Pub Date : 2025-12-10DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102250
Friederike Hendriks
The replication crisis in Psychology has undermined both intra-scientific and public trust. This review shows–using Wilholt's notion of epistemic trust–that replicability is fundamental for epistemic reliability. It reports empirical evidence indicating that replication failures may negatively affect public trust, yet transparent communication of Open Science initiatives and proactive self-correction can mitigate these effects. It concludes that robust solutions must not only reinforce epistemic reliability but also ensure researcher's dedication to core values such as transparency and self-correction. Therefore, while Open Science reforms are crucial, they must be accompanied by systemic changes that nurture a scientific culture in which rigorous practices are genuinely incentivized and valued.
{"title":"Trust in science amid a replication crisis","authors":"Friederike Hendriks","doi":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102250","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102250","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The replication crisis in Psychology has undermined both intra-scientific and public trust. This review shows–using Wilholt's notion of epistemic trust–that replicability is fundamental for epistemic reliability. It reports empirical evidence indicating that replication failures may negatively affect public trust, yet transparent communication of Open Science initiatives and proactive self-correction can mitigate these effects. It concludes that robust solutions must not only reinforce epistemic reliability but also ensure researcher's dedication to core values such as transparency and self-correction. Therefore, while Open Science reforms are crucial, they must be accompanied by systemic changes that nurture a scientific culture in which rigorous practices are genuinely incentivized and valued.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48279,"journal":{"name":"Current Opinion in Psychology","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102250"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145732662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-09DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102232
Valerie van Mulukom
Human survival depends on cooperation for collective action, but also for the sharing and collecting of information that underpins cumulative culture. Trust as well as mistrust in scientists are shaped by social learning biases such as conformity, prestige, and similarity biases, and credibility-enhancing displays, evolved to help individuals navigate uncertainty by identifying trustworthy sources of information. Identity-based reasoning, a form of similarity bias, reflects how individuals accept or reject information according to group alignments. Motivated reasoning explains why maintaining such identity-affirming beliefs can be practically rational if not factually rational. Interventions aimed at tackling misinformation and mistrust should consider these social mechanisms and aim to increase the belief that the scientist has the best interests of the trustor at heart.
{"title":"Social biases, identity-based reasoning, and trust in scientists","authors":"Valerie van Mulukom","doi":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102232","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102232","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Human survival depends on cooperation for collective action, but also for the sharing and collecting of information that underpins cumulative culture. Trust as well as mistrust in scientists are shaped by social learning biases such as conformity, prestige, and similarity biases, and credibility-enhancing displays, evolved to help individuals navigate uncertainty by identifying trustworthy sources of information. Identity-based reasoning, a form of similarity bias, reflects how individuals accept or reject information according to group alignments. Motivated reasoning explains why maintaining such identity-affirming beliefs can be practically rational if not factually rational. Interventions aimed at tackling misinformation and mistrust should consider these social mechanisms and aim to increase the belief that the scientist has the best interests of the trustor at heart.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48279,"journal":{"name":"Current Opinion in Psychology","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102232"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145730821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-08DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102230
Carissa A. Sharp
Social identity is important in determining our perceptions of the world and beliefs about our own and other groups. Religion and nonreligion can both provide people with social identities, which can be helpful for understanding people's perceptions of science. Using a social identity lens provides us with theoretical underpinnings which can add nuance to the use of other measures of (non)religiosity. Implications include perceptions of science and scientists, perceptions of combined (non)religious scientist identities, and the effectiveness of science communication.
{"title":"(Non)religious social identity and perceptions of science","authors":"Carissa A. Sharp","doi":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102230","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102230","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Social identity is important in determining our perceptions of the world and beliefs about our own and other groups. Religion and nonreligion can both provide people with social identities, which can be helpful for understanding people's perceptions of science. Using a social identity lens provides us with theoretical underpinnings which can add nuance to the use of other measures of (non)religiosity. Implications include perceptions of science and scientists, perceptions of combined (non)religious scientist identities, and the effectiveness of science communication.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48279,"journal":{"name":"Current Opinion in Psychology","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102230"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145730823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-08DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102233
Eva Thomm , Johannes Bauer , Rainer Bromme
The COVID-19 pandemic spotlighted the critical role of scientific expertise in epistemic trust. Diverse experts entered the public arena and became visible in debates, confronting non-experts with the question of whom to trust—especially when experts contradicted each other, changed recommendations, or were intermingled with unreliable voices. This article highlights the pertinence of scientific expertise (i.e., the alignment between a source's expertise and the claims it advances) as key factor for epistemic trust. While judgments of expertise are recognized as essential, little is known about how non-experts assess its pertinence. More research is needed to examine non-experts’ skills to assess the pertinence of expertise and how these skills can be enhanced through education and science communication.
