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Management Forecasts and Reactions by Analysts and Investors: The Effect of CEO Gender 管理层预测与分析师和投资者的反应:CEO性别的影响
IF 2.4 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-03-21 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12869
Alison Cook, Adam Esplin, Christy Glass, J. Scott Judd, Kari Olsen

We examine whether CEO gender is associated with management forecast properties and analysts’ and investors’ reactions to those management forecasts. Using a dataset of CEO transitions, we find that while women CEOs are more likely to issue management earnings forecasts, the properties of those forecasts issued by women and men CEOs do not exhibit differences in the likelihood of missing the forecast, forecast bias, and forecast precision. We find that analysts and investors react less to forecasts issued by women CEOs than men CEOs. Additional analyses suggest that this result is attributable to internally hired rather than externally hired women CEOs. Our results are generally consistent with analysts and investors treating management forecasts issued by women CEOs to be less credible than forecasts issued by men CEOs, despite no apparent differences in their forecast properties.

我们研究了CEO性别是否与管理层预测属性以及分析师和投资者对这些管理层预测的反应有关。利用CEO更替的数据集,我们发现,虽然女性CEO更有可能发布管理层盈利预测,但女性CEO和男性CEO发布的这些预测的属性在预测缺失的可能性、预测偏差和预测精度方面并没有表现出差异。我们发现,与男性ceo相比,分析师和投资者对女性ceo发布的预测反应更少。进一步分析认为,这一结果是由内部聘用的女性ceo造成的,而不是外部聘用的女性ceo。我们的结果与分析师和投资者普遍认为女性首席执行官发布的管理预测比男性首席执行官发布的预测更不可信的观点一致,尽管他们的预测属性没有明显差异。
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引用次数: 0
Busy Directors and Monitoring: Evidence From Goodwill Impairments 忙碌的董事和监督:商誉减值的证据
IF 2.4 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-03-21 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12867
Mohamad Mazboudi, Satish Sahoo, Mark Soliman

Prior research has shown that the adoption of SFAS 142 resulted in inflated goodwill levels and untimely impairments by managers. One possible cause is that directors are simply too busy to properly monitor the managers, and accordingly, we explore whether busy directors impact managers’ decisions to impair goodwill. We find that firms with busy directors, with less time to perform monitoring duties, recognize fewer and smaller goodwill impairment losses. For instance, the likelihood of recognizing goodwill impairment losses is around 10% lower in firms with busy directors. Our results are confirmed using an exogenous shock to director busyness from the termination of board seats in merged firms. We also find that managers with busy directors tend to recognize goodwill impairment losses in a less timely manner. Finally, these effects are more evident in firms with weaker internal and external monitoring mechanisms and are driven by busy directors who are independent or members of the audit committee. Overall, our results suggest that effective monitoring by less busy directors, especially independent and audit committee members, can restrict management's discretion afforded by SFAS 142 in recognizing goodwill impairments.

先前的研究表明,采用SFAS 142导致商誉水平虚高和管理人员过早减值。一个可能的原因是董事太忙而无法适当地监督经理,因此,我们探讨忙碌的董事是否会影响经理的决策,从而损害商誉。我们发现,董事忙碌的公司,履行监督职责的时间更少,确认的商誉减值损失也更少、更小。例如,在董事忙碌的公司,确认商誉减值损失的可能性要低10%左右。我们的研究结果被合并公司董事会席位的终止对董事忙碌的外生冲击所证实。我们还发现,董事忙碌的管理者往往不太及时地确认商誉减值损失。最后,这些影响在内部和外部监督机制较弱、由忙碌的独立董事或审计委员会成员驱动的公司中更为明显。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,不那么忙碌的董事,尤其是独立董事和审计委员会成员的有效监督,可能会限制《财务会计准则第142号》赋予管理层确认商誉减值的自由裁量权。
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引用次数: 0
Investor Sentiment and Information Demand 投资者情绪与信息需求
IF 2.4 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-03-21 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12868
Jayson Talakai, Devon Erickson, Kevin H. Kim, Lynn Rees

