Moral judgment is politically situational—people are more forgiving of transgressive copartisans and more likely to behave punitively and unethically toward political opponents. Such differences are widely observed, but not fully explained. If moral values are nonnegotiable first‐principle beliefs about right and wrong, why do similar transgressions elicit different moral judgment in the personal and political realm? We argue this pattern arises from the same forces intuitionist frameworks of moral psychology use to explain the origins of morality: the adaptive need to suppress individual behavior to ensure ingroup success. We hypothesize ingroups serve as moral boundaries, that the relative tight constraints morality exerts over ingroup relations loosen in competitive group environments because doing so also serves ingroup interests. We find support for this hypothesis in four independent samples and also find that group antipathy—internalized dislike of the outgroup—pushes personal and political moral boundaries farther apart.
{"title":"Politics makes bastards of us all: Why moral judgment is politically situational","authors":"Kyle Hull, Clarisse Warren, Kevin Smith","doi":"10.1111/pops.12954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12954","url":null,"abstract":"Moral judgment is politically situational—people are more forgiving of transgressive copartisans and more likely to behave punitively and unethically toward political opponents. Such differences are widely observed, but not fully explained. If moral values are nonnegotiable first‐principle beliefs about right and wrong, why do similar transgressions elicit different moral judgment in the personal and political realm? We argue this pattern arises from the same forces intuitionist frameworks of moral psychology use to explain the origins of morality: the adaptive need to suppress individual behavior to ensure ingroup success. We hypothesize ingroups serve as moral boundaries, that the relative tight constraints morality exerts over ingroup relations loosen in competitive group environments because doing so also serves ingroup interests. We find support for this hypothesis in four independent samples and also find that group antipathy—internalized dislike of the outgroup—pushes personal and political moral boundaries farther apart.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139628247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What happens to peoples' social‐policy preferences when their expectations concerning collective behavior are met, or even exceeded? And what conversely occurs when these expectations are unmet, and trust is thereby breached? Drawing on the first Italian COVID‐19 lockdown as a massive exercise in collective action, this study tests how information on lockdown‐compliance rates causally affects the social‐policy preferences of Italian voters, conditional on their pretreatment levels of trust. Examining social‐policy preferences across multiple dimensions, we find that trust is most closely linked to attitudes towards transfer generosity, as opposed to preferences on policy universalism and conditionality. Results highlight that neutral, fact‐based information on cooperation levels can affect social‐policy preferences—and that the direction of attitude change depends on whether one's trust has been met or breached.
{"title":"Trust in action: Cooperation, information, and social policy preferences","authors":"Francesco Colombo, Ari Ray","doi":"10.1111/pops.12944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12944","url":null,"abstract":"What happens to peoples' social‐policy preferences when their expectations concerning collective behavior are met, or even exceeded? And what conversely occurs when these expectations are unmet, and trust is thereby breached? Drawing on the first Italian COVID‐19 lockdown as a massive exercise in collective action, this study tests how information on lockdown‐compliance rates causally affects the social‐policy preferences of Italian voters, conditional on their pretreatment levels of trust. Examining social‐policy preferences across multiple dimensions, we find that trust is most closely linked to attitudes towards transfer generosity, as opposed to preferences on policy universalism and conditionality. Results highlight that neutral, fact‐based information on cooperation levels can affect social‐policy preferences—and that the direction of attitude change depends on whether one's trust has been met or breached.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139438989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does women's representation in politics affect working‐class women's attitudes toward political processes? Despite their increasing presence in the workforce, many women continue to concentrate in occupational sectors characterized by high economic vulnerability and low social status. This dynamic has important implications for the politics of representation. Previous studies suggest that women politicians positively affect women voters' political attitudes, but women's representation in politics is likely to have differing impacts on the political attitudes of working‐class and professional women. This study demonstrates that women's representation has a large class impact among women voters. In particular, using cross‐national data from 31 OECD countries as well as panel survey data from the British Election Study, we show that in countries with a higher degree of women's representation, there is more skepticism among women in low‐skill sectors toward voting and leadership than among those in white‐collar sectors. This is because there exist higher standards of accountability and relatability for women representatives among women voters. Given such high expectations, there is greater room for dissatisfaction among working‐class women than among their white‐collar counterparts when they constantly experience occupational segregation despite a high share of women in politics. In these settings, by contrast, women voters with high‐skill jobs are more likely to believe that voting and leadership matter, as they can better associate themselves with women political elites. Since men voters do not have strong expectations for relatability and accountability for public officeholders, the class impact of women's representation is weak among men. These findings have important implications for the symbolic representation of marginalized groups and democratic accountability.