{"title":"The role of expert pertinence for epistemic trust during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond","authors":"Eva Thomm , Johannes Bauer , Rainer Bromme","doi":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102233","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102233","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The COVID-19 pandemic spotlighted the critical role of scientific expertise in epistemic trust. Diverse experts entered the public arena and became visible in debates, confronting non-experts with the question of whom to trust—especially when experts contradicted each other, changed recommendations, or were intermingled with unreliable voices. This article highlights the pertinence of scientific expertise (i.e., the alignment between a source's expertise and the claims it advances) as key factor for epistemic trust. While judgments of expertise are recognized as essential, little is known about how non-experts assess its pertinence. More research is needed to examine non-experts’ skills to assess the pertinence of expertise and how these skills can be enhanced through education and science communication.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48279,"journal":{"name":"Current Opinion in Psychology","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102233"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145730822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-08DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102234
Robbie M. Sutton , Stefan Leach
Scientists and their work are often dismissed, ignored, or attacked, yet in general, science is widely trusted and esteemed. This article examines how these seemingly contradictory attitudes coexist: how can science be both revered and rejected? We outline four models of the relationship between the esteem of science and the frequent rejection of scientific claims. First, although attitudes toward science are generally positive, they are not absolute or unanimous. This gives people latitude to reject scientific claims that seem uncongenial to their values, identities, or interests. Second, people may engage in cherry-picking: regardless of their overall attitudes toward science, they can selectively accept congenial claims and reject uncongenial ones. Two further models, less documented in the literature, highlight the role of perceived “scienciness”—the extent to which a claim appears prototypically scientific. In the third model, some claims are met with prejudice because they are less “sciency” than others a priori (e.g., due to their source or underpinning methods). Thus, the esteem of science may do little to discourage their rejection. The fourth model suggests that uncongenial claims are subject to desciencing: in the process of rejecting them, people may strategically downgrade their scienciness (e.g., by consigning them to a marginal subcategory of science). Over time, desciencing may cumulatively alter people's understandings of science itself, leaving future work vulnerable to prejudice. Together, these models may explain how positive views of science can coexist with, facilitate, and themselves be shaped by the rejection of scientific claims.
{"title":"Why science is revered and rejected","authors":"Robbie M. Sutton , Stefan Leach","doi":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102234","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102234","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Scientists and their work are often dismissed, ignored, or attacked, yet in general, science is widely trusted and esteemed. This article examines how these seemingly contradictory attitudes coexist: how can science be both revered and rejected? We outline four models of the relationship between the esteem of science and the frequent rejection of scientific claims. First, although attitudes toward science are generally positive, they are not absolute or unanimous. This gives people <em>latitude</em> to reject scientific claims that seem uncongenial to their values, identities, or interests. Second, people may engage in <em>cherry-picking</em>: regardless of their overall attitudes toward science, they can selectively accept congenial claims and reject uncongenial ones. Two further models, less documented in the literature, highlight the role of perceived “scienciness”—the extent to which a claim appears prototypically scientific. In the third model, some claims are met with <em>prejudice</em> because they are less “sciency” than others a priori (e.g., due to their source or underpinning methods). Thus, the esteem of science may do little to discourage their rejection. The fourth model suggests that uncongenial claims are subject to <em>desciencing</em>: in the process of rejecting them, people may strategically downgrade their scienciness (e.g., by consigning them to a marginal subcategory of science). Over time, desciencing may cumulatively alter people's understandings of science itself, leaving future work vulnerable to prejudice. Together, these models may explain how positive views of science can coexist with, facilitate, and themselves be shaped by the rejection of scientific claims.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48279,"journal":{"name":"Current Opinion in Psychology","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102234"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145697308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-08DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102229
Maayan Dvir , Ezgi Beşikci , Kipling D. Williams
Ostracism—being ignored and excluded—threatens fundamental psychological needs and produces profound harm. Although behaviors like silent treatment, stonewalling, and emotional withdrawal are documented in intimate partner violence research, they have not been explicitly recognized as ostracism. This review integrates ostracism and intimate partner violence literature, arguing that these withdrawal-based behaviors constitute a significant form of partner maltreatment. Williams's temporal need-threat model (2009) explains why partner ostracism produces harm rivaling physical violence: it threatens belongingness, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence. Evidence shows that victims who experienced both physical abuse and ostracism rate ostracism as more damaging, especially when it comes from a romantic partner. Partner ostracism fits clearly within psychological aggression definitions and appears across multiple relationship theories under different labels. Most critically, when ostracism co-occurs with coercive control that isolates victims from external support, it blocks the recovery pathway and accelerates progression into resignation, trapping victims in abusive relationships. Understanding ostracism as central to intimate partner violence has direct implications for intervention, prevention, and future research directions.
