This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 (Krueger, 2002a,b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important (IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.
{"title":"Creating a new sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism: why incentives, risk sharing, and CACs will all matter","authors":"G. Menzies, D. Vines","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 (Krueger, 2002a,b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important (IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46940382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sir Alan Budd: a tribute","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41658740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The global financial architecture is struggling to facilitate the sustainable investment needed to address climate change. Some argue that if the Basel III global capital rules treated environmentally friendly assets as being safer forms of capital, banks would be incentivized to hold more of these assets on their balance sheets and extend more green debt, promoting sustainable investment. This paper explores the possible impacts of this reform by combining firm-level environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data with a global general equilibrium model. It finds that the reform would result in a significant reallocation of capital, goods, and services across sectors and economies. It finds that while the reform could significantly increase investment, the investment is not necessarily sustainable and not all countries benefit from cooperation. The paper identifies a range of challenges that need to be overcome for these results to hold, including the reliability of ESG data, inconsistencies in taxonomies and methodologies, and further analysis confirming whether green firms are indeed safer borrowers. The paper argues that the G20 is well placed to address these challenges and outlines an agenda to achieve it.
{"title":"Promoting sustainable investment through financial architecture reform","authors":"A. Triggs","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The global financial architecture is struggling to facilitate the sustainable investment needed to address climate change. Some argue that if the Basel III global capital rules treated environmentally friendly assets as being safer forms of capital, banks would be incentivized to hold more of these assets on their balance sheets and extend more green debt, promoting sustainable investment. This paper explores the possible impacts of this reform by combining firm-level environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data with a global general equilibrium model. It finds that the reform would result in a significant reallocation of capital, goods, and services across sectors and economies. It finds that while the reform could significantly increase investment, the investment is not necessarily sustainable and not all countries benefit from cooperation. The paper identifies a range of challenges that need to be overcome for these results to hold, including the reliability of ESG data, inconsistencies in taxonomies and methodologies, and further analysis confirming whether green firms are indeed safer borrowers. The paper argues that the G20 is well placed to address these challenges and outlines an agenda to achieve it.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42032797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An aspect of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ we examine in this paper is the ability of the reserve currency issuer to run expansionary fiscal policies to stabilize the economy when a negative shock occurs without triggering an adverse reaction of foreign lenders, including, in particular, higher interest rates imposed by global capital markets. To explore this ‘privilege’ we look at the G7, a group of advanced economies that enjoy larger fiscal space than other countries. We estimate a panel regression model to explain the differences in magnitude of fiscal policy responses to common shocks as a function of countries’ reserve currency status. We find that, indeed, the prevalence of this channel is not rejected by the data and that in fact it seems to have become stronger over time, supported by the global build-up of currency reserves.
{"title":"Exorbitant privilege and fiscal autonomy","authors":"Paola Subacchi, Paul van den Noord","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 An aspect of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ we examine in this paper is the ability of the reserve currency issuer to run expansionary fiscal policies to stabilize the economy when a negative shock occurs without triggering an adverse reaction of foreign lenders, including, in particular, higher interest rates imposed by global capital markets. To explore this ‘privilege’ we look at the G7, a group of advanced economies that enjoy larger fiscal space than other countries. We estimate a panel regression model to explain the differences in magnitude of fiscal policy responses to common shocks as a function of countries’ reserve currency status. We find that, indeed, the prevalence of this channel is not rejected by the data and that in fact it seems to have become stronger over time, supported by the global build-up of currency reserves.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47520214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement give countries wide latitude to regulate cross-border capital movements, subject mainly to the proviso that such regulations not be used to manipulate the exchange rate for the purpose of gaining an unfair competitive advantage. Beginning from the 1990s, however, the IMF has seemed far more supportive of fully open capital accounts than its legal framework. This can be seen not only in the institutional push to amend the Articles to enshrine fully open capital accounts in the mid-1990s, but also in subsequent speeches by IMF managing directors impugning capital controls and recent attempts to codify a set of highly restrictive circumstances under which countries may avail themselves of external financial regulations. This history suggests that, institutionally, the IMF would be far more comfortable with an architecture in which countries (strive to) eliminate restrictions on cross-border capital movements than with the vision of capital controls enshrined in its constitution by the IMF’s founding fathers, Keynes and White.
