Review of Economic Dynamics最新文献

We develop a general equilibrium model with search frictions in the labor market, wage bargaining and a welfare state, to study the impact of immigrants on the fiscal balance and welfare of natives in the host country. We distinguish immigrants by legal status and account for both their direct fiscal effects, through their tax contributions and transfer receipts, and their indirect fiscal and welfare effects, through their labor-market impact. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and find that legal immigrants reduce the tax burden on natives and increase natives' welfare, mainly because their tax contributions greatly exceed the transfers they receive. On the other hand, illegal immigrants' positive welfare impact stems mainly from their positive effect on job creation, which increases income to natives and in turn consumption. A legalization program leads to a fiscal gain, increases natives' welfare and is more beneficial to natives than a purely restrictive immigration policy that reduces the illegal immigrant population.

The Hamilton (H) filter is proposed as an alternative to the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. It is designed to meet all of the objectives desired by users of the HP filter while avoiding its drawbacks (spurious dynamics, ad hoc filter settings, end-of-sample bias). I document a trade-off that has been overlooked: Addressing the HP filter's drawbacks means that the H filter cannot fulfill all of the desired objectives. It modifies different frequencies captured in an estimated cyclical component by inducing phase shifts and by likely altering variances. Typically, these modifications vary across time series. Through both simulation and real data exercises, I illustrate each filter's cyclical properties.

Why do some financial crises lead to macroeconomic disasters, while others barely affect the real economy? This paper proposes a model to study unusually deep financial crises. Deep crises arise from the interplay of demand-driven coordination failures on the productive sector and weak banks' balance sheets. There is a dynamic feedback between banks' balance sheets and coordination. Coordination failures happen when banks suffer large losses and substantially reduce asset prices and welfare, even if the economy is in good times and they rarely happen. Financial crises that start from similar initial shocks can feature very heterogeneous real effects.

The debate about the falling labor share has brought attention to the income-shares trends, but less attention has been devoted to their variability. We analyze how their fluctuations can be insured between workers and capitalists, and the corresponding implications for financial markets. We study a neoclassical growth model with aggregate shocks that affect income shares and financial frictions that prevent firms from fully insuring idiosyncratic risk. We examine theoretically how aggregate risk sharing is shaped by the combination of idiosyncratic risk and moving shares. In this setting, accumulation of safe assets by capitalists and risky assets by workers emerges naturally as a tool to insure income shares' risk. Then, in a quantitative exploration we show that low interest rates, rising capital shares, and accumulation of safe assets by firms and risky assets by households can be rationalized by persistent shocks to the labor share.

The consensus among central bankers is that higher inflation expectations can drive up actual inflation. We assess this by devising a novel method for identifying shocks to inflation expectations, estimating a semi-structural VAR where an expectation shock is identified as that which causes measured forecasts to diverge from the rational expectation. Surprisingly, using data for the United States we find that a positive inflation expectation shock is contractionary and deflationary: output, inflation, and interest rates all fall. These results are inconsistent with the standard New Keynesian model, which predicts inflation and interest rate hikes.

This paper measures option-implied skewness for individual firms and the S&P 500 index between 1980 and 2021, giving real-time measures of conditional micro and macro skewness. There are three key results: 1. Micro skewness is significantly procyclical, while macro skewness is acyclical; 2. Micro skewness leads the business cycle and is strongly linked to credit spreads, suggesting one potential causal channel; 3. Micro skewness is significantly, and not mechanically, correlated with macro volatility, implying that there is a common shock driving them both, which is also linked to the business cycle.

We revisit the question about whether a larger public sector stabilizes or destabilizes the economy. Based on results from two causal identification approaches, we show that a higher rate of public-sector employment reduces volatility in, i.e. stabilizes, private-sector employment growth, with at most a slight crowding-out of private employment. Public wages, meanwhile, increase private wages but appear not to be destabilizing. The stabilizing effect of public employment with limited crowding out is at odds with standard search and matching models that contain a public sector, which predict 1:1 crowding out and strong destabilization. To improve the performance of such models, we follow Gomes (2015) and add a product market that can replicate what Gomes calls the Business Cycle Wealth Effect. We also point out that the government procures output directly from the private sector. When the model has these two features, then it can generate stabilizing effects of public employment on private employment, with reduced crowding out.

This paper investigates the endogenous search intensity of traders in the OTC market, examining both competitive equilibrium and socially optimal scenario. Our study introduces a random search-and-matching model, where traders have the flexibility to ex post choose and adjust their search intensities based on two trader-level states: asset position and preference type. Our findings uncover the following key insights: (1) Changes in the level of search friction and/or the frequency of shocks on traders' preference type may lead to traders switching between high and low search intensities, shifting between the core and periphery of the trading network; and (2) Social optimality is achieved in the absence of intermediation, where no trader simultaneously invests in positive buying intensity and positive selling intensity. In contrast, competitive equilibrium reveals that some traders tend to over-search while others under-search, compared to the socially optimal outcome.

Our central banks set interest rates, and do not even pretend to control money supplies. How do interest rates affect inflation? We finally have a complete economic theory of inflation under interest rate targets and unconstrained liquidity. Its long-run properties mirror those of monetary theory: Inflation can be stable and determinate under interest rate targets, including a peg, analogous to a k-percent rule.

Uncomfortably, stability means that higher interest rates eventually raise inflation, just as higher money growth eventually raises inflation. Sticky prices generate some short-run non-neutrality: Higher nominal interest rates can raise real rates and lower output. A model in which higher nominal interest rates temporarily lower inflation, without a change in fiscal policy, is a harder task. I exhibit one such model, but it paints a more limited picture than standard beliefs. Generically, without a change in fiscal policy, monetary policy can only move inflation from one time to another.

The last decade has provided a near-ideal set of natural experiments to distinguish the principal theories of inflation. Inflation did not show spirals or indeterminacies at the long zero bound. The large monetary-fiscal expansion of the covid era produced a temporary spurt of inflation. The same money unleashed in quantitative easing had no such effect.

We characterize optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in a heterogeneous-agent model with unemployment risk and sticky prices. In the long run, the optimal reform calls for a lower replacement rate that raises vacancies and lowers unemployment. In the short run, the optimal reform raises the replacement rate initially to smooth real wage adjustments along the transition and attenuate short-run welfare losses. Once at its optimal level, the replacement rate should vary counter-cyclically in response to demand shocks. Productivity shocks generate quasi-efficient fluctuations and call for a quasi-constant replacement rate. The aggregate welfare gains from an optimal reform are large, around 1% of equivalent consumption. The aggregate welfare gains from an optimal UI policy over the business cycle are smaller, around 0.2%, and essentially vanish with flexible prices because the aggregate demand stabilization motive is muted.