Topics in Cognitive Science最新文献

Research suggests that stress has immediate and long-term effects on attention and memory. Rather than disrupting memory formation and consolidation, acute stress has been shown to shift attention processes resulting in a tradeoff between prioritized and nonprioritized information. Both arousal and stress result in cognitive and neurobiological shifts that often support memory formation. When an acute stressor occurs, it can distort immediate attentional focus, increasing processing for high-priority features while reducing processing for extraneous features. The downstream cognitive consequences for this shift in attention are better memory for some features and poorer memory for others when compared to conditions of low stress. However, individual differences (e.g., sex, age, basal stress response, and stress reactivity) all impact the relationship between the acute stress response and memory. Although acute stress generally benefits memory formation, we suggest that forgetting and later recovery of stressful memories can better be understood by examining factors that influence the subjective experience of stress and stress reactivity.

This article discusses the possibility of practitioners who mistake organic memory loss for dissociative amnesia. It starts with the case of a young man with complete retrograde amnesia due to a traumatic head injury. Because he did not show any gross neurological abnormalities, a neurologist thought his amnesia had a psychological origin. An extensive neuropsychological examination revealed that the man did have an organic reason for his amnesia. Next, the existence of dissociative memory loss as well as isolated organic retrograde amnesia is considered. While cases of organic memory loss are well-documented, there is hardly any evidence for dissociative amnesia. It is argued that organic memory loss might be mistakenly taken for dissociative amnesia. In line with the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, practitioners are advised to rule out the possibility of organic memory loss, before diagnosing a patient with dissociative amnesia.

The controversy over alleged repressed and recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) was among the most contentious ever to embroil psychology and psychiatry. Adapting paradigms from cognitive psychology, my research group tested hypotheses pertinent to repressed memory and false memory interpretations of recovered memories. We tested adults who: (1) report recovering memories of CSA after not having thought about their abuse for years; (2) report never having forgotten their CSA; (3) believe they harbor "repressed" memories of CSA; and (4) deny having been sexually abused. We tested hypotheses about mechanisms that might figure in the inability to recall memories of one's abuse and those that might render one susceptible to developing false memories of abuse. The purpose of this article is to summarize this work. Finally, I draw on the work of Lionel Penrose to speculate about why the popularity of the concept of repressed memories of trauma-or its synonym, dissociative amnesia for trauma-may be rising today.

Debates surrounding the origin of recovered memories of child abuse have traditionally focused on two conflicting arguments, namely that these memories are either false memories or instances of repressed memories (i.e., reflecting the idea that people can unconsciously block traumatic autobiographical experiences and eventually regain access). While scientific evidence for the first is clearly established, the second is the subject of a controversy in the academic, clinical, and legal fields. This controversy rages on today. In this introductory article to our topic "Beyond Repressed Memory: Current Alternative Solutions to the Controversy," we present alternative and more parsimonious explanations for repressed memories that we sorted into three categories: cognitive, motivational, and biological factors. Our aim is to provide a timely overview to help clinical and legal professionals, academics, and the general public to move beyond the idea that traumatic memories can be unconsciously repressed.

One of the most heated debates in psychological science concerns the concept of repressed memory. We discuss how the debate on repressed memories continues to surface in legal settings, sometimes even to suggest avenues of legal reform. In the past years, several European countries have extended or abolished the statute of limitations for the prosecution of sexual crimes. Such statutes force legal actions (e.g., prosecution of sexual abuse) to be applied within a certain period of time. One of the reasons for the changes in statutes of limitations concerns the idea of repressed memory. We argue that from a psychological standpoint, these law reforms can be detrimental, particularly when they are done to endorse unfounded psychological theories. The validity of testimonies is compromised many years after the alleged facts, and abolishing the statute of limitations increases the chance that even more (false) recovered memories of abuse might enter the courtroom. We propose solutions to these changes such as establishing an independent expert committee evaluating claims of sexual abuse.