{"title":"We see symbols but not saviors: Women's representation and the political attitudes of working‐class women","authors":"Yesola Kweon","doi":"10.1111/pops.12953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12953","url":null,"abstract":"How does women's representation in politics affect working‐class women's attitudes toward political processes? Despite their increasing presence in the workforce, many women continue to concentrate in occupational sectors characterized by high economic vulnerability and low social status. This dynamic has important implications for the politics of representation. Previous studies suggest that women politicians positively affect women voters' political attitudes, but women's representation in politics is likely to have differing impacts on the political attitudes of working‐class and professional women. This study demonstrates that women's representation has a large class impact among women voters. In particular, using cross‐national data from 31 OECD countries as well as panel survey data from the British Election Study, we show that in countries with a higher degree of women's representation, there is more skepticism among women in low‐skill sectors toward voting and leadership than among those in white‐collar sectors. This is because there exist higher standards of accountability and relatability for women representatives among women voters. Given such high expectations, there is greater room for dissatisfaction among working‐class women than among their white‐collar counterparts when they constantly experience occupational segregation despite a high share of women in politics. In these settings, by contrast, women voters with high‐skill jobs are more likely to believe that voting and leadership matter, as they can better associate themselves with women political elites. Since men voters do not have strong expectations for relatability and accountability for public officeholders, the class impact of women's representation is weak among men. These findings have important implications for the symbolic representation of marginalized groups and democratic accountability.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139445555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lucas Monzani, Kira Bibic, S. A. Haslam, Rudolf Kerschreiter, Jérémy E. Wilson Lemoine, Niklas K. Steffens, S. Akfırat, C. J. Ballada, Tahir Bazarov, J. J. B. Aruta, L. Avanzi, Aldijana Bunjak, M. Černe, Charlotte M. Edelmann, O. Epitropaki, K. Fransen, Cristina García-Ael, S. Giessner, I. Gleibs, D. Godlewska-Werner, R. Kark, Ana Laguia Gonzalez, Hodar Lam, A. Lupina‐Wegener, Y. Markovits, Mazlan Maskor, Fernando Jorge Molero Alonso, Juan Antonio Moriano Leon, Pedro Neves, Daniela Pauknerová, Sylwiusz Retowski, C. Roland-Lévy, Adil Samekin, Tomoki Sekiguchi, J. Story, Jeroen Stouten, L. Sultanova, Srinivasan Tatachari, Lisanne van Bunderen, Dina Van Dijk, Sut I. Wong, R. van Dick
Identity leadership captures leaders efforts to create and promote a sense of shared group membership (i.e., a sense of “we” and of “us”) among followers. The present research report tests this claim by drawing on data from 26 countries that are part of the Global Identity Leadership Development (GILD) project to examine the relationship between political leaders' identity leadership and civic citizenship behavior (N = 6787). It also examines the contributions of trust and economic inequality to this relationship. Political leaders' identity leadership (PLIL) was positively associated with respondents' people‐oriented civic citizenship behaviors (CCB‐P) in 20 of 26 countries and civic citizenship behaviors aimed at one's country (CCB‐C) in 23 of 26 countries. Mediational analyses also confirmed the indirect effects of PLIL via trust in fellow citizens on both CCB‐P (in 25 out of 26 countries) and CCB‐C (in all 26 countries). Economic inequality moderated these effects such that the main and indirect effects of trust in one's fellow citizens on CCB‐C were stronger in countries with higher economic inequality. This interaction effect was not observed for CCB‐P. The study highlights the importance of identity leadership and trust in fellow citizens in promoting civic citizenship behavior, especially in the context of economic inequality.
