As disruptions from climate change increase, so will the urgency to find shorter-term approaches to ameliorating its harms. This may include calls to implement solar geoengineering, an approach to cooling the planet by reflecting incoming sunlight back to space. While the exact effects of solar geoengineering are still highly uncertain, physical science to date suggests that it may be effective at reducing many aspects of climate change in the short term. One of the biggest concerns about solar geoengineering is the extent to which it may interfere with crucial emissions reductions policies, i.e. mitigation. There are multiple channels by which geoengineering could alter mitigation pathways, both financial and behavioural. Here we define three such linkages and present the evidence available to constrain their potential magnitudes. Because solar geoengineering is not a substitute for mitigation, policies to develop or implement technologies that could be used to carry it out should be designed to accentuate its complementary nature to mitigation and deter the possibility it is used to delay decarbonizing the economy.
{"title":"How may solar geoengineering impact global prospects for climate change mitigation?","authors":"Katharine Ricke, Anthony Harding","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad044","url":null,"abstract":"As disruptions from climate change increase, so will the urgency to find shorter-term approaches to ameliorating its harms. This may include calls to implement solar geoengineering, an approach to cooling the planet by reflecting incoming sunlight back to space. While the exact effects of solar geoengineering are still highly uncertain, physical science to date suggests that it may be effective at reducing many aspects of climate change in the short term. One of the biggest concerns about solar geoengineering is the extent to which it may interfere with crucial emissions reductions policies, i.e. mitigation. There are multiple channels by which geoengineering could alter mitigation pathways, both financial and behavioural. Here we define three such linkages and present the evidence available to constrain their potential magnitudes. Because solar geoengineering is not a substitute for mitigation, policies to develop or implement technologies that could be used to carry it out should be designed to accentuate its complementary nature to mitigation and deter the possibility it is used to delay decarbonizing the economy.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Air pollution is a growing concern in India, and its adverse health effects are well documented. Climate change is likely to exacerbate this problem by altering weather patterns and increasing the frequency and severity of extreme events. This paper examines the potential impact of climate change on ambient air pollution in India and its implications for policy design. Our analysis reveals that pollution in India is highly sensitive to variation in weather, particularly in the densely populated Indus-Gangetic Plain. Using our estimated relationship between weather and pollution, we predict that changing weather patterns will increase average PM2.5 concentrations by 3.1 µg/m3, leading to a loss of 364 million years of life expectancy. To address this challenge, we propose an emissions fee calibrated to be highest in regions most vulnerable to persistently high levels of pollution and most sensitive to future deterioration in air quality due to climate change.
{"title":"How will climate change affect ambient air pollution and what can policy-makers do now? Lessons from India","authors":"Avraham Ebenstein, Sangeeta Bansal, Sagnik Dey, Tanya Gupta, Kshitij Abhay Kakade, Avi Simhon","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad041","url":null,"abstract":"Air pollution is a growing concern in India, and its adverse health effects are well documented. Climate change is likely to exacerbate this problem by altering weather patterns and increasing the frequency and severity of extreme events. This paper examines the potential impact of climate change on ambient air pollution in India and its implications for policy design. Our analysis reveals that pollution in India is highly sensitive to variation in weather, particularly in the densely populated Indus-Gangetic Plain. Using our estimated relationship between weather and pollution, we predict that changing weather patterns will increase average PM2.5 concentrations by 3.1 µg/m3, leading to a loss of 364 million years of life expectancy. To address this challenge, we propose an emissions fee calibrated to be highest in regions most vulnerable to persistently high levels of pollution and most sensitive to future deterioration in air quality due to climate change.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"184 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Grubb, Alexandra Poncia, Paul Drummond, Karsten Neuhoff, Jean-Charles Hourcade
