Journal of International Money and Finance最新文献

Heterogeneity in Phillips Curve slopes among members of a monetary union can lead to biased to estimates of the union-wide ‘average’ slope in reduced form regressions. The intuition is that in a monetary union with heterogeneous regional Phillips curve slopes, the central bank, aiming at stabilizing demand shocks, will react stronger to shocks in regions with steep slopes compared to shocks in regions with flat slopes. Using a simple New-Keynesian model of a monetary union we show that when failing to account for this heterogeneity in the estimation, reduced form estimates of the union-wide ‘average’ slope suffer from a sizable bias. Empirically, we show that a similar bias exists in EMU data and slope estimates that adequately control for slope heterogeneity are steeper than those from reduced form OLS regressions.

We show that the international credit channel is an important channel through which US financial uncertainty spills over internationally. Moreover, we find the asymmetric responses of domestic and international credit conditions to US financial uncertainty shocks, contingent upon market participants' expectations. During periods of pessimism regarding future economic conditions, the impact of US financial uncertainty on both domestic and international credit conditions intensifies significantly, leading to a severe global economic slowdown. Elevated US financial uncertainty disproportionately affects the left tails of the distribution more than the right tails, heightening the likelihood of negative global output growth. Conversely, in times of optimism, heightened US financial uncertainty exerts modest effects on international credit conditions and global economic conditions. Yet it stretches the conditional distribution substantially, signaling an increasingly uncertain future.

This paper examines the informativeness and drivers of the tone used by FOMC members to gain insights into the decision-making process of the FOMC. We use a bag-of-words approach to measure the tone of transcripts at the speaker-meeting-round level from 1992-2009 and find persistent differences in tone among FOMC members. We also document how Presidents of regional Federal Reserve Banks use a more volatile and positive tone than the Federal Reserve Bank Board of Governors members. Next, we investigate whether the tone used during FOMC deliberations is associated with future monetary policy decisions and study the drivers of differences in tone among FOMC members. Our results suggest that tone is useful in predicting future policy decisions and that differences in tone are mainly associated with the differences in the individual inflation projections of FOMC members.

This paper investigates the drivers explaining the heterogeneous responses of foreign portfolio investors across 43 emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) during low-flow episodes. Our investigations reveal several findings: (a) During low-flow episodes, EMDEs with stronger macroeconomic/institutional fundamentals—e.g., larger foreign reserves, less public indebtedness, and better institutional quality—suffer fewer reductions in foreign inflows. (b) EMDEs with more open/developed financial markets attract more portfolio inflows during surges but suffer larger declines during stops. Hence, we provide evidence supporting the foreign investor differentiation (according to fundamentals) and the mixed blessing of financial sectors hypothesis.

We investigate the determinants of emerging markets performance during five U.S. Federal Reserve monetary tightening and easing cycles during 2004–2023. We study how macroeconomic and institutional conditions of an Emerging Market (EM) at the beginning of a cycle explain EM resilience during each cycle. More specifically, our baseline cross-sectional regressions examine how those conditions affect three measures of resilience, namely bilateral exchange rate against the USD, exchange rate market pressure, and country-specific Morgan Stanley Capital International index (MSCI). We then stack the five cross-sections to build a panel database to investigate potential asymmetry between tightening versus easing cycles. Our evidence indicates that macroeconomic and institutional variables are associated with EM performance, determinants of resilience differ during tightening versus easing cycles, and institutions matter more during difficult times. Our specific findings are largely consistent with economic intuition. For instance, we find that current account balance, international reserves, and inflation are all important determinants of EM resilience.

This paper empirically examines the impact of public debt shocks on output and inflation in 34 emerging market economies (EMEs), using panel local projections over the period 2000 to 2022. The estimated results show that real GDP falls significantly after an unanticipated increase in public debt while inflation rises. We also examine whether fundamental characteristics across EMEs could affect the impact of public debt shocks. The results also suggest nonlinearities in the dynamics, where higher initial debt levels, tighter domestic financial conditions, and lower income levels amplify the negative responses of real GDP, while tighter global financial conditions dampen the negative impacts of debt shocks. For inflation, the responses vary depending on economic-specific characteristics.

Central banks often buy or sell reserves—so called FX interventions (FXIs)—to dampen sharp exchange rate movements caused by volatile capital flows. At the same time, these interventions may entail unintended side effects. In this paper, we investigate whether FXIs incentivize firms to take on more unhedged FX debt, thereby increasing medium-term corporate vulnerabilities. Using a novel dataset with close to 5,000 nonfinancial firms across 19 emerging markets covering 2002–2017, we find that the firm-level share of FX debt rises following intensive use of FXIs, particularly for non-exporting firms in shallow financial markets with no FX debt to begin with. The magnitude of this effect is economically significant, with one standard deviation increase in the intensity of FXI leading to an average 2 percentage points increase in the FX debt share. For reference, the median share of FX debt in the sample is zero.

I study the effects of labor market outcomes on firms' loan demand and credit intermediation. I first show in partial equilibrium that the presence of frictions in the banking sector lowers the capital factor demand elasticity to changes in real wages. This finding helps to connect the substitutability of labor and capital with credit conditions. Second, I use a new Keynesian banking model with an endogenous financial accelerator mechanism to study the role of lower capital factor demand elasticity in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Stabilizing nominal wages is close to the optimal monetary policy because it coincides with stabilizing the credit spread, the net worth gap, and the output gap. Inflation stabilization, in turn, imposes a policy trade-off with high welfare costs.

Financial crises tend to spread across countries, causing equity price crashes that cannot be fully explained by fundamentals. This paper introduces a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model of global financial crises that distinguishes between interdependence and financial contagion. Interdependence arises through trade and capital flows, while contagion occurs through a new channel: confidence spillovers. In the model, contagion is possible due to multiple dynamic and steady-state equilibria, even with fully rational consumers. Self-fulfilling beliefs about equity prices can shift the economy between equilibria, amplifying negative effects and causing contagion. The model has three policy implications. Firstly, monetary policy can offset recessions without causing inflation. Coordinated international policy can potentially improve welfare further. Secondly, capital controls can prevent contagion. Lastly, increased trust in government can mitigate negative confidence shocks. These recommendations emphasize the role of beliefs, where pessimism can spread internationally via the confidence channel, leading to contagion.

We examine how the tail risk of currency returns over the past 20 years were impacted by central bank monetary and liquidity measures across the globe with an original and unique dataset that we make publicly available. Using a standard factor model, we derive theoretical measures of tail risks of currency returns which we then relate to the various policy instruments employed by central banks. We find empirical evidence for the existence of a cross-border transmission channel of central bank policy through the FX market. The tail impact is particularly sizeable for asset purchases and swap lines. The effects last for up to 1 month, and are proportionally higher for joint QE actions. This cross-border source of tail risk is largely undiversifiable, even after controlling for the U.S. dollar dominance and the effects of its own monetary policy stance.