Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041521x16007785801364
Kelly M. McMann, M. Maguire, J. Gerring, M. Coppedge, Staffan I. Lindberg
Studies of a small number of countries have revealed that both democratic and nondemocratic subnational governments can exist within a single country. However, these works have neither demonstrated how common subnational regime variation is nor explained why some countries are more prone to it. This article does both. We show that subnational regime variation exists in all world regions, in both unitary and federal states, and in both the present and past, using Varieties of Democracy global data from 1900 to 2018. The article also demonstrates theoretically and empirically how social heterogeneity and factors undermining a national government's ability to extend control throughout a country promote this variation. Specifically, subnational regime variation is more common in countries that are ethnically diverse, rugged, and populous.
{"title":"Explaining Subnational Regime Variation: Country-Level Factors","authors":"Kelly M. McMann, M. Maguire, J. Gerring, M. Coppedge, Staffan I. Lindberg","doi":"10.5129/001041521x16007785801364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041521x16007785801364","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of a small number of countries have revealed that both democratic and nondemocratic subnational governments can exist within a single country. However, these works have neither demonstrated how common subnational regime variation is nor explained why some countries are more prone to it. This article does both. We show that subnational regime variation exists in all world regions, in both unitary and federal states, and in both the present and past, using Varieties of Democracy global data from 1900 to 2018. The article also demonstrates theoretically and empirically how social heterogeneity and factors undermining a national government's ability to extend control throughout a country promote this variation. Specifically, subnational regime variation is more common in countries that are ethnically diverse, rugged, and populous.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70696923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041521x16059819775864
J. Abbott, B. Goldfrank
The three books reviewed here represent a new generation of rigorous scholarship on participatory institutions (PIs). They demonstrate that – under certain conditions – it is possible to build large-scale PIs that strengthen democratic governance and improve citizens' lives. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain. Due in part to the absence of either high-quality national-level comparative data or fine-grained subnational data, and in part to research design choices of existing studies, the literature remains limited in its capacity to make general claims about the causes and effects of large-scale PIs. Ultimately, the key question collectively addressed, but not fully answered, by the works reviewed is whether governments can build PIs that deliver on their promise to improve the quality of democracy and enhance public service provision on a large scale in diverse contexts beyond Brazil.
{"title":"Scaling-Up and Zooming-Out: Understanding How and When Participatory Institutions Matter","authors":"J. Abbott, B. Goldfrank","doi":"10.5129/001041521x16059819775864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041521x16059819775864","url":null,"abstract":"The three books reviewed here represent a new generation of rigorous scholarship on participatory institutions (PIs). They demonstrate that – under certain conditions – it is possible to build large-scale PIs that strengthen democratic governance and improve citizens' lives. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain. Due in part to the absence of either high-quality national-level comparative data or fine-grained subnational data, and in part to research design choices of existing studies, the literature remains limited in its capacity to make general claims about the causes and effects of large-scale PIs. Ultimately, the key question collectively addressed, but not fully answered, by the works reviewed is whether governments can build PIs that deliver on their promise to improve the quality of democracy and enhance public service provision on a large scale in diverse contexts beyond Brazil.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041521X16118708793032
J. Abbott
Why are large-scale participatory institutions implemented in some countries but only adopted on paper in others? I argue that nationwide implementation of Binding Participatory Institutions (BPIs)––a critical subtype of participatory institutions––is dependent on the backing of a strong institutional supporter, often a political party. In turn, parties will only implement BPIs if they place a lower value on the political costs than on the potential benefits of implementation. This will be true if: 1) significant societal demand exists for BPI implementation and 2) the party’s political opponents cannot take advantage of BPIs for their own gain. I test this theory through two detailed case studies of Venezuela and Ecuador, drawing on 165 interviews with key national-level actors and grassroots activists.
