Investors are increasingly placing reliance on alternative performance measures (APMs). Key performance indicators (KPIs) are a subset of these APMs that illustrate industry‐specific firm financial and operational performance. In this study, we investigate analysts’ demand for KPI‐related information in earnings conference calls and whether managers adjust their decisions about voluntary KPI disclosure in subsequent earnings calls. Using 51 KPIs for six industries, we find that after analysts request KPI‐related information, managers increase both the likelihood and intensity of their KPI disclosure in subsequent earnings conference calls. This effect is more pronounced when the firm has less relevant earnings and lower proprietary costs, and when analysts are connected to management. Analyst KPI demand leads to a higher coverage of KPIs in subsequent news and generates benefits in analyst forecast dispersion, cost of capital and stock liquidity. Our study highlights the role that analysts play in voluntary KPI disclosure when there is an absence of mandatory integrated reporting.
{"title":"KPI information acquisition by analysts: Evidence from conference calls","authors":"Qi Rachel Tang, Alan Guoming Huang","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12822","url":null,"abstract":"Investors are increasingly placing reliance on alternative performance measures (APMs). Key performance indicators (KPIs) are a subset of these APMs that illustrate industry‐specific firm financial and operational performance. In this study, we investigate analysts’ demand for KPI‐related information in earnings conference calls and whether managers adjust their decisions about voluntary KPI disclosure in subsequent earnings calls. Using 51 KPIs for six industries, we find that after analysts request KPI‐related information, managers increase both the likelihood and intensity of their KPI disclosure in subsequent earnings conference calls. This effect is more pronounced when the firm has less relevant earnings and lower proprietary costs, and when analysts are connected to management. Analyst KPI demand leads to a higher coverage of KPIs in subsequent news and generates benefits in analyst forecast dispersion, cost of capital and stock liquidity. Our study highlights the role that analysts play in voluntary KPI disclosure when there is an absence of mandatory integrated reporting.","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141781936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's Rule 3211 mandates firms to disclose the types of component auditors employed and their contribution to the overall audit. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we examine the effect of the disclosure of component auditor usage on shareholder dissatisfaction. We find that multinational companies (MNCs) reporting higher use of large component auditors (LCAs), defined as component auditors contributing materially to the audit, experience a 17% decrease in shareholder votes against (or abstaining from) auditor ratification compared to MNCs with lower usage. This effect is more pronounced for firms with high institutional shareholding. We fail to find evidence of any effect on firms with the higher usage of small component auditors (SCAs). Our findings are robust to various definitions for treated and control firms. Our results support the view that, on average, LCAs offer higher “local” benefits and impose lower coordination costs compared to SCAs.
{"title":"Do investors differentiate between types of component auditors? Evidence from auditor ratification voting","authors":"Bullipe R. Chintha, Sriniwas Mahapatro","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12819","url":null,"abstract":"The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's Rule 3211 mandates firms to disclose the types of component auditors employed and their contribution to the overall audit. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we examine the effect of the disclosure of component auditor usage on shareholder dissatisfaction. We find that multinational companies (MNCs) reporting higher use of large component auditors (LCAs), defined as component auditors contributing materially to the audit, experience a 17% decrease in shareholder votes against (or abstaining from) auditor ratification compared to MNCs with lower usage. This effect is more pronounced for firms with high institutional shareholding. We fail to find evidence of any effect on firms with the higher usage of small component auditors (SCAs). Our findings are robust to various definitions for treated and control firms. Our results support the view that, on average, LCAs offer higher “local” benefits and impose lower coordination costs compared to SCAs.","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141614876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the value and corporate governance consequences of government awards for a sample of French CEOs appointed to the national Order of the Legion of Honor (Légion d'honneur). Short‐term market reactions surrounding award announcements are significantly positive, whereas the valuation of firms with awarded CEOs is greater than that of (matched) firms with nonawarded CEOs. We explore the channels through which government awards create value and find evidence that they provide awarded CEOs and their firms with increased political access. We also observe that government awards are associated with better corporate governance in that awarded CEOs are more likely to be fired for poor performance. The negative effects that have been documented for media awards and are associated with CEOs’ superstar status do not seem to apply to state awards.
