The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) spurred an unprecedented increase in the IRS’s ability to obtain information about assets held and income earned by US persons in foreign financial accounts, which were especially prone to illegal tax evasion. We review the evidence on FATCA’s efficacy at reducing tax evasion through foreign accounts and provide additional, longer-term evidence. We then discuss potential avenues for avoiding FATCA reporting. We also highlight other consequences of FATCA and provide exploratory analyses pointing to the use of the United States as a tax haven for foreign investors. We conclude with policy recommendations and suggestions for future research in areas where more analysis is needed.
{"title":"Has FATCA succeeded in reducing tax evasion through foreign accounts?","authors":"L. De Simone, Bridget Stomberg","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) spurred an unprecedented increase in the IRS’s ability to obtain information about assets held and income earned by US persons in foreign financial accounts, which were especially prone to illegal tax evasion. We review the evidence on FATCA’s efficacy at reducing tax evasion through foreign accounts and provide additional, longer-term evidence. We then discuss potential avenues for avoiding FATCA reporting. We also highlight other consequences of FATCA and provide exploratory analyses pointing to the use of the United States as a tax haven for foreign investors. We conclude with policy recommendations and suggestions for future research in areas where more analysis is needed.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43847652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers the role of capital gains taxation in enhancing tax progressivity, and argues that capital gains are the Achilles’ heel of taxing the rich more effectively. We revisit the key aspects of how capital gains are taxed and address the main arguments against taxing capital gains more heavily: (i) it would discourage socially beneficial activities, such as innovation, (ii) implementing structural changes is unadministrable, and (iii) the ‘lock-in’ effect means that increasing the tax rate is an inefficient way to raise revenue. To address concerns with the unpopularity of taxing unrealized gains during one’s lifetime and retroactive taxes, we conclude with a partial proposal for constructive realization at death that would apply only to gains accrued after a certain date, while allowing for discounted pre-payments of tax liability.
{"title":"Are capital gains the Achilles’ heel of taxing the rich?","authors":"J. Slemrod, Xinyu Chen","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad027","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper considers the role of capital gains taxation in enhancing tax progressivity, and argues that capital gains are the Achilles’ heel of taxing the rich more effectively. We revisit the key aspects of how capital gains are taxed and address the main arguments against taxing capital gains more heavily: (i) it would discourage socially beneficial activities, such as innovation, (ii) implementing structural changes is unadministrable, and (iii) the ‘lock-in’ effect means that increasing the tax rate is an inefficient way to raise revenue. To address concerns with the unpopularity of taxing unrealized gains during one’s lifetime and retroactive taxes, we conclude with a partial proposal for constructive realization at death that would apply only to gains accrued after a certain date, while allowing for discounted pre-payments of tax liability.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47566728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the optimal design of tax reform proposals, and in decisions about when and how to recommend them, it is useful to take explicit account of issues of political feasibility. In the United States—and probably around the world—important political barriers work against the enactment of major progressive tax reforms. A close look at US poll and survey data indicates that opposition by the general public is not a significant barrier: large majorities favour progressive taxation in general and favour a number of specific progressive tax changes, including higher top personal income tax rates; higher taxes on corporations; increased taxation of realized capital gains; and taxation of unrealized gains at death. But there exist other serious political barriers against tax reform, including an institutional status quo bias that makes any major policy change (especially any progressive change) very difficult; and strong political opposition from business corporations and wealthy individuals. The best available evidence indicates that nearly all US business firms, and most multi-millionaires and billionaires, oppose practically any sort of progressive tax reform. The best evidence also indicates that these firms and individuals exercise far more influence on policy-making than ordinary citizens do. We mention some possible strategies for dealing with this problem.
{"title":"The wealthy as a barrier to tax reform","authors":"Benjamin I. Page, Jason Seawright","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad036","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the optimal design of tax reform proposals, and in decisions about when and how to recommend them, it is useful to take explicit account of issues of political feasibility. In the United States—and probably around the world—important political barriers work against the enactment of major progressive tax reforms. A close look at US poll and survey data indicates that opposition by the general public is not a significant barrier: large majorities favour progressive taxation in general and favour a number of specific progressive tax changes, including higher top personal income tax rates; higher taxes on corporations; increased taxation of realized capital gains; and taxation of unrealized gains at death. But there exist other serious political barriers against tax reform, including an institutional status quo bias that makes any major policy change (especially any progressive change) very difficult; and strong political opposition from business corporations and wealthy individuals. The best available evidence indicates that nearly all US business firms, and most multi-millionaires and billionaires, oppose practically any sort of progressive tax reform. The best evidence also indicates that these firms and individuals exercise far more influence on policy-making than ordinary citizens do. We mention some possible strategies for dealing with this problem.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44126870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy addresses whether and how to tax the rich more, drawing on the expertise of 16 author teams, most of whom are economists but also spanning legal scholarship and political science. The papers in this issue ask a range of research and policy questions about the way governments tax the rich. How can we measure the effective tax rates on the incomes and/or wealth of the rich? How do governments tax specific sources of income that the rich earn, and is there need for reform? Who bears the burden of different types of taxes, and do potential gains from reducing the tax burden on the rich ‘trickle down’? How do the rich respond to the taxes imposed on them?