{"title":"Political leaders' identity leadership and civic citizenship behavior: The mediating role of trust in fellow citizens and the moderating role of economic inequality","authors":"Lucas Monzani, Kira Bibic, S. A. Haslam, Rudolf Kerschreiter, Jérémy E. Wilson Lemoine, Niklas K. Steffens, S. Akfırat, C. J. Ballada, Tahir Bazarov, J. J. B. Aruta, L. Avanzi, Aldijana Bunjak, M. Černe, Charlotte M. Edelmann, O. Epitropaki, K. Fransen, Cristina García-Ael, S. Giessner, I. Gleibs, D. Godlewska-Werner, R. Kark, Ana Laguia Gonzalez, Hodar Lam, A. Lupina‐Wegener, Y. Markovits, Mazlan Maskor, Fernando Jorge Molero Alonso, Juan Antonio Moriano Leon, Pedro Neves, Daniela Pauknerová, Sylwiusz Retowski, C. Roland-Lévy, Adil Samekin, Tomoki Sekiguchi, J. Story, Jeroen Stouten, L. Sultanova, Srinivasan Tatachari, Lisanne van Bunderen, Dina Van Dijk, Sut I. Wong, R. van Dick","doi":"10.1111/pops.12952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12952","url":null,"abstract":"Identity leadership captures leaders efforts to create and promote a sense of shared group membership (i.e., a sense of “we” and of “us”) among followers. The present research report tests this claim by drawing on data from 26 countries that are part of the Global Identity Leadership Development (GILD) project to examine the relationship between political leaders' identity leadership and civic citizenship behavior (N = 6787). It also examines the contributions of trust and economic inequality to this relationship. Political leaders' identity leadership (PLIL) was positively associated with respondents' people‐oriented civic citizenship behaviors (CCB‐P) in 20 of 26 countries and civic citizenship behaviors aimed at one's country (CCB‐C) in 23 of 26 countries. Mediational analyses also confirmed the indirect effects of PLIL via trust in fellow citizens on both CCB‐P (in 25 out of 26 countries) and CCB‐C (in all 26 countries). Economic inequality moderated these effects such that the main and indirect effects of trust in one's fellow citizens on CCB‐C were stronger in countries with higher economic inequality. This interaction effect was not observed for CCB‐P. The study highlights the importance of identity leadership and trust in fellow citizens in promoting civic citizenship behavior, especially in the context of economic inequality.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139385362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jörg Matthes, Ruta Kaskeleviciute, Helena Knupfer, Muhammad Masood
Social media, as an important resource of information for many contentious topics, has great affective potential in terms of anger and fear. We investigated how exposure to news about refugees on social media is related to negative attitudes toward refugees as well as attitudinal differentiation with respect to Muslims and terrorists. A two‐wave panel survey (NT2 = 524) showed that social media use about refugees was not directly related to negative attitudes and attitudinal differentiation. However, we found that anger served as the affective nexus between the refugee topic and the terrorism topic: Social media use about refugees led to more anger about terrorism over time, which in turn led to more negative attitudes toward refugees. Fear with respect to terrorism did not play a role in this process. Overall, our findings underline the key role of anger, but not fear, when trying to understand negative reactions toward refugees.