We present an economics framework appropriate to the exceptionally broad scope of the climate change problem. This considers that economic and social processes, particularly those involved in purposive transitions of energy technologies and systems, involve the interplay between three distinct domains of decision-making and associated actors. The first concerns small-scale and often short-term decision-making, much of which reflects extensive ‘satisficing’ and habituation as identified in behavioural economics. Calculated economic optimization decisions, especially of companies in the energy and energy-intensive industries, then best reflect the core assumptions of neoclassical and welfare economics, including discrete market failures. Third, at the largest scale are strategic judgements made by big actors (e.g. governments, large multinational companies) relevant to transformation of complex systems over long periods—particularly concerning innovation and structural changes, for which lessons from theories of evolutionary and institutional economics are most relevant. Economically, these can be logically mapped in relation to the technology (or more accurately, ‘best practice’) frontier. Each has corresponding policy implications: most directly, respectively in terms of (i) standards and engagement to establish norms; (ii) competitive markets with the critical role of prices; and (iii) strategic investment in innovation and infrastructure. Each faces challenges of implementation and government failure, as observed, for example, with wholly inadequate carbon pricing to date, naïve and ineffective approaches to enhancing energy efficiency, or misdirected support to R&D. Based on the domain distinctions, we argue that the corresponding pillars of policy are naturally complementary, and can be mutually supportive: strong standards and norms on energy efficiency, for example, would enhance the political space for carbon pricing by reducing its direct consumer impacts, while carbon pricing has multiple positive two-way interactions with enhanced low-carbon innovation. From this we also posit a ‘carbon pricing paradox’: that adequate carbon prices, the central recommendation of most economists, are in most jurisdictions only feasible (or even optimal) if equal analytic and policy attention is devoted to the other pillars, and the wider context of macroeconomic and fiscal policies. Only these other aspects can reduce the absolute cost impact of carbon pricing (potentially turning into a gain) and offer consumers and businesses better lower-carbon alternatives, which are critical to establishing climate-compatible pricing structures across our economies.
{"title":"Policy complementarity and the paradox of carbon pricing","authors":"Michael Grubb, Alexandra Poncia, Paul Drummond, Karsten Neuhoff, Jean-Charles Hourcade","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad045","url":null,"abstract":"We present an economics framework appropriate to the exceptionally broad scope of the climate change problem. This considers that economic and social processes, particularly those involved in purposive transitions of energy technologies and systems, involve the interplay between three distinct domains of decision-making and associated actors. The first concerns small-scale and often short-term decision-making, much of which reflects extensive ‘satisficing’ and habituation as identified in behavioural economics. Calculated economic optimization decisions, especially of companies in the energy and energy-intensive industries, then best reflect the core assumptions of neoclassical and welfare economics, including discrete market failures. Third, at the largest scale are strategic judgements made by big actors (e.g. governments, large multinational companies) relevant to transformation of complex systems over long periods—particularly concerning innovation and structural changes, for which lessons from theories of evolutionary and institutional economics are most relevant. Economically, these can be logically mapped in relation to the technology (or more accurately, ‘best practice’) frontier. Each has corresponding policy implications: most directly, respectively in terms of (i) standards and engagement to establish norms; (ii) competitive markets with the critical role of prices; and (iii) strategic investment in innovation and infrastructure. Each faces challenges of implementation and government failure, as observed, for example, with wholly inadequate carbon pricing to date, naïve and ineffective approaches to enhancing energy efficiency, or misdirected support to R&D. Based on the domain distinctions, we argue that the corresponding pillars of policy are naturally complementary, and can be mutually supportive: strong standards and norms on energy efficiency, for example, would enhance the political space for carbon pricing by reducing its direct consumer impacts, while carbon pricing has multiple positive two-way interactions with enhanced low-carbon innovation. From this we also posit a ‘carbon pricing paradox’: that adequate carbon prices, the central recommendation of most economists, are in most jurisdictions only feasible (or even optimal) if equal analytic and policy attention is devoted to the other pillars, and the wider context of macroeconomic and fiscal policies. Only these other aspects can reduce the absolute cost impact of carbon pricing (potentially turning into a gain) and offer consumers and businesses better lower-carbon alternatives, which are critical to establishing climate-compatible pricing structures across our economies.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While carbon pricing, in general, and carbon taxes, in particular, are popular with economists, they are subject to considerable misunderstanding among policy-makers and the public. In this paper I consider and refute five myths about carnbon taxes: (i) that a carbon price will hurt economic growth; (ii) that carbon pricing will kill jobs; (iii) that a carbon tax and cap-and-trade programme have the same economic impacts; (iv) that we can’t achieve carbon reduction targets with a carbon tax; and (v) that carbon pricing is regressive. I then discuss implications for policy-making.
