Literatures on institutional, ideational and policy change have made great strides in dynamically conceptualizing agency within structure. What continues to be insufficiently understood, however, is how actors actually work with ideas, that is, how broad policy ideas become concrete and implementable. One concept that has gained some traction in understanding actors' application of ideas is bricolage, understood as the stabilization or changing of institutions through a creative recombination of existing ideational and institutional resources. We theorize bricolage as a process of working with ideas by testing their cognitive, normative and strategic capacity. In contrast to much of the existing literature, we theorize this ideational policy entrepreneurship as collective agency. This gives greater analytical weight to how different bricoleurs work together—simultaneously and across time—to develop the ideas that come to shape policy. The empirical relevance of the theoretical argument is corroborated with an analysis of the work of bricoleurs in the paradigm shift of German pension policy.
{"title":"Working with ideas: Collective bricolage, political tests and the emergence of policy paradigms","authors":"Martin B. Carstensen, Nils Röper","doi":"10.1111/gove.12882","DOIUrl":"10.1111/gove.12882","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Literatures on institutional, ideational and policy change have made great strides in dynamically conceptualizing agency within structure. What continues to be insufficiently understood, however, is how actors actually work with ideas, that is, how broad policy ideas become concrete and implementable. One concept that has gained some traction in understanding actors' application of ideas is bricolage, understood as the stabilization or changing of institutions through a creative recombination of existing ideational and institutional resources. We theorize bricolage as a process of working with ideas by testing their cognitive, normative and strategic capacity. In contrast to much of the existing literature, we theorize this ideational policy entrepreneurship as collective agency. This gives greater analytical weight to how different bricoleurs work together—simultaneously and across time—to develop the ideas that come to shape policy. The empirical relevance of the theoretical argument is corroborated with an analysis of the work of bricoleurs in the paradigm shift of German pension policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12882","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141553027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Did the financial and economic crisis (2008/2009) induce a permanent shift to more economic intervention in the advanced democracies? Three relevant theoretical perspectives are considered. First, the crisis could have led all governments to intervene more, irrespective of their partisan composition. Second, voter demand could have shifted towards more intervention due to the crisis, again inducing all governments to expand economic intervention. Third, increasing salience of economic issues could have led to an accentuation of partisan differences in economic policy which should have led to an expansion of economic intervention under left governments only. We present data from a new index of economic intervention, which show that governments increased economic intervention during the immediate crisis but returned to liberalization afterward. Similarly, statistical analyses show that partisan differences disappear during the acute crisis but return thereafter. Hence, the financial and economic crisis did not constitute a game-changer in economic policymaking in advanced democracies.
{"title":"A return of economic intervention in advanced democracies after the financial and economic crisis (2008/2009)?","authors":"Reimut Zohlnhöfer, Jan Jathe, Fabian Engler","doi":"10.1111/gove.12880","DOIUrl":"10.1111/gove.12880","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Did the financial and economic crisis (2008/2009) induce a permanent shift to more economic intervention in the advanced democracies? Three relevant theoretical perspectives are considered. First, the crisis could have led all governments to intervene more, irrespective of their partisan composition. Second, voter demand could have shifted towards more intervention due to the crisis, again inducing all governments to expand economic intervention. Third, increasing salience of economic issues could have led to an accentuation of partisan differences in economic policy which should have led to an expansion of economic intervention under left governments only. We present data from a new index of economic intervention, which show that governments increased economic intervention during the immediate crisis but returned to liberalization afterward. Similarly, statistical analyses show that partisan differences disappear during the acute crisis but return thereafter. Hence, the financial and economic crisis did not constitute a game-changer in economic policymaking in advanced democracies.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12880","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141344511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ensuring equitable local service delivery requires sustained investments that are often beyond the reach of local governments in poor countries. In many developing countries, access to basic education is achieved primarily through the complementary efforts of state, municipal, non-governmental and international development agencies — what I call the complementary “quartet” of service delivery. While the current literature acknowledges the individual roles of this “quartet,” it has not given much attention to the influence of their complementary efforts on access and quality of education outcomes. Using a unique (2013–2015) dataset of 260 Ghanaian municipalities in a cross-sectional pooled regression analysis, the study finds that state assistance has broader influence on both access and quality of education outcomes, while municipal capacity, international development assistance and the presence of education focused non-governmental organizations are associated with access (enrollment).
