Several antitrust authorities have investigated platform price parity clauses around the world. I analyze the impact of these clauses when platforms design a search environment for sellers and buyers to interact. In a model where platforms choose the unit search cost faced by consumers, I show when platforms can profitably obfuscate consumers through high search costs. Then, I show that price parity clauses, when exogenously given, can increase or reduce obfuscation, prices, and consumer surplus. Finally, when price parity clauses are endogenous, they are only observed in equilibrium if they hurt consumers.
{"title":"Platform Price Parity Clauses and Consumer Obfuscation*","authors":"José Ignacio Heresi","doi":"10.1111/joie.12313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12313","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Several antitrust authorities have investigated platform price parity clauses around the world. I analyze the impact of these clauses when platforms design a search environment for sellers and buyers to interact. In a model where platforms choose the unit search cost faced by consumers, I show when platforms can profitably obfuscate consumers through high search costs. Then, I show that price parity clauses, when exogenously given, can increase or reduce obfuscation, prices, and consumer surplus. Finally, when price parity clauses are endogenous, they are only observed in equilibrium if they hurt consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":"291-322"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50149159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When analyzing firm competition over two strategic variables (e.g., quality and price), it is important to decide whether to model it as a one-stage or a two-stage game. Our analysis focuses on markets in which consumers are not aware of all alternatives. We find that, if consumers are sufficiently unaware, both the one-stage and the two-stage equilibria of the game that explicitly models limited awareness are close to the one-stage equilibrium of the standard game, which assumes full awareness. Therefore, markets in which consumers have limited awareness can be studied with standard models, provided that the one-stage game is analyzed.
{"title":"Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness*","authors":"Samir Mamadehussene, Francisco Silva","doi":"10.1111/joie.12317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12317","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When analyzing firm competition over two strategic variables (e.g., quality and price), it is important to decide whether to model it as a one-stage or a two-stage game. Our analysis focuses on markets in which consumers are not aware of all alternatives. We find that, if consumers are sufficiently unaware, both the one-stage and the two-stage equilibria of the game that explicitly models limited awareness are close to the one-stage equilibrium of the standard game, which assumes full awareness. Therefore, markets in which consumers have limited awareness can be studied with standard models, provided that the one-stage game is analyzed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":"192-211"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50148016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyse the effects of input price discrimination in the canonical model where an upstream monopolist sells to downstream firms with various degrees of efficiency. We first recast a series of existing results within our setting, extending previous findings related to discrimination in final-goods markets to the case of discrimination in input markets. Then, we examine the impact of input price discrimination on welfare. A key determinant of the effects of input price discrimination corresponds to the sum of demand curvature and pass-through elasticity. We provide examples relying on derived demands with constant curvature, including demands with constant pass-through rates.
{"title":"Input Price Discrimination, Demand Forms, And Welfare*","authors":"Germain Gaudin, Romain Lestage","doi":"10.1111/joie.12306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12306","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyse the effects of input price discrimination in the canonical model where an upstream monopolist sells to downstream firms with various degrees of efficiency. We first recast a series of existing results within our setting, extending previous findings related to discrimination in final-goods markets to the case of discrimination in input markets. Then, we examine the impact of input price discrimination on welfare. A key determinant of the effects of input price discrimination corresponds to the sum of demand curvature and pass-through elasticity. We provide examples relying on derived demands with constant curvature, including demands with constant pass-through rates.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"70 4","pages":"1033-1057"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12306","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137698807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do licensing and technology transfer influence the spread of General Purpose Technologies? To answer this question, we analyze the diffusion of the transistor, one of the most important technologies of our time. We show that the transistor diffusion and cross-technology spillovers increased dramatically after AT&T began licensing its transistor patents along with symposia to educate follow-on inventors in 1952. Both these symposia and the licensing of the patents itself played important roles in the diffusion. A subsequent reduction in royalties did not lead to further increases, suggesting that licensing and technology transfer were more important than specific royalty rates.