{"title":"Government awards to CEOs","authors":"François Belot, Timothée Waxin","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12813","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the value and corporate governance consequences of government awards for a sample of French CEOs appointed to the national Order of the Legion of Honor (<jats:italic>Légion d'honneur</jats:italic>). Short‐term market reactions surrounding award announcements are significantly positive, whereas the valuation of firms with awarded CEOs is greater than that of (matched) firms with nonawarded CEOs. We explore the channels through which government awards create value and find evidence that they provide awarded CEOs and their firms with increased political access. We also observe that government awards are associated with better corporate governance in that awarded CEOs are more likely to be fired for poor performance. The negative effects that have been documented for media awards and are associated with CEOs’ superstar status do not seem to apply to state awards.","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"127 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141509412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Balasingham Balachandran, Robert W. Faff, Sagarika Mishra, Syed Shams
This study investigates whether the attribute of integrity culture (derived from target firms’ annual reports) influences merger and acquisition (M&A) performance. We find that a target firm's integrity culture, measured from its 10‐K reports, has a positive and significant effect on market reaction to the bidder firm's M&A announcement. Our study's analysis is found to be robust to sample selection bias by utilising the entropy balancing technique and to endogeneity concerns by employing an instrumental variable approach. Our results are also robust to alternative measures of integrity culture and when controlling for a target firm's religiosity and corporate social responsibility, an acquirer firm's fixed effects, chief executive officer's fixed effects, governance for corporate control and advisor quality. We identify the retention of a target firm's directors and of its customers as channels that underlie our main findings. Furthermore, we find that acquisition synergies improve, with decreased time taken to complete the deal, for acquisitions of target firms with a higher integrity culture.
{"title":"Target firm's integrity culture and M&A performance","authors":"Balasingham Balachandran, Robert W. Faff, Sagarika Mishra, Syed Shams","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12818","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates whether the attribute of integrity culture (derived from target firms’ annual reports) influences merger and acquisition (M&A) performance. We find that a target firm's integrity culture, measured from its 10‐K reports, has a positive and significant effect on market reaction to the bidder firm's M&A announcement. Our study's analysis is found to be robust to sample selection bias by utilising the entropy balancing technique and to endogeneity concerns by employing an instrumental variable approach. Our results are also robust to alternative measures of integrity culture and when controlling for a target firm's religiosity and corporate social responsibility, an acquirer firm's fixed effects, chief executive officer's fixed effects, governance for corporate control and advisor quality. We identify the retention of a target firm's directors and of its customers as channels that underlie our main findings. Furthermore, we find that acquisition synergies improve, with decreased time taken to complete the deal, for acquisitions of target firms with a higher integrity culture.","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141509413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine implications from the expansion of private equity (PE) firms into the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) (i.e., leveraged lending) business. Due to similarities in the investment universes of CLO managers and PE firms, asset managers running both of them frequently hold debt and equity claims of the same company. Our results indicate lower credit costs for these companies through the mitigation of shareholder–creditor agency conflicts. The lower funding costs imply increased equity returns for the sponsoring PE firms. In addition, our findings suggest that PE‐affiliated CLO managers benefit from informed trading in the secondary leveraged loan market.
我们研究了私募股权(PE)公司向抵押贷款义务(CLO)(即杠杆贷款)业务扩张所带来的影响。由于 CLO 管理者和 PE 公司的投资领域相似,经营这两种公司的资产管理者经常持有同一家公司的债权和股权。我们的研究结果表明,通过缓解股东与债权人之间的代理冲突,这些公司的信贷成本降低了。融资成本的降低意味着私募股权投资公司的股权收益增加。此外,我们的研究结果表明,与 PE 有关联的 CLO 管理者可以从二级杠杆贷款市场的知情交易中获益。
{"title":"Dual holdings and shareholder–creditor agency conflicts: Evidence from the syndicated loan market","authors":"Ingo Geburtig, Thomas Mählmann, Roberto Liebscher","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12805","url":null,"abstract":"We examine implications from the expansion of private equity (PE) firms into the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) (i.e., leveraged lending) business. Due to similarities in the investment universes of CLO managers and PE firms, asset managers running both of them frequently hold debt and equity claims of the same company. Our results indicate lower credit costs for these companies through the mitigation of shareholder–creditor agency conflicts. The lower funding costs imply increased equity returns for the sponsoring PE firms. In addition, our findings suggest that PE‐affiliated CLO managers benefit from informed trading in the secondary leveraged loan market.","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140942577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate whether generalist chief executive officers (CEOs), that is, CEOs who gain transferable skills across firms and industries, have less incentive to hoard bad news. To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm–CEO matching, we deploy a difference‐in‐differences method utilizing exogenous CEO turnovers, propensity score matching and entropy balancing matching methods, and Oster's coefficient stability test. Supporting our conjecture, we find a negative relation between CEOs’ general ability index (GAI) and future stock price crash risk. The effect of CEOs’ GAI on crash risk is stronger when labor demand is stronger and when firms have more agency conflicts. Our analysis further suggests that generalist CEOs attenuate crash risk by increasing conditional accounting conservatism and reducing real earnings management. Taken together, our findings highlight the role of CEOs’ general human capital in increasing their tolerance for failure and mitigating the agency problem.
