Andrew Flores, Dakota Strode, Donald P. Haider‐Markel
Social science interest in LGBTQI+ politics and policy has grown in the 21st century. Likewise, the political opportunity structure for LGBTQI+ activists has changed significantly, with historical expansions of legal protections only to be followed by the current period of backlash and retrenchment. In this article, we outline existing and potential research in LGBTQI+ politics and policy employing theoretical perspectives from political psychology. Promising advances in the study of LGBTQI+ politics and policy draw on framework and theories grounded in social and political psychology. Nevertheless, we also identify several significant gaps in the literature including the lack of focus on intersectional perspectives, subpopulations such as intersex people and those born with differences in sexual development, and the psychology of LGBTQI+ people and its relevance for their political attitudes and behavior.
{"title":"Political psychology and the study of LGBTQI+ groups, politics, and policy: Existing research and future directions","authors":"Andrew Flores, Dakota Strode, Donald P. Haider‐Markel","doi":"10.1111/pops.12989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12989","url":null,"abstract":"Social science interest in LGBTQI+ politics and policy has grown in the 21st century. Likewise, the political opportunity structure for LGBTQI+ activists has changed significantly, with historical expansions of legal protections only to be followed by the current period of backlash and retrenchment. In this article, we outline existing and potential research in LGBTQI+ politics and policy employing theoretical perspectives from political psychology. Promising advances in the study of LGBTQI+ politics and policy draw on framework and theories grounded in social and political psychology. Nevertheless, we also identify several significant gaps in the literature including the lack of focus on intersectional perspectives, subpopulations such as intersex people and those born with differences in sexual development, and the psychology of LGBTQI+ people and its relevance for their political attitudes and behavior.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141000502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Previous research portrays radical‐right voters as economically, geographically, or politically marginalized. However, it seems implausible that these self‐perceived ordinary people—often overrepresenting historically powerful majorities (Whites, men, Christians)—are also socially marginalized. In the present article, I theorize why they may still feel socially excluded: Optimal distinctiveness research posits that individuals feel included in society if they experience (1) belonging to it and (2) uniqueness within it (i.e., feel their background is recognized). I argue that historical power and self‐perceived ordinariness satisfy most majority members' belonging need, but recent diversification and liberalization leave their uniqueness need unsatisfied. Indeed, cluster analyses of American National Election Studies (ANES) data show that a substantial share of majority members experiences firm belonging to society but lacks uniqueness therein. This group is more likely to support Trump than individuals whose needs are satisfied. This article contributes a social‐inclusion perspective on radical‐right voters' position in society.
{"title":"Trump Voters' social position in U.S. Society: Uniqueness and radical‐right support","authors":"P. L. Versteegen","doi":"10.1111/pops.12984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12984","url":null,"abstract":"Previous research portrays radical‐right voters as economically, geographically, or politically marginalized. However, it seems implausible that these self‐perceived ordinary people—often overrepresenting historically powerful majorities (Whites, men, Christians)—are also socially marginalized. In the present article, I theorize why they may still feel socially excluded: Optimal distinctiveness research posits that individuals feel included in society if they experience (1) belonging to it and (2) uniqueness within it (i.e., feel their background is recognized). I argue that historical power and self‐perceived ordinariness satisfy most majority members' belonging need, but recent diversification and liberalization leave their uniqueness need unsatisfied. Indeed, cluster analyses of American National Election Studies (ANES) data show that a substantial share of majority members experiences firm belonging to society but lacks uniqueness therein. This group is more likely to support Trump than individuals whose needs are satisfied. This article contributes a social‐inclusion perspective on radical‐right voters' position in society.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141010545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lusine Grigoryan, Vladimir Ponizovskiy, Marie Isabelle Weißflog, Evgeny Osin, Brian Lickel
Feeling guilt and shame for the harm done to others by the ingroup can facilitate intergroup reconciliation. Most of the studies showing this effect are conducted in democratic countries and on historical, not current, conflicts. We investigated the role of group‐based guilt and shame in collective action in an authoritarian country at war. We asked more than 1000 Russians living in Russia, in a sample representative of the country's population by gender and age, about their experiences of group‐based guilt and shame regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine and their past and future antiwar political actions. We tested whether political efficacy is necessary for experiencing group‐based guilt and shame, and whether these emotions are predictive of antiwar action over and above other emotions and attitudes. Democratic values, not political efficacy, were the most robust predictor of group‐based guilt and shame. Only moral shame, but not image shame or guilt, predicted past and future antiwar action. Whereas attitude towards the war and moral shame predicted engagement in antiwar action (vs none), other negative dominant emotions like anger predicted the degree of this engagement. We highlight the gaps in the study of collective action and the need for more evidence from nondemocratic contexts.