The existence or questionability of "repressed memories" can be discussed as being a matter of definition. It seems, however, far-fetched to consider all "lost" memories as caused by encoding problems, brain damage, forgetfulness, failure to disclose events, and so on. We argue that dissociative amnesia (DA) (or "psychogenic amnesia," or "functional amnesia," or, as we favor to call it, "mnestic block syndrome") is caused by psychic alterations, but ultimately they can be traced to changes in the physiology of the brain, as we are of the opinion that all memory processes-positive or negative-alter brain functions, sometimes more permanently, sometimes transiently. We have proven this idea using functional imaging techniques, in particular fluoro-deoxy-d-glucose positron emission tomography. Having investigated dozens of patients with severe and long-lasting DA conditions, we believe it to be disrespectful to many (but not to all) of the affected patients to question their disease condition, which can be proven to be not caused by feigning, malingering, or direct brain damage.

Amnesia is a frequent claim in major crimes, and it is estimated that the complete or partial absence of memory following a crime ranges from 25% to 50% of total cases. Although some cases may constitute a genuine form of amnesia, due to organic-neurological defects or psychological causes, and possibly combined with a dissociative or repressive coping style after an extreme experience, malingering is still fairly common in offenders. Therefore, one of the main goals in medico-legal proceedings is to find methods to determine the credibility of crime-related amnesia. At present, a number of lie and memory detection techniques can assist the forensic assessment of the reliability of declarative proof, and have been devised and improved over the past century: for example, modern polygraphs, event-related potentials, thermal imaging, functional magnetic resonance imaging, kinematic, and facial analysis. Other ad hoc psychological tests, such as the so-called Symptom Validity Test (SVT) and Performance Validity Test (PVT), as well as the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT), can also be used. To date, however, there is little evidence or case reports that document their real usefulness in forensic practice. Here, we report two cases of crime-related amnesia, whereby both defendants, who were found guilty of homicide, appeared to exhibit dissociative amnesia but where the application of SVTs, PVTs, and aIAT detected a malingered amnesia.

The expression "repressed memory" was introduced over 100 years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked-yet the term "repressed memory" seems to remain. In this paper, I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this theoretical term as well as an argument to question its scientific status by comparing it to other cases of theoretical terms that have either survived scientific change-such as "atom" or "gene"-or that have perished, such as "black bile." Ultimately, I argue that "repressed memory" is more like "black bile" than "atom" or "gene" and, thus, recommend its demotion from our scientific vocabulary.

In this paper, we explore the role of emotion in the interpretation and memory of sexual encounters. We consider situations likely to generate negative emotions during sex, and the mechanisms through which the experience of negative emotions can lead to false memories of coercion and mislabeling of an encounter as sexual assault. Specifically, we consider the role of emotion in directing attention during a sexual encounter and the effects of emotion as context for interpretation at the time of the encounter, and for retrieval and interpretation when the encounter is later recalled and reported. Our intent is to provide a greater understanding of the processes of interpretation and memory through which false claims of sexual assault might arise, if and when they do arise.

The Think/No-Think (T/NT) task was designed to test whether the deliberate avoidance of retrieving a memory (i.e., suppression) hinders the subsequent recall of that memory. Forgetting effects obtained with the T/NT-task (Suppression-Induced Forgetting) are thought to result from memory inhibition: the deactivation of the representation of the to-be-suppressed memory. Memory inhibition can be specifically inferred from decreased performance on a test using Independent Probes-cues that are unrelated to the initial study phase in the T/NT-procedure. The present contribution explores the evidence for the idea that Suppression-Induced Forgetting obtained with such Independent Probes may provide a viable model for repression. A review of the literature on Suppression-Induced Forgetting with Independent Probes (SIF-IP) suggests that reliable estimates of the overall effect size are unavailable, that the extent to which the literature suffers from publication bias is unknown and that reporting bias may obstruct a clear view of the percentage of studies that find a statistically significant effect. In addition, it is difficult to study SIF-IP in autobiographical memories, due to their complexity and idiosyncrasy. All in all, it seems questionable whether suppression-induced forgetting obtained with independent probes provides a viable model of repression.