{"title":"The co-governance of basic education: Assessing the complementary effects of intergovernmental support, municipal capacity, non-governmental organization presence and international development assistance","authors":"Charles W. Kaye-Essien","doi":"10.1111/gove.12879","DOIUrl":"10.1111/gove.12879","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Ensuring equitable local service delivery requires sustained investments that are often beyond the reach of local governments in poor countries. In many developing countries, access to basic education is achieved primarily through the complementary efforts of state, municipal, non-governmental and international development agencies — what I call the <i>complementary “quartet”</i> of service delivery. While the current literature acknowledges the individual roles of this <i>“quartet</i>,” it has not given much attention to the influence of their complementary efforts on access and quality of education outcomes. Using a unique (2013–2015) dataset of 260 Ghanaian municipalities in a cross-sectional pooled regression analysis, the study finds that state assistance has broader influence on both access and quality of education outcomes, while municipal capacity, international development assistance and the presence of education focused non-governmental organizations are associated with access (enrollment).</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12879","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141352797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking global governance: Learning from long ignored societies. By Justin Jennings, New York and London: Routledge. 2023. pp. 162. £31.99. ISBN: 978-1-003-37332-2","authors":"Sinta Novia, Aditya Putra","doi":"10.1111/gove.12878","DOIUrl":"10.1111/gove.12878","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141267639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Conflict of interest is among the most regulated forms of official behavior. In the United States, the vast bureaucracy of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) is almost entirely devoted to controlling conflicts of interest. Ethics rules for state agencies and state legislatures are ubiquitous. But this profusion of effort has failed to solve the problem. According to one comprehensive survey, conflict of interest regulations in European countries abound, but “the landscape is highly fragmented [among] various ethics commissions, ethics inspectorates, ethics commissioners, integrity officers… No EU- and national administration is equipped with the necessary resources, skills, and tools to monitor COI in an efficient and effective way” (European Parliament, <span>2020</span>, pp. 8–9). Surveys show that conflict of interest is a major concern of citizens. There may well be more conflicts of interest now than several decades ago (Cox & Thomas, <span>2018</span>; Shepherd & You, <span>2019</span>; Wike et al., <span>2021</span>). Conflict of interest is among the least well understood of dilemmas of public office. By exposing errors about conflicts of interest, we hope to enable officials to confront these conflicts more honestly, citizens to judge official conflicts of interest more fairly, and regulators to do their job more competently.</p><p>Conflicts of interest compromise not just integrity and competence but democracy itself. Democratic processes importantly determine the public interest. Democracy requires officials to exercise their judgment to advance that public interest (Boot, <span>2022</span>). Officials who are not motivated to act in the public interest thus threaten democratic governance. Contrary motivations arise because officials also have their own interests, often coming from their private lives, that may not be compatible with public interests. The juxtaposition of these two kinds of interests—a primary public interest dictated by their official role and a secondary interest influenced by private life—create the tension that is known as conflict of interest.</p><p>A conflict of interest is thus best understood as a set of circumstances that is reasonably believed to create a substantial risk that an official's judgment of a primary, public, interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest which typically though not exclusively involves financial gain (Thompson, <span>1993</span> see also chapter 2 of Institute of Medicine, <span>2009</span>). A conflict of interest thus increases the risk of corruption. We have learned from common experience that secondary private interests can taint official's judgment about how best to advance the public interest. Comparative scholars note that while attention in the US has focused on the danger of private sector interests, in the parliamentary and Westminster systems, the burdens on MPs independent judgments often come from the party itself, for instance from a Prime M
{"title":"Conflict of interest in government: Avoiding ethical and conceptual mistakes","authors":"Archon Fung, Dennis Thompson","doi":"10.1111/gove.12870","DOIUrl":"10.1111/gove.12870","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Conflict of interest is among the most regulated forms of official behavior. In the United States, the vast bureaucracy of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) is almost entirely devoted to controlling conflicts of interest. Ethics rules for state agencies and state legislatures are ubiquitous. But this profusion of effort has failed to solve the problem. According to one comprehensive survey, conflict of interest regulations in European countries abound, but “the landscape is highly fragmented [among] various ethics commissions, ethics inspectorates, ethics commissioners, integrity officers… No EU- and national administration is equipped with the necessary resources, skills, and tools to monitor COI in an efficient and effective way” (European Parliament, <span>2020</span>, pp. 8–9). Surveys show that conflict of interest is a major concern of citizens. There may well be more conflicts of interest now than several decades ago (Cox & Thomas, <span>2018</span>; Shepherd & You, <span>2019</span>; Wike et al., <span>2021</span>). Conflict of interest is among the least well understood of dilemmas of public office. By exposing errors about conflicts of interest, we hope to enable officials to confront these conflicts more honestly, citizens to judge official conflicts of interest more fairly, and regulators to do their job more competently.