Pub Date : 2022-07-13DOI: 10.1177/17540739221112419
S. Walter, A. Stephan
Proponents of situated affectivity hold that “tools for feeling” are just as characteristic of the human condition as are “tools for thinking” or tools for carpentry. An agent’s affective life, they argue, is dependent upon both physical characteristics of the agent and the agent’s reciprocal relationship to an appropriately structured natural, technological, or social environment. One important achievement has been the distinction between two fundamentally different ways in which affectivity might be intertwined with the environment: the “user-resource-model” and the “mind-invasion-model.” The twofold purpose of this paper is to complement the debate about situated affectivity in general and about “mind invasion” in particular by, firstly, connecting it to situationist research in social psychology and, secondly, broadening the perspective to not only accommodate decidedly detrimental “invasions” but also potentially beneficial forms of “mind shaping” that include the manipulation of an agent’s experiential life and behaviour through the moulding of both the agent’s environment and the agent’s body.
{"title":"Situated Affectivity and Mind Shaping: Lessons from Social Psychology*","authors":"S. Walter, A. Stephan","doi":"10.1177/17540739221112419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221112419","url":null,"abstract":"Proponents of situated affectivity hold that “tools for feeling” are just as characteristic of the human condition as are “tools for thinking” or tools for carpentry. An agent’s affective life, they argue, is dependent upon both physical characteristics of the agent and the agent’s reciprocal relationship to an appropriately structured natural, technological, or social environment. One important achievement has been the distinction between two fundamentally different ways in which affectivity might be intertwined with the environment: the “user-resource-model” and the “mind-invasion-model.” The twofold purpose of this paper is to complement the debate about situated affectivity in general and about “mind invasion” in particular by, firstly, connecting it to situationist research in social psychology and, secondly, broadening the perspective to not only accommodate decidedly detrimental “invasions” but also potentially beneficial forms of “mind shaping” that include the manipulation of an agent’s experiential life and behaviour through the moulding of both the agent’s environment and the agent’s body.","PeriodicalId":48064,"journal":{"name":"Emotion Review","volume":"15 1","pages":"3 - 16"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47396069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1177/17540739221108220
Brett A. Murphy, Sara B. Algoe
The three commentaries on “Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching (RIM) Definition of Empathy” mostly concurred with our critique of that widely adopted definition of empathy. Yet, commenters also raised important questions relating to the clarity and operationalizability of our recommended alternative: returning to a classical conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic, functionally oriented, multi-faceted unfolding process. To help contextualize these issues, we provide an extended analogy between empathy research and creativity research, areas of study which are conceptually linked and have faced similar conceptual and methodological obstacles. In doing so, we highlight the challenge of (a) distilling empathy down to a firm operationalizable definition without (b) losing sight of the general meaning and real-world value of the construct.
{"title":"Authors Reply: Empathy and Creativity: Dangers of the Methodological Tail Wagging the Conceptual Dog","authors":"Brett A. Murphy, Sara B. Algoe","doi":"10.1177/17540739221108220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221108220","url":null,"abstract":"The three commentaries on “Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching (RIM) Definition of Empathy” mostly concurred with our critique of that widely adopted definition of empathy. Yet, commenters also raised important questions relating to the clarity and operationalizability of our recommended alternative: returning to a classical conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic, functionally oriented, multi-faceted unfolding process. To help contextualize these issues, we provide an extended analogy between empathy research and creativity research, areas of study which are conceptually linked and have faced similar conceptual and methodological obstacles. In doing so, we highlight the challenge of (a) distilling empathy down to a firm operationalizable definition without (b) losing sight of the general meaning and real-world value of the construct.","PeriodicalId":48064,"journal":{"name":"Emotion Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"189 - 193"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47396671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-14DOI: 10.1177/17540739221107030
Alexandra Main
I strongly agree with the criticisms of the restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition of empathy made by Murphy, Lilienfeld, and Algoe (2022), and largely agree with their conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic process best defined by its function. In this commentary, I extend this argument by emphasizing the relational, interpersonal aspects of empathy. It is my view that in order to understand the functions of empathy, we must take into account not only the internal experience of the individual empathizing, but also the individual (or group) whose perspective the empathizer is attempting to take. I highlight how the emotional needs of others are dynamic and require flexible adaptation and underscore the role of context in appreciating the function of empathy.