We investigate how investor sentiment influences investor demand for financial information. Using two separate settings—earnings announcements and acquisition announcements—we find that as sentiment decreases, investor demand increases for SEC-regulated information that is highly detailed and relatively complicated to process. This result is consistent with psychology theory suggesting that during times of negative sentiment (i.e., pessimism), individuals are more likely to make decisions based on detailed information that requires high processing costs. Furthermore, consistent with our expectations, we find that the effects of sentiment on information demand are affected by other factors conveyed in the earnings announcement setting that can signal the need for more detailed information, such as the magnitude of the earnings surprise and firm distress. We also find that as sentiment increases, investor demand increases for higher level (summary) information that is obtained from Google ticker searches. Combined with our primary results on SEC information, these results are consistent with the notion that during times of optimism, investors rely less on complex information and are more likely to use simple heuristics that require less cognitive effort to process. Our study provides new insights on how sentiment influences investor demand for information, which has significant implications for price discovery.

我们研究投资者情绪如何影响投资者对财务信息的需求。使用两种不同的设置——收益公告和收购公告——我们发现,随着情绪的下降,投资者对美国证券交易委员会监管的信息的需求增加,这些信息非常详细,处理起来相对复杂。这一结果与心理学理论一致,即在消极情绪(即悲观主义)时期,个人更有可能根据需要高处理成本的详细信息做出决定。此外,与我们的预期一致,我们发现情绪对信息需求的影响受到盈余公告设置中传达的其他因素的影响,这些因素可以表明对更详细信息的需求,例如盈余意外的程度和公司困境。我们还发现,随着情绪的增加,投资者对从谷歌股票搜索中获得的更高水平(摘要)信息的需求增加。结合我们对SEC信息的初步结果,这些结果与以下观点一致:在乐观时期,投资者较少依赖复杂的信息,更有可能使用简单的启发式,这需要较少的认知努力来处理。我们的研究为情绪如何影响投资者对信息的需求提供了新的见解,这对价格发现具有重要意义。
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引用次数: 0
Influential Information Supply or Just a Modern Pillory? Investor Perceptions of the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule 有影响力的信息供给还是仅仅是现代的耻辱?投资者对CEO薪酬比率披露规则的看法
IF 2.4 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-03-13 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12864
Anamarija Delic, Peter Schäfer

We investigate investor perceptions of the US CEO pay ratio disclosure rule by studying market reactions to its implementation. Our findings reveal an overall negative market reaction, suggesting that investors anticipated the disclosure rule to be detrimental on average across firms. The negative reaction is more pronounced for firms that investors expected to disclose high pay ratios. That is, investors anticipated stronger disadvantages for firms that are required to disclose high pay ratios. This finding suggests investors expected mandatory disclosures to raise public attention to pay ratios, causing some stakeholders to penalize firms disclosing high pay ratios. Finally, the negative reaction is less pronounced for firms with weakly performance-related CEO compensation, that is, investors expected the disclosure mandate to be less detrimental to firms with inefficient CEO compensation design. This finding suggests that investors believe public pressure resulting from mandatory pay ratio disclosures can influence the compensation-setting process. Together, our findings have implications for policymakers and corporate boards, highlighting investors’ perceptions of the potential consequences of mandatory transparency on within-firm pay inequality.

我们通过研究市场对美国CEO薪酬比率披露规则实施的反应,来调查投资者对该规则的看法。我们的研究结果揭示了市场的整体负面反应,表明投资者预期披露规则对公司的平均影响是有害的。对于投资者期望披露高薪酬比率的公司,负面反应更为明显。也就是说,投资者预计那些被要求披露高薪酬比率的公司将面临更大的不利因素。这一发现表明,投资者期望强制性披露能够提高公众对薪酬比率的关注,从而导致一些利益相关者惩罚披露高薪酬比率的公司。最后,对于绩效相关性较弱的公司,负面反应不那么明显,也就是说,投资者期望披露要求对CEO薪酬设计效率低下的公司的不利影响较小。这一发现表明,投资者认为强制性薪酬比率披露带来的公众压力会影响薪酬设定过程。总之,我们的研究结果对政策制定者和公司董事会具有启示意义,突出了投资者对强制性透明度对公司内部薪酬不平等的潜在影响的看法。
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引用次数: 0
Retail Investors’ Trades Around Comment Letter Disclosures 散户投资者围绕评论信披露进行交易
IF 2.4 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-03-11 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12863
Ruby Brownen-Trinh, Joe (Joonghi) Cho, Pawel Bilinski