国际货币基金组织(imf)的《协定》(Articles of Agreement)赋予各国监管跨境资本流动的广泛自由度，但主要附带条件是，不得利用此类监管来操纵汇率，以获得不公平的竞争优势。然而，从上世纪90年代开始，IMF似乎更支持全面开放资本账户，而不是其法律框架。这不仅体现在20世纪90年代中期，机构推动修改《章程》，以保证完全开放资本账户，还体现在IMF总裁随后的讲话中，他们抨击资本管制，以及最近试图编纂一系列高度限制性的环境，在这些环境下，各国可以利用外部金融监管。这段历史表明，从制度上讲，IMF更愿意接受各国(努力)消除对跨境资本流动限制的架构，而不是IMF创始人凯恩斯和怀特在其章程中所倡导的资本管制愿景。
{"title":"The IMF’s journey on capital controls: what is the destination?","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement give countries wide latitude to regulate cross-border capital movements, subject mainly to the proviso that such regulations not be used to manipulate the exchange rate for the purpose of gaining an unfair competitive advantage. Beginning from the 1990s, however, the IMF has seemed far more supportive of fully open capital accounts than its legal framework. This can be seen not only in the institutional push to amend the Articles to enshrine fully open capital accounts in the mid-1990s, but also in subsequent speeches by IMF managing directors impugning capital controls and recent attempts to codify a set of highly restrictive circumstances under which countries may avail themselves of external financial regulations. This history suggests that, institutionally, the IMF would be far more comfortable with an architecture in which countries (strive to) eliminate restrictions on cross-border capital movements than with the vision of capital controls enshrined in its constitution by the IMF’s founding fathers, Keynes and White.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42171988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
China’s interaction with the international financial system is driven by its growing economic importance in the world. However, China’s financial influence has been much under-presented compared with its economic power. This mismatch provides an opportunity for China to promote greater inclusiveness and better balance of power in global financial governance. The accelerated financial opening-up, exchange-rate flexibility, and deepened domestic reform also nourished the ambition of internationalization of the renminbi that would have impact on the global reserve currency system. This paper investigates the motivations behind China’s engagements with the international financial system, the approaches China adopted to achieve its goals, and the key domestic policies required for China to gain more weight in the global financial market.
{"title":"The role of China in the international financial system","authors":"Haihong Gao","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 China’s interaction with the international financial system is driven by its growing economic importance in the world. However, China’s financial influence has been much under-presented compared with its economic power. This mismatch provides an opportunity for China to promote greater inclusiveness and better balance of power in global financial governance. The accelerated financial opening-up, exchange-rate flexibility, and deepened domestic reform also nourished the ambition of internationalization of the renminbi that would have impact on the global reserve currency system. This paper investigates the motivations behind China’s engagements with the international financial system, the approaches China adopted to achieve its goals, and the key domestic policies required for China to gain more weight in the global financial market.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42424146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The impossible trinity suggests that an economy cannot simultaneously achieve a fixed exchange rate, high capital mobility, and independent monetary policy without abandoning one of these. However, This paper looks at Indonesia’s experiences from the 2009 QE and the 2013 taper tantrum, considering why Indonesian policy-makers were unable to use policies as per the trilemma, and the policy implications of this. There are three possible reasons why Indonesia found it difficult to implement this trilemma policy choice: differing monetary policy objectives, volatile floating exchange rates, and balance sheet effects. The commodity supercycle also plays an exogenous role, unable to be overcome by monetary or exchange rate policy while at the same time impacting fiscal policy, income redistribution, trade balance, and the exchange rate. Overall, this paper argues that monetary policy on its own is likely to be insufficient to manage the economy adequately. Other levers and factors, such as macroprudential policy, fiscal policy, capital flow management, and institutional quality, are critical to make the policy choices more effective.