{"title":"The quiet cruelty: Ostracism as intimate partner violence","authors":"Maayan Dvir , Ezgi Beşikci , Kipling D. Williams","doi":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102229","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102229","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Ostracism—being ignored and excluded—threatens fundamental psychological needs and produces profound harm. Although behaviors like silent treatment, stonewalling, and emotional withdrawal are documented in intimate partner violence research, they have not been explicitly recognized as ostracism. This review integrates ostracism and intimate partner violence literature, arguing that these withdrawal-based behaviors constitute a significant form of partner maltreatment. Williams's temporal need-threat model (2009) explains why partner ostracism produces harm rivaling physical violence: it threatens belongingness, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence. Evidence shows that victims who experienced both physical abuse and ostracism rate ostracism as more damaging, especially when it comes from a romantic partner. Partner ostracism fits clearly within psychological aggression definitions and appears across multiple relationship theories under different labels. Most critically, when ostracism co-occurs with coercive control that isolates victims from external support, it blocks the recovery pathway and accelerates progression into resignation, trapping victims in abusive relationships. Understanding ostracism as central to intimate partner violence has direct implications for intervention, prevention, and future research directions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48279,"journal":{"name":"Current Opinion in Psychology","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102229"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145697307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The problem of mistrust cannot be solved by increasing trust indiscriminately; rather, we need tools that help people trust more in what is credible and doubt what is not. In this review we argue that intellectual humility, a willingness to acknowledge the limitations of one's knowledge and beliefs, has much to offer in this regard. We review evidence suggesting that intellectual humility (1) helps people discern what is trustworthy, (2) helps credible sources be perceived as more trustworthy, and (3) helps facilitate trusting relationships across deep socio-political divides. Implications are discussed. Cultivating intellectual humility offers a promising means of fostering a more discerning, informed, and connected public.
{"title":"Intellectual humility and trust","authors":"Tenelle Porter , Shauna Bowes , Jonah Koetke , Michal Lehmann","doi":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102231","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102231","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The problem of mistrust cannot be solved by increasing trust indiscriminately; rather, we need tools that help people trust more in what is credible and doubt what is not. In this review we argue that intellectual humility, a willingness to acknowledge the limitations of one's knowledge and beliefs, has much to offer in this regard. We review evidence suggesting that intellectual humility (1) helps people discern what is trustworthy, (2) helps credible sources be perceived as more trustworthy, and (3) helps facilitate trusting relationships across deep socio-political divides. Implications are discussed. Cultivating intellectual humility offers a promising means of fostering a more discerning, informed, and connected public.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48279,"journal":{"name":"Current Opinion in Psychology","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102231"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145730820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-06DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102228
Barbara Krahé
Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a worldwide problem with a wide range of negative effects, and a broad literature has identified risk factors at the societal, relationship, interpersonal, and individual level associated with relatively stable differences in the likelihood of IPV. In addition, risk factors for IPV may be located within a given situation, promoting the use of violence by one or both partners. Based on two influential theories of aggression, the General Aggression Model and I3 theory, this article presents evidence on five situational risk factors for IPV: alcohol use, provocation and jealousy, acute stress, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the presence of firearms, and outlines implications for prevention.