我们研究了通才型首席执行官(CEO),即获得跨公司和跨行业可转移技能的首席执行官,是否有较少的动机囤积坏消息。为了解决企业与首席执行官匹配所产生的内生性问题,我们采用了一种利用外生首席执行官更替的差分法、倾向得分匹配法和熵平衡匹配法以及奥斯特系数稳定性检验。我们发现,CEO 的综合能力指数(GAI)与未来股价暴跌风险之间存在负相关关系,这证明了我们的猜想。当劳动力需求较强和公司存在较多代理冲突时,CEO 的 GAI 对股价暴跌风险的影响更大。我们的分析进一步表明,通才型首席执行官通过增加条件会计保守主义和减少实际收益管理来降低股价暴跌风险。综上所述,我们的研究结果凸显了首席执行官的一般人力资本在提高其失败容忍度和缓解代理问题方面的作用。
{"title":"Generalist CEOs and stock price crash risk","authors":"Xiaohua Fang, Claudia Girardone, Yiwei Li, Yeqin Zeng","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12804","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether generalist chief executive officers (CEOs), that is, CEOs who gain transferable skills across firms and industries, have less incentive to hoard bad news. To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm–CEO matching, we deploy a difference‐in‐differences method utilizing exogenous CEO turnovers, propensity score matching and entropy balancing matching methods, and Oster's coefficient stability test. Supporting our conjecture, we find a negative relation between CEOs’ general ability index (GAI) and future stock price crash risk. The effect of CEOs’ GAI on crash risk is stronger when labor demand is stronger and when firms have more agency conflicts. Our analysis further suggests that generalist CEOs attenuate crash risk by increasing conditional accounting conservatism and reducing real earnings management. Taken together, our findings highlight the role of CEOs’ general human capital in increasing their tolerance for failure and mitigating the agency problem.","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"12 20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140839808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper re‐examines corporate dividend payout policy by focusing on how investors evaluate dividend cuts. Our focus is to understand why despite the documented on average negative market response, many dividend‐cutting firms experience a positive market response. We juxtapose a well‐established literature on corporate payout policies with the literature on the role of prior information in investor evaluation of newly arrived information and document that the market responds positively to dividend cuts when firms have positive investment opportunity sets. Our results support the primary thesis that not all dividend cuts are bad news—it depends. We validate this result by documenting that firms cutting dividends in the presence of investment opportunities do make significant investments such as capital expenditures and merger and acquisition activities in future years. Furthermore, we also find that future operating profitability is higher for dividend‐cutting firms with relatively higher investment opportunities. We also document that among dividend‐cutting firms, there is a statistically significant difference in the buy‐and‐hold returns for up to 2 years, between firms with high versus low investment opportunities. This provides support for the economic significance of our results. These results provide new evidence on how investors interpret corporate payout policies to distinguish among dividend cuts.
{"title":"Dividend cuts and a firm's investment opportunity set","authors":"Somnath Das, Sandip Dhole","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12801","url":null,"abstract":"This paper re‐examines corporate dividend payout policy by focusing on how investors evaluate dividend cuts. Our focus is to understand why despite the documented <jats:italic>on average</jats:italic> negative market response, many dividend‐cutting firms experience a positive market response. We juxtapose a well‐established literature on corporate payout policies with the literature on the role of prior information in investor evaluation of newly arrived information and document that the market responds positively to dividend cuts when firms have positive investment opportunity sets. Our results support the primary thesis that not all dividend cuts are bad news—it depends. We validate this result by documenting that firms cutting dividends in the presence of investment opportunities do make significant investments such as capital expenditures and merger and acquisition activities in future years. Furthermore, we also find that future operating profitability is higher for dividend‐cutting firms with relatively higher investment opportunities. We also document that among dividend‐cutting firms, there is a statistically significant difference in the buy‐and‐hold returns for up to 2 years, between firms with high versus low investment opportunities. This provides support for the economic significance of our results. These results provide new evidence on how investors interpret corporate payout policies to distinguish among dividend cuts.","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140586867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the effect of media coverage of corporate environmental activities on corporate green innovation. Using a large sample of corporate news coverage over the period 2001–2019, we find a positive relationship between green media coverage and the green innovation of a corporation but a negative one between nongreen media coverage and green innovation. These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including the instrumental approach and propensity score matching method. We examine and verify two well-documented general channels through which the media influences corporate behaviors, namely, the financial constraint mitigation and external governance. More importantly, we examine channels specifically related to green media coverage and find that green media coverage strengthens the effect of pressure imposed by the government and the public for green innovation. Taken together, our results suggest that the media plays a distinctive role in green innovation through its particular attention to the environment.
