Businesses may be subject to either individual income taxes or entity-level taxes. Policy choices surrounding the boundary between these taxes can and do vary between countries and over time. I discuss the need for and implications of the existence of this boundary for behaviour, economic measurement, and policy.
{"title":"The messy boundary between pass-through and corporate taxation","authors":"W. Kopczuk","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad034","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Businesses may be subject to either individual income taxes or entity-level taxes. Policy choices surrounding the boundary between these taxes can and do vary between countries and over time. I discuss the need for and implications of the existence of this boundary for behaviour, economic measurement, and policy.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44070496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using anonymized administrative data on the population of UK taxpayers, we show that—in line with high-profile anecdotes about the tax affairs of the rich—effective average tax rates (EATRs) decline at the top of the distribution of income and capital gains. We also document substantial variation in EATRs within remuneration level: a quarter of those in the top 1 per cent pay headline rates, while another quarter pay at least 9pp less than the headline rate. Most of this effect is driven by the composition of remuneration, with investment income having lower tax rates and capital gains having lower rates still. If all individuals with income above £100,000 paid the headline rates, this would raise tax revenue on income and gains by £23 billion on a static basis, an increase of 27 per cent in the tax paid by this group.
{"title":"How much tax do the rich really pay? Evidence from the UK","authors":"A. Advani, H. Hughson, A. Summers","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad032","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Using anonymized administrative data on the population of UK taxpayers, we show that—in line with high-profile anecdotes about the tax affairs of the rich—effective average tax rates (EATRs) decline at the top of the distribution of income and capital gains. We also document substantial variation in EATRs within remuneration level: a quarter of those in the top 1 per cent pay headline rates, while another quarter pay at least 9pp less than the headline rate. Most of this effect is driven by the composition of remuneration, with investment income having lower tax rates and capital gains having lower rates still. If all individuals with income above £100,000 paid the headline rates, this would raise tax revenue on income and gains by £23 billion on a static basis, an increase of 27 per cent in the tax paid by this group.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46577529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract To assess the constitutionality of an unapportioned federal wealth tax, and/or of a federal income tax provision reaching wealthy taxpayers’ unrealized gains, one needs an underlying framework for making judgements about legal claims. While no such framework can be entirely specified, at least to general agreement, this does not support nihilistically rejecting all comparative judgements about better versus worse, or more versus less convincing, instances of legal analysis. While it appears nearly certain that the Supreme Court’s current right-wing majority would strike down an unapportioned federal wealth tax, the ‘correct’ answer to this constitutional question cannot be proven to general agreement. I myself would disagree with such a holding by the Court. An important variable in resolving the issue for oneself is how much continuing precedential weight one should give to Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.—a case that itself blatantly disrespected precedent, but that did so more than a century ago, and that (on the other hand) some argue has already ceased to be good law. The principle of respecting precedent both has instrumental value and has been long (if fitfully) honoured within the American legal system, but all agree that its weight is not absolute. An unapportioned minimum income tax on the wealthiest Americans that included in income their unrealized capital gains would likely be constitutional under currently prevalent legal doctrine. It is true, however, that Eisner v. Macomber (1920), if it were held to remain good law beyond its immediate facts, would support holding it unconstitutional. The prospect that the current Supreme Court’s six right-wingers will decide to revive Macomber provides only one reason for suspecting that they might strike down such a provision, perhaps while also launching a broader constitutional war against central tenets of the current regime for taxing wealthy individuals and capital income. However, it lies beyond the power of conventional legal analysis to predict either what form such a war would take, or on what terms it might end up being resolved.