{"title":"When Participation Wins Votes: Explaining the Emergence of Large-Scale Participatory Democracy","authors":"J. Abbott","doi":"10.5129/001041521X16118708793032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041521X16118708793032","url":null,"abstract":"Why are large-scale participatory institutions implemented in some countries but only adopted on paper in others? I argue that nationwide implementation of Binding Participatory Institutions (BPIs)––a critical subtype of participatory institutions––is dependent on the backing of a strong institutional supporter, often a political party. In turn, parties will only implement BPIs if they place a lower value on the political costs than on the potential benefits of implementation. This will be true if: 1) significant societal demand exists for BPI implementation and 2) the party’s political opponents cannot take advantage of BPIs for their own gain. I test this theory through two detailed case studies of Venezuela and Ecuador, drawing on 165 interviews with key national-level actors and grassroots activists.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16316387001621
Haakon Gjerløw, M. Rasmussen
We present a systemic threat theory to explain the introduction of Proportional Representation (PR). If facing a revolutionary threat, incumbents agree to enact electoral reforms such as PR to secure the stability of the parliamentary system, even if this could imply their own personal electoral loss. We argue that the theory can help explain the largest wave of PR adoptions in history, namely in the years immediately after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Incumbents came to over-estimate the true revolutionary threat in Europe. Simultaneously, reformist parliamentarian socialists came to push for PR to weaken the radicals within their party. Incumbents and reformist socialists could therefore support the same system. We test this using qualitative and quantitative data from Norway’s adoption of PR in 1919.
{"title":"Revolution, Elite Fear, and Electoral Institutions","authors":"Haakon Gjerløw, M. Rasmussen","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16316387001621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16316387001621","url":null,"abstract":"We present a systemic threat theory to explain the introduction of Proportional Representation (PR). If facing a revolutionary threat, incumbents agree to enact electoral reforms such as PR to secure the stability of the parliamentary system, even if this could imply their own personal electoral loss. We argue that the theory can help explain the largest wave of PR adoptions in history, namely in the years immediately after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Incumbents came to over-estimate the true revolutionary threat in Europe. Simultaneously, reformist parliamentarian socialists came to push for PR to weaken the radicals within their party. Incumbents and reformist socialists could therefore support the same system. We test this using qualitative and quantitative data from Norway’s adoption of PR in 1919.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16331935725154
Ammar Shamaileh, Yousra Chaábane
What is the relationship between institutional favoritism, economic well-being, and political trust? Due to the role that East Bank tribes played in supporting the monarchy during the state’s formative years, Jordan has institutionalized a type of political discrimination that privileges East Bank Jordanians over Palestinian Jordanians. An empirical examination of the political institutions of the state reveals that such discrimination remains pervasive. It was subsequently theorized that institutional favoritism’s impact on political trust is conditional on income due to the greater salience of group identity among individuals with lower incomes. Regression analyses of survey data reveal a consistent negative correlation between political trust and income among East Bank Jordanians. There is little evidence of a substantively meaningful unconditional relationship between national origin and political trust.
{"title":"Institutional Favoritism, Income, and Political Trust: Evidence from Jordan","authors":"Ammar Shamaileh, Yousra Chaábane","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16331935725154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16331935725154","url":null,"abstract":"What is the relationship between institutional favoritism, economic well-being, and political trust? Due to the role that East Bank tribes played in supporting the monarchy during the state’s formative years, Jordan has institutionalized a type of political discrimination that privileges East Bank Jordanians over Palestinian Jordanians. An empirical examination of the political institutions of the state reveals that such discrimination remains pervasive. It was subsequently theorized that institutional favoritism’s impact on political trust is conditional on income due to the greater salience of group identity among individuals with lower incomes. Regression analyses of survey data reveal a consistent negative correlation between political trust and income among East Bank Jordanians. There is little evidence of a substantively meaningful unconditional relationship between national origin and political trust.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16314500561319
Alexander Reisenbichler
Why do mortgage subsidies vary across countries? Until the 2000s, the U.S. and Germany provided large-scale subsidies for homeownership. Yet, their paths diverged when they faced deep economic crises at that time. While the U.S. doubled down on government support by quasi-nationalizing its mortgage market, Germany retrenched homeowner subsidies. This article argues that growth regimes shape coalitional logics that explain these contrasting outcomes. In the U.S. demand-led regime, where housing is key to growth, a bipartisan coalition entrenched mortgage subsidies to stimulate household credit and consumption. Germany’s export-led regime, where housing is less central to growth, produced a broad-based coalition that retrenched homeowner subsidies to boost competitiveness. Detailed case studies contrast the quasi-nationalization of U.S. government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with the retrenchment of the German “homeowner subsidy” (Eigenheimzulage).