{"title":"Situational risk factors for intimate partner violence","authors":"Barbara Krahé","doi":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102228","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102228","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a worldwide problem with a wide range of negative effects, and a broad literature has identified risk factors at the societal, relationship, interpersonal, and individual level associated with relatively stable differences in the likelihood of IPV. In addition, risk factors for IPV may be located within a given situation, promoting the use of violence by one or both partners. Based on two influential theories of aggression, the General Aggression Model and I<sup>3</sup> theory, this article presents evidence on five situational risk factors for IPV: alcohol use, provocation and jealousy, acute stress, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the presence of firearms, and outlines implications for prevention.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48279,"journal":{"name":"Current Opinion in Psychology","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102228"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145689633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102227
Brady Wagoner , Maja Sødinge Jørgensen , Kirstine Pahuus
While conspiracy theories (CTs) are often treated as consequences of cognitive deficits, this article approaches them as cultural tools through which individuals and groups make sense of uncertainty, threat, and their place in society. Drawing on a collective memory approach, we trace how CTs emerge from and contribute to historically embedded meaning-making processes and outline three interrelated connections between CTs and collective memory: 1) they are often forged during crises as narrative responses to disruption that become part of collective memory; 2) they draw on long-standing intergroup histories of distrust shaped by conflict, marginalization, and institutional betrayal; and 3) they repurpose enduring cultural symbols and narrative templates that lend coherence to new claims.
{"title":"Conspiracy theories through the lens of collective memory","authors":"Brady Wagoner , Maja Sødinge Jørgensen , Kirstine Pahuus","doi":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102227","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102227","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While conspiracy theories (CTs) are often treated as consequences of cognitive deficits, this article approaches them as cultural tools through which individuals and groups make sense of uncertainty, threat, and their place in society. Drawing on a collective memory approach, we trace how CTs emerge from and contribute to historically embedded meaning-making processes and outline three interrelated connections between CTs and collective memory: 1) they are often forged during crises as narrative responses to disruption that become part of collective memory; 2) they draw on long-standing intergroup histories of distrust shaped by conflict, marginalization, and institutional betrayal; and 3) they repurpose enduring cultural symbols and narrative templates that lend coherence to new claims.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48279,"journal":{"name":"Current Opinion in Psychology","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102227"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145696615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102226
Travis Harries , Emma Marshall , Ashlee Curtis
Parent-directed aggression often emerges in childhood, yet research is currently limited to adolescence. Early-onset parent-directed aggression (i.e., beginning in childhood as opposed to adolescence) may be that which uniquely persists and generalises into adult relationships. It is therefore critical to understand early onset parent-directed aggression to prevent the intergenerational transmission of family violence. Drawing on the Harshness-Unpredictability model and applying this within dynamic systems and family systems frameworks, this paper proposes a model of early-onset parent-directed aggression that is specific to behavioral development in childhood. We argue that early-onset parent-directed aggression emerges in harsh, unpredictable family systems, via escalating negative parent–child interactions which are exacerbated by child mental health and child-parent attachment.
{"title":"The development of parent-directed aggression in childhood","authors":"Travis Harries , Emma Marshall , Ashlee Curtis","doi":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102226","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.copsyc.2025.102226","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Parent-directed aggression often emerges in childhood, yet research is currently limited to adolescence. Early-onset parent-directed aggression (i.e., beginning in childhood as opposed to adolescence) may be that which uniquely persists and generalises into adult relationships. It is therefore critical to understand early onset parent-directed aggression to prevent the intergenerational transmission of family violence. Drawing on the Harshness-Unpredictability model and applying this within dynamic systems and family systems frameworks, this paper proposes a model of early-onset parent-directed aggression that is specific to behavioral development in childhood. We argue that early-onset parent-directed aggression emerges in harsh, unpredictable family systems, via escalating negative parent–child interactions which are exacerbated by child mental health and child-parent attachment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48279,"journal":{"name":"Current Opinion in Psychology","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102226"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145657450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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