We examine implications from the expansion of private equity (PE) firms into the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) (i.e., leveraged lending) business. Due to similarities in the investment universes of CLO managers and PE firms, asset managers running both of them frequently hold debt and equity claims of the same company. Our results indicate lower credit costs for these companies through the mitigation of shareholder–creditor agency conflicts. The lower funding costs imply increased equity returns for the sponsoring PE firms. In addition, our findings suggest that PE-affiliated CLO managers benefit from informed trading in the secondary leveraged loan market.
我们研究了私募股权(PE)公司向抵押贷款义务(CLO)(即杠杆贷款)业务扩张所带来的影响。由于 CLO 管理者和 PE 公司的投资领域相似,经营这两种公司的资产管理者经常持有同一家公司的债权和股权。我们的研究结果表明,通过缓解股东与债权人之间的代理冲突,这些公司的信贷成本降低了。融资成本的降低意味着私募股权投资公司的股权收益增加。此外,我们的研究结果表明,与 PE 有关联的 CLO 管理者可以从二级杠杆贷款市场的知情交易中获益。
{"title":"Dual holdings and shareholder–creditor agency conflicts: Evidence from the syndicated loan market","authors":"Ingo Geburtig, Thomas Mählmann, Roberto Liebscher","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12805","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12805","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine implications from the expansion of private equity (PE) firms into the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) (i.e., leveraged lending) business. Due to similarities in the investment universes of CLO managers and PE firms, asset managers running both of them frequently hold debt and equity claims of the same company. Our results indicate lower credit costs for these companies through the mitigation of shareholder–creditor agency conflicts. The lower funding costs imply increased equity returns for the sponsoring PE firms. In addition, our findings suggest that PE-affiliated CLO managers benefit from informed trading in the secondary leveraged loan market.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":"222-260"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12805","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140942577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate whether generalist chief executive officers (CEOs), that is, CEOs who gain transferable skills across firms and industries, have less incentive to hoard bad news. To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm–CEO matching, we deploy a difference-in-differences method utilizing exogenous CEO turnovers, propensity score matching and entropy balancing matching methods, and Oster's coefficient stability test. Supporting our conjecture, we find a negative relation between CEOs’ general ability index (GAI) and future stock price crash risk. The effect of CEOs’ GAI on crash risk is stronger when labor demand is stronger and when firms have more agency conflicts. Our analysis further suggests that generalist CEOs attenuate crash risk by increasing conditional accounting conservatism and reducing real earnings management. Taken together, our findings highlight the role of CEOs’ general human capital in increasing their tolerance for failure and mitigating the agency problem.
我们研究了通才型首席执行官(CEO),即获得跨公司和跨行业可转移技能的首席执行官,是否有较少的动机囤积坏消息。为了解决企业与首席执行官匹配所产生的内生性问题,我们采用了一种利用外生首席执行官更替的差分法、倾向得分匹配法和熵平衡匹配法以及奥斯特系数稳定性检验。我们发现,CEO 的综合能力指数(GAI)与未来股价暴跌风险之间存在负相关关系,这证明了我们的猜想。当劳动力需求较强和公司存在较多代理冲突时,CEO 的 GAI 对股价暴跌风险的影响更大。我们的分析进一步表明,通才型首席执行官通过增加条件会计保守主义和减少实际收益管理来降低股价暴跌风险。综上所述,我们的研究结果凸显了首席执行官的一般人力资本在提高其失败容忍度和缓解代理问题方面的作用。
{"title":"Generalist CEOs and stock price crash risk","authors":"Xiaohua Fang, Claudia Girardone, Yiwei Li, Yeqin Zeng","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12804","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12804","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate whether generalist chief executive officers (CEOs), that is, CEOs who gain transferable skills across firms and industries, have less incentive to hoard bad news. To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm–CEO matching, we deploy a difference-in-differences method utilizing exogenous CEO turnovers, propensity score matching and entropy balancing matching methods, and Oster's coefficient stability test. Supporting our conjecture, we find a negative relation between CEOs’ general ability index (GAI) and future stock price crash risk. The effect of CEOs’ GAI on crash risk is stronger when labor demand is stronger and when firms have more agency conflicts. Our analysis further suggests that generalist CEOs attenuate crash risk by increasing conditional accounting conservatism and reducing real earnings management. Taken together, our findings highlight the role of CEOs’ general human capital in increasing their tolerance for failure and mitigating the agency problem.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":"182-221"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12804","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140839808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the effect of tax cuts on the pay dispersion between firms’ executives and rank-and-file employees. Using the 2009 value-added tax (VAT) reform in China as a quasi-experimental setting, we find that tax cuts are associated with increased vertical pay dispersion, which is an unintentional consequence. We also find that managerial power intensifies the effect of tax cuts on vertical pay dispersion, consistent with the view that the increase in pay dispersion is due to managerial rent extraction. Furthermore, our results are not driven by executives’ higher pay-for-performance sensitivity than rank-and-file employees. In addition, we find that the VAT reform significantly increases pay dispersion driven by noneconomic factors but has no significant impact on dispersion driven by economic factors. Overall, our results support the rent-extraction channel for the effect of tax cuts on income inequality.