{"title":"Entrenchment or Retrenchment: The Political Economy of Mortgage Debt Subsidies in the United States and Germany","authors":"Alexander Reisenbichler","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16314500561319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16314500561319","url":null,"abstract":"Why do mortgage subsidies vary across countries? Until the 2000s, the U.S. and Germany provided large-scale subsidies for homeownership. Yet, their paths diverged when they faced deep economic crises at that time. While the U.S. doubled down on government support by quasi-nationalizing its mortgage market, Germany retrenched homeowner subsidies. This article argues that growth regimes shape coalitional logics that explain these contrasting outcomes. In the U.S. demand-led regime, where housing is key to growth, a bipartisan coalition entrenched mortgage subsidies to stimulate household credit and consumption. Germany’s export-led regime, where housing is less central to growth, produced a broad-based coalition that retrenched homeowner subsidies to boost competitiveness. Detailed case studies contrast the quasi-nationalization of U.S. government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with the retrenchment of the German “homeowner subsidy” (Eigenheimzulage).","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16364817575110
C. Belge, Semuhi Sinanoğlu
Why do states target some civilians with collective punishment while coopting others with material goods during an ethnic civil war? This article examines how the Turkish government calibrated its repression and cooptation policies towards the Kurdish population during the counterinsurgency of the 1990s. In contrast to the situational conflict dynamics emphasized by the civil war literature, we explain the distribution of cooptation and repression with the state’s identity policy: government policies were more punitive in areas that displayed strong Kurdish linguistic/political identity, or high tribal concentration, while they were more cooptative where the government had fostered a Sunni-Muslim Kurdish identity. The study is based on a novel dataset that includes information about displacement, tribal concentration, and violent events from archival sources.
{"title":"Containing Ethnic Conflict: Repression, Cooptation, and Identity Politics","authors":"C. Belge, Semuhi Sinanoğlu","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16364817575110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16364817575110","url":null,"abstract":"Why do states target some civilians with collective punishment while coopting others with material goods during an ethnic civil war? This article examines how the Turkish government calibrated its repression and cooptation policies towards the Kurdish population during the counterinsurgency of the 1990s. In contrast to the situational conflict dynamics emphasized by the civil war literature, we explain the distribution of cooptation and repression with the state’s identity policy: government policies were more punitive in areas that displayed strong Kurdish linguistic/political identity, or high tribal concentration, while they were more cooptative where the government had fostered a Sunni-Muslim Kurdish identity. The study is based on a novel dataset that includes information about displacement, tribal concentration, and violent events from archival sources.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16258614977180
Vincent Mauro
A redistributive wave across Latin America provided credence to existing explanations that emphasize the importance of democracy and the political left for democratic redistribution. Yet, neither of these theories tells the entire story behind the contemporary politics of inequality in Latin America. This article stresses the importance of party systems for democratic redistribution, especially their role in increasing the scope of social policy as well as igniting competitive electoral environments that incentivize political elites to redistribute, leading to the amelioration of inequality over time. Utilizing a time-series cross-sectional dataset on fifteen Latin American countries covering the period of 1990–2015, and extending the analysis to sixty-five global democracies, this article finds that countries with institutionalized party systems exhibit greater income redistribution and lower levels of inequality than those with inchoate counterparts.