{"title":"The impossibility of the impossible trinity? The case of Indonesia","authors":"M. Basri, Luqman Sumartono","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The impossible trinity suggests that an economy cannot simultaneously achieve a fixed exchange rate, high capital mobility, and independent monetary policy without abandoning one of these. However, This paper looks at Indonesia’s experiences from the 2009 QE and the 2013 taper tantrum, considering why Indonesian policy-makers were unable to use policies as per the trilemma, and the policy implications of this. There are three possible reasons why Indonesia found it difficult to implement this trilemma policy choice: differing monetary policy objectives, volatile floating exchange rates, and balance sheet effects. The commodity supercycle also plays an exogenous role, unable to be overcome by monetary or exchange rate policy while at the same time impacting fiscal policy, income redistribution, trade balance, and the exchange rate. Overall, this paper argues that monetary policy on its own is likely to be insufficient to manage the economy adequately. Other levers and factors, such as macroprudential policy, fiscal policy, capital flow management, and institutional quality, are critical to make the policy choices more effective.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47145402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Controls on international capital flows were a central issue for the International Monetary Fund at Bretton Woods in 1944. But by the 1970s, mainstream thinking was encouraging open capital flows. A succession of damaging crises followed: Latin America in the 1980s, Mexico again in 1994, and Asia in 1997. Fund policies were tweaked, but the causes were seen as being largely in the recipient countries. Capital controls were specifically rejected. Nevertheless, the Fund’s view began to shift, probably encouraged by the 2008 global financial crisis. There was a growing recognition that the capital-flow surges at the heart of these crises were often externally driven, reflecting global factors. The appropriate response would include capital flow management (CFM). The Fund recognized this in its 2012 Institutional View, but CFM was at the bottom of the policy toolbox, surrounded by conditions and constraints, maintaining the stigma on CFM. Meanwhile many emerging economies were enhancing their ability to cope with excessive capital flows, although at some cost (slower growth, tighter fiscal policy, large foreign-exchange reserves). At the same time the flows were increasing, with a bigger component of flighty portfolio flows. CFM measures still have an important place in this new environment, but the Fund’s reluctance to embrace them means that a deep discussion on operationalizing effective CFMs is still lacking.
{"title":"The International Monetary Fund and capital flows","authors":"S. Grenville","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Controls on international capital flows were a central issue for the International Monetary Fund at Bretton Woods in 1944. But by the 1970s, mainstream thinking was encouraging open capital flows. A succession of damaging crises followed: Latin America in the 1980s, Mexico again in 1994, and Asia in 1997. Fund policies were tweaked, but the causes were seen as being largely in the recipient countries. Capital controls were specifically rejected.\u0000 Nevertheless, the Fund’s view began to shift, probably encouraged by the 2008 global financial crisis. There was a growing recognition that the capital-flow surges at the heart of these crises were often externally driven, reflecting global factors. The appropriate response would include capital flow management (CFM). The Fund recognized this in its 2012 Institutional View, but CFM was at the bottom of the policy toolbox, surrounded by conditions and constraints, maintaining the stigma on CFM.\u0000 Meanwhile many emerging economies were enhancing their ability to cope with excessive capital flows, although at some cost (slower growth, tighter fiscal policy, large foreign-exchange reserves). At the same time the flows were increasing, with a bigger component of flighty portfolio flows. CFM measures still have an important place in this new environment, but the Fund’s reluctance to embrace them means that a deep discussion on operationalizing effective CFMs is still lacking.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43200160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
All sovereign debt restructurings are inherently messy, expensive, exasperating, time-consuming, and contentious. These are the familiar pathologies in the international system to resolve unsustainable sovereign debts. But the period since the onset of the Covid-19 crisis has revealed (to use a term we all learned during pandemic lockdowns) several new co-morbidities. These include a breakdown in the ability of the major external creditor groups (traditional Paris Club lenders, non-Paris Club bilateral creditors like China and bondholders) to coordinate their debt relief efforts, the increasingly diverse nature of the private-sector entities holding claims against a debtor state, and the total absence of any mechanisms—statutory or contractual—that can be used to ensure that the sacrifices made by the vast majority of claimants and official sector sponsors in the economic recovery process cannot be exploited by the uncooperative few.