{"title":"The affective nexus between refugees and terrorism: A panel study on how social media use shapes negative attitudes toward refugees","authors":"Jörg Matthes, Ruta Kaskeleviciute, Helena Knupfer, Muhammad Masood","doi":"10.1111/pops.12950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12950","url":null,"abstract":"Social media, as an important resource of information for many contentious topics, has great affective potential in terms of anger and fear. We investigated how exposure to news about refugees on social media is related to negative attitudes toward refugees as well as attitudinal differentiation with respect to Muslims and terrorists. A two‐wave panel survey (NT2 = 524) showed that social media use about refugees was not directly related to negative attitudes and attitudinal differentiation. However, we found that anger served as the affective nexus between the refugee topic and the terrorism topic: Social media use about refugees led to more anger about terrorism over time, which in turn led to more negative attitudes toward refugees. Fear with respect to terrorism did not play a role in this process. Overall, our findings underline the key role of anger, but not fear, when trying to understand negative reactions toward refugees.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139157940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research often finds that immigrants tend to have a different profile from locals regarding confidence in the government. Both the origin's and destination's institutional features can influence immigrants' confidence. Scholars have relied on three major models—the cultural‐persistence model, the performance model, and the dual‐reference model—to explain the possible mechanisms behind this difference. Our research builds on previous studies by expanding the country coverage to explore the heterogeneity in immigrants' confidence. Specifically, we focus on how the level of democracy as an institutional factor is associated with immigrants' confidence. Using integrated datasets from the World Value Survey (WVS, 2017–21) and the European Value Study (EVS, 2017–20) and employing a multilevel model, we confirm that immigrants, on average, tend to have a higher level of confidence in the government. However, their confidence is contingent on institutional performance. In countries with high levels of democracy, the disparity in confidence between immigrants and locals becomes more pronounced. Moreover, the institutional performance in the origin country also influences immigrants' confidence in the government of the destination country. Immigrants constantly compare the institutional performance between the two places. Compared to immigrants from countries with a high level of democracy, immigrants from countries with a lower level of democracy tend to have higher confidence in the destination government. Our results provide support for all three major theoretical models.
{"title":"Immigrants as natural supporters? Cross‐nation analysis with a multilevel mixed‐effects model","authors":"Skylar Biyang Sun, Xiaohang Zhao, Mengran Liu, Xinru Qiu","doi":"10.1111/pops.12946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12946","url":null,"abstract":"Research often finds that immigrants tend to have a different profile from locals regarding confidence in the government. Both the origin's and destination's institutional features can influence immigrants' confidence. Scholars have relied on three major models—the cultural‐persistence model, the performance model, and the dual‐reference model—to explain the possible mechanisms behind this difference. Our research builds on previous studies by expanding the country coverage to explore the heterogeneity in immigrants' confidence. Specifically, we focus on how the level of democracy as an institutional factor is associated with immigrants' confidence. Using integrated datasets from the World Value Survey (WVS, 2017–21) and the European Value Study (EVS, 2017–20) and employing a multilevel model, we confirm that immigrants, on average, tend to have a higher level of confidence in the government. However, their confidence is contingent on institutional performance. In countries with high levels of democracy, the disparity in confidence between immigrants and locals becomes more pronounced. Moreover, the institutional performance in the origin country also influences immigrants' confidence in the government of the destination country. Immigrants constantly compare the institutional performance between the two places. Compared to immigrants from countries with a high level of democracy, immigrants from countries with a lower level of democracy tend to have higher confidence in the destination government. Our results provide support for all three major theoretical models.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138961230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Individuals often come across political conspiracy theories in various daily encounters. Researchers have mainly investigated predictors of conspiracy beliefs; meanwhile, the psychological and behavioral consequences of conspiracy exposure remain less known. In four experimental studies (total valid N = 1,091) with U.S. and Chinese participants, we examined whether conspiracy exposure promotes aggressive behavior and tested several potential mechanisms underlying the effect. We also tested whether reinforcing the importance of following rules weakens conspiracy exposure's effect on aggression. Our results revealed that conspiracy exposure increases aggression through a greater tendency to break rules (Experiments 1–3). We also ruled out two alternative mechanisms because neither sense of control (Experiment 2) nor negative mood (Experiment 3) accounted for conspiracy exposure's effect on aggression, and rule‐breaking tendencies still significantly mediated the effect after we controlled for these factors. Finally, increasing the perceived importance of rules weakened conspiracy exposure's effect on aggression (Experiment 4). Taken together, this research carries significant implications for how exposure to political conspiracy theories influences people's aggression. Our findings also lend themselves practically to the development of strategies for reducing the negative impacts of political conspiracy theories.