{"title":"Party Systems and Redistribution in Democratic Latin America","authors":"Vincent Mauro","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16258614977180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16258614977180","url":null,"abstract":"A redistributive wave across Latin America provided credence to existing explanations that emphasize the importance of democracy and the political left for democratic redistribution. Yet, neither of these theories tells the entire story behind the contemporary politics of inequality in Latin America. This article stresses the importance of party systems for democratic redistribution, especially their role in increasing the scope of social policy as well as igniting competitive electoral environments that incentivize political elites to redistribute, leading to the amelioration of inequality over time. Utilizing a time-series cross-sectional dataset on fifteen Latin American countries covering the period of 1990–2015, and extending the analysis to sixty-five global democracies, this article finds that countries with institutionalized party systems exhibit greater income redistribution and lower levels of inequality than those with inchoate counterparts.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16317396828722
Jean Lachapelle
Research on repression has primarily focused on its destructive potential, namely how violence serves to eliminate threats. This article proposes an alternative role for repression: to build popular support. I argue that repression builds support for an autocratic regime when it targets groups perceived as dangerous. I refer to this phenomenon as a legitimation strategy of repression, which aims to gain the support of civilian bystanders beyond eliminating threats. To test the argument, I present a case study of state repression in Egypt after the 2013 coup. I explain how repression against the Muslim Brotherhood helped build popular support for the new regime. My findings contribute to scholarship on authoritarianism and repression by demonstrating the oft-overlooked role of civilian bystanders in shaping state violence.
{"title":"Repression Reconsidered: Bystander Effects and Legitimation in Authoritarian Regimes","authors":"Jean Lachapelle","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16317396828722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16317396828722","url":null,"abstract":"Research on repression has primarily focused on its destructive potential, namely how violence serves to eliminate threats. This article proposes an alternative role for repression: to build popular support. I argue that repression builds support for an autocratic regime when it targets groups perceived as dangerous. I refer to this phenomenon as a legitimation strategy of repression, which aims to gain the support of civilian bystanders beyond eliminating threats. To test the argument, I present a case study of state repression in Egypt after the 2013 coup. I explain how repression against the Muslim Brotherhood helped build popular support for the new regime. My findings contribute to scholarship on authoritarianism and repression by demonstrating the oft-overlooked role of civilian bystanders in shaping state violence.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16358097946287
Jamie L Shenk
Conflicts between local communities and their governments over natural resource development are not new in Latin America. When mining and oil companies move in, communities have blocked roads, staged protests, and undertaken other forms of direct action. More recently, however, communities have expanded their tactics, turning toward the state and its participatory institutions to contest claims over their land. This article investigates this trend and the conditions that facilitate it by analyzing an original database of 102 attempts by communities in Colombia to implement one participatory institution—the popular consultation—to challenge large scale extractive projects. I argue that communities’ ability to contest extractive projects by leveraging participatory institutions depends on the balance of power between two external players—private firms and expert allies.
{"title":"Consultations and Competing Claims: Implementing Participatory Institutions in Colombia’s Extractives Industries","authors":"Jamie L Shenk","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16358097946287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16358097946287","url":null,"abstract":"Conflicts between local communities and their governments over natural resource development are not new in Latin America. When mining and oil companies move in, communities have blocked roads, staged protests, and undertaken other forms of direct action. More recently, however, communities have expanded their tactics, turning toward the state and its participatory institutions to contest claims over their land. This article investigates this trend and the conditions that facilitate it by analyzing an original database of 102 attempts by communities in Colombia to implement one participatory institution—the popular consultation—to challenge large scale extractive projects. I argue that communities’ ability to contest extractive projects by leveraging participatory institutions depends on the balance of power between two external players—private firms and expert allies.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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