How sophisticated are retail investors in monitoring their holdings? We answer this question by examining Robinhood investors’ trades around the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letter (CL) disclosures. We focus on CLs because, compared to periodic filings, CL disclosures are unscheduled (high search cost) and unstandardized with a significant variation in their content (high processing cost). We find that CLs attract Robinhood investors’ attention, as evidenced by a significant abnormal Google search volume index around CLs disclosure, particularly around more severe CLs. The number of Robinhood investors holding a stock reduces after a firm receives more severe CLs in anticipation of the future decline in stock prices. Our results are (i) robust to addressing the endogeneity concern; (ii) robust to controlling for concurrent information from insider sales, short-selling activity, Twitter, press, analysts, and other concurrent CLs; and (iii) do not reflect Robinhood investors relying on heuristics in analyzing CLs’ content. Our evidence suggests that retail investors are sophisticated in processing CL disclosures as part of their portfolio monitoring activities.

散户投资者在监控自己所持资产方面有多老练?我们通过研究罗宾汉投资者围绕美国证券交易委员会(SEC)评论信(CL)披露的交易来回答这个问题。我们之所以关注CL,是因为与定期提交的文件相比,CL的披露是计划外的(高搜索成本)和未标准化的,其内容存在很大差异(高处理成本)。我们发现,CLs吸引了罗宾汉投资者的注意力,这一点可以从围绕CLs披露的谷歌搜索量指数显著异常中得到证明,尤其是在更严重的CLs披露中。罗宾汉投资者持有股票的数量减少后,公司收到更严重的CLs预期未来股价下跌。我们的结果是(i)健壮的解决内生性问题;(ii)强有力地控制来自内幕销售、卖空活动、Twitter、媒体、分析师和其他并发CLs的同步信息;以及(iii)不反映罗宾汉投资者在分析CLs内容时依赖启发式方法。我们的证据表明,散户投资者在处理CL披露作为其投资组合监控活动的一部分是成熟的。
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引用次数: 0
Influence of Legal Environment and Banking System on Trade Credit in Private Firms 法律环境和银行制度对民营企业贸易信贷的影响
IF 2.4 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-03-10 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12862
Víctor M. González

Using a firm-level database covering 52 countries during the period 2004–2021, I investigate how legal institutions and characteristics of banking systems affect the provision of trade credit for private firms. The results show that there is more reliance on trade credit versus short-term bank financing in environments characterized by higher legal enforcement while protection of creditors’ rights has no effect on the relative use of trade credit. As for the influence of the structure of the banking system, the relative use of trade credit, compared to short-term debt, increases with the weight of bank financing in the country and the existence of restrictions on banks owning and controlling nonfinancial firms. During the global financial crisis, the relative use of trade credit increased, compared to short-term debt, while it decreased during the COVID-19 pandemic.

利用2004-2021年期间覆盖52个国家的企业层面数据库,我研究了法律制度和银行体系的特征如何影响私营企业的贸易信贷提供。结果表明,在执法力度较大的环境中,企业对贸易信贷的依赖程度高于对短期银行融资的依赖程度,而对债权人权利的保护对贸易信贷的相对使用没有影响。至于银行体系结构的影响,与短期债务相比,贸易信贷的相对使用随着该国银行融资比重的增加以及对银行拥有和控制非金融公司的限制的存在而增加。在全球金融危机期间,与短期债务相比,贸易信贷的相对使用量有所增加,而在2019冠状病毒病大流行期间,贸易信贷的相对使用量有所下降。
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引用次数: 0
Regulatory Cooperation, Enforcement, and Accounting Restatements of US-Listed Foreign Firms 美国上市外国公司的监管合作、执法与会计重述
IF 2.4 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-03-09 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12866
Yuyuan Chang, Wen He

