This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 (Krueger, 2002a,b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important (IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.
{"title":"Creating a new sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism: why incentives, risk sharing, and CACs will all matter","authors":"G. Menzies, D. Vines","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 (Krueger, 2002a,b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important (IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46940382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sir Alan Budd: a tribute","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41658740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The global financial architecture is struggling to facilitate the sustainable investment needed to address climate change. Some argue that if the Basel III global capital rules treated environmentally friendly assets as being safer forms of capital, banks would be incentivized to hold more of these assets on their balance sheets and extend more green debt, promoting sustainable investment. This paper explores the possible impacts of this reform by combining firm-level environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data with a global general equilibrium model. It finds that the reform would result in a significant reallocation of capital, goods, and services across sectors and economies. It finds that while the reform could significantly increase investment, the investment is not necessarily sustainable and not all countries benefit from cooperation. The paper identifies a range of challenges that need to be overcome for these results to hold, including the reliability of ESG data, inconsistencies in taxonomies and methodologies, and further analysis confirming whether green firms are indeed safer borrowers. The paper argues that the G20 is well placed to address these challenges and outlines an agenda to achieve it.
{"title":"Promoting sustainable investment through financial architecture reform","authors":"A. Triggs","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The global financial architecture is struggling to facilitate the sustainable investment needed to address climate change. Some argue that if the Basel III global capital rules treated environmentally friendly assets as being safer forms of capital, banks would be incentivized to hold more of these assets on their balance sheets and extend more green debt, promoting sustainable investment. This paper explores the possible impacts of this reform by combining firm-level environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data with a global general equilibrium model. It finds that the reform would result in a significant reallocation of capital, goods, and services across sectors and economies. It finds that while the reform could significantly increase investment, the investment is not necessarily sustainable and not all countries benefit from cooperation. The paper identifies a range of challenges that need to be overcome for these results to hold, including the reliability of ESG data, inconsistencies in taxonomies and methodologies, and further analysis confirming whether green firms are indeed safer borrowers. The paper argues that the G20 is well placed to address these challenges and outlines an agenda to achieve it.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42032797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An aspect of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ we examine in this paper is the ability of the reserve currency issuer to run expansionary fiscal policies to stabilize the economy when a negative shock occurs without triggering an adverse reaction of foreign lenders, including, in particular, higher interest rates imposed by global capital markets. To explore this ‘privilege’ we look at the G7, a group of advanced economies that enjoy larger fiscal space than other countries. We estimate a panel regression model to explain the differences in magnitude of fiscal policy responses to common shocks as a function of countries’ reserve currency status. We find that, indeed, the prevalence of this channel is not rejected by the data and that in fact it seems to have become stronger over time, supported by the global build-up of currency reserves.
{"title":"Exorbitant privilege and fiscal autonomy","authors":"Paola Subacchi, Paul van den Noord","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 An aspect of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ we examine in this paper is the ability of the reserve currency issuer to run expansionary fiscal policies to stabilize the economy when a negative shock occurs without triggering an adverse reaction of foreign lenders, including, in particular, higher interest rates imposed by global capital markets. To explore this ‘privilege’ we look at the G7, a group of advanced economies that enjoy larger fiscal space than other countries. We estimate a panel regression model to explain the differences in magnitude of fiscal policy responses to common shocks as a function of countries’ reserve currency status. We find that, indeed, the prevalence of this channel is not rejected by the data and that in fact it seems to have become stronger over time, supported by the global build-up of currency reserves.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47520214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement give countries wide latitude to regulate cross-border capital movements, subject mainly to the proviso that such regulations not be used to manipulate the exchange rate for the purpose of gaining an unfair competitive advantage. Beginning from the 1990s, however, the IMF has seemed far more supportive of fully open capital accounts than its legal framework. This can be seen not only in the institutional push to amend the Articles to enshrine fully open capital accounts in the mid-1990s, but also in subsequent speeches by IMF managing directors impugning capital controls and recent attempts to codify a set of highly restrictive circumstances under which countries may avail themselves of external financial regulations. This history suggests that, institutionally, the IMF would be far more comfortable with an architecture in which countries (strive to) eliminate restrictions on cross-border capital movements than with the vision of capital controls enshrined in its constitution by the IMF’s founding fathers, Keynes and White.