{"title":"Fostering the Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies: Evidence from the Licensing of the Transistor Patents*","authors":"Markus Nagler, Monika Schnitzer, Martin Watzinger","doi":"10.1111/joie.12311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12311","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do licensing and technology transfer influence the spread of General Purpose Technologies? To answer this question, we analyze the diffusion of the transistor, one of the most important technologies of our time. We show that the transistor diffusion and cross-technology spillovers increased dramatically after AT&T began licensing its transistor patents along with symposia to educate follow-on inventors in 1952. Both these symposia and the licensing of the patents itself played important roles in the diffusion. A subsequent reduction in royalties did not lead to further increases, suggesting that licensing and technology transfer were more important than specific royalty rates.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"70 4","pages":"838-866"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12311","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137531316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does resale affect multiproduct bundling? I investigate using a model of monopoly bundling with costly resale. Consumers purchase in the primary market while anticipating resale, then participate in a resale market with market-clearing prices. Resale forces the monopolist to balance the additional profit from a discounted bundle against the opportunity for consumer arbitrage. In equilibrium, the monopolist may still offer a discounted bundle, but resale reduces the returns to bundling and has an ambiguous effect on consumer and total welfare. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of resale, it is possible for consumers to resell in equilibrium.
{"title":"Bundling with Resale*","authors":"Drew Vollmer","doi":"10.1111/joie.12304","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12304","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How does resale affect multiproduct bundling? I investigate using a model of monopoly bundling with costly resale. Consumers purchase in the primary market while anticipating resale, then participate in a resale market with market-clearing prices. Resale forces the monopolist to balance the additional profit from a discounted bundle against the opportunity for consumer arbitrage. In equilibrium, the monopolist may still offer a discounted bundle, but resale reduces the returns to bundling and has an ambiguous effect on consumer and total welfare. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of resale, it is possible for consumers to resell in equilibrium.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"70 4","pages":"913-938"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72891160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.47576/2712-7559_2023_1_174
N. Z. Zelimkhanova, Taisa Khusainovna Khadzhimuradova, Fatima Shaaranovna Amerkhanova
{"title":"INTEGRATION OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING INTO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT","authors":"N. Z. Zelimkhanova, Taisa Khusainovna Khadzhimuradova, Fatima Shaaranovna Amerkhanova","doi":"10.47576/2712-7559_2023_1_174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47576/2712-7559_2023_1_174","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80368922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.47576/2712-7559_2023_1_33
Galina Alekseevna Zolotareva, Yu. Bendas
{"title":"EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN TAX AUTHORITIES AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS AUTHORITIES IN THE PROCESS OF CARRYING OUT CONTROL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ON-SITE TAX AUDITS","authors":"Galina Alekseevna Zolotareva, Yu. Bendas","doi":"10.47576/2712-7559_2023_1_33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47576/2712-7559_2023_1_33","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77262818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.47576/2949-1886_2023_2_54
Olga Valentinovna Shuvalova
{"title":"REVOLVING FUND AS A MECHANISM OF EXTRABUDGETARY FINANCING OF THE SOLID MUNICIPAL WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM","authors":"Olga Valentinovna Shuvalova","doi":"10.47576/2949-1886_2023_2_54","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47576/2949-1886_2023_2_54","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"140 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80984788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN E-COMMERCE","authors":"Gadzhiev N.K. Gadzhiev, Khava Movledinovna Kantaeva, Yakha Akhmudovna Khadueva","doi":"10.47576/2949-1886_2023_2_138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47576/2949-1886_2023_2_138","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78219461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.47576/2949-1886_2023_2_163
Alexander Valerievich Alshannikov
{"title":"STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF ANTICRISIS MANAGEMENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE IN MODERN CONDITIONS","authors":"Alexander Valerievich Alshannikov","doi":"10.47576/2949-1886_2023_2_163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47576/2949-1886_2023_2_163","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73822218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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