Srinivasan et al. document evidence that foreign firms listed in the United States report fewer accounting restatements than US domestic firms. Using a regulatory change and a novel statistical method, we provide evidence suggesting that the evidence is driven by foreign firms systematically underreporting misstatements. Specifically, after their home countries join the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) network that facilitates cross-border regulatory enforcement, US-listed foreign firms are less likely to commit misstatements but are more likely to report their misstatements. Furthermore, foreign firms’ restatements have a stronger association with measures of earnings management and receive less negative market reactions in the post-MMoU period. The results suggest that stronger regulatory enforcement deters underreporting of restatements and makes foreign firms’ financial reporting more similar to that of US domestic firms.

Srinivasan等人的文献证据表明,在美国上市的外国公司报告的会计重述比美国国内公司少。利用监管变化和一种新的统计方法,我们提供的证据表明,这些证据是由外国公司系统地少报错报所驱动的。具体而言,在其本国加入促进跨境监管执法的多边谅解备忘录(MMoU)网络后,在美国上市的外国公司不太可能犯下错报,但更有可能报告错报。此外,外资公司的重述与盈余管理措施有更强的关联,并且在谅解备忘录后的时期受到较少的负面市场反应。结果表明,更强的监管执法阻止了重述的少报,并使外国公司的财务报告更接近于美国国内公司。
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引用次数: 0
Corporate Resilience Against the COVID-19 Crisis: How Valuable is an Islamic Label? 企业应对COVID-19危机的韧性:伊斯兰标签有多大价值?
IF 2.4 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12865
Mohammed Abdullah Al Mamun, Md Lutfur Rahman, Md Reiazul Haque

The COVID-19 pandemic provides a novel setting to explore whether an Islamic label benefits firms during a crisis. The existing literature mostly explores the differential performance between Islamic and conventional equity markets at the aggregate level without controlling for idiosyncratic firm characteristics. Using the cross-sectional and difference-in-differences (DiD) regressions, we provide novel evidence at the firm level on how market segmentation based on investors’ religious or ethical preferences significantly affects how firms withstand a crisis. Segregating S&P1500 companies into Islamic and non-Islamic, we show that an Islamic label has a significantly positive (negative) impact on abnormal returns and operating performance (volatility). Specifically, S&P1500 Islamic firms generate an extra daily return of 0.64% and exhibit 1.2% lower daily volatility than their non-Islamic counterparts. Although researchers report firms’ environmental and social (ES) performance as a resilience factor during the COVID-19 crisis, we observe that the ES score does not offer explanatory power when we control firm-level financial variables. In contrast, the Islamic label remains a statistically and economically significant positive determinant of pandemic period returns and operating performance. Our key findings are robust in (i) the cross-sectional and DiD regressions; (ii) alternative definitions of abnormal returns, volatility, and operating performance; (iii) the propensity score-matched samples; and (iv) S&P500 Islamic and non-Islamic subsamples.

2019冠状病毒病大流行为探索伊斯兰标签是否在危机期间有利于公司提供了一个新的背景。现有文献大多在总体水平上探讨伊斯兰和传统股票市场之间的差异表现,而没有控制特殊的公司特征。利用横截面回归和差分回归(DiD),我们在企业层面上提供了新的证据,证明基于投资者宗教或道德偏好的市场细分如何显著影响企业抵御危机的方式。将s&p;P1500公司分为伊斯兰和非伊斯兰,我们表明伊斯兰标签对异常回报和经营业绩(波动性)具有显着的正(负)影响。具体来说,标普P1500伊斯兰公司的日回报率比非伊斯兰公司高出0.64%,日波动性比非伊斯兰公司低1.2%。尽管研究人员将企业的环境和社会(ES)绩效报告为2019冠状病毒病危机期间的弹性因素,但我们观察到,当我们控制企业层面的财务变量时,ES得分并没有提供解释力。相比之下,伊斯兰标签在统计上和经济上仍然是流行病期间收益和经营业绩的重要积极决定因素。我们的主要发现在(i)横截面和DiD回归中是稳健的;(ii)对异常收益、波动性和经营业绩的不同定义;(iii)倾向得分匹配的样本;(iv) S&;P500伊斯兰和非伊斯兰亚样本。
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引用次数: 0
Share Pledging and Environmental Investment: Evidence From China 股权质押与环境投资:来自中国的证据
IF 2.4 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-03-02 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12856
Yankun Zhou, Le Luo, Taijie Tang