国际货币基金组织(imf)的《协定》(Articles of Agreement)赋予各国监管跨境资本流动的广泛自由度，但主要附带条件是，不得利用此类监管来操纵汇率，以获得不公平的竞争优势。然而，从上世纪90年代开始，IMF似乎更支持全面开放资本账户，而不是其法律框架。这不仅体现在20世纪90年代中期，机构推动修改《章程》，以保证完全开放资本账户，还体现在IMF总裁随后的讲话中，他们抨击资本管制，以及最近试图编纂一系列高度限制性的环境，在这些环境下，各国可以利用外部金融监管。这段历史表明，从制度上讲，IMF更愿意接受各国(努力)消除对跨境资本流动限制的架构，而不是IMF创始人凯恩斯和怀特在其章程中所倡导的资本管制愿景。
{"title":"The IMF’s journey on capital controls: what is the destination?","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement give countries wide latitude to regulate cross-border capital movements, subject mainly to the proviso that such regulations not be used to manipulate the exchange rate for the purpose of gaining an unfair competitive advantage. Beginning from the 1990s, however, the IMF has seemed far more supportive of fully open capital accounts than its legal framework. This can be seen not only in the institutional push to amend the Articles to enshrine fully open capital accounts in the mid-1990s, but also in subsequent speeches by IMF managing directors impugning capital controls and recent attempts to codify a set of highly restrictive circumstances under which countries may avail themselves of external financial regulations. This history suggests that, institutionally, the IMF would be far more comfortable with an architecture in which countries (strive to) eliminate restrictions on cross-border capital movements than with the vision of capital controls enshrined in its constitution by the IMF’s founding fathers, Keynes and White.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42171988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
China’s interaction with the international financial system is driven by its growing economic importance in the world. However, China’s financial influence has been much under-presented compared with its economic power. This mismatch provides an opportunity for China to promote greater inclusiveness and better balance of power in global financial governance. The accelerated financial opening-up, exchange-rate flexibility, and deepened domestic reform also nourished the ambition of internationalization of the renminbi that would have impact on the global reserve currency system. This paper investigates the motivations behind China’s engagements with the international financial system, the approaches China adopted to achieve its goals, and the key domestic policies required for China to gain more weight in the global financial market.
{"title":"The role of China in the international financial system","authors":"Haihong Gao","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 China’s interaction with the international financial system is driven by its growing economic importance in the world. However, China’s financial influence has been much under-presented compared with its economic power. This mismatch provides an opportunity for China to promote greater inclusiveness and better balance of power in global financial governance. The accelerated financial opening-up, exchange-rate flexibility, and deepened domestic reform also nourished the ambition of internationalization of the renminbi that would have impact on the global reserve currency system. This paper investigates the motivations behind China’s engagements with the international financial system, the approaches China adopted to achieve its goals, and the key domestic policies required for China to gain more weight in the global financial market.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42424146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
All sovereign debt restructurings are inherently messy, expensive, exasperating, time-consuming, and contentious. These are the familiar pathologies in the international system to resolve unsustainable sovereign debts. But the period since the onset of the Covid-19 crisis has revealed (to use a term we all learned during pandemic lockdowns) several new co-morbidities. These include a breakdown in the ability of the major external creditor groups (traditional Paris Club lenders, non-Paris Club bilateral creditors like China and bondholders) to coordinate their debt relief efforts, the increasingly diverse nature of the private-sector entities holding claims against a debtor state, and the total absence of any mechanisms—statutory or contractual—that can be used to ensure that the sacrifices made by the vast majority of claimants and official sector sponsors in the economic recovery process cannot be exploited by the uncooperative few.
{"title":"Avoiding a lost decade—an interim update","authors":"L. Buchheit, Mitu G. Gulati","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 All sovereign debt restructurings are inherently messy, expensive, exasperating, time-consuming, and contentious. These are the familiar pathologies in the international system to resolve unsustainable sovereign debts. But the period since the onset of the Covid-19 crisis has revealed (to use a term we all learned during pandemic lockdowns) several new co-morbidities. These include a breakdown in the ability of the major external creditor groups (traditional Paris Club lenders, non-Paris Club bilateral creditors like China and bondholders) to coordinate their debt relief efforts, the increasingly diverse nature of the private-sector entities holding claims against a debtor state, and the total absence of any mechanisms—statutory or contractual—that can be used to ensure that the sacrifices made by the vast majority of claimants and official sector sponsors in the economic recovery process cannot be exploited by the uncooperative few.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49666719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Controls on international capital flows were a central issue for the International Monetary Fund at Bretton Woods in 1944. But by the 1970s, mainstream thinking was encouraging open capital flows. A succession of damaging crises followed: Latin America in the 1980s, Mexico again in 1994, and Asia in 1997. Fund policies were tweaked, but the causes were seen as being largely in the recipient countries. Capital controls were specifically rejected. Nevertheless, the Fund’s view began to shift, probably encouraged by the 2008 global financial crisis. There was a growing recognition that the capital-flow surges at the heart of these crises were often externally driven, reflecting global factors. The appropriate response would include capital flow management (CFM). The Fund recognized this in its 2012 Institutional View, but CFM was at the bottom of the policy toolbox, surrounded by conditions and constraints, maintaining the stigma on CFM. Meanwhile many emerging economies were enhancing their ability to cope with excessive capital flows, although at some cost (slower growth, tighter fiscal policy, large foreign-exchange reserves). At the same time the flows were increasing, with a bigger component of flighty portfolio flows. CFM measures still have an important place in this new environment, but the Fund’s reluctance to embrace them means that a deep discussion on operationalizing effective CFMs is still lacking.