{"title":"Would an unapportioned US federal wealth tax be constitutional, and what does that mean?","authors":"Daniel Shaviro","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract To assess the constitutionality of an unapportioned federal wealth tax, and/or of a federal income tax provision reaching wealthy taxpayers’ unrealized gains, one needs an underlying framework for making judgements about legal claims. While no such framework can be entirely specified, at least to general agreement, this does not support nihilistically rejecting all comparative judgements about better versus worse, or more versus less convincing, instances of legal analysis. While it appears nearly certain that the Supreme Court’s current right-wing majority would strike down an unapportioned federal wealth tax, the ‘correct’ answer to this constitutional question cannot be proven to general agreement. I myself would disagree with such a holding by the Court. An important variable in resolving the issue for oneself is how much continuing precedential weight one should give to Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.—a case that itself blatantly disrespected precedent, but that did so more than a century ago, and that (on the other hand) some argue has already ceased to be good law. The principle of respecting precedent both has instrumental value and has been long (if fitfully) honoured within the American legal system, but all agree that its weight is not absolute. An unapportioned minimum income tax on the wealthiest Americans that included in income their unrealized capital gains would likely be constitutional under currently prevalent legal doctrine. It is true, however, that Eisner v. Macomber (1920), if it were held to remain good law beyond its immediate facts, would support holding it unconstitutional. The prospect that the current Supreme Court’s six right-wingers will decide to revive Macomber provides only one reason for suspecting that they might strike down such a provision, perhaps while also launching a broader constitutional war against central tenets of the current regime for taxing wealthy individuals and capital income. However, it lies beyond the power of conventional legal analysis to predict either what form such a war would take, or on what terms it might end up being resolved.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136020538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Giovanni Farese, Paolo Guerrieri, Pierre Carlo Padoan
After the fall of the Bretton Woods system, the EU initiated an original path towards monetary integration which led to the establishment of the European monetary system (EMS) in the 1980s and the economic monetary union (EMU) in the 1990s. This path was an alternative to the floating exchange rate regime which many other countries decided to follow. Adopting a political economy approach, in this paper we reconstruct the main phases of this process, from the 1970s up until today, arguing that they cannot be explained only in terms of costs and benefits of alternative exchange rate configuration, but should consider political as well as economic factors—both domestic and international ones—and the interaction between European monetary and real integration. Ultimately, the predominance of political factors led to an underestimation of the economic difficulties generated by the coexistence of irrevocable exchange rates and full capital mobility. We suggest that new policy instruments and institutional changes are needed to make the common currency workable in the long run. The mandatory path should be towards a more deeply integrated Europe. Such integration is essential to enable the European monetary union to confront with future challenges.
{"title":"European monetary regimes after the fall of Bretton Woods: a political economy approach","authors":"Giovanni Farese, Paolo Guerrieri, Pierre Carlo Padoan","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 After the fall of the Bretton Woods system, the EU initiated an original path towards monetary integration which led to the establishment of the European monetary system (EMS) in the 1980s and the economic monetary union (EMU) in the 1990s. This path was an alternative to the floating exchange rate regime which many other countries decided to follow. Adopting a political economy approach, in this paper we reconstruct the main phases of this process, from the 1970s up until today, arguing that they cannot be explained only in terms of costs and benefits of alternative exchange rate configuration, but should consider political as well as economic factors—both domestic and international ones—and the interaction between European monetary and real integration. Ultimately, the predominance of political factors led to an underestimation of the economic difficulties generated by the coexistence of irrevocable exchange rates and full capital mobility. We suggest that new policy instruments and institutional changes are needed to make the common currency workable in the long run. The mandatory path should be towards a more deeply integrated Europe. Such integration is essential to enable the European monetary union to confront with future challenges.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49505288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides quantitative modelling of the effect of three longer-term global transitions: the global demographic transition involving a marked reduction in population growth; a long-term slowdown in productivity growth which may continue, or may conceivably be reversed; and the disruption in the global economy due to increasing climate shocks and the implementation of climate policies that will be needed to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. We study the global investment needs to which these transitions will lead. We demonstrate that these investment needs will be both asymmetric across countries and over time. This asymmetry will lead to potentially large changes in trade flows and significant financial capital flows across national borders, and also to substantial real exchange changes and interest rate movements. The resulting large movements in international capital flows will have significant implications for the global financial system, which we demonstrate at the country and regional level.