</p><p>Conflicts of interest compromise not just integrity and competence but democracy itself. Democratic processes importantly determine the public interest. Democracy requires officials to exercise their judgment to advance that public interest (Boot, <span>2022</span>). Officials who are not motivated to act in the public interest thus threaten democratic governance. Contrary motivations arise because officials also have their own interests, often coming from their private lives, that may not be compatible with public interests. The juxtaposition of these two kinds of interests—a primary public interest dictated by their official role and a secondary interest influenced by private life—create the tension that is known as conflict of interest.</p><p>A conflict of interest is thus best understood as a set of circumstances that is reasonably believed to create a substantial risk that an official's judgment of a primary, public, interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest which typically though not exclusively involves financial gain (Thompson, <span>1993</span> see also chapter 2 of Institute of Medicine, <span>2009</span>). A conflict of interest thus increases the risk of corruption. We have learned from common experience that secondary private interests can taint official's judgment about how best to advance the public interest. Comparative scholars note that while attention in the US has focused on the danger of private sector interests, in the parliamentary and Westminster systems, the burdens on MPs independent judgments often come from the party itself, for instance from a Prime M","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12870","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141269010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) are central to the implementation of government policies, which becomes crucial in the context of democratic backsliding. Their willingness to carry out policies developed by “unprincipled” principals influences the final impact of backsliding on citizens. Research on civil servants and anecdotal evidence indicate that SLBs may engage in various dissent activities when they disagree with politicians and their policies. However, the scale of this behavior depends on how many of them perceive the government as “unprincipled.” Hence, to understand the potential for dissent activities in the face of democratic backsliding, we need to examine SLBs' support for the ruling government. This paper focuses on Poland, an important case of democratic backsliding, analyzing the approval of the opposition parties and the protests in the wake of democracy-undermining reforms among the SLBs. By analyzing Polish Center for Public Opinion Research survey data, it concludes that SLBs' support for the opposition was not overwhelming, rendering significant scale of dissent activities at the street level unlikely.
{"title":"Street-level bureaucracy and democratic backsliding. Evidence from Poland","authors":"Barbara Maria Piotrowska","doi":"10.1111/gove.12876","DOIUrl":"10.1111/gove.12876","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) are central to the implementation of government policies, which becomes crucial in the context of democratic backsliding. Their willingness to carry out policies developed by “unprincipled” principals influences the final impact of backsliding on citizens. Research on civil servants and anecdotal evidence indicate that SLBs may engage in various dissent activities when they disagree with politicians and their policies. However, the scale of this behavior depends on how many of them perceive the government as “unprincipled.” Hence, to understand the potential for dissent activities in the face of democratic backsliding, we need to examine SLBs' support for the ruling government. This paper focuses on Poland, an important case of democratic backsliding, analyzing the approval of the opposition parties and the protests in the wake of democracy-undermining reforms among the SLBs. By analyzing Polish Center for Public Opinion Research survey data, it concludes that SLBs' support for the opposition was not overwhelming, rendering significant scale of dissent activities at the street level unlikely.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"37 S1","pages":"127-151"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12876","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141197651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines a collaborative strategic planning initiative undertaken by Pennsylvania's Office of Medical Assistance Programs (OMAP) to enhance service delivery for children with medical complexity in Medicaid Managed Care. By engaging a broad spectrum of stakeholders OMAP employed a structured yet adaptable process to collaborative strategic planning that resulted in multiple actionable recommendations. Analysis of the process provides insights for strategic management practice and research by identifying key process design features and process context factors. Findings reveal that success was primarily driven by effective leadership, strategic stakeholder engagement, and robust cross-sector collaboration. The initiative exemplifies how structured, yet adaptable collaborative strategic planning can result in innovations to public service delivery. This case not only provides vicarious learning but also underscores the importance of systemic and inclusive approaches to public management.