{"title":"An unintentional consequence of taxation: Tax cuts and vertical pay dispersion","authors":"Xiaoning Song, Cen Wu, Ying Zheng","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12806","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the effect of tax cuts on the pay dispersion between firms’ executives and rank-and-file employees. Using the 2009 value-added tax (VAT) reform in China as a quasi-experimental setting, we find that tax cuts are associated with increased vertical pay dispersion, which is an unintentional consequence. We also find that managerial power intensifies the effect of tax cuts on vertical pay dispersion, consistent with the view that the increase in pay dispersion is due to managerial rent extraction. Furthermore, our results are not driven by executives’ higher pay-for-performance sensitivity than rank-and-file employees. In addition, we find that the VAT reform significantly increases pay dispersion driven by noneconomic factors but has no significant impact on dispersion driven by economic factors. Overall, our results support the rent-extraction channel for the effect of tax cuts on income inequality.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":"158-181"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143424142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yanming Cao, Jengfang Chen, Xiaomeng Charlene Chen, Meiting Lu
This study examines the effect of the US–China trade tensions on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of the Chinese suppliers most affected by the 2018 US tariff surges. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that Chinese suppliers with direct US corporate customers experience a significant decline in CSR performance, compared with their peers without direct US corporate customers. We also show that the adverse effect of tariff surges on Chinese suppliers’ CSR performance is concentrated among those with a strong cost leadership strategy. However, the CSR performance of Chinese suppliers that have direct US corporate customers with high CSR awareness is not affected by the tariff surges. Further analyses reveal that the negative effects of the trade tensions on CSR performance are felt most strongly by the employees of Chinese suppliers. Taken together, despite the challenges posed by the deglobalization wave to the diffusion of CSR across global supply chains, the increasing demand for CSR involvement from US corporate customers can exert significant pressure on Chinese suppliers’ CSR performance.
{"title":"Compromise in hard times? The impact of deglobalization on corporate social responsibility in the US–China supply chain","authors":"Yanming Cao, Jengfang Chen, Xiaomeng Charlene Chen, Meiting Lu","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12803","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12803","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the effect of the US–China trade tensions on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of the Chinese suppliers most affected by the 2018 US tariff surges. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that Chinese suppliers with direct US corporate customers experience a significant decline in CSR performance, compared with their peers without direct US corporate customers. We also show that the adverse effect of tariff surges on Chinese suppliers’ CSR performance is concentrated among those with a strong cost leadership strategy. However, the CSR performance of Chinese suppliers that have direct US corporate customers with high CSR awareness is not affected by the tariff surges. Further analyses reveal that the negative effects of the trade tensions on CSR performance are felt most strongly by the employees of Chinese suppliers. Taken together, despite the challenges posed by the deglobalization wave to the diffusion of CSR across global supply chains, the increasing demand for CSR involvement from US corporate customers can exert significant pressure on Chinese suppliers’ CSR performance.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":"127-157"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12803","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140679517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper re-examines corporate dividend payout policy by focusing on how investors evaluate dividend cuts. Our focus is to understand why despite the documented on average negative market response, many dividend-cutting firms experience a positive market response. We juxtapose a well-established literature on corporate payout policies with the literature on the role of prior information in investor evaluation of newly arrived information and document that the market responds positively to dividend cuts when firms have positive investment opportunity sets. Our results support the primary thesis that not all dividend cuts are bad news—it depends. We validate this result by documenting that firms cutting dividends in the presence of investment opportunities do make significant investments such as capital expenditures and merger and acquisition activities in future years. Furthermore, we also find that future operating profitability is higher for dividend-cutting firms with relatively higher investment opportunities. We also document that among dividend-cutting firms, there is a statistically significant difference in the buy-and-hold returns for up to 2 years, between firms with high versus low investment opportunities. This provides support for the economic significance of our results. These results provide new evidence on how investors interpret corporate payout policies to distinguish among dividend cuts.