{"title":"Guilt, shame, and antiwar action in an authoritarian country at war","authors":"Lusine Grigoryan, Vladimir Ponizovskiy, Marie Isabelle Weißflog, Evgeny Osin, Brian Lickel","doi":"10.1111/pops.12985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12985","url":null,"abstract":"Feeling guilt and shame for the harm done to others by the ingroup can facilitate intergroup reconciliation. Most of the studies showing this effect are conducted in democratic countries and on historical, not current, conflicts. We investigated the role of group‐based guilt and shame in collective action in an authoritarian country at war. We asked more than 1000 Russians living in Russia, in a sample representative of the country's population by gender and age, about their experiences of group‐based guilt and shame regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine and their past and future antiwar political actions. We tested whether political efficacy is necessary for experiencing group‐based guilt and shame, and whether these emotions are predictive of antiwar action over and above other emotions and attitudes. Democratic values, not political efficacy, were the most robust predictor of group‐based guilt and shame. Only moral shame, but not image shame or guilt, predicted past and future antiwar action. Whereas attitude towards the war and moral shame predicted engagement in antiwar action (vs none), other negative dominant emotions like anger predicted the degree of this engagement. We highlight the gaps in the study of collective action and the need for more evidence from nondemocratic contexts.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141006621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Which women win? How gender and context influence women's representation in the United States","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/pops.12981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12981","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140678175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can corruption scandals trigger citizens to punish a poor‐performing government? Citizens often fail to punish governments with subpar policy outcomes because they tend to isolate politics from their personal life and avoid blaming one's own party. Challenging these popular beliefs, our findings from a survey experiment in South Korea indicate that corruption scandals accusing elected officials of nepotism trigger people to blame the government as the cause of their personal grievances. This effect is prominent among individuals who are highly worried about their own education, employment, and retirement, highlighting anxiety as a driving factor. Surprisingly, the effect of nepotism spills across domains; for example, college admission nepotism increases government blame for concerns on not only education but also employment and retirement. Moreover, nepotism may prompt partisans whose party is in power, who are otherwise less likely to blame the incumbent government, to attribute greater blame to the government. These findings imply that corruption scandals can alter perceptions of how government performance affects personal lives. Overall, the study suggests that nepotism in areas critical to personal well‐being may generate an effective opposition against poor‐performing government, as seen in the 2016–17 South Korean presidential corruption scandal.
{"title":"Can corruption connect you to politics? Nepotism, anxiety, and government blame","authors":"Deanna Kolberg‐Shah, Hwayong Shin","doi":"10.1111/pops.12980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12980","url":null,"abstract":"Can corruption scandals trigger citizens to punish a poor‐performing government? Citizens often fail to punish governments with subpar policy outcomes because they tend to isolate politics from their personal life and avoid blaming one's own party. Challenging these popular beliefs, our findings from a survey experiment in South Korea indicate that corruption scandals accusing elected officials of nepotism trigger people to blame the government as the cause of their personal grievances. This effect is prominent among individuals who are highly worried about their own education, employment, and retirement, highlighting anxiety as a driving factor. Surprisingly, the effect of nepotism spills across domains; for example, college admission nepotism increases government blame for concerns on not only education but also employment and retirement. Moreover, nepotism may prompt partisans whose party is in power, who are otherwise less likely to blame the incumbent government, to attribute greater blame to the government. These findings imply that corruption scandals can alter perceptions of how government performance affects personal lives. Overall, the study suggests that nepotism in areas critical to personal well‐being may generate an effective opposition against poor‐performing government, as seen in the 2016–17 South Korean presidential corruption scandal.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140688288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide the first account of the culture wars in the political psychology and public opinion literature based on a theory of culture. Using innovative measures of grid‐group cultural theory (CT), we identify the cultures associated with ideological and partisan identifications in annual U.S. national surveys from 2011 to 2022, a unique data set of 24,870 respondents. As hypothesized, we find that the culture wars occur not just between ideologues and partisans but among them as they draw support from distinct, relatively stable yet shifting cultural coalitions. Egalitarian and, less often, fatalistic liberals and Democrats battle against individualistic and, less often, hierarchical, conservatives and Republicans. As hypothesized, fatalists are the least reliable coalition partners, and, as expected, they gravitate Republican and conservative in 2017, after Trump's election. However, fatalists who are strong partisan identifiers never defect. Moreover, our hypothesis that fatalist attraction to Trump would drive defections in their political identification is largely invalidated. Instead, fatalists mostly flee Trump in our aggregate analysis as well as in subanalyses of strong and weak ideological and partisan identifiers. In 2016 and 2018–2022, it appears that independent fatalists cause fatalists to gravitate liberal and Democrat. Unexpectedly, hierarchists also go liberal and Democrat in 2022, in apparent reaction to Trump's multifront attacks on the 2020 election that he lost. We identify the basis for cultural coalitions that can end particular culture wars, including the most significant one now occurring between egalitarians and individualists, and conclude with suggestions for further research.
