How do we judge others' behavior when they are both seen and not seen-when we observe their behavior but not the underlying traits or history that moderate the perceived riskiness of their behavior? We investigate this question in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic: How people make sense of, and judge, vaccination-contingent behaviors-behaviors, such as going to the gym or a bar, which are considered to be more or less risky and appropriate, depending on the target's vaccination status. While decision theoretic models suggest that these judgments should depend on the probability that the target is vaccinated (e.g., the positivity of judgments should increase linearly with the probability of vaccination), in a large-scale pre-registered experiment (N = 936) we find that both riskiness and appropriateness judgments deviate substantially from such normative benchmarks. Specifically, when participants judge a stranger's behavior, without being asked to think about the stranger's vaccination status, they tend to judge these behaviors similarly positively to behaviors of others who are known to be fully vaccinated. By contrast, when participants are explicitly prompted to think about the vaccination status of others, they do so, leading them to view others more disparagingly, at times even more negatively than what a normative benchmark would imply. More broadly, these results suggest new directions for research on how people respond to risk and ambiguity. We demonstrate that even subtle cues can fundamentally alter what information is "top of mind," that is, what information is included or excluded when making judgments.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11166-022-09396-7.
Incentivized experiments in which individuals receive monetary rewards according to the outcomes of their decisions are regarded as the gold standard for preference elicitation in experimental economics. These task-related real payments are considered necessary to reveal subjects' "true preferences." Using a systematic, large-sample approach with three subject pools of private investors, professional investors, and students, we test the effect of task-related monetary incentives on risk preferences in four standard experimental tasks. We find no significant differences in behavior between and within subjects in the incentivized and non-incentivized regimes. We discuss implications for academic research and forions in the field.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11166-022-09377-w.
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