{"title":"Longer-term structural transitions and short-term macroeconomic adjustment: quantitative implications for the global financial system","authors":"Warwick McKibbin, D. Vines","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper provides quantitative modelling of the effect of three longer-term global transitions: the global demographic transition involving a marked reduction in population growth; a long-term slowdown in productivity growth which may continue, or may conceivably be reversed; and the disruption in the global economy due to increasing climate shocks and the implementation of climate policies that will be needed to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. We study the global investment needs to which these transitions will lead. We demonstrate that these investment needs will be both asymmetric across countries and over time. This asymmetry will lead to potentially large changes in trade flows and significant financial capital flows across national borders, and also to substantial real exchange changes and interest rate movements. The resulting large movements in international capital flows will have significant implications for the global financial system, which we demonstrate at the country and regional level.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48173058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper first describes the Bretton Woods system: its origin, what it was meant to achieve, and why it collapsed. We then describe the emergence of the global non-system in which inflation targeting has replaced full-employment Keynesianism and floating exchange rates have replaced the Bretton Woods set-up of fixed but adjustable exchange rates. We describe how the Bretton Woods system set about achieving the three objectives laid down for a well-functioning international economic system by John Maynard Keynes: full employment without inflation, sustainable current account balances between countries, and a sustainable flow of international financial capital—on the understanding that an open trading regime is also fostered. Because the global non-system is now very different from the Bretton Woods system, Keynes’s objectives now need to be achieved in a very different manner. Looking forward, this non-system faces a number of longer-term challenges. Important adjustment issues will arise in relation to the global demographic transition; the potential long-term slowdown in productivity growth; and the rise in investment in renewable sources of energy which will be necessary to help ensure that the world is able to move towards zero emissions of carbon by 2050. We also discuss important policy issues in relation to the flows of international capital to emerging market economies, and the likely need for a sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism. We then go on to consider two significant structural changes to the world—the emergence of the European Monetary Union and the rise of China. A final section of the paper considers the importance of leadership in this global non-system.
{"title":"Fifty years on: what the Bretton Woods System can teach us about global macroeconomic policy-making","authors":"Paola Subacchi, D. Vines","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper first describes the Bretton Woods system: its origin, what it was meant to achieve, and why it collapsed. We then describe the emergence of the global non-system in which inflation targeting has replaced full-employment Keynesianism and floating exchange rates have replaced the Bretton Woods set-up of fixed but adjustable exchange rates. We describe how the Bretton Woods system set about achieving the three objectives laid down for a well-functioning international economic system by John Maynard Keynes: full employment without inflation, sustainable current account balances between countries, and a sustainable flow of international financial capital—on the understanding that an open trading regime is also fostered. Because the global non-system is now very different from the Bretton Woods system, Keynes’s objectives now need to be achieved in a very different manner. Looking forward, this non-system faces a number of longer-term challenges. Important adjustment issues will arise in relation to the global demographic transition; the potential long-term slowdown in productivity growth; and the rise in investment in renewable sources of energy which will be necessary to help ensure that the world is able to move towards zero emissions of carbon by 2050. We also discuss important policy issues in relation to the flows of international capital to emerging market economies, and the likely need for a sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism. We then go on to consider two significant structural changes to the world—the emergence of the European Monetary Union and the rise of China. A final section of the paper considers the importance of leadership in this global non-system.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43061127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
More than two decades after the emerging market crises of the 1990s, foreign investors are now active investors in emerging-market local-currency-denominated sovereign bonds. In this sense, emerging market governments have overcome ‘Original Sin’—the dictum that emerging market borrowers cannot borrow from foreigners in their own currency. However, although the borrowers no longer bear the risk of currency mismatches, the mismatch has migrated to the lenders’ balance sheet in the sense that investors evaluate gains and losses in terms of dollars or other major currencies. This paper examines the associated risks and potential remedies to financial stability risks stemming from this migration of currency mismatch from the borrower to the lender.