{"title":"Examining the process of a collaborative strategic planning initiative: The pediatric shift care initiative in Pennsylvania Medicaid","authors":"Joseph A. Hafer, Nicole M. Harris, Gwen Zander","doi":"10.1111/gove.12877","DOIUrl":"10.1111/gove.12877","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines a collaborative strategic planning initiative undertaken by Pennsylvania's Office of Medical Assistance Programs (OMAP) to enhance service delivery for children with medical complexity in Medicaid Managed Care. By engaging a broad spectrum of stakeholders OMAP employed a structured yet adaptable process to collaborative strategic planning that resulted in multiple actionable recommendations. Analysis of the process provides insights for strategic management practice and research by identifying key process design features and process context factors. Findings reveal that success was primarily driven by effective leadership, strategic stakeholder engagement, and robust cross-sector collaboration. The initiative exemplifies how structured, yet adaptable collaborative strategic planning can result in innovations to public service delivery. This case not only provides vicarious learning but also underscores the importance of systemic and inclusive approaches to public management.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141197870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Juan Carlos Triviño-Salazar, Vicent Climent-Ferrando
The deliberative democracy and governance literature indicates that the challenge of participatory mechanisms (e.g., participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies) is to be inclusive of all citizens, especially marginalized ones from the political system. Immigrants as a marginalized group are a target of inclusion. Asking the circumstances under which these mechanisms promote immigrants' effective inclusion is still a pending question. This article proposes a theoretical model centered on their inclusion in these mechanisms. We apply our model to the incorporation of immigrants into Barcelona's Neighborhood Council Meetings, revamped under the radical-left Barcelona en Comú-led government (2015–2023). Findings show that opening participatory mechanisms for immigrants did not build de facto inclusionary dynamics in Barcelona. We explained such findings on the mismatch between the political quest to deepen democracy and promote social justice through participatory mechanisms and the limitations to implement practices leading to a pluralist engagement with immigrants.
协商民主和治理文献表明,参与机制(如参与式预算编制、公民大会)面临的挑战是包容所有公民,特别是政治系统中的边缘化公民。移民作为一个边缘化群体,是包容的对象。这些机制在何种情况下能促进移民的有效融入,仍是一个悬而未决的问题。本文提出了一个以移民融入这些机制为中心的理论模型。我们将模型应用于移民融入巴塞罗那邻里委员会会议的情况,该会议在激进左翼的巴塞罗那委员会(Barcelona en Comú)领导的政府(2015-2023 年)下进行了改革。研究结果表明,为移民开放参与机制并没有在巴塞罗那形成事实上的包容性动力。我们将这些发现解释为通过参与机制深化民主和促进社会正义的政治追求与实施导致移民多元化参与的实践限制之间的不匹配。
{"title":"Including immigrant voices in local mechanisms of citizen participation? Insights from the crucial case of Barcelona","authors":"Juan Carlos Triviño-Salazar, Vicent Climent-Ferrando","doi":"10.1111/gove.12875","DOIUrl":"10.1111/gove.12875","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The deliberative democracy and governance literature indicates that the challenge of participatory mechanisms (e.g., participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies) is to be inclusive of all citizens, especially marginalized ones from the political system. Immigrants as a marginalized group are a target of inclusion. Asking the circumstances under which these mechanisms promote immigrants' effective inclusion is still a pending question. This article proposes a theoretical model centered on their inclusion in these mechanisms. We apply our model to the incorporation of immigrants into Barcelona's Neighborhood Council Meetings, revamped under the radical-left <i>Barcelona en Comú</i>-led government (2015–2023). Findings show that opening participatory mechanisms for immigrants did not build de facto inclusionary dynamics in Barcelona. We explained such findings on the mismatch between the political quest to deepen democracy and promote social justice through participatory mechanisms and the limitations to implement practices leading to a pluralist engagement with immigrants.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12875","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141197954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corruption in healthcare is widespread and consequential. Informal payments (IPs) are a common form of petty corruption, especially in low- and middle-income countries. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey encompassing 33 countries across Europe and Central Asia, I analyze the prevalence and reasons behind IPs made to public health providers. In addition to individual- and system-level factors often used in literature, I also introduce a latent measure of social norms related to high levels of corruption. These are associated with a significantly higher prevalence of paying informally. This paper also bridges a gap between the corruption literature and health-related research by introducing a typology of IPs based on why they were made. I find that the association between health system characteristics and IPs prevalence differs based on the reason for payment. This difference is further exacerbated by the existence of corruption-related social norms. The results of this analysis highlight the need to revisit existing anti-corruption policies and align them to the underlying social norms.
{"title":"The effect of institutional characteristics and social norms on corruption in healthcare","authors":"Iva Parvanova","doi":"10.1111/gove.12868","DOIUrl":"10.1111/gove.12868","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Corruption in healthcare is widespread and consequential. Informal payments (IPs) are a common form of petty corruption, especially in low- and middle-income countries. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey encompassing 33 countries across Europe and Central Asia, I analyze the prevalence and reasons behind IPs made to public health providers. In addition to individual- and system-level factors often used in literature, I also introduce a latent measure of social norms related to high levels of corruption. These are associated with a significantly higher prevalence of paying informally. This paper also bridges a gap between the corruption literature and health-related research by introducing a typology of IPs based on why they were made. I find that the association between health system characteristics and IPs prevalence differs based on the reason for payment. This difference is further exacerbated by the existence of corruption-related social norms. The results of this analysis highlight the need to revisit existing anti-corruption policies and align them to the underlying social norms.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12868","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140671375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2023, a major earthquake struck Turkey, leaving thousands dead and exposing the country's corruption problems. The current Turkish president Erdoğan was sworn into power in 2003. Erdoğan's government has completely transformed the country with construction projects that have provided a huge economic boost. However, successive amnesties and non-compliance with building regulations have uncovered cases of corruption. This paper analyses the evolution of corruption in Turkey during Erdoğan's rule. Several indicators are considered, such as the Corruption Perception Index, the Index on Impartial Administration or the V-Dem Indicator on Political Corruption. The results indicate that two distinct stages can be distinguished during Erdoğan's term in office. The first stage was marked by a reduction in the perception of corruption, and the second stage was marked by an increase in the number of tenders for public works and corruption. Finally, several policy recommendations are proposed to reduce corruption in Turkey.
{"title":"Political corruption and earthquakes: Governance in Turkey under Erdogan's rule","authors":"Javier Cifuentes-Faura","doi":"10.1111/gove.12869","DOIUrl":"10.1111/gove.12869","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In 2023, a major earthquake struck Turkey, leaving thousands dead and exposing the country's corruption problems. The current Turkish president Erdoğan was sworn into power in 2003. Erdoğan's government has completely transformed the country with construction projects that have provided a huge economic boost. However, successive amnesties and non-compliance with building regulations have uncovered cases of corruption. This paper analyses the evolution of corruption in Turkey during Erdoğan's rule. Several indicators are considered, such as the Corruption Perception Index, the Index on Impartial Administration or the V-Dem Indicator on Political Corruption. The results indicate that two distinct stages can be distinguished during Erdoğan's term in office. The first stage was marked by a reduction in the perception of corruption, and the second stage was marked by an increase in the number of tenders for public works and corruption. Finally, several policy recommendations are proposed to reduce corruption in Turkey.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12869","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140625178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}