This analysis examined whether commonly assumed associations between personal values and political attitudes within countries varied worldwide by the level of democratic governance. In less democratic countries, people may have less exposure to or engagement with value expression through political party affiliation and experience less motivation to express values through political attitudes. Therefore, in such countries, the commonly assumed association of personal values typically labeled “conservative” (e.g., tradition) or “liberal” (e.g., universalism) with right‐ or left‐wing political ideologies could be weaker. Furthermore, less democratic governments are more likely to be perceived as a deciding presence in economic outcomes than the people's or the market's will, which could alter the degree to which right‐wing economic attitudes toward free markets and private enterprise are associated with conservative values. Responses to the World Value Survey across 60 countries were largely consistent with these moderation effects when operationalizing democratic governance using both more objective, structural, and subjective, perceptual metrics. In less democratic countries, conservation‐oriented personal values were less positively associated with broad right‐wing political identification and self‐transcendence‐oriented values less positively associated with broad left‐wing political identification. In less democratic countries, conservation‐oriented values were more negatively associated with right‐wing economic attitudes.
{"title":"The moderating role of democratic governance in the association between personal values and political ideologies","authors":"Eileen Wu, D. Molden","doi":"10.1111/pops.12939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12939","url":null,"abstract":"This analysis examined whether commonly assumed associations between personal values and political attitudes within countries varied worldwide by the level of democratic governance. In less democratic countries, people may have less exposure to or engagement with value expression through political party affiliation and experience less motivation to express values through political attitudes. Therefore, in such countries, the commonly assumed association of personal values typically labeled “conservative” (e.g., tradition) or “liberal” (e.g., universalism) with right‐ or left‐wing political ideologies could be weaker. Furthermore, less democratic governments are more likely to be perceived as a deciding presence in economic outcomes than the people's or the market's will, which could alter the degree to which right‐wing economic attitudes toward free markets and private enterprise are associated with conservative values. Responses to the World Value Survey across 60 countries were largely consistent with these moderation effects when operationalizing democratic governance using both more objective, structural, and subjective, perceptual metrics. In less democratic countries, conservation‐oriented personal values were less positively associated with broad right‐wing political identification and self‐transcendence‐oriented values less positively associated with broad left‐wing political identification. In less democratic countries, conservation‐oriented values were more negatively associated with right‐wing economic attitudes.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139265502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A consensus seems to exist around physically attractive candidates winning elections more often. Unfortunately, we have limited understanding of how voters assess candidates with socioeconomically (dis)advantageous physical appearances. To bridge this gap, we studied the electoral consequences of candidates looking upper class, middle class, or working class. Using official electoral data for the 2017 Finnish municipal elections and a novel data set based on a representative sample of the Finnish population ( N = 7,920), we found that Finnish citizens systematically vote for candidates who look like they have (and do have) upper‐class occupations. Furthermore, the data strongly suggest that a systematic electoral penalty exists, particularly for female candidates who look like they have (and do have) working‐class occupations.
{"title":"Physical appearance and elections: An inequality perspective","authors":"Hector Bahamonde, Outi Sarpila","doi":"10.1111/pops.12940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12940","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A consensus seems to exist around physically attractive candidates winning elections more often. Unfortunately, we have limited understanding of how voters assess candidates with socioeconomically (dis)advantageous physical appearances. To bridge this gap, we studied the electoral consequences of candidates looking upper class, middle class, or working class. Using official electoral data for the 2017 Finnish municipal elections and a novel data set based on a representative sample of the Finnish population ( N = 7,920), we found that Finnish citizens systematically vote for candidates who look like they have (and do have) upper‐class occupations. Furthermore, the data strongly suggest that a systematic electoral penalty exists, particularly for female candidates who look like they have (and do have) working‐class occupations.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135684687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Political disagreement with family members can have a deleterious impact on familial relationships, but the long‐term consequences are understudied. This study examined the relational outcomes of familial political incongruence two years after the 2019 social unrest in Hong Kong and the extent to which frequency and types of family contact explain their association. This two‐wave questionnaire study augmented with a 14‐day daily record of family contact recruited (1) young adults and (2) parents with children aged 18–30 (N = 559). Nearly half of the respondents reported significant political incongruence with their parents/children. We observed consistent findings in both adult children and parents. Greater parent–child political differences were associated with reduced likelihood of having positive family communication and family functioning. Increased political differences with family members were associated with greater odds of family dysfunctionality. Moreover, expression of love and care mediated the effect of political differences with family members on changes in family functioning. This study demonstrates familial political incongruence exerts an influence on families two years after the unrest. Parent–child political differences are associated with a decline in the quality of family communication and family environment. We discuss how parent–child political incongruence drives a family to worsened well‐being through dysfunctional family dynamics.