{"title":"The International Monetary Fund and capital flows","authors":"S. Grenville","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Controls on international capital flows were a central issue for the International Monetary Fund at Bretton Woods in 1944. But by the 1970s, mainstream thinking was encouraging open capital flows. A succession of damaging crises followed: Latin America in the 1980s, Mexico again in 1994, and Asia in 1997. Fund policies were tweaked, but the causes were seen as being largely in the recipient countries. Capital controls were specifically rejected.\u0000 Nevertheless, the Fund’s view began to shift, probably encouraged by the 2008 global financial crisis. There was a growing recognition that the capital-flow surges at the heart of these crises were often externally driven, reflecting global factors. The appropriate response would include capital flow management (CFM). The Fund recognized this in its 2012 Institutional View, but CFM was at the bottom of the policy toolbox, surrounded by conditions and constraints, maintaining the stigma on CFM.\u0000 Meanwhile many emerging economies were enhancing their ability to cope with excessive capital flows, although at some cost (slower growth, tighter fiscal policy, large foreign-exchange reserves). At the same time the flows were increasing, with a bigger component of flighty portfolio flows. CFM measures still have an important place in this new environment, but the Fund’s reluctance to embrace them means that a deep discussion on operationalizing effective CFMs is still lacking.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43200160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The impossible trinity suggests that an economy cannot simultaneously achieve a fixed exchange rate, high capital mobility, and independent monetary policy without abandoning one of these. However, This paper looks at Indonesia’s experiences from the 2009 QE and the 2013 taper tantrum, considering why Indonesian policy-makers were unable to use policies as per the trilemma, and the policy implications of this. There are three possible reasons why Indonesia found it difficult to implement this trilemma policy choice: differing monetary policy objectives, volatile floating exchange rates, and balance sheet effects. The commodity supercycle also plays an exogenous role, unable to be overcome by monetary or exchange rate policy while at the same time impacting fiscal policy, income redistribution, trade balance, and the exchange rate. Overall, this paper argues that monetary policy on its own is likely to be insufficient to manage the economy adequately. Other levers and factors, such as macroprudential policy, fiscal policy, capital flow management, and institutional quality, are critical to make the policy choices more effective.
{"title":"The impossibility of the impossible trinity? The case of Indonesia","authors":"M. Basri, Luqman Sumartono","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The impossible trinity suggests that an economy cannot simultaneously achieve a fixed exchange rate, high capital mobility, and independent monetary policy without abandoning one of these. However, This paper looks at Indonesia’s experiences from the 2009 QE and the 2013 taper tantrum, considering why Indonesian policy-makers were unable to use policies as per the trilemma, and the policy implications of this. There are three possible reasons why Indonesia found it difficult to implement this trilemma policy choice: differing monetary policy objectives, volatile floating exchange rates, and balance sheet effects. The commodity supercycle also plays an exogenous role, unable to be overcome by monetary or exchange rate policy while at the same time impacting fiscal policy, income redistribution, trade balance, and the exchange rate. Overall, this paper argues that monetary policy on its own is likely to be insufficient to manage the economy adequately. Other levers and factors, such as macroprudential policy, fiscal policy, capital flow management, and institutional quality, are critical to make the policy choices more effective.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47145402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The war in Ukraine draws renewed attention to the question of whether the international monetary and financial system is moving towards a more ‘multipolar’ character. The euro has been the second most important global currency since its creation, and well-placed to help diversify the global financial architecture. This article reviews the evolution of the euro’s international role along with the evolution of the institutional architecture to support it. Previous and ongoing reforms in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) can support the common currency on the international stage.
{"title":"The Euro on the global stage","authors":"Klaus Regling","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The war in Ukraine draws renewed attention to the question of whether the international monetary and financial system is moving towards a more ‘multipolar’ character. The euro has been the second most important global currency since its creation, and well-placed to help diversify the global financial architecture. This article reviews the evolution of the euro’s international role along with the evolution of the institutional architecture to support it. Previous and ongoing reforms in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) can support the common currency on the international stage.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48340298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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