Review of Economic Dynamics最新文献

Our central banks set interest rates, and do not even pretend to control money supplies. How do interest rates affect inflation? We finally have a complete economic theory of inflation under interest rate targets and unconstrained liquidity. Its long-run properties mirror those of monetary theory: Inflation can be stable and determinate under interest rate targets, including a peg, analogous to a k-percent rule.

Uncomfortably, stability means that higher interest rates eventually raise inflation, just as higher money growth eventually raises inflation. Sticky prices generate some short-run non-neutrality: Higher nominal interest rates can raise real rates and lower output. A model in which higher nominal interest rates temporarily lower inflation, without a change in fiscal policy, is a harder task. I exhibit one such model, but it paints a more limited picture than standard beliefs. Generically, without a change in fiscal policy, monetary policy can only move inflation from one time to another.

The last decade has provided a near-ideal set of natural experiments to distinguish the principal theories of inflation. Inflation did not show spirals or indeterminacies at the long zero bound. The large monetary-fiscal expansion of the covid era produced a temporary spurt of inflation. The same money unleashed in quantitative easing had no such effect.

We characterize optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in a heterogeneous-agent model with unemployment risk and sticky prices. In the long run, the optimal reform calls for a lower replacement rate that raises vacancies and lowers unemployment. In the short run, the optimal reform raises the replacement rate initially to smooth real wage adjustments along the transition and attenuate short-run welfare losses. Once at its optimal level, the replacement rate should vary counter-cyclically in response to demand shocks. Productivity shocks generate quasi-efficient fluctuations and call for a quasi-constant replacement rate. The aggregate welfare gains from an optimal reform are large, around 1% of equivalent consumption. The aggregate welfare gains from an optimal UI policy over the business cycle are smaller, around 0.2%, and essentially vanish with flexible prices because the aggregate demand stabilization motive is muted.

We quantitatively analyze the macroeconomic consequences of border delays in Sub-Saharan Africa. Delays of imported intermediate inputs lower aggregate output because of factor misallocation and due to an inefficiently low number of firms that uses foreign inputs in production. Our model economy features heterogeneous firms that endogenously differ in the degree to which foreign inputs are used. The model is calibrated to micro-level data from Sub-Saharan Africa. Reducing border delays can increase aggregate output by up to 9.4%. The gains are mainly due to a reallocation of economic activity towards more productive firms.

We show the competing effects of a housing bubble on the real economy by developing a multi-sector dynamic model with housing production. On the one hand, firms can sell or collateralize their housing, so a housing bubble helps firms obtain credit to finance their investment and expand production. On the other hand, a boom in the housing sector crowds out labor in the non-housing sector. We show that housing booms can reduce social welfare both in the steady state and in the transitional dynamics only when the production externalities in the non-housing sector are sufficiently large. We quantitatively evaluate our model and demonstrate its robustness with model extensions. Policies that target labor, housing transactions and output generate different welfare implications.

The paper studies human capital accumulation over workers' careers in an on-the-job search setting with heterogeneous firms. In renegotiation-proof employment contracts, more productive firms provide more training. General and specific training both induce higher wages within jobs and with future employers, even conditional on the future employer type.

Because matches do not internalize the specific capital loss from employer changes, specific human capital can be over-accumulated, more so in low type firms. The analysis also establishes that general training can be efficient regardless of the level of labor market frictions.

We calibrate the model to the US economy using Compustat and NLSY79. While validating the Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) mechanisms, the analysis nevertheless arrives at the opposite conclusion: increased labor market friction reduces training in equilibrium.

We analyze the impact of public health policy on the spread of a disease using a version of the SIR model that includes vital statistics, waning immunity, and vaccination. This model is rich enough to accommodate endemic steady states and disease-free steady states. We derive social distancing and vaccination policies that maximize an objective function that penalizes lost output resulting from social distancing, deaths resulting from the disease, and the cost of vaccination. Even though a disease-free steady state is attainable, optimal policy leads to an endemic steady state, albeit with a small number of deaths and negligible loss of output.

We formalize a decentralized market where consumers with privately-known preferences meet bilaterally with firms. The latter acquire information to raise their degree of price discrimination from second to first. In a dynamic setting where outside options are endogenous, information choices are strategic complements, possibly generating multiple equilibria across which consumers' surpluses and firms' investment in information are negatively correlated. While there exists a sequence of equilibria converging to perfect competition when trading frictions vanish, there exist other equilibria that fail to approach perfect competition. Our findings are robust to firm heterogeneity, entry, noisy signals, and consumers' price-setting power.

Weak financial institutions may affect developing countries due to slowing the much-needed construction process of residential housing. Using novel data collected from Nairobi, I document considerable heterogeneity in the construction duration of new residential buildings, with about 40% of buildings started in 2009 still unfinished in 2018. To understand the role of financial development in constructing residential housing, I develop a heterogeneous agent model with financial frictions in which households construct individual housing units. Counterfactual simulations show that improvements in credit provision can substantially speed up the expansion of the aggregate housing stock and increase the city's density by enabling the construction of taller buildings. The model also predicts that investments in incomplete structures emerge as an alternative savings vehicle in the absence of reliable savings accounts.

The share of births to unmarried women in the U.S. rose well above 30% in the 1990s, despite unmarried women having greater access to abortion and improved birth control. We show that an equilibrium matching model in which unmarried couples behave co-operatively can explain 97% of the rise in the UMB ratio as the response to a combination of well-documented shocks: rising divorce rates, access to abortion, and improved contraception. Equilibrium interactions among these factors are important; had the marital surplus remained constant, very little change in unmarried births would have occurred. We also find that reforms reversing accessibility of birth control or abortion would on their own do little to reverse these social trends.

In this note, we present a formal proof of Obstfeld and Rogoff's (1983, 2021) claim that their fractional-currency-backing scheme eliminates the inflationary equilibria in the money-in-utility model. To do so, we fully articulate the optimization problem of consumers who have the option to redeem (part or all of) their cash for a small amount of goods at any date. We also relate the scheme to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level.