{"title":"All we need is love? Irreconcilable political incongruence in families after the 2019 social unrest in Hong Kong","authors":"Branda Yee‐Man Yu, Calvin Lam, Christian S. Chan","doi":"10.1111/pops.12941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12941","url":null,"abstract":"Political disagreement with family members can have a deleterious impact on familial relationships, but the long‐term consequences are understudied. This study examined the relational outcomes of familial political incongruence two years after the 2019 social unrest in Hong Kong and the extent to which frequency and types of family contact explain their association. This two‐wave questionnaire study augmented with a 14‐day daily record of family contact recruited (1) young adults and (2) parents with children aged 18–30 (N = 559). Nearly half of the respondents reported significant political incongruence with their parents/children. We observed consistent findings in both adult children and parents. Greater parent–child political differences were associated with reduced likelihood of having positive family communication and family functioning. Increased political differences with family members were associated with greater odds of family dysfunctionality. Moreover, expression of love and care mediated the effect of political differences with family members on changes in family functioning. This study demonstrates familial political incongruence exerts an influence on families two years after the unrest. Parent–child political differences are associated with a decline in the quality of family communication and family environment. We discuss how parent–child political incongruence drives a family to worsened well‐being through dysfunctional family dynamics.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135935500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Richard M. Walker, Jiasheng Zhang, Edmund W. Cheng
Abstract Understanding the formation of and changes in citizens' extreme views on complex public policies is an important task in our increasingly polarized world. Behavioral sciences offer insights on cognitive processes and potential mechanisms to mitigate extremity in policy preferences and develop more realistic models that underprint political attitudes. About a decade ago, Fernbach et al. (2013) offered a simple cognitive intervention to reduce political extremism: Confront people with their lack of procedural policy knowledge such that their overestimation of knowledge is shattered. We conducted three high‐value replications and extensions to examine the applicability of Fernbach's proposed theory among a sample of 5,139 citizens in postconflict Hong Kong. Our results suggest the opposite: Positional extremity is higher when citizens articulate their understanding of policy. Our study, which is larger in scale, draws on different time periods and extended interventions and examines more controversial policy issues has epistemological and cognitive implications for future research on the political psychology of extremism.
{"title":"Puncturing the Knowledge Illusion Does Not Reduce Policy and Political Extremism: Evidence From a Replication and Extension","authors":"Richard M. Walker, Jiasheng Zhang, Edmund W. Cheng","doi":"10.1111/pops.12938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12938","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Understanding the formation of and changes in citizens' extreme views on complex public policies is an important task in our increasingly polarized world. Behavioral sciences offer insights on cognitive processes and potential mechanisms to mitigate extremity in policy preferences and develop more realistic models that underprint political attitudes. About a decade ago, Fernbach et al. (2013) offered a simple cognitive intervention to reduce political extremism: Confront people with their lack of procedural policy knowledge such that their overestimation of knowledge is shattered. We conducted three high‐value replications and extensions to examine the applicability of Fernbach's proposed theory among a sample of 5,139 citizens in postconflict Hong Kong. Our results suggest the opposite: Positional extremity is higher when citizens articulate their understanding of policy. Our study, which is larger in scale, draws on different time periods and extended interventions and examines more controversial policy issues has epistemological and cognitive implications for future research on the political psychology of extremism.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136068102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A positive relationship between assessments of procedural justice and attitudes toward the political system has been identified in many studies of various countries. To quantify this relationship, a meta‐analysis was conducted on 69 samples from 50,814 respondents, reported in 37 manuscripts between 1981 and 2021. We found positive correlations between assessments of procedural justice and attitudes toward politicians, political institutions, and the political system in people of different ages and in countries with different political regimes. These positive correlations exist in real and hypothetical situations with various levels of authority. However, two factors moderated the association between the assessment of procedural justice and political attitudes. First, procedural justice as a set of norms is more strongly related to attitudes toward the system than procedural justice as a generalized assessment is. Second, the assessment of procedural justice is more strongly associated with attitudes toward political institutions and the system than attitudes toward the procedures and decisions. Moreover, the percentage of heterogeneity in the obtained models is fairly high; categorical moderators explain 43% of the variance of the effects obtained. The results should therefore be interpreted with consideration of this substantial heterogeneity in the correlations' sizes.