{"title":"Dividend cuts and a firm's investment opportunity set","authors":"Somnath Das, Sandip Dhole","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12801","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12801","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper re-examines corporate dividend payout policy by focusing on how investors evaluate dividend cuts. Our focus is to understand why despite the documented <i>on average</i> negative market response, many dividend-cutting firms experience a positive market response. We juxtapose a well-established literature on corporate payout policies with the literature on the role of prior information in investor evaluation of newly arrived information and document that the market responds positively to dividend cuts when firms have positive investment opportunity sets. Our results support the primary thesis that not all dividend cuts are bad news—it depends. We validate this result by documenting that firms cutting dividends in the presence of investment opportunities do make significant investments such as capital expenditures and merger and acquisition activities in future years. Furthermore, we also find that future operating profitability is higher for dividend-cutting firms with relatively higher investment opportunities. We also document that among dividend-cutting firms, there is a statistically significant difference in the buy-and-hold returns for up to 2 years, between firms with high versus low investment opportunities. This provides support for the economic significance of our results. These results provide new evidence on how investors interpret corporate payout policies to distinguish among dividend cuts.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":"91-126"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12801","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140586867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the effect of media coverage of corporate environmental activities on corporate green innovation. Using a large sample of corporate news coverage over the period 2001–2019, we find a positive relationship between green media coverage and the green innovation of a corporation but a negative one between nongreen media coverage and green innovation. These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including the instrumental approach and propensity score matching method. We examine and verify two well-documented general channels through which the media influences corporate behaviors, namely, the financial constraint mitigation and external governance. More importantly, we examine channels specifically related to green media coverage and find that green media coverage strengthens the effect of pressure imposed by the government and the public for green innovation. Taken together, our results suggest that the media plays a distinctive role in green innovation through its particular attention to the environment.
{"title":"Green media coverage and corporate green innovation","authors":"Jie Gao, Huiying Wu, Jiaxing You, Meg Smith","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12802","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12802","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the effect of media coverage of corporate environmental activities on corporate green innovation. Using a large sample of corporate news coverage over the period 2001–2019, we find a positive relationship between green media coverage and the green innovation of a corporation but a negative one between nongreen media coverage and green innovation. These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including the instrumental approach and propensity score matching method. We examine and verify two well-documented general channels through which the media influences corporate behaviors, namely, the financial constraint mitigation and external governance. More importantly, we examine channels specifically related to green media coverage and find that green media coverage strengthens the effect of pressure imposed by the government and the public for green innovation. Taken together, our results suggest that the media plays a distinctive role in green innovation through its particular attention to the environment.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":"48-90"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140586868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine whether and to what extent the personal communication of corporate information by individual managers is affected by their personal preferences for impression management. Using earnings conference calls as a setting in which to observe individual managers’ personal communication and controlling for firm-specific and manager-specific factors, we document that the communication style of managers who sell corporate stock shortly after the call is significantly more optimistic than that of the nonselling manager who participates in the same call. The effect is more pronounced in the less scripted and more flexible question and answer section and is more likely to emerge from Chief Financial Officer (CFO) than from Chief Executive Officer (CEO) communications. Taken together, our findings suggest that differences in individual communication styles are not only affected by personality and career backgrounds of individual managers but rather can also emerge from managers’ conscious or unconscious preferences for impression management.
{"title":"Speaking with one voice? Individual preferences and managers’ personal communication style","authors":"Christoph J. Sextroh, Juliane Wutzler","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12792","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12792","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine whether and to what extent the personal communication of corporate information by individual managers is affected by their personal preferences for impression management. Using earnings conference calls as a setting in which to observe individual managers’ personal communication and controlling for firm-specific and manager-specific factors, we document that the communication style of managers who sell corporate stock shortly after the call is significantly more optimistic than that of the nonselling manager who participates in the same call. The effect is more pronounced in the less scripted and more flexible question and answer section and is more likely to emerge from Chief Financial Officer (CFO) than from Chief Executive Officer (CEO) communications. Taken together, our findings suggest that differences in individual communication styles are not only affected by personality and career backgrounds of individual managers but rather can also emerge from managers’ conscious or unconscious preferences for impression management.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":"5-47"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12792","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140586865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using energy firm data and the 1997 introduction of weather derivatives as a natural experiment, we document an average 21-basis-point interest reduction in bank loans after borrowers hedge with weather derivatives. This saving increases among borrowers with higher risk or less complex financial reports, and during more uncertain market conditions or when investors pay more attention to climate risks. Our results are robust to endogeneity-corrected methods. Hedging firms are more willing to pledge collateral, accept stricter covenants and exhibit lower risks and a lower likelihood of covenant violations within 1 year following loan origination. We also find hedging firms have lower bond yields and a lower bank debt ratio, indicating that the benefits from hedging with weather derivatives extend to the public debt market. Overall, our findings demonstrate important financial implications of hedging using weather derivatives.