{"title":"Avoiding a lost decade—an interim update","authors":"L. Buchheit, Mitu G. Gulati","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 All sovereign debt restructurings are inherently messy, expensive, exasperating, time-consuming, and contentious. These are the familiar pathologies in the international system to resolve unsustainable sovereign debts. But the period since the onset of the Covid-19 crisis has revealed (to use a term we all learned during pandemic lockdowns) several new co-morbidities. These include a breakdown in the ability of the major external creditor groups (traditional Paris Club lenders, non-Paris Club bilateral creditors like China and bondholders) to coordinate their debt relief efforts, the increasingly diverse nature of the private-sector entities holding claims against a debtor state, and the total absence of any mechanisms—statutory or contractual—that can be used to ensure that the sacrifices made by the vast majority of claimants and official sector sponsors in the economic recovery process cannot be exploited by the uncooperative few.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49666719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we analyse why an understanding of the global ‘non-system’, in which we now live, took so long to arrive after the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971. We first describe how knowledge of how an inflation-targeting regime would operate—what we call ‘Taylor-rule macroeconomics’—was only gradually created during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. We then describe how, subsequent to this, an awareness emerged, also gradually, of how the international non-system might work, depending, as it does, on Taylor-rule macroeconomics being already in place. We then discuss the Great Moderation, making clear that a well-functioning global non-system would require not just inflation targeting and floating exchange rates in each country, but also adequate fiscal discipline, and a satisfactory form of financial regulation. We describe how a well-functioning version of this global non-system would actually fit together. We then discuss how this non-system has responded to two enormous challenges of the last 15 years, namely the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid pandemic. This discussion of what has happened in the recent past provides the background to a discussion, in the companion paper by Subacchi and Vines in this issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy, of the challenges that the global non-system will face in the future.
在本文中，我们分析了为什么在1971年布雷顿森林体系崩溃后，人们花了这么长时间才理解我们现在所处的全球“非体系”。我们首先描述了通胀目标制如何运作的知识——我们称之为“泰勒规则宏观经济学”——在20世纪70年代、80年代和90年代才逐渐被创造出来。然后，我们描述了在此之后，人们如何逐渐意识到国际非体系如何运作，这取决于已经存在的泰勒规则宏观经济学。然后，我们讨论了大稳健，明确指出一个运作良好的全球非体系不仅需要每个国家的通胀目制制和浮动汇率，还需要充分的财政纪律和令人满意的金融监管形式。我们描述了一个运作良好的全球非系统是如何真正整合在一起的。然后，我们讨论了这一非体系如何应对过去15年的两大挑战，即全球金融危机和新冠肺炎大流行。苏巴奇和瓦因斯在本期《牛津经济政策评论》(Oxford Review of Economic Policy)的合著论文中讨论了全球非体系未来将面临的挑战，对最近发生的事情的讨论为这一讨论提供了背景。
{"title":"From the Bretton Woods system to the global non-system: the trials and tribulations of slow learning","authors":"D. Vines, Paola Subacchi","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper we analyse why an understanding of the global ‘non-system’, in which we now live, took so long to arrive after the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971. We first describe how knowledge of how an inflation-targeting regime would operate—what we call ‘Taylor-rule macroeconomics’—was only gradually created during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. We then describe how, subsequent to this, an awareness emerged, also gradually, of how the international non-system might work, depending, as it does, on Taylor-rule macroeconomics being already in place. We then discuss the Great Moderation, making clear that a well-functioning global non-system would require not just inflation targeting and floating exchange rates in each country, but also adequate fiscal discipline, and a satisfactory form of financial regulation. We describe how a well-functioning version of this global non-system would actually fit together. We then discuss how this non-system has responded to two enormous challenges of the last 15 years, namely the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid pandemic. This discussion of what has happened in the recent past provides the background to a discussion, in the companion paper by Subacchi and Vines in this issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy, of the challenges that the global non-system will face in the future.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42909263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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