebrate discoveries about the mind made possible by studies of homesigns and emerging languages while ignoring the pervasiveness of language deprivation among deaf people, and the relative lack of deaf participation in science, even in studies of sign languages. While the scientific community learns much from studying homesigns and sign languages, we also have a responsibility to work toward ensuring that every deaf person has access to language, communication, and education.

The 1998 article by van Gelder proposed a Dynamical Hypothesis (DH) in cognitive science consisting of Nature (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and Knowledge (cognitive agents should be understood dynamically) hypotheses in contrast to the Computational Hypothesis (CH) that cognitive agents are computers. My commentary focuses on the contributions of Paxton and Necaise et al. in interpersonal motor coordination and radicalization across social media. I do not think that either contribution supports the Nature hypothesis but does conform with the Knowledge hypothesis. I conclude by describing cognitive agents as living systems (or nonliving systems that mimic aspects of living systems) that can be alternately viewed to support the DH or CH or both at the same time.

An enigma for human languages is that children learn to understand words in their mother tongue extremely fast. The cognitive sciences have not been able to fully understand the mechanisms behind this highly efficient learning process. In order to provide at least a partial answer to this problem, I have developed a cognitive model of the semantics of natural language in terms of conceptual spaces. I present a background to conceptual spaces and provide a brief summary of their main features, in particular how it handles learning of concepts. I then apply the model to give a geometric account of the semantics of different word classes. In particular, I propose a "single-domain hypotheses" for the semantics of all word classes except nouns. These hypotheses provide a partial answer to the enigma of how words are learned. Next, a dynamic cognitive model of events is introduced that replaces and extends the function of thematic roles. I apply it to analyze the meanings of different kinds of verbs. I argue that the model also explains some aspects of syntactic structure. In particular, I propose that a sentence typically refers to an event. Some further applications of conceptual spaces are briefly presented.

Retrieval practice-the process of actively calling information to mind rather than passively studying materials-has been proven to be a highly effective learning strategy. However, only recently, researchers have started to examine differences between learners in terms of the optimal conditions of retrieval practice in applied educational settings. In this study (N = 118), we focus on learners with dyslexia. We compare their performance to the performance of typical learners in an adaptive retrieval practice task using both typing-based and speech-based response conditions. We find that typical learners outperform learners with dyslexia when they are asked to respond by typing, but that this difference disappears when learners respond by speech. Using a mathematical model to decompose response times, we demonstrate that this typing-specific disadvantage in learners with dyslexia is mainly a consequence of processing delays, rather than poorer memory performance. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying declarative learning in dyslexia, and they can be used to tailor educational technology toward the needs of neurodiverse learners.

This paper explores the role of measurement as a cognitive technology across human history, emphasizing the coexistence of formal and informal measurement systems. While standardized systems dominate contemporary culture and are well documented across large-scale societies of the past, this manuscript highlights the less explored domain of informal measurement practices that have been integral to daily life from the past to the present. Through the examination of body-based measurement systems and proportional heuristics, we demonstrate how these informal strategies were not merely precursors to formal standards but essential adaptive tools for solving everyday problems. Often, these informal solutions come with practical advantages. This manuscript calls for a broader recognition of their significance in cultural and technological evolution.

Throughout the long history of Classic Maya hieroglyphs, a logosyllabic writing system used from the late first millennium BCE through the mid-second millennium CE in southern Mesoamerica, the most commonly recorded phonetic value was the syllable u (/ʔu/). With over a dozen different u hieroglyphs, Classic Maya scribes had more options for recording /ʔu/ than any other syllable or logograph. Cognitive approaches to writing systems typically attribute graphemic variation (i.e., alternation between signs with equivalent linguistic value) to semantic differences like animacy or to non-linguistic factors like identity. Distribution of Classic Maya u hieroglyphs, however, suggests that morphosyntactic context influenced which grapheme scribes wrote and when. This case suggests that scribal knowledge of Classic Maya hieroglyphs included ideas about writing's relationship to language. It also highlights the cognitive relevance of morphosyntax for a writing system's users as they differentiate among graphic signs with identical linguistic denotation.

The interaction-dominant approach to perception and action, originally formulated in the mid-1990s, has matured and gained remarkable momentum as an entailment of the dynamical hypotheses proposed at that time. This framework seeks to explain the fluid and intricate interplay of causality spanning the entire organism by integrating high-dimensional details with low-dimensional constraints across various scales of behavior. Both Chemero (2024) and Wallot et al. (2024) have skillfully explored the theoretical implications and methodological challenges this perspective introduces. We echo Chemero's (2024) and Wallot et al.'s (2024) focus on multifractality, while also underscoring new efforts to model the synergetic relationships and cascading dynamics inherent in this interaction-dominant approach.

Engraved portable objects from Upper Palaeolithic and earlier sites are argued to be cognitive tools designed to store information for the purposes of calculation, record-keeping, or communication. This paper reviews the surprisingly long intellectual history of comparisons between these ancient objects and message sticks: marked graphic devices traditionally used for long-distance communication in Indigenous Australia. I argue that, while such comparisons have often been misguided, more cautious applications of ethnographic analogy may yield useful insights. A systematic analysis of historical observations together with more recent fieldwork, indicate that Australian message sticks are primarily tools of social cognition, as opposed to cognition tout court, and rely on orality and other context to become meaningful. Further, the practice of message stick communication may help clarify ongoing problems in the interpretation of Upper Palaeolithic objects including their possible role in aggregation activities, the distinction between decoration and notation, and the interplay between graphic sequences and speech.

About 30 years ago, the Dynamical Hypothesis instigated a variety of insights and transformations in cognitive science. One of them was the simple observation that, quite unlike trial-based tasks in a laboratory, natural ecologically valid behaviors almost never have context-free starting points. Instead, they produce lengthy time series data that can be recorded with dense-sampling measures, such as heartrate, eye movements, EEG, etc. That emphasis on studying the temporal dynamics of extended behaviors may have been the trigger that led to a rethinking of what a "representation" is, and then of what a "cognitive agent" is. This most recent and perhaps most revolutionary transformation is the idea that a cognitive agent need not be a singular physiological organism. Perhaps a group of organisms, such as several people working on a joint task, can temporarily function as one cognitive agent - at least while they're working adaptively and successfully.

This is a commentary for a special issue on predictive processing and rational constructivist models of development. Mainly I use the opportunity to ask a bunch of questions about what these theoretical frameworks show us (and what they do not) and mostly where the open questions still are. To get meta for a moment, I thought these questions were the best way to maximize the value of my commentary: They have the highest probability of leading to the most uncertainty reduction for our field in the long term. Please read in that spirit.