{"title":"The relationship between political procedural justice and attitudes toward the political system: A meta‐analysis","authors":"Olga Gulevich, Julia Borovikova, Maria Rodionova","doi":"10.1111/pops.12936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12936","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A positive relationship between assessments of procedural justice and attitudes toward the political system has been identified in many studies of various countries. To quantify this relationship, a meta‐analysis was conducted on 69 samples from 50,814 respondents, reported in 37 manuscripts between 1981 and 2021. We found positive correlations between assessments of procedural justice and attitudes toward politicians, political institutions, and the political system in people of different ages and in countries with different political regimes. These positive correlations exist in real and hypothetical situations with various levels of authority. However, two factors moderated the association between the assessment of procedural justice and political attitudes. First, procedural justice as a set of norms is more strongly related to attitudes toward the system than procedural justice as a generalized assessment is. Second, the assessment of procedural justice is more strongly associated with attitudes toward political institutions and the system than attitudes toward the procedures and decisions. Moreover, the percentage of heterogeneity in the obtained models is fairly high; categorical moderators explain 43% of the variance of the effects obtained. The results should therefore be interpreted with consideration of this substantial heterogeneity in the correlations' sizes.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136160038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joaquín Alcañiz‐Colomer, Inmaculada Valor‐Segura, Miguel Moya
Abstract Distributive justice remains a central issue in contemporary welfare states, even more during times of economic hardship and social uncertainty. In this article, we analyze how attitudes toward the principles of normative distributive justice (equality, need, equity, and entitlement) are related to support for the redistribution of resources (Study 2) and attitudes toward social protection policies (Studies 1 and 3). In Study 1 ( N = 325), we found that equality and need positively predicted attitudes toward social protection policies while equity and entitlement negatively predicted these attitudes. In Study 2 ( N = 49,519), using data from Round 9 of the European Social Survey, we replicated this linking normative orientation toward different distributive justice principles with support for redistribution. We replicated these results in Study 3 ( N = 494). In addition, we explored the role of attributions for poverty in the relationship found in Studies 1 and 2. Attributions for poverty mediated the relationship between orientations toward justice principles and attitudes toward social protection policies.