{"title":"Five myths about carbon pricing","authors":"Gilbert E Metcalf","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad042","url":null,"abstract":"While carbon pricing, in general, and carbon taxes, in particular, are popular with economists, they are subject to considerable misunderstanding among policy-makers and the public. In this paper I consider and refute five myths about carnbon taxes: (i) that a carbon price will hurt economic growth; (ii) that carbon pricing will kill jobs; (iii) that a carbon tax and cap-and-trade programme have the same economic impacts; (iv) that we can’t achieve carbon reduction targets with a carbon tax; and (v) that carbon pricing is regressive. I then discuss implications for policy-making.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"187 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite some progress, the Group of 7 (G7) have yet to act collectively to foster a low-carbon transition of their economies. This paper outlines such a strategy, which would also encourage other economies to follow suit. This strategy has three elements: fossil fuel pricing reforms; recycling revenues to fund green innovation and to offset any adverse income or employment impacts; and developing the proposed G7 Climate Club to promote compliance by other countries. This must be accompanied by comprehensive assistance to emerging market and developing economies to help accelerate their clean energy transition, facilitate their participation in the Climate Club, and attain climate, poverty and development goals.
{"title":"Greening the G7 economies","authors":"Edward B Barbier","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad039","url":null,"abstract":"Despite some progress, the Group of 7 (G7) have yet to act collectively to foster a low-carbon transition of their economies. This paper outlines such a strategy, which would also encourage other economies to follow suit. This strategy has three elements: fossil fuel pricing reforms; recycling revenues to fund green innovation and to offset any adverse income or employment impacts; and developing the proposed G7 Climate Club to promote compliance by other countries. This must be accompanied by comprehensive assistance to emerging market and developing economies to help accelerate their clean energy transition, facilitate their participation in the Climate Club, and attain climate, poverty and development goals.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores whether economic viability is the key to achieve deep decarbonization or net zero emissions. The hypothesis tested is that popular support for decarbonization policies is conditional upon most people’s belief that their economic well-being will improve, or at least not suffer with these policies. While GDP growth is the typical metric for economic health, a more useful socio-economic indicator for gauging the political viability of climate policies may be job creation. Specifically, the paper reviews the existing evidence about whether climate policies are more successful in achieving deep decarbonization in the long run if policy-makers include job creation as well as emissions reductions when designing and implementing climate policies, because, to date, climate policy-makers have often focused on emissions reductions as the primary criterion for policy choice. While empirical evidence remains thin, we find that job creation in low-carbon industries appears to lead to greater political support for the climate policies that contribute to decarbonization, but employment factors are not always the most salient factor in a voter’s decision. We also find empirical evidence that clean energy deployment policies, such as feed-in tariffs, have led to significant net gains in employment in the countries that have been studied. The review points to several policy implications, including the need to assess competitive advantage, develop plans, design and execute industrial policy, and develop a low-carbon workforce.