{"title":"Are rules made to be broken? Conspiracy exposure promotes aggressive behavior","authors":"Kai-Tak Poon, Rheal S. W. Chan, Hill-Son Lai","doi":"10.1111/pops.12947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12947","url":null,"abstract":"Individuals often come across political conspiracy theories in various daily encounters. Researchers have mainly investigated predictors of conspiracy beliefs; meanwhile, the psychological and behavioral consequences of conspiracy exposure remain less known. In four experimental studies (total valid N = 1,091) with U.S. and Chinese participants, we examined whether conspiracy exposure promotes aggressive behavior and tested several potential mechanisms underlying the effect. We also tested whether reinforcing the importance of following rules weakens conspiracy exposure's effect on aggression. Our results revealed that conspiracy exposure increases aggression through a greater tendency to break rules (Experiments 1–3). We also ruled out two alternative mechanisms because neither sense of control (Experiment 2) nor negative mood (Experiment 3) accounted for conspiracy exposure's effect on aggression, and rule‐breaking tendencies still significantly mediated the effect after we controlled for these factors. Finally, increasing the perceived importance of rules weakened conspiracy exposure's effect on aggression (Experiment 4). Taken together, this research carries significant implications for how exposure to political conspiracy theories influences people's aggression. Our findings also lend themselves practically to the development of strategies for reducing the negative impacts of political conspiracy theories.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138959221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article calls for revisiting the predominant yet flawed nationalism‐patriotism dichotomy, which has to date remained unchallenged. It advocates for a more nuanced triad: nationalism, exclusively referring to the nation; patriotism, revolving around the homeland; and democratic patriotism, with democracy as its object of attachment. This novel conceptual approach explicitly theorizes these three objects of attachment, which have hitherto rarely been considered. In so doing, the article synthesizes the field's predominant research traditions that have not been fully recognized as diverging nor been simultaneously investigated. By responding to calls for more theoretically robust measures, it not only makes a theoretical but also an empirical contribution to the field. Drawing on data from a representative sample (N = 1875) in Germany in 2022, the study introduces a three‐factor measurement model of nationalism, patriotism, and democratic patriotism. Taking into account both the antecedents of the triad and its impact on outgroup hostility, the measures are further validated. To establish its applicability in non‐German contexts, the model is additionally supported using data from a representative sample (N = 1164) in Denmark in 2022.
{"title":"On nation, homeland, and democracy: Toward a novel three‐factor measurement model for nationalism and patriotism. Evidence from two representative studies","authors":"Marlene Mußotter","doi":"10.1111/pops.12945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12945","url":null,"abstract":"This article calls for revisiting the predominant yet flawed nationalism‐patriotism dichotomy, which has to date remained unchallenged. It advocates for a more nuanced triad: nationalism, exclusively referring to the nation; patriotism, revolving around the homeland; and democratic patriotism, with democracy as its object of attachment. This novel conceptual approach explicitly theorizes these three objects of attachment, which have hitherto rarely been considered. In so doing, the article synthesizes the field's predominant research traditions that have not been fully recognized as diverging nor been simultaneously investigated. By responding to calls for more theoretically robust measures, it not only makes a theoretical but also an empirical contribution to the field. Drawing on data from a representative sample (N = 1875) in Germany in 2022, the study introduces a three‐factor measurement model of nationalism, patriotism, and democratic patriotism. Taking into account both the antecedents of the triad and its impact on outgroup hostility, the measures are further validated. To establish its applicability in non‐German contexts, the model is additionally supported using data from a representative sample (N = 1164) in Denmark in 2022.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138963223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The twenty‐first century has been one of democratic backsliding. This has stimulated wide‐ranging scholarship on the causes of democratic erosion. Yet an overarching framework that identifies actors, behaviors, and decision processes has not been developed. I offer such a structure that includes elites (e.g., elected officials, the judiciary), societal actors (e.g., social movements, interest groups, media), and citizens. I discuss erosive threats stemming from each actor and the concomitant role of psychological mechanisms. The framework highlights the challenge of arriving at a holistic explanation of erosion within a given country during a finite period. It also accentuates why scholars should regularly consider the implications of their specific findings for democratic stability. I conclude by discussing various lessons and suggestions for how to study democratic backsliding.