{"title":"Social justice orientations: Exploring their impact on poverty attributions and support for social protection","authors":"Joaquín Alcañiz‐Colomer, Inmaculada Valor‐Segura, Miguel Moya","doi":"10.1111/pops.12937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12937","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Distributive justice remains a central issue in contemporary welfare states, even more during times of economic hardship and social uncertainty. In this article, we analyze how attitudes toward the principles of normative distributive justice (equality, need, equity, and entitlement) are related to support for the redistribution of resources (Study 2) and attitudes toward social protection policies (Studies 1 and 3). In Study 1 ( N = 325), we found that equality and need positively predicted attitudes toward social protection policies while equity and entitlement negatively predicted these attitudes. In Study 2 ( N = 49,519), using data from Round 9 of the European Social Survey, we replicated this linking normative orientation toward different distributive justice principles with support for redistribution. We replicated these results in Study 3 ( N = 494). In addition, we explored the role of attributions for poverty in the relationship found in Studies 1 and 2. Attributions for poverty mediated the relationship between orientations toward justice principles and attitudes toward social protection policies.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135883901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
José J. Pizarro, Huseyin Cakal, Lander Méndez, Larraitz N. Zumeta, Marcela Gracia‐Leiva, Nekane Basabe, Ginés Navarro‐Carrillo, Ana‐Maria Cazan, Saeed Keshavarzi, Wilson López‐López, Illia Yahiiaiev, Carolina Alzugaray‐Ponce, Loreto Villagrán, Emilio Moyano‐Díaz, Nebojša Petrović, Anderson Mathias, Elza M. Techio, Anna Wlodarczyk, Laura Alfaro‐Beracoechea, Manuel L. Ibarra, Andreas Michael, Sumeet Mhaskar, Gonzalo Martínez‐Zelaya, Marian Bilbao, Gisela Delfino, Catarina L. Carvalho, Isabel R. Pinto, Falak Zehra Mohsin, Agustín Espinosa, Rosa María Cueto, Stefano Cavalli, Silvia da Costa, Alberto Amutio, Itziar Alonso‐Arbiol, Darío Páez
Abstract Although different social crises may eventually favor undemocratic and authoritarian forms of governance, at some point, such antidemocratic practices require the support of a significant part of the population to be implemented. The present research investigates how and whether the COVID‐19 pandemic might have favoured greater support for antidemocratic governmental practices, on the premise of regaining control and security. Using data from 17 countries ( N = 4364) and national‐level indicators (i.e., real number of contagions and deaths, and sociopolitical indicators), we test how the risk of contagion and death from COVID‐19, along with personal orientations (i.e., social dominance orientation [SDO], right‐wing authoritarianism [RWA], and perceived anomie) motivate authoritarian and antidemocratic practices. Results from multilevel models indicate that risk perception and perceptions of political instability predict a wish for stronger leadership, agreement with martial law, and support for a controlling government especially when SDO and RWA are high, while more egalitarian and less conservative people agree less with these authoritarian measures in spite of the levels of risk perception. We discuss the implications for these findings for future research on similar but also dissimilar external events (natural disasters, war, or terror incidents) and the consequences for societies with higher authoritarian tendencies.
{"title":"Sociopolitical consequences of COVID‐19 in the Americas, Europe, and Asia: A multilevel, multicountry investigation of risk perceptions and support for antidemocratic practices","authors":"José J. Pizarro, Huseyin Cakal, Lander Méndez, Larraitz N. Zumeta, Marcela Gracia‐Leiva, Nekane Basabe, Ginés Navarro‐Carrillo, Ana‐Maria Cazan, Saeed Keshavarzi, Wilson López‐López, Illia Yahiiaiev, Carolina Alzugaray‐Ponce, Loreto Villagrán, Emilio Moyano‐Díaz, Nebojša Petrović, Anderson Mathias, Elza M. Techio, Anna Wlodarczyk, Laura Alfaro‐Beracoechea, Manuel L. Ibarra, Andreas Michael, Sumeet Mhaskar, Gonzalo Martínez‐Zelaya, Marian Bilbao, Gisela Delfino, Catarina L. Carvalho, Isabel R. Pinto, Falak Zehra Mohsin, Agustín Espinosa, Rosa María Cueto, Stefano Cavalli, Silvia da Costa, Alberto Amutio, Itziar Alonso‐Arbiol, Darío Páez","doi":"10.1111/pops.12930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12930","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although different social crises may eventually favor undemocratic and authoritarian forms of governance, at some point, such antidemocratic practices require the support of a significant part of the population to be implemented. The present research investigates how and whether the COVID‐19 pandemic might have favoured greater support for antidemocratic governmental practices, on the premise of regaining control and security. Using data from 17 countries ( N = 4364) and national‐level indicators (i.e., real number of contagions and deaths, and sociopolitical indicators), we test how the risk of contagion and death from COVID‐19, along with personal orientations (i.e., social dominance orientation [SDO], right‐wing authoritarianism [RWA], and perceived anomie) motivate authoritarian and antidemocratic practices. Results from multilevel models indicate that risk perception and perceptions of political instability predict a wish for stronger leadership, agreement with martial law, and support for a controlling government especially when SDO and RWA are high, while more egalitarian and less conservative people agree less with these authoritarian measures in spite of the levels of risk perception. We discuss the implications for these findings for future research on similar but also dissimilar external events (natural disasters, war, or terror incidents) and the consequences for societies with higher authoritarian tendencies.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136033083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ronja Demel, Arezoo Pooresmaeili, Florian Gagsch, Mareike Spengler, Anne Schacht