{"title":"Job creation and deep decarbonization","authors":"Kelly Sims Gallagher, Soyoung Oh","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad038","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores whether economic viability is the key to achieve deep decarbonization or net zero emissions. The hypothesis tested is that popular support for decarbonization policies is conditional upon most people’s belief that their economic well-being will improve, or at least not suffer with these policies. While GDP growth is the typical metric for economic health, a more useful socio-economic indicator for gauging the political viability of climate policies may be job creation. Specifically, the paper reviews the existing evidence about whether climate policies are more successful in achieving deep decarbonization in the long run if policy-makers include job creation as well as emissions reductions when designing and implementing climate policies, because, to date, climate policy-makers have often focused on emissions reductions as the primary criterion for policy choice. While empirical evidence remains thin, we find that job creation in low-carbon industries appears to lead to greater political support for the climate policies that contribute to decarbonization, but employment factors are not always the most salient factor in a voter’s decision. We also find empirical evidence that clean energy deployment policies, such as feed-in tariffs, have led to significant net gains in employment in the countries that have been studied. The review points to several policy implications, including the need to assess competitive advantage, develop plans, design and execute industrial policy, and develop a low-carbon workforce.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Penny Mealy, Pete Barbrook-Johnson, Matthew C Ives, Sugandha Srivastav, Cameron Hepburn
While some countries are making progress reducing greenhouse gas emissions, few are progressing rapidly enough to be on track to reach net zero emissions by mid-century. The transition to net zero involves deep structural transformation of the global economy and its associated complex socio-technical systems. Here, we set out a conceptual framework to identify ‘sensitive intervention points’ (SIPs) in systems where a small or moderately-sized intervention could drive outsized impacts and transformational change. These points take three forms: (i) critical tipping points, such as a critical price threshold, (ii) critical nodes in networks, such as an influential actor in a social network, and (iii) critical points in time, where windows of opportunity for change open up. We also propose an assessment methodology for prioritizing interventions in terms of their potential impacts, risks, and ease of implementation. We apply our framework and assessment methodology to evaluate a list of proposed interventions for accelerating global decarbonization. Promising interventions include investing in key clean energy technologies with consistent cost declines, introducing central bank policies to reduce the value of polluting collateral, and enhancing climate-related financial risk disclosure.
{"title":"Sensitive intervention points: a strategic approach to climate action","authors":"Penny Mealy, Pete Barbrook-Johnson, Matthew C Ives, Sugandha Srivastav, Cameron Hepburn","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad043","url":null,"abstract":"While some countries are making progress reducing greenhouse gas emissions, few are progressing rapidly enough to be on track to reach net zero emissions by mid-century. The transition to net zero involves deep structural transformation of the global economy and its associated complex socio-technical systems. Here, we set out a conceptual framework to identify ‘sensitive intervention points’ (SIPs) in systems where a small or moderately-sized intervention could drive outsized impacts and transformational change. These points take three forms: (i) critical tipping points, such as a critical price threshold, (ii) critical nodes in networks, such as an influential actor in a social network, and (iii) critical points in time, where windows of opportunity for change open up. We also propose an assessment methodology for prioritizing interventions in terms of their potential impacts, risks, and ease of implementation. We apply our framework and assessment methodology to evaluate a list of proposed interventions for accelerating global decarbonization. Promising interventions include investing in key clean energy technologies with consistent cost declines, introducing central bank policies to reduce the value of polluting collateral, and enhancing climate-related financial risk disclosure.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"529 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Like in many other countries, wealth inequality has increased in Switzerland over the last 50 years. By providing new evidence on cantonal top wealth shares for each of the 26 cantons since 1969, we show that the overall trend masks striking differences across cantons, both in levels and trends. Combining this with variation in cantonal wealth taxes, we then estimate an event study model to identify the dynamic effects of reforms to top wealth tax rates on the subsequent evolution of wealth concentration. Our results imply that a reduction in the top marginal wealth tax rate by 0.1 percentage points increases the top 1 per cent (0.1 per cent) wealth share by 0.9 (1.2) percentage points 5 years after the reform. This suggests that wealth tax cuts over the last 50 years explain roughly 18 per cent (25 per cent) of the increase in wealth concentration among the top 1 per cent (0.1 per cent).