{"title":"Risk management and private debt contracts: The role of weather derivatives","authors":"Viet Do, Thu Ha Nguyen, Tram Vu","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12800","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12800","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using energy firm data and the 1997 introduction of weather derivatives as a natural experiment, we document an average 21-basis-point interest reduction in bank loans after borrowers hedge with weather derivatives. This saving increases among borrowers with higher risk or less complex financial reports, and during more uncertain market conditions or when investors pay more attention to climate risks. Our results are robust to endogeneity-corrected methods. Hedging firms are more willing to pledge collateral, accept stricter covenants and exhibit lower risks and a lower likelihood of covenant violations within 1 year following loan origination. We also find hedging firms have lower bond yields and a lower bank debt ratio, indicating that the benefits from hedging with weather derivatives extend to the public debt market. Overall, our findings demonstrate important financial implications of hedging using weather derivatives.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2848-2883"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12800","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140602896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the effect of environmental policy stringency (EPS) on audit pricing. By exploiting the exogenous variation in environmental policies across 26 countries, we find that firms in countries with more stringent environmental policies incur lower audit fees. The inverse association is more pronounced in common law countries, in countries with a higher level of public enforcement of regulations and in countries with more investor protection. The lower audit fees are also more prominent for firms that are followed by more analysts and firms that have a greater institutional ownership. Furthermore, we find that firms in countries with strong regulations are better and more innovative at managing environmental risk, which implies that better environmental performance of the firms following stronger regulations could lower business risks and thus decrease audit fees. Overall, our findings suggest that compliant firms benefit from EPS.
{"title":"Environmental policy and audit pricing","authors":"Monika K. Rabarison, Ibrahim Siraj, Bin Wang","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12799","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12799","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the effect of environmental policy stringency (EPS) on audit pricing. By exploiting the exogenous variation in environmental policies across 26 countries, we find that firms in countries with more stringent environmental policies incur lower audit fees. The inverse association is more pronounced in common law countries, in countries with a higher level of public enforcement of regulations and in countries with more investor protection. The lower audit fees are also more prominent for firms that are followed by more analysts and firms that have a greater institutional ownership. Furthermore, we find that firms in countries with strong regulations are better and more innovative at managing environmental risk, which implies that better environmental performance of the firms following stronger regulations could lower business risks and thus decrease audit fees. Overall, our findings suggest that compliant firms benefit from EPS.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2820-2847"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140586864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Savannah (Yuanyuan) Guo, Pritam Saha, Leyuan You, Michael Zheng
We document that firms in competitive industries experience significantly more deterioration in financial reporting quality after a reduction in analyst coverage due to brokerage closures or mergers, as compared to firms in noncompetitive industries. Most of the effects are mainly driven by firms with smaller initial analyst coverage, lower institutional ownership and greater financial constraints. Importantly, we further show that after brokerage exits, managerial slack increases more for firms in noncompetitive than competitive industries. Consistent with the notion that agency manifestation can take different forms, we provide evidence that competition may curtail some agency issues, such as managerial slack, while also exacerbating other agency issues, such as financial misreporting.
{"title":"Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries? Evidence from brokerage mergers and closures","authors":"Savannah (Yuanyuan) Guo, Pritam Saha, Leyuan You, Michael Zheng","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12797","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12797","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We document that firms in competitive industries experience significantly more deterioration in financial reporting quality after a reduction in analyst coverage due to brokerage closures or mergers, as compared to firms in noncompetitive industries. Most of the effects are mainly driven by firms with smaller initial analyst coverage, lower institutional ownership and greater financial constraints. Importantly, we further show that after brokerage exits, managerial slack increases more for firms in noncompetitive than competitive industries. Consistent with the notion that agency manifestation can take different forms, we provide evidence that competition may curtail some agency issues, such as managerial slack, while also exacerbating other agency issues, such as financial misreporting.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2791-2819"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12797","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140377363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}