Abstract Political orientation profoundly influences individual and social decisions. Yet adequate and culturally adaptable tools to quantify it are missing. In personality research, it is common to use questionnaires to capture the multifaceted nature of a construct. Thus, surprisingly, most studies assess political orientation using single‐item scales that fail to account for cultural contexts beyond two‐party systems. Using a bottom‐up approach in which the core content of political orientation was defined by a German sample ( N = 117), the current preregistered study developed a contemporary German questionnaire of political orientation (CGPOQ). The CGPOQ consists of 20 items that together form three main factors: “Tradition and National Security,” Gender and Sexuality,” and “Global Thinking.” The factor structure that was determined by exploratory factor analysis ( N = 1,089) was validated by confirmatory factor analysis in an independent sample ( N = 303). Good fit was demonstrated by comparing the CGPOQ with several convergent (self‐identification, older conservatism questionnaire, voting intention, social dominance orientation, right‐wing authoritarianism) and divergent (religiosity, empathy) measures. The results indicate that the CGPOQ is a valid and reliable instrument for measuring political orientation in a German population. Furthermore, it challenges the assumption that political orientation relies on the same two dimensions across cultures.
{"title":"Beyond bidimensional measures: Introducing a culturally tailored measure of political orientation","authors":"Ronja Demel, Arezoo Pooresmaeili, Florian Gagsch, Mareike Spengler, Anne Schacht","doi":"10.1111/pops.12935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12935","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Political orientation profoundly influences individual and social decisions. Yet adequate and culturally adaptable tools to quantify it are missing. In personality research, it is common to use questionnaires to capture the multifaceted nature of a construct. Thus, surprisingly, most studies assess political orientation using single‐item scales that fail to account for cultural contexts beyond two‐party systems. Using a bottom‐up approach in which the core content of political orientation was defined by a German sample ( N = 117), the current preregistered study developed a contemporary German questionnaire of political orientation (CGPOQ). The CGPOQ consists of 20 items that together form three main factors: “Tradition and National Security,” Gender and Sexuality,” and “Global Thinking.” The factor structure that was determined by exploratory factor analysis ( N = 1,089) was validated by confirmatory factor analysis in an independent sample ( N = 303). Good fit was demonstrated by comparing the CGPOQ with several convergent (self‐identification, older conservatism questionnaire, voting intention, social dominance orientation, right‐wing authoritarianism) and divergent (religiosity, empathy) measures. The results indicate that the CGPOQ is a valid and reliable instrument for measuring political orientation in a German population. Furthermore, it challenges the assumption that political orientation relies on the same two dimensions across cultures.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136112892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Itziar Guerendiain‐Gabás, Lorena Gil de Montes, Magdalena Bobowik, Maitane Arnoso‐Martínez
Abstract Unconditional basic income (UBI) is a redistributive policy proposal that is receiving increasing attention in the Spanish political sphere. Welfare attitudes literature has shown that support for UBI is higher among left‐wing citizens and those of lower socioeconomic status. However, previous studies have not addressed the mediating role of ideological values such as egalitarianism or meritocratism in supporting UBI. Furthermore, studies have not considered the interactive relationship between ideological and self‐interest motives when studying attitudes toward UBI. Drawing on modernization theory, we propose that individuals' socioeconomic status conditions the role of ideological motivations in shaping support for UBI. To test this hypothesis, we study data from two different surveys conducted in Spain in 2017 ( N = 1958) and 2021 ( N = 2004). Our findings suggest that ideology is a less relevant motivation for supporting UBI among the Spanish citizens of lower socioeconomic status, but it becomes increasingly salient among higher‐status citizens. Among the latter, egalitarian values lead leftists to support UBI, whereas anti‐egalitarian and meritocratic values lead rightists to anti‐UBI positions. We discuss these findings within the framework of modernization theory, addressing support for UBI by different social groups and the ability of this policy proposal to elicit broad‐based support.