{"title":"A cultural theory of the culture wars","authors":"B. Swedlow, Joseph T. Ripberger, Meng Yuan","doi":"10.1111/pops.12968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12968","url":null,"abstract":"We provide the first account of the culture wars in the political psychology and public opinion literature based on a theory of culture. Using innovative measures of grid‐group cultural theory (CT), we identify the cultures associated with ideological and partisan identifications in annual U.S. national surveys from 2011 to 2022, a unique data set of 24,870 respondents. As hypothesized, we find that the culture wars occur not just between ideologues and partisans but among them as they draw support from distinct, relatively stable yet shifting cultural coalitions. Egalitarian and, less often, fatalistic liberals and Democrats battle against individualistic and, less often, hierarchical, conservatives and Republicans. As hypothesized, fatalists are the least reliable coalition partners, and, as expected, they gravitate Republican and conservative in 2017, after Trump's election. However, fatalists who are strong partisan identifiers never defect. Moreover, our hypothesis that fatalist attraction to Trump would drive defections in their political identification is largely invalidated. Instead, fatalists mostly flee Trump in our aggregate analysis as well as in subanalyses of strong and weak ideological and partisan identifiers. In 2016 and 2018–2022, it appears that independent fatalists cause fatalists to gravitate liberal and Democrat. Unexpectedly, hierarchists also go liberal and Democrat in 2022, in apparent reaction to Trump's multifront attacks on the 2020 election that he lost. We identify the basis for cultural coalitions that can end particular culture wars, including the most significant one now occurring between egalitarians and individualists, and conclude with suggestions for further research.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140692040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A superordinate identity unites different subgroups into an overarching, common one. But does superordinate identification then improve or worsen attitudes towards the former outgroup? The common ingroup identity model (CIIM) asserts that recategorization ameliorates outgroup bias by reducing perceptions of intergroup threat. It predicts that superordinate identification will improve intergroup relations by promoting tolerance and acceptance of diversity. In contrast, the ingroup project model (IPM) asserts that identifying superordinately will actually exacerbate outgroup bias because ingroup members naturally project their own characteristics onto the superordinate category and will more strongly dislike the former outgroup for not fitting the “correct” superordinate prototype. Existing evidence—largely drawn from psychology lab experiments, not real‐world situations—suggests both models can be correct insofar as ingroup projection only occurs under certain conditions. In that case, which model is correct for European identity? Results from original survey data collected in three European countries (Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom) show that increased identification with Europe is almost always associated with more favorable attitudes towards outgroup immigrants, even among those most likely to engage in ingroup projection. Future research should continue to investigate when and why this inclusivity does—and does not—hold.
{"title":"European identity's effect on immigration attitudes: Testing the predictions of the common Ingroup identity model versus ingroup projection model","authors":"K. A. Curtis","doi":"10.1111/pops.12970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12970","url":null,"abstract":"A superordinate identity unites different subgroups into an overarching, common one. But does superordinate identification then improve or worsen attitudes towards the former outgroup? The common ingroup identity model (CIIM) asserts that recategorization ameliorates outgroup bias by reducing perceptions of intergroup threat. It predicts that superordinate identification will improve intergroup relations by promoting tolerance and acceptance of diversity. In contrast, the ingroup project model (IPM) asserts that identifying superordinately will actually exacerbate outgroup bias because ingroup members naturally project their own characteristics onto the superordinate category and will more strongly dislike the former outgroup for not fitting the “correct” superordinate prototype. Existing evidence—largely drawn from psychology lab experiments, not real‐world situations—suggests both models can be correct insofar as ingroup projection only occurs under certain conditions. In that case, which model is correct for European identity? Results from original survey data collected in three European countries (Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom) show that increased identification with Europe is almost always associated with more favorable attitudes towards outgroup immigrants, even among those most likely to engage in ingroup projection. Future research should continue to investigate when and why this inclusivity does—and does not—hold.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140728743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Laura K. Taylor, Christine E. Merrilees, Marcie C. Goeke‐Morey, Pete Shirlow, E. M. Cummings
Rebuilding society in the wake of conflict often falls on the generation born in peace. Yet, youth contributions to peacebuilding are often overlooked. This article challenges the narrative that sidelines the constructive contributions of young people in conflict‐affected settings. Instead, we identify different kinds of youth peacebuilders. Using a person‐centered approach, we conduct a latent class analysis of 590 adolescents (Mage = 16.8, SDage = 2.0, years old), evenly split by sex (51% female) and representing both communities, or conflict‐related identity groups, in Northern Ireland (38% Catholic, 62% Protestant). Across 10 indicators capturing different types and targets of prosocial action, the best fit to the data was a four‐class model: Peace in Name Only (36%), Peace at Home (33%), Peace Within Community (13%), and Future Peacebuilder (16%). Class membership varied based on youth's prior exposure to intergroup threat, or sectarian antisocial behavior. Prior exposure was related to a higher probability of being in the Peace at Home or Future Peacebuilder, compared to the Peace in Name Only class. The importance of recognizing the different kinds of youth peacebuilders in a conflict‐affected society is discussed, along with implications for global policy.