本期的《牛津经济政策评论》(Oxford Review of Economic Policy)讨论了是否以及如何向富人增税，利用了16个作者团队的专业知识，其中大多数是经济学家，但也涵盖了法学和政治学。本期的论文就政府向富人征税的方式提出了一系列研究和政策问题。我们如何衡量富人的收入和/或财富的有效税率?政府如何对富人的特定收入来源征税?是否需要改革?谁来承担不同类型的税收负担?减轻富人税负的潜在收益是否会“涓滴效应”?富人如何应对强加给他们的税收?
{"title":"Taxing the rich (more)","authors":"Irem Güçeri, J. Slemrod","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad033","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy addresses whether and how to tax the rich more, drawing on the expertise of 16 author teams, most of whom are economists but also spanning legal scholarship and political science. The papers in this issue ask a range of research and policy questions about the way governments tax the rich. How can we measure the effective tax rates on the incomes and/or wealth of the rich? How do governments tax specific sources of income that the rich earn, and is there need for reform? Who bears the burden of different types of taxes, and do potential gains from reducing the tax burden on the rich ‘trickle down’? How do the rich respond to the taxes imposed on them?","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44183446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines some drivers behind substantial changes in tax policy in recent decades. Using existing theories and our definition of ‘beneficial major tax reforms’, we discuss three case studies: the US in the 1980s, the UK in the 1980s, and the UK’s failed ‘mini-budget’ of 2022. Our analysis reveals that the US’s TRA86 has, to some degree, improved efficiency, while the UK reforms may have exacerbated inequality with ambiguous effects on efficiency. Finally, we outline the potential for future reforms and conclude that political conditions are more likely to instigate major change than economic motivations.
{"title":"What drives major tax reform? Implications for taxing the rich","authors":"Martina Beretta, Irem Güçeri, K. Jakobsen","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper examines some drivers behind substantial changes in tax policy in recent decades. Using existing theories and our definition of ‘beneficial major tax reforms’, we discuss three case studies: the US in the 1980s, the UK in the 1980s, and the UK’s failed ‘mini-budget’ of 2022. Our analysis reveals that the US’s TRA86 has, to some degree, improved efficiency, while the UK reforms may have exacerbated inequality with ambiguous effects on efficiency. Finally, we outline the potential for future reforms and conclude that political conditions are more likely to instigate major change than economic motivations.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49041691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Katherine Baer, Ruud De Mooij, Shafik Hebous, Michael Keen
Abstract Policy-makers are struggling to accommodate cryptocurrencies within tax systems not designed to handle them; this paper reviews the issues that arise. The greatest challenges are for implementation: crypto’s pseudonymity is an inherent obstacle to third-party reporting. Design problems arise from cryptocurrencies’ dual nature as investment assets and means of payment: more straightforward is a compelling case for corrective taxation of carbon-intensive mining. Ownership is highly concentrated at the top, but many crypto investors have only moderate incomes. The capital gains tax revenue at stake worldwide may be in the tens of billions of dollars, but the more profound risks may ultimately be for VAT/sales taxes.
{"title":"Taxing cryptocurrencies","authors":"Katherine Baer, Ruud De Mooij, Shafik Hebous, Michael Keen","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Policy-makers are struggling to accommodate cryptocurrencies within tax systems not designed to handle them; this paper reviews the issues that arise. The greatest challenges are for implementation: crypto’s pseudonymity is an inherent obstacle to third-party reporting. Design problems arise from cryptocurrencies’ dual nature as investment assets and means of payment: more straightforward is a compelling case for corrective taxation of carbon-intensive mining. Ownership is highly concentrated at the top, but many crypto investors have only moderate incomes. The capital gains tax revenue at stake worldwide may be in the tens of billions of dollars, but the more profound risks may ultimately be for VAT/sales taxes.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135971830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that the ability to enforce taxes on offshore income may shape the redistributional properties of the tax system through two channels. First, it mechanically raises tax progressivity for given parameters of the tax system because high-income taxpayers own most of the offshore wealth. In the US, recent comprehensive reporting by offshore banks suggests the mechanical increase in average tax rates may be around 1.5 percentage points for the top 0.01 per cent and virtually zero below the top 1 per cent. Second, it may further raise tax progressivity by changing the trade-offs underlying optimal taxation in favour of higher taxation of top incomes.