{"title":"Support for unconditional basic income in Spain: A materialist or post‐materialist issue?","authors":"Itziar Guerendiain‐Gabás, Lorena Gil de Montes, Magdalena Bobowik, Maitane Arnoso‐Martínez","doi":"10.1111/pops.12934","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12934","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Unconditional basic income (UBI) is a redistributive policy proposal that is receiving increasing attention in the Spanish political sphere. Welfare attitudes literature has shown that support for UBI is higher among left‐wing citizens and those of lower socioeconomic status. However, previous studies have not addressed the mediating role of ideological values such as egalitarianism or meritocratism in supporting UBI. Furthermore, studies have not considered the interactive relationship between ideological and self‐interest motives when studying attitudes toward UBI. Drawing on modernization theory, we propose that individuals' socioeconomic status conditions the role of ideological motivations in shaping support for UBI. To test this hypothesis, we study data from two different surveys conducted in Spain in 2017 ( N = 1958) and 2021 ( N = 2004). Our findings suggest that ideology is a less relevant motivation for supporting UBI among the Spanish citizens of lower socioeconomic status, but it becomes increasingly salient among higher‐status citizens. Among the latter, egalitarian values lead leftists to support UBI, whereas anti‐egalitarian and meritocratic values lead rightists to anti‐UBI positions. We discuss these findings within the framework of modernization theory, addressing support for UBI by different social groups and the ability of this policy proposal to elicit broad‐based support.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136013885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jasper Neerdaels, Christian Tröster, Niels Van Quaquebeke, Laurent Licata
Abstract A common explanation for the success of populists is that they rhetorically shift blame for their followers' hardships toward “elites,” therefore creating a culpable outgroup. However, we argue that there are two confounded effects at play here: shifting blame toward an outgroup and shifting blame away from oneself. Therefore, we theorize that above and beyond elite blame, victimization rhetoric heightens leader support because it specifically relieves followers of the pressure of having to take responsibility for negative life outcomes, especially when they subscribe to neoliberal competition ideology. Supporting our predictions, we show via a survey that victim rhetoric increases leader support while controlling for elite blame, especially among people subscribing to neoliberal competition ideology. In a subsequent experiment, we replicate the findings causally and show that the effect works by reducing perceived personal responsibility for negative life outcomes. Our results indicate that populist rhetoric involves shifting blame toward others and away from oneself. This can explain some of the conundrums that have plagued the literature, such as why elites also fall for populist rhetoric. We discuss our findings in relation to cultural differences and differences in left‐ versus right‐wing populism.
{"title":"Absolved from the neoliberal burden of responsibility: The effect of populist victim rhetoric on leader support","authors":"Jasper Neerdaels, Christian Tröster, Niels Van Quaquebeke, Laurent Licata","doi":"10.1111/pops.12932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12932","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A common explanation for the success of populists is that they rhetorically shift blame for their followers' hardships toward “elites,” therefore creating a culpable outgroup. However, we argue that there are two confounded effects at play here: shifting blame toward an outgroup and shifting blame away from oneself. Therefore, we theorize that above and beyond elite blame, victimization rhetoric heightens leader support because it specifically relieves followers of the pressure of having to take responsibility for negative life outcomes, especially when they subscribe to neoliberal competition ideology. Supporting our predictions, we show via a survey that victim rhetoric increases leader support while controlling for elite blame, especially among people subscribing to neoliberal competition ideology. In a subsequent experiment, we replicate the findings causally and show that the effect works by reducing perceived personal responsibility for negative life outcomes. Our results indicate that populist rhetoric involves shifting blame toward others and away from oneself. This can explain some of the conundrums that have plagued the literature, such as why elites also fall for populist rhetoric. We discuss our findings in relation to cultural differences and differences in left‐ versus right‐wing populism.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134973393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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