Public Understanding of Science最新文献

Advancements in New Plant Breeding Techniques have emerged as promising tools for enhancing crop productivity, quality, and resilience in the face of global challenges, such as climate change and food security. However, the successful implementation of these techniques relies also on public acceptance of this innovation. Understanding what shapes public perception and acceptance of New Plant Breeding Techniques is crucial for effective science communication, policymaking, and the sustainable adoption of these innovations. The objective of this systematic review was to synthesize existing research on the public perception of New Plant Breeding Techniques applied to food crops and explore the psychosocial determinants that influence acceptance. Twenty papers published between 2015 and 2023 were included on various New Plant Breeding Techniques and their reception by the general public. Determinants affecting the acceptance of food crops derived from New Plant Breeding Techniques were categorized into six areas: sociodemographic factors, perceived benefits and risks, attitudes toward science, communication strategies, personal values, and product characteristics.

This article examines the visions of citizens' ideal practices regarding technoscientific affairs in a democratic society, namely "imaginaries of model citizens," that underlie three science and public initiatives: public understanding of science, public engagement in science, and citizen science. While imaginaries of citizens are performative and necessary to these initiatives, they are often relegated to the background. I argue that such imaginaries are the result of a complex of perceptions on the nature of science, the role of democracy in scientific activities, and the form of "democratizing" science. The imaginary of model citizens in public understanding of science is of literate citizens who should know science sufficiently, use it in daily life, and support science; in public engagement in science, the model citizen is a responsible one who should engage in the governance of technoscientific issues; and in citizen science, a contributive one who should partake in and enjoy creating scientific knowledge.

To examine whether different types of disclosure made by climate scientists on social media influence perceived source credibility (i.e. competence, integrity, benevolence) and likability, we conducted a 2 (self-disclosure type: personal vs political) × 3 (proportion of posts including a self-disclosure: 20% vs 50% vs 80%) × 2 (gender identity of scientist: male vs female) between-subjects experiment (N = 734). We found that people liked the scientist more for a personal than political disclosure, rated them as being more competent for a political disclosure, and liked a female scientist more than a male scientist. However, scientist's gender did not moderate the effect of disclosure type or the effect of participants' gender. Our results suggest distinct benefits when scientists deliver different types of messages on social media, although disclosure is unlikely to have substantial effects on lay judgments of scientists' credibility.

This article demonstrates-based on an interpretive discourse analysis of three types of memes (Rabid Feminists, Women's Bodies, Policy Ideas) and secondary thread discourse on 4chan's "Politically Incorrect" discussion board-two key findings: (1) the existence of a gendered hate based scientific discourse, "science fan fiction," in online spaces and (2) how gender "science fan fiction" is an outcome of the male supremacist cosmology, by producing and justifying resentment against white women as being both inherently untrustworthy (politically, sexually, intellectually) and dangerous. This perspective-which combines hatred and distrust of women with white nationalist anxieties about demographic shifts, racial integrity, and sexuality-then motivates misogynist policy ideas including total domination of women or their removal. 4chan users employ this discourse to "scientifically" substantiate claims of white male supremacy, the fundamental untrustworthiness of white women, and to argue white women's inherent threat to white male supremacist goals.

Organizations involved with gene editing may engage with the public to share information and address concerns about the technology. It is unclear, however, if the information shared aligns with what people want to know. We aimed to understand what members of the public want to know about gene editing in animals by soliciting their questions through an open-ended survey question and comparing them with questions posed in Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) webpages developed by gene editing stakeholder organizations. Participants (338 USA residents) asked the most questions about gene editing in general and animal welfare. In contrast, FAQ webpages focused on regulations. The questions survey participants asked demonstrate a range of knowledge and interests. The discrepancy between survey participant questions and the information provided in the FAQ webpages suggests that gene editing stakeholders might engage in more meaningful public engagement by soliciting actual questions from the public and opening up opportunities for real dialogue.

In the context of science communication, complexity is often reduced. This study employs a 2 × 2 experimental design (N = 432) to investigate how two factors, namely the communication of complexity (reduced vs not reduced) and the provision of suggestions for concrete action (suggested vs not suggested), influence individuals' productive engagement with the socio-scientific topic of sustainable energy. Measured variables include topic-specific intellectual humility, judgements of source trustworthiness, willingness to act, anxiety, and hope. As expected, communication of complexity led to higher topic-specific intellectual humility, higher epistemic trustworthiness and higher anxiety. When a concrete action was communicated, participants reported lower topic-specific intellectual humility. Participants' willingness to act was not significantly affected by the experimental manipulation. The results of the study imply that the communication of complexity does not hinder people's productive engagement with science.

Scientific findings can be overturned when new evidence arises. This study examines how communicating and explaining uncertainty around scientific findings affect trust in the communicator when findings change. In an online experiment (N = 800, convenience sample), participants read a fictitious statement from a public health authority announcing that there was no link between a new COVID-19 vaccine and heart muscle inflammation. The authority communicated (1) no uncertainty, (2) uncertainty without giving a reason, (3) uncertainty due to imprecision, or (4) uncertainty due to incomplete accounting of patients. Participants were then informed that the authority's statement was no longer correct as new data showed a link between the vaccine and heart muscle inflammation. Participants rated the authority's trustworthiness before and after the evidence update. Our findings indicate that communicating uncertainty buffers against a loss of trust when evidence changes. Moreover, explaining uncertainty does not appear to harm trust.

This article offers an in-depth analysis of the diffusion model of science popularisation. It reviews criticisms against the model and shows that they do not warrant its rejection. It argues that the diffusion model has elements, hitherto neglected, which can facilitate a better understanding of popularisation. Viewing popularisation as the diffusion of knowledge is beneficial because it enables us to: (1) pinpoint the origins of popularisation and trace its historical continuity; (2) explain why science requires continuous popularisation; (3) understand why the values that popularisers promote are not arbitrary; and (4) define more precisely the role of popularisers.

The motivated reception of science in line with one's preexisting convictions is a well-documented, pervasive phenomenon. In two studies (N = 743), we investigated whether this bias might be stronger in some people than others due to dispositional differences. Building on the assumptions that motivated science reception is driven by perceived threat and suspicion and higher under perceived ambiguity and uncertainty, we focused on traits associated with such perceptions. In particular, we tested the impact of conspiracy mentality and victim sensitivity on motivated science reception (as indicated by ascriptions of researchers' trustworthiness and evidence credibility). In addition, we explored the role of broader personality traits (generalized mistrust and ambiguity intolerance) in this context. None of the investigated dispositions modulated the motivated science reception effect. This demonstrates once again, that motivated science reception is a ubiquitous challenge for the effective dissemination of science and everyone seems to be at risk of it.

This research explored the strategic beliefs that people have about science and the extent to which it can explain moral and immoral behaviors. Although people do not believe that science is able to explain certain aspects of their mind, they might nevertheless accept a scientific explanation for their immoral behaviors if that explanation is exculpatory. In a first study, participants reflected on moral and immoral deeds that they performed or that other people performed. Participants were somewhat skeptic that science can account for people's behavior-except for when they reflected on the wrongdoings that they committed. Two further studies suggest that strategic belief in science arises because it enables external attributions for the behavior, outside of the wrongdoers' control. Implications are discussed for science understanding and communication.