{"title":"Does a progressive wealth tax reduce top wealth inequality? Evidence from Switzerland","authors":"Samira Marti, Isabel Z Martínez, Florian Scheuer","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Like in many other countries, wealth inequality has increased in Switzerland over the last 50 years. By providing new evidence on cantonal top wealth shares for each of the 26 cantons since 1969, we show that the overall trend masks striking differences across cantons, both in levels and trends. Combining this with variation in cantonal wealth taxes, we then estimate an event study model to identify the dynamic effects of reforms to top wealth tax rates on the subsequent evolution of wealth concentration. Our results imply that a reduction in the top marginal wealth tax rate by 0.1 percentage points increases the top 1 per cent (0.1 per cent) wealth share by 0.9 (1.2) percentage points 5 years after the reform. This suggests that wealth tax cuts over the last 50 years explain roughly 18 per cent (25 per cent) of the increase in wealth concentration among the top 1 per cent (0.1 per cent).","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"291 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136020545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reviews recent developments in the theory and practice of optimal capital taxation. We emphasize three main rationales for capital taxation. First, the frontier between capital and labour income flows is often fuzzy, thereby lending support to a broad-based, comprehensive income tax. Next, the very notions of income and consumption flows are difficult to define and measure for top wealth holders where capital gains due to asset price effects dwarf ordinary income and consumption flows. Therefore the proper way to tax billionaires is a progressive wealth tax. Finally, as individuals cannot choose their parents, there are strong meritocratic reasons why we should tax inherited wealth more than earned income or self-made wealth for which individuals can be held responsible, at least in part. This implies that the ideal fiscal system should also include a progressive inheritance tax, in addition to progressive income and wealth taxes. We then confront our prescriptions with historical experience. Although there are significant differences, we argue that observed fiscal systems in modern democracies bear important similarities with this ideal triptych.
{"title":"Rethinking capital and wealth taxation","authors":"T. Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, G. Zucman","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad026","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper reviews recent developments in the theory and practice of optimal capital taxation. We emphasize three main rationales for capital taxation. First, the frontier between capital and labour income flows is often fuzzy, thereby lending support to a broad-based, comprehensive income tax. Next, the very notions of income and consumption flows are difficult to define and measure for top wealth holders where capital gains due to asset price effects dwarf ordinary income and consumption flows. Therefore the proper way to tax billionaires is a progressive wealth tax. Finally, as individuals cannot choose their parents, there are strong meritocratic reasons why we should tax inherited wealth more than earned income or self-made wealth for which individuals can be held responsible, at least in part. This implies that the ideal fiscal system should also include a progressive inheritance tax, in addition to progressive income and wealth taxes. We then confront our prescriptions with historical experience. Although there are significant differences, we argue that observed fiscal systems in modern democracies bear important similarities with this ideal triptych.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43285556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyses the relative merits of wealth and capital income taxes as instruments for taxing the rich. The main rationale for a wealth tax is to address the incompleteness of the tax code in taxing unrealized capital gains, which can be enormous and concentrated among the wealthy. However, by taxing presumed rather than actual returns, a wealth tax fails to address inequality among taxpayers with the same wealth but different capital incomes. In addition, wealth taxation creates liquidity problems that may adversely affect growth firms and start-ups, which is why wealth taxes typically provide exemptions and deductions for certain business assets. Our empirical analysis, based on Swedish register data, describes the wealth composition of the wealthiest and assesses the distributional incidence of different combinations of wealth and capital income taxation.
{"title":"Taxing the wealthy: the choice between wealth and capital income taxation","authors":"S. Bastani, Daniel Waldenström","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad030","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper analyses the relative merits of wealth and capital income taxes as instruments for taxing the rich. The main rationale for a wealth tax is to address the incompleteness of the tax code in taxing unrealized capital gains, which can be enormous and concentrated among the wealthy. However, by taxing presumed rather than actual returns, a wealth tax fails to address inequality among taxpayers with the same wealth but different capital incomes. In addition, wealth taxation creates liquidity problems that may adversely affect growth firms and start-ups, which is why wealth taxes typically provide exemptions and deductions for certain business assets. Our empirical analysis, based on Swedish register data, describes the wealth composition of the wealthiest and assesses the distributional incidence of different combinations of wealth and capital income taxation.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45418835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：