{"title":"Green media coverage and corporate green innovation","authors":"Jie Gao, Huiying Wu, Jiaxing You, Meg Smith","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12802","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of media coverage of corporate environmental activities on corporate green innovation. Using a large sample of corporate news coverage over the period 2001–2019, we find a positive relationship between green media coverage and the green innovation of a corporation but a negative one between nongreen media coverage and green innovation. These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including the instrumental approach and propensity score matching method. We examine and verify two well-documented general channels through which the media influences corporate behaviors, namely, the financial constraint mitigation and external governance. More importantly, we examine channels specifically related to green media coverage and find that green media coverage strengthens the effect of pressure imposed by the government and the public for green innovation. Taken together, our results suggest that the media plays a distinctive role in green innovation through its particular attention to the environment.","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140586868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine whether and to what extent the personal communication of corporate information by individual managers is affected by their personal preferences for impression management. Using earnings conference calls as a setting in which to observe individual managers’ personal communication and controlling for firm-specific and manager-specific factors, we document that the communication style of managers who sell corporate stock shortly after the call is significantly more optimistic than that of the nonselling manager who participates in the same call. The effect is more pronounced in the less scripted and more flexible question and answer section and is more likely to emerge from Chief Financial Officer (CFO) than from Chief Executive Officer (CEO) communications. Taken together, our findings suggest that differences in individual communication styles are not only affected by personality and career backgrounds of individual managers but rather can also emerge from managers’ conscious or unconscious preferences for impression management.
{"title":"Speaking with one voice? Individual preferences and managers’ personal communication style","authors":"Christoph J. Sextroh, Juliane Wutzler","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12792","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether and to what extent the personal communication of corporate information by individual managers is affected by their personal preferences for impression management. Using earnings conference calls as a setting in which to observe individual managers’ personal communication and controlling for firm-specific and manager-specific factors, we document that the communication style of managers who sell corporate stock shortly after the call is significantly more optimistic than that of the nonselling manager who participates in the same call. The effect is more pronounced in the less scripted and more flexible question and answer section and is more likely to emerge from Chief Financial Officer (CFO) than from Chief Executive Officer (CEO) communications. Taken together, our findings suggest that differences in individual communication styles are not only affected by personality and career backgrounds of individual managers but rather can also emerge from managers’ conscious or unconscious preferences for impression management.","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"110 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140586865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using energy firm data and the 1997 introduction of weather derivatives as a natural experiment, we document an average 21-basis-point interest reduction in bank loans after borrowers hedge with weather derivatives. This saving increases among borrowers with higher risk or less complex financial reports, and during more uncertain market conditions or when investors pay more attention to climate risks. Our results are robust to endogeneity-corrected methods. Hedging firms are more willing to pledge collateral, accept stricter covenants and exhibit lower risks and a lower likelihood of covenant violations within 1 year following loan origination. We also find hedging firms have lower bond yields and a lower bank debt ratio, indicating that the benefits from hedging with weather derivatives extend to the public debt market. Overall, our findings demonstrate important financial implications of hedging using weather derivatives.
{"title":"Risk management and private debt contracts: The role of weather derivatives","authors":"Viet Do, Thu Ha Nguyen, Tram Vu","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12800","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12800","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using energy firm data and the 1997 introduction of weather derivatives as a natural experiment, we document an average 21-basis-point interest reduction in bank loans after borrowers hedge with weather derivatives. This saving increases among borrowers with higher risk or less complex financial reports, and during more uncertain market conditions or when investors pay more attention to climate risks. Our results are robust to endogeneity-corrected methods. Hedging firms are more willing to pledge collateral, accept stricter covenants and exhibit lower risks and a lower likelihood of covenant violations within 1 year following loan origination. We also find hedging firms have lower bond yields and a lower bank debt ratio, indicating that the benefits from hedging with weather derivatives extend to the public debt market. Overall, our findings demonstrate important financial implications of hedging using weather derivatives.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2848-2883"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12800","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140602896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}