{"title":"The end of bank secrecy: implications for redistribution and optimal taxation","authors":"Niels Johannesen","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper argues that the ability to enforce taxes on offshore income may shape the redistributional properties of the tax system through two channels. First, it mechanically raises tax progressivity for given parameters of the tax system because high-income taxpayers own most of the offshore wealth. In the US, recent comprehensive reporting by offshore banks suggests the mechanical increase in average tax rates may be around 1.5 percentage points for the top 0.01 per cent and virtually zero below the top 1 per cent. Second, it may further raise tax progressivity by changing the trade-offs underlying optimal taxation in favour of higher taxation of top incomes.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44048051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I estimate the average federal individual income tax rate paid by America’s 400 wealthiest families, using a relatively comprehensive estimate of their Haig–Simons income: their change in wealth, plus US individual taxes. I do so using publicly available statistics from the IRS Statistics of Income Division, the Survey of Consumer Finances, and Forbes magazine from 1992 to 2020. This paper’s baseline analysis uses all years of data and systematically varies start and end years. The baseline estimates of the average federal individual income tax rate on the wealthiest 400 families are 9.6 per cent in nominal terms and 12.0 per cent in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Sensitivity analyses yield nominal estimates in the 6.7–14.6 per cent range and real estimates in the 8.4–17.9 per cent range. These estimates can be combined with effective corporate income tax rates to estimate all-in effective income tax rates on the wealthiest.
{"title":"What is the average federal individual income tax rate on the wealthiest Americans?","authors":"Danny Yagan","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad031","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I estimate the average federal individual income tax rate paid by America’s 400 wealthiest families, using a relatively comprehensive estimate of their Haig–Simons income: their change in wealth, plus US individual taxes. I do so using publicly available statistics from the IRS Statistics of Income Division, the Survey of Consumer Finances, and Forbes magazine from 1992 to 2020. This paper’s baseline analysis uses all years of data and systematically varies start and end years. The baseline estimates of the average federal individual income tax rate on the wealthiest 400 families are 9.6 per cent in nominal terms and 12.0 per cent in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Sensitivity analyses yield nominal estimates in the 6.7–14.6 per cent range and real estimates in the 8.4–17.9 per cent range. These estimates can be combined with effective corporate income tax rates to estimate all-in effective income tax rates on the wealthiest.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42811961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I discuss what can be learned about ‘trickle-down’ ideas from recent empirical evidence on tax incidence, or the effect of tax policies on the distribution of welfare. I underscore three lessons. First, recent research suggests that business income taxes affect the earnings of workers, but these effects largely derive from taxing rents and rent-sharing, highlighting the importance of these channels for determining the ultimate incidence. Second, when workers are affected by these taxes, the burden is not borne equally by all workers, but predominantly by those at the top of the earnings distribution. Third, across different tax policies that statutorily affect the rich, the burden is largely borne by the rich, but heterogeneity in responses across tax incentives and taxpayers provides context for incidence analyses. Throughout, I discuss the value of analysing heterogeneous responses, particularly how tax incidence depends on labour markets, product markets, and tax systems.
{"title":"Trickle-down revisited","authors":"Max Risch","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper I discuss what can be learned about ‘trickle-down’ ideas from recent empirical evidence on tax incidence, or the effect of tax policies on the distribution of welfare. I underscore three lessons. First, recent research suggests that business income taxes affect the earnings of workers, but these effects largely derive from taxing rents and rent-sharing, highlighting the importance of these channels for determining the ultimate incidence. Second, when workers are affected by these taxes, the burden is not borne equally by all workers, but predominantly by those at the top of the earnings distribution. Third, across different tax policies that statutorily affect the rich, the burden is largely borne by the rich, but heterogeneity in responses across tax incentives and taxpayers provides context for incidence analyses. Throughout, I discuss the value of analysing heterogeneous responses, particularly how tax incidence depends on labour markets, product markets, and tax systems.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47389214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Trusts play important roles in the financial, estate, and tax plans of wealthy families. Evidence from US taxpayers indicates that the tax savings that they obtain from using trusts are rather modest, with one of the major tax benefits providing aggregate savings equal to just 0.05 per cent of the annual income of the top 0.01 per cent of US taxpayers. Trusts are primarily used to facilitate intergenerational and other transfers. Restrictions imposed by trusts can have the effect of preserving high levels of wealth and income, creating greater opportunities for governments to tax the rich.
{"title":"The role of trusts in taxing the rich","authors":"J. Hines,","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grad022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Trusts play important roles in the financial, estate, and tax plans of wealthy families. Evidence from US taxpayers indicates that the tax savings that they obtain from using trusts are rather modest, with one of the major tax benefits providing aggregate savings equal to just 0.05 per cent of the annual income of the top 0.01 per cent of US taxpayers. Trusts are primarily used to facilitate intergenerational and other transfers. Restrictions imposed by trusts can have the effect of preserving high levels of wealth and income, creating greater opportunities for governments to tax the rich.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44775308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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