{"title":"How to study democratic backsliding","authors":"James N Druckman","doi":"10.1111/pops.12942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12942","url":null,"abstract":"The twenty‐first century has been one of democratic backsliding. This has stimulated wide‐ranging scholarship on the causes of democratic erosion. Yet an overarching framework that identifies actors, behaviors, and decision processes has not been developed. I offer such a structure that includes elites (e.g., elected officials, the judiciary), societal actors (e.g., social movements, interest groups, media), and citizens. I discuss erosive threats stemming from each actor and the concomitant role of psychological mechanisms. The framework highlights the challenge of arriving at a holistic explanation of erosion within a given country during a finite period. It also accentuates why scholars should regularly consider the implications of their specific findings for democratic stability. I conclude by discussing various lessons and suggestions for how to study democratic backsliding.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138620756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nazita Lajevardi, Kassra A. R. Oskooii, Muniba Saleem, Meagan Docherty
What are the underpinnings and ramifications of anti‐Muslim attitudes in the United States? While scholars have emphasized the centrality of race and racial attitudes to American politics, examinations of hostility towards Muslim Americans with context‐specific measures are still lacking despite the increasing relevance of this population in the public imagination. Particularly after the tragic 9/11 attacks, Islamophobia emerged as a pervasive force in American social and political life, entangling race, religion, and nationality to further stigmatize and marginalize Muslims. By more systematically examining the relationship between anti‐Muslim attitudes and public support for a range of initiatives that aim to, or already have, further marginalize(d) American Muslims, the research presented herein aims to underscore the limitations of attitudinal measures that lack context specificity. Through two studies that utilize a nationally representative survey and a longitudinal study of public opinion towards Muslims, we make the case for the development and use of more nuanced measures that capture the distinct nature of hostility towards Muslims as encompassing both perceived realistic and symbolic threats. Additionally, we consider the range of social, psychological, and physical consequences that Islamophobia may exert on Muslim individuals themselves, as well as their interactions with the majority population. These have important implications for scholars studying the sociopolitical behavior of Muslims and policymakers seeking to counteract the adverse effects of Islamophobia in the United States or elsewhere.
{"title":"In the shadow of September 11: The roots and ramifications of anti‐Muslim attitudes in the United States","authors":"Nazita Lajevardi, Kassra A. R. Oskooii, Muniba Saleem, Meagan Docherty","doi":"10.1111/pops.12943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12943","url":null,"abstract":"What are the underpinnings and ramifications of anti‐Muslim attitudes in the United States? While scholars have emphasized the centrality of race and racial attitudes to American politics, examinations of hostility towards Muslim Americans with context‐specific measures are still lacking despite the increasing relevance of this population in the public imagination. Particularly after the tragic 9/11 attacks, Islamophobia emerged as a pervasive force in American social and political life, entangling race, religion, and nationality to further stigmatize and marginalize Muslims. By more systematically examining the relationship between anti‐Muslim attitudes and public support for a range of initiatives that aim to, or already have, further marginalize(d) American Muslims, the research presented herein aims to underscore the limitations of attitudinal measures that lack context specificity. Through two studies that utilize a nationally representative survey and a longitudinal study of public opinion towards Muslims, we make the case for the development and use of more nuanced measures that capture the distinct nature of hostility towards Muslims as encompassing both perceived realistic and symbolic threats. Additionally, we consider the range of social, psychological, and physical consequences that Islamophobia may exert on Muslim individuals themselves, as well as their interactions with the majority population. These have important implications for scholars studying the sociopolitical behavior of Muslims and policymakers seeking to counteract the adverse effects of Islamophobia in the United States or elsewhere.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138608170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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