Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions最新文献

This paper investigates the accountability paradoxes that emerge when public administrations operate under conditions of financial resource abundance and explores how these paradoxes are managed in practice. Focusing on Italian universities in the wake of Next Generation EU (NGEU) funding, the study applies paradox theory to reconceptualize accountability as a dynamic, processual, and relational phenomenon. The findings reveal that rather than reducing complexity, financial abundance amplifies and transforms accountability pressures into persistent, multidimensional paradoxes. Through qualitative analysis, three core accountability paradoxes are identified, along with the coping strategies universities use to navigate them. The results show that accountability paradoxes are never solved, but they require a dynamic adaptation and negotiation among competing demands. The study advances the literature on public sector accountability by highlighting the challenges and opportunities of public service delivery in resource-rich environments.

This paper investigates whether populist parties serve as a corrective to democratic deficiencies by enhancing access to information, or if they represent a threat to transparency, thereby undermining democratic accountability. The research employs a dual-method approach that combines quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative analysis draws on a novel dataset measuring the strength of Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation across 11 European countries from 2000 to 2022. To deepen these findings, the study incorporates an in-depth qualitative analysis of Hungary—a country characterized by the dominant position in government of a right-wing populist party. Results reveal that the effect of populist parties on access to information is contingent upon their degree of access to government power and their ideological orientation.

Lee, D. S. Governance. 2025; 38(3):1–13.

On page 1, the author's affiliation “Graduate School of Governance and Department of Public Administration, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, South Korea” and the contact information “[email protected]” was incorrect. The correct affiliation and contact information should be: “Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea” and “[email protected]”.

We apologize for this error.

This study explores the role of representative bureaucracy in buffering the impact of adverse policy environments on immigrants' access to public benefits. Specifically, we examine whether and to what extent a more representative government workforce influences immigrant families' participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and moderates the impact of unfavorable immigrant policy climates. Analyzing data on 49 states from 2006 to 2016, we find that a government workforce with higher Hispanic and Asian representation within the public welfare area is associated with increased SNAP participation among U.S.-born children with immigrant parents. This link is contingent on states' immigrant policy climates. Higher shares of Hispanic and Asian public administrators are associated with higher SNAP participation in states with a more unwelcoming policy environment. However, there is no similar association between the levels of Black employees and SNAP participation, regardless of the policy climate.

Current studies on authoritarian resilience have yet to fully explain how autocracies can effectively cope with crises that threaten regime survival. To fill the gap, we introduce the concept of “authoritarian elasticity” to theorize how an autocracy may dramatically transform, expand, and repurpose its institutions for crisis management, fine-tune its response to crisis development, and scale back mobilization when conditions permit to sustain the crisis management mode for an extended time. We argue, the agile institutional maneuvering capacity, which differs from the long-term institutional adaptability highlighted in the current literature, explains not only how an autocracy can swiftly mobilize its resources during a crisis, but more importantly why such exhaustive mobilization may last longer than one would normally expect. We illustrate our theory empirically by examining how China elastically mobilized its Grid Management System during different phases of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Many European countries are concerned about the asymmetric distribution of refugees within their territory. In response, they have developed policies to spatially disperse asylum seekers. Yet, we lack a comprehensive understanding of such refugee dispersal policies (RDPs). This article fills that gap with two contributions. First, we conceptualize RDPs as systems of subnational responsibility-sharing in asylum governance, defined along five policy attributes and three ideal types. Second, we introduce a novel dataset covering the dispersal policies of 32 European countries and develop an index of policy restrictiveness. We show that dispersal is widespread but varies in formality and design. Most countries adopt a negotiated model combining binding spatial allocation, material incentives, and discretionary dispersal criteria. Restrictiveness is higher in states with high past arrivals and strong local autonomy. Our findings offer new insights into the spatial governance of asylum and the institutional design of responsibility-sharing mechanisms.

The European Union's current pursuit of strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty through industrial policy initiatives occurs amid intensifying US-China competition, prompting new policy instruments and rhetoric that many scholars interpret as fundamental transformation in EU economic governance. However, historical analysis reveals striking parallels with the 1970s–1980s, when Europe confronted US technological dominance and Japanese competition. Drawing on historical institutionalist theory, extensive archival research, and seven interviews with key policymakers from the European Commission, this paper demonstrates how four interconnected structural constraints have maintained the EU's decentralized industrial policy governance across both periods. These constraints create what we term the “Competence Paradox”: external competitive pressures simultaneously create functional demands for centralized coordination while activating national sovereignty protection mechanisms that prevent such centralization. This analysis challenges interpretations of strategic autonomy as institutional transformation, revealing instead how external pressures generate innovation through institutional layering rather than governance transformation.