{"title":"Comment: Empathy as a Flexible and Fundamentally Interpersonal Phenomenon: Comment on “Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching Definition of Empathy”","authors":"Alexandra Main","doi":"10.1177/17540739221107030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221107030","url":null,"abstract":"I strongly agree with the criticisms of the restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition of empathy made by Murphy, Lilienfeld, and Algoe (2022), and largely agree with their conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic process best defined by its function. In this commentary, I extend this argument by emphasizing the relational, interpersonal aspects of empathy. It is my view that in order to understand the functions of empathy, we must take into account not only the internal experience of the individual empathizing, but also the individual (or group) whose perspective the empathizer is attempting to take. I highlight how the emotional needs of others are dynamic and require flexible adaptation and underscore the role of context in appreciating the function of empathy.","PeriodicalId":48064,"journal":{"name":"Emotion Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"182 - 184"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65511844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-09DOI: 10.1177/17540739221107027
D. Zahavi
The three commentaries on “Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching (RIM) Definition of Empathy” mostly concurred with our critique of that widely adopted definition of empathy. Yet, commenters also raised important questions relating to the clarity and operationalizability of our recommended alternative: returning to a classical conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic, functionally oriented, multi-faceted unfolding process. To help contextualize these issues, we provide an extended analogy between empathy research and creativity research, areas of study which are conceptually linked and have faced similar conceptual and methodological obstacles. In doing so, we highlight the challenge of (a) distilling empathy down to a firm operationalizable definition without (b) losing sight of the general meaning and real-world value of the
{"title":"Comment: Debating Empathy: Historical Awareness and Conceptual Precision","authors":"D. Zahavi","doi":"10.1177/17540739221107027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221107027","url":null,"abstract":"The three commentaries on “Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching (RIM) Definition of Empathy” mostly concurred with our critique of that widely adopted definition of empathy. Yet, commenters also raised important questions relating to the clarity and operationalizability of our recommended alternative: returning to a classical conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic, functionally oriented, multi-faceted unfolding process. To help contextualize these issues, we provide an extended analogy between empathy research and creativity research, areas of study which are conceptually linked and have faced similar conceptual and methodological obstacles. In doing so, we highlight the challenge of (a) distilling empathy down to a firm operationalizable definition without (b) losing sight of the general meaning and real-world value of the","PeriodicalId":48064,"journal":{"name":"Emotion Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"187 - 189"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42194255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-07DOI: 10.1177/17540739221107029
A. Marsh
Empathy is a construct that is notoriously difficult to define. Murphy and colleagues (2022) argue for leaning into the construct's inherent fuzziness and reverting to what they term a classical definition informed by the observations of philosophers and clinicians: as a dynamic, “unfolding process of imaginatively experiencing the subjective consciousness of another person, sensing, understanding, and structuring the world as if one were that person.” Although consistent with some historical conceptualizations, this definition risks incorporating so many processes it would make empathy difficult to operationalize or distinguish from any generally socially sensitive interaction. Defining empathy instead as the attempted representation, or simulation, of another's subjective internal experiences (whether sensory, affective, or cognitive) would increase its clarity and empirical utility.