We investigate whether share pledging by controlling shareholders influences corporate environmental investment. On the basis of a sample of listed companies from 2003 to 2022 in China, we find that firms whose shares have been pledged by their controlling shareholders and those with a higher share pledge ratio of the controlling shareholder tend to increase environmental investment to avoid margin call risk. We further find that this positive relationship is stronger in heavily polluting industries, for firms that operate in regions with more severe pollution, and for those that face greater margin call pressure; the effect is weaker for more financially constrained firms. Additional analyses reveal that environmental investment tends to decrease once controlling shareholders release their pledged shares. Moreover, firms whose controlling shareholders engage in share pledging often increase voluntary environmental disclosures as a complementary strategy to mitigate potential risks. Finally, our findings affirm the efficacy of this risk management strategy: Environmental investment significantly mitigates the adverse impact of pledging on stock price crash risk and firm value compared to firms that do not adopt this practice.

我们研究了控股股东的股权质押是否会影响企业的环境投资。基于2003 - 2022年中国上市公司样本,我们发现控股股东股权质押的公司和控股股东股权质押比例较高的公司倾向于增加环境投资以规避追加保证金风险。我们进一步发现,这种正相关关系在重污染行业、在污染更严重地区运营的企业以及面临更大追加保证金压力的企业中更为明显;对于资金更紧张的公司,这种影响更弱。另外,分析表明,一旦控股股东解除其质押股份,环境投资就会减少。此外,控股股东参与股权质押的公司往往会增加自愿环境披露,作为减轻潜在风险的补充策略。最后,我们的研究结果证实了这种风险管理策略的有效性:与不采用这种做法的公司相比,环境投资显著减轻了质押对股价崩盘风险和公司价值的不利影响。
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引用次数: 0
Busy Boards, Delegated Decision-Making, and Misreporting 忙碌的董事会、授权决策和错误报告
IF 2.2 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-02-26 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12861
Abhishek Ramchandani, Alexandra Lilge

We study how shareholders choose board directors with respect to outside directorships. In our setting, a CEO works on a project, and the board has formal authority over an interim decision. A relatively “busy” board—a board composed of directors who also serve on some other boards—is likely to delegate the interim decision to the CEO, while a more “available” board is likely to retain its formal authority. By reducing the likelihood of delegation, greater board availability decreases the pressure on costly bonus payments designed to discipline the CEO. However, precisely because the CEO is unlikely to control the interim decision, she misreports performance to distort the board's decision-making according to her preferences. Shareholders trade off these opposing effects in choosing the board's busyness. Our results offer a new explanation for why shareholders rarely elect “dedicated” directors and highlight a potential downside of guidelines aimed at limiting directors' total directorships. We also provide an alternate rationale for the finding that younger firms choose busier boards. Finally, our model predicts that boards should be relatively busier in emerging markets.

我们研究了股东如何选择外部董事。在我们的环境中,首席执行官负责一个项目,董事会对临时决定有正式的权力。一个相对“忙碌”的董事会——一个由同时在其他董事会任职的董事组成的董事会——可能会把临时决策权委托给首席执行官,而一个更“有空”的董事会可能会保留其正式权力。通过减少授权的可能性,董事会更大的可用性减少了旨在约束首席执行官的高额奖金的压力。然而,正是因为CEO不太可能控制临时决策,她才会根据自己的偏好错误地报告业绩,从而扭曲董事会的决策。股东们在选择董事会的忙碌程度时权衡了这些相反的影响。我们的研究结果为为什么股东很少选择“专职”董事提供了新的解释,并突出了旨在限制董事总董事职位的指导方针的潜在缺点。我们还为年轻公司选择更繁忙的董事会这一发现提供了另一种理由。最后,我们的模型预测,新兴市场的董事会应该相对更忙。
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引用次数: 0
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