{"title":"Who is building peace? A latent class analysis of youth peacebuilders in a conflict‐affected setting","authors":"Laura K. Taylor, Christine E. Merrilees, Marcie C. Goeke‐Morey, Pete Shirlow, E. M. Cummings","doi":"10.1111/pops.12977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12977","url":null,"abstract":"Rebuilding society in the wake of conflict often falls on the generation born in peace. Yet, youth contributions to peacebuilding are often overlooked. This article challenges the narrative that sidelines the constructive contributions of young people in conflict‐affected settings. Instead, we identify different kinds of youth peacebuilders. Using a person‐centered approach, we conduct a latent class analysis of 590 adolescents (Mage = 16.8, SDage = 2.0, years old), evenly split by sex (51% female) and representing both communities, or conflict‐related identity groups, in Northern Ireland (38% Catholic, 62% Protestant). Across 10 indicators capturing different types and targets of prosocial action, the best fit to the data was a four‐class model: Peace in Name Only (36%), Peace at Home (33%), Peace Within Community (13%), and Future Peacebuilder (16%). Class membership varied based on youth's prior exposure to intergroup threat, or sectarian antisocial behavior. Prior exposure was related to a higher probability of being in the Peace at Home or Future Peacebuilder, compared to the Peace in Name Only class. The importance of recognizing the different kinds of youth peacebuilders in a conflict‐affected society is discussed, along with implications for global policy.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140373966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When do people support government assistance for people with disabilities? Disability welfare programs account for large shares of national welfare budgets, but little is known about public attitudes toward disabled welfare claimants. Drawing on psychological research in stereotype content, we argue that attitudes toward welfare for people with disabilities are likely to be more conditional than previously acknowledged. In two nationally representative, preregistered survey experiments in Wales (N = 3393) and Scotland (1707), we ask respondents to evaluate the deservingness of a fictitious disabled claimant to government assistance. We manipulate the claimant's outgroup status and the manner in which they acquired their impairment. We find that disabled claimants perceived as even somewhat responsible for their impairments are considered substantially less deserving of government assistance than those perceived not responsible, even when their needs for assistance are identical. Contrary to expectations, we find relatively modest and inconsistent outgroup penalties in perceived deservingness. Finally, we find large heterogeneous treatment effects among respondents holding to more authoritarian social values. These results challenge conventional wisdom regarding the universality of support for disability welfare and help explain why voters may not be inclined to punish politicians who propose cuts to programs for even stereotypically high‐deserving groups.
{"title":"Responsibility for impairment shapes the perceived deservingness of welfare claimants with disabilities","authors":"Joshua Thorp, J. Larner","doi":"10.1111/pops.12978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12978","url":null,"abstract":"When do people support government assistance for people with disabilities? Disability welfare programs account for large shares of national welfare budgets, but little is known about public attitudes toward disabled welfare claimants. Drawing on psychological research in stereotype content, we argue that attitudes toward welfare for people with disabilities are likely to be more conditional than previously acknowledged. In two nationally representative, preregistered survey experiments in Wales (N = 3393) and Scotland (1707), we ask respondents to evaluate the deservingness of a fictitious disabled claimant to government assistance. We manipulate the claimant's outgroup status and the manner in which they acquired their impairment. We find that disabled claimants perceived as even somewhat responsible for their impairments are considered substantially less deserving of government assistance than those perceived not responsible, even when their needs for assistance are identical. Contrary to expectations, we find relatively modest and inconsistent outgroup penalties in perceived deservingness. Finally, we find large heterogeneous treatment effects among respondents holding to more authoritarian social values. These results challenge conventional wisdom regarding the universality of support for disability welfare and help explain why voters may not be inclined to