{"title":"Comment: Getting Our Affect Together: Shared Representations as the Core of Empathy","authors":"A. Marsh","doi":"10.1177/17540739221107029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221107029","url":null,"abstract":"Empathy is a construct that is notoriously difficult to define. Murphy and colleagues (2022) argue for leaning into the construct's inherent fuzziness and reverting to what they term a classical definition informed by the observations of philosophers and clinicians: as a dynamic, “unfolding process of imaginatively experiencing the subjective consciousness of another person, sensing, understanding, and structuring the world as if one were that person.” Although consistent with some historical conceptualizations, this definition risks incorporating so many processes it would make empathy difficult to operationalize or distinguish from any generally socially sensitive interaction. Defining empathy instead as the attempted representation, or simulation, of another's subjective internal experiences (whether sensory, affective, or cognitive) would increase its clarity and empirical utility.","PeriodicalId":48064,"journal":{"name":"Emotion Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"184 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41930435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-06DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104457
Maciej Behnke, M. Pietruch, Patrycja Chwilkowska, Eliza Wessel, Lukasz D. Kaczmarek, M. Assink, J. Gross
The undoing hypothesis proposes that positive emotions serve to undo sympathetic arousal related to negative emotions and stress. However, a recent qualitative review challenged the undoing effect by presenting conflicting results. To address this issue quantitatively, we conducted a meta-analytic review of 16 studies (N = 1,220; 72 effect sizes) measuring sympathetic recovery during elicited positive emotions and neutral conditions. Findings indicated that in most cases, positive emotions did not speed sympathetic recovery compared to neutral conditions. However, when a composite index of cardiovascular reactivity was used, undoing effects were evident. Our findings suggest the need for further work on the functions of positive emotions.
{"title":"The Undoing Effect of Positive Emotions: A Meta-Analytic Review","authors":"Maciej Behnke, M. Pietruch, Patrycja Chwilkowska, Eliza Wessel, Lukasz D. Kaczmarek, M. Assink, J. Gross","doi":"10.1177/17540739221104457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221104457","url":null,"abstract":"The undoing hypothesis proposes that positive emotions serve to undo sympathetic arousal related to negative emotions and stress. However, a recent qualitative review challenged the undoing effect by presenting conflicting results. To address this issue quantitatively, we conducted a meta-analytic review of 16 studies (N = 1,220; 72 effect sizes) measuring sympathetic recovery during elicited positive emotions and neutral conditions. Findings indicated that in most cases, positive emotions did not speed sympathetic recovery compared to neutral conditions. However, when a composite index of cardiovascular reactivity was used, undoing effects were evident. Our findings suggest the need for further work on the functions of positive emotions.","PeriodicalId":48064,"journal":{"name":"Emotion Review","volume":"15 1","pages":"45 - 62"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46001434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104804
K. Lampert
The phenomenological understanding of empathy as the direct experiencing of the mental states (feelings, intentions, moods) of others eschews the identification of empathy with caring. At the same time, it leaves open the possibility of sadistic pleasure, indifference, or malice as consequences of empathic experience. In this paper, I intend to defend the place of caring as an inseparable part of the empathic experience, specifically when understood as direct perception. My defense relies on (a) conceiving of attentive concern as a perceptual predisposition, and (b) understanding the caring responsiveness of the empathizer as embedded in her direct perception of the empathee's mental states. My claim proceeds by three steps. Firstly, I will present the need to include caring within empathy through the problem that arises from excluding it. Secondly, I will argue for the presence of active responsiveness, inherent in the phenomenological concept of perception and expressed more explicitly in its Gibsonian understanding. Thirdly, I will propose my understanding of attentive concern as a predisposition, which together with the intentionality attributed to the other (itself also a disposition) forms the pre-perceptual basis for identifying empathy with caring.
{"title":"Caring as the Default of Empathic Direct Perception","authors":"K. Lampert","doi":"10.1177/17540739221104804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221104804","url":null,"abstract":"The phenomenological understanding of empathy as the direct experiencing of the mental states (feelings, intentions, moods) of others eschews the identification of empathy with caring. At the same time, it leaves open the possibility of sadistic pleasure, indifference, or malice as consequences of empathic experience. In this paper, I intend to defend the place of caring as an inseparable part of the empathic experience, specifically when understood as direct perception. My defense relies on (a) conceiving of attentive concern as a perceptual predisposition, and (b) understanding the caring responsiveness of the empathizer as embedded in her direct perception of the empathee's mental states. My claim proceeds by three steps. Firstly, I will present the need to include caring within empathy through the problem that arises from excluding it. Secondly, I will argue for the presence of active responsiveness, inherent in the phenomenological concept of perception and expressed more explicitly in its Gibsonian understanding. Thirdly, I will propose my understanding of attentive concern as a predisposition, which together with the intentionality attributed to the other (itself also a disposition) forms the pre-perceptual basis for identifying empathy with caring.","PeriodicalId":48064,"journal":{"name":"Emotion Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"194 - 205"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42131264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-31DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104456
Assaf Kron, Assaf Weksler
This paper proposes and develops the feelings of goals hypothesis (FGH). It has two aims: first, to describe the evolutionary function of emotional feelings (EFs), and second, to describe the content and the format of EFs. According to FGH, the evolutionary function of EFs is to enable motoric flexibility. Specifically, EFs are a component of a psychological mechanism that permits differential motoric reactions to the same stimulus. Further, according to FGH, EF is a special type of mental representation with the content of an action goal, and with a non-motoric, non-conceptual format. This paper thoroughly clarifies the assumptions underlying FGH and discusses its theoretical implications and empirical predictions.