{"title":"Overcoming ‘original sin’ to secure policy space","authors":"H. Shin","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 More than two decades after the emerging market crises of the 1990s, foreign investors are now active investors in emerging-market local-currency-denominated sovereign bonds. In this sense, emerging market governments have overcome ‘Original Sin’—the dictum that emerging market borrowers cannot borrow from foreigners in their own currency. However, although the borrowers no longer bear the risk of currency mismatches, the mismatch has migrated to the lenders’ balance sheet in the sense that investors evaluate gains and losses in terms of dollars or other major currencies. This paper examines the associated risks and potential remedies to financial stability risks stemming from this migration of currency mismatch from the borrower to the lender.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45818514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
New and evolving financial technologies, including the advent of cryptocurrencies and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), will make cross-border payments cheaper and quicker. However, reduced frictions in global capital flows could also result in more capital flow and exchange rate volatility, which is of particular concern for emerging market economies. There will be greater competition among fiat currencies and certain private currencies such as stablecoins in their roles as mediums of exchange for payment and settlement of domestic as well as cross-border transactions. However, neither the advent of CBDCs nor the lowering of barriers to international financial flows will do much on their own to reorder the international monetary system or the balance of power among major currencies. Currencies such as the US dollar that are dominant stores of value will remain so because that dominance rests not just on the issuing country’s economic size and financial market depth, but also on a strong institutional foundation that is essential for maintaining investors’ trust in a currency.
{"title":"How will digital technologies influence the international monetary system?","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 New and evolving financial technologies, including the advent of cryptocurrencies and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), will make cross-border payments cheaper and quicker. However, reduced frictions in global capital flows could also result in more capital flow and exchange rate volatility, which is of particular concern for emerging market economies. There will be greater competition among fiat currencies and certain private currencies such as stablecoins in their roles as mediums of exchange for payment and settlement of domestic as well as cross-border transactions. However, neither the advent of CBDCs nor the lowering of barriers to international financial flows will do much on their own to reorder the international monetary system or the balance of power among major currencies. Currencies such as the US dollar that are dominant stores of value will remain so because that dominance rests not just on the issuing country’s economic size and financial market depth, but also on a strong institutional foundation that is essential for maintaining investors’ trust in a currency.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41311356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1971–3 led to ambitious efforts to reform the international monetary system, mainly through the deliberations of the Committee of Twenty (C-20). Many of the issues considered by the C-20 will be familiar to aficionados of twenty-first century discussions of international monetary reform. Ultimately, attempts to reach a consensus in the C-20 were unsuccessful. This paper seeks to identify explanations for that failure in an effort to limit the likelihood that it will be repeated.
{"title":"Lessons from the 1970s for international monetary reform","authors":"Barry Eichengreen","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1971–3 led to ambitious efforts to reform the international monetary system, mainly through the deliberations of the Committee of Twenty (C-20). Many of the issues considered by the C-20 will be familiar to aficionados of twenty-first century discussions of international monetary reform. Ultimately, attempts to reach a consensus in the C-20 were unsuccessful. This paper seeks to identify explanations for that failure in an effort to limit the likelihood that it will be repeated.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42701792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The World Bank today faces parallel challenges to its operations and governance. The institution has since its founding provided financing on favourable terms to developing country governments to support national development efforts. Alongside these country demands, there are now calls for a new set of mandates and activities associated with global public goods. Advocates would have the Bank allocate large sums toward climate mitigation, pandemic response and preparedness, and other activities that may or may not align with national priorities in developing countries. The ability of the World Bank to strike an appropriate balance between country demands and global goods depends on the institution’s shareholders. Yet, the deterioration in the bilateral relationship between the United States and China now threatens to undermine effective governance at the institution. This paper considers the challenge of competing demands on World Bank resources and the degree to which a resolution could depend on an agreement between the United States and China, one that sets the strategic direction of the institution and addresses the growing impasse on the question of China’s shareholding in the Bank.
{"title":"Development finance cooperation amidst great power competition: what role for the World Bank?","authors":"Scott A. Morris","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The World Bank today faces parallel challenges to its operations and governance. The institution has since its founding provided financing on favourable terms to developing country governments to support national development efforts. Alongside these country demands, there are now calls for a new set of mandates and activities associated with global public goods. Advocates would have the Bank allocate large sums toward climate mitigation, pandemic response and preparedness, and other activities that may or may not align with national priorities in developing countries. The ability of the World Bank to strike an appropriate balance between country demands and global goods depends on the institution’s shareholders. Yet, the deterioration in the bilateral relationship between the United States and China now threatens to undermine effective governance at the institution. This paper considers the challenge of competing demands on World Bank resources and the degree to which a resolution could depend on an agreement between the United States and China, one that sets the strategic direction of the institution and addresses the growing impasse on the question of China’s shareholding in the Bank.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44338300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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