{"title":"The Feelings of Goals Hypothesis: Emotional Feelings are Non-Conceptual, Non-Motoric Representations of Goals","authors":"Assaf Kron, Assaf Weksler","doi":"10.1177/17540739221104456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221104456","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes and develops the feelings of goals hypothesis (FGH). It has two aims: first, to describe the evolutionary function of emotional feelings (EFs), and second, to describe the content and the format of EFs. According to FGH, the evolutionary function of EFs is to enable motoric flexibility. Specifically, EFs are a component of a psychological mechanism that permits differential motoric reactions to the same stimulus. Further, according to FGH, EF is a special type of mental representation with the content of an action goal, and with a non-motoric, non-conceptual format. This paper thoroughly clarifies the assumptions underlying FGH and discusses its theoretical implications and empirical predictions.","PeriodicalId":48064,"journal":{"name":"Emotion Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"217 - 229"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44760262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-30DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104464
Slawa Loev
This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic tasks that typically rely on epistemic feelings. Finally, it is argued that the affective properties do not only correlate with epistemic feelings but that we, in fact, capitalise on these affective properties to perform the epistemic tasks. In other words: the affective properties in question constitute epistemic feelings.
{"title":"Epistemic Feelings are Affective Experiences","authors":"Slawa Loev","doi":"10.1177/17540739221104464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221104464","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic tasks that typically rely on epistemic feelings. Finally, it is argued that the affective properties do not only correlate with epistemic feelings but that we, in fact, capitalise on these affective properties to perform the epistemic tasks. In other words: the affective properties in question constitute epistemic feelings.","PeriodicalId":48064,"journal":{"name":"Emotion Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"206 - 216"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2022-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41381088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-02DOI: 10.1177/17540739221082215
Brett A. Murphy, S. Lilienfeld, Sara B. Algoe
A growing cadre of influential scholars has converged on a circumscribed definition of empathy as restricted only to feeling the same emotion that one perceives another is feeling. We argue that this restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition is deeply problematic because (1) it deviates dramatically from traditional conceptualizations of empathy and unmoors the construct from generations of scientific research and clinical practice; (2) insistence on an isomorphic form undercuts much of the functional value of empathy from multiple perspectives of analysis; and (3) combining the opposing concepts of isomorphic matching and self-other awareness implicitly requires motivational content, causing the RIM definition to implicitly require the kind of non-matching emotional content that it explicitly seeks to exclude.
{"title":"Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching Definition of Empathy","authors":"Brett A. Murphy, S. Lilienfeld, Sara B. Algoe","doi":"10.1177/17540739221082215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221082215","url":null,"abstract":"A growing cadre of influential scholars has converged on a circumscribed definition of empathy as restricted only to feeling the same emotion that one perceives another is feeling. We argue that this restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition is deeply problematic because (1) it deviates dramatically from traditional conceptualizations of empathy and unmoors the construct from generations of scientific research and clinical practice; (2) insistence on an isomorphic form undercuts much of the functional value of empathy from multiple perspectives of analysis; and (3) combining the opposing concepts of isomorphic matching and self-other awareness implicitly requires motivational content, causing the RIM definition to implicitly require the kind of non-matching emotional content that it explicitly seeks to exclude.","PeriodicalId":48064,"journal":{"name":"Emotion Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"167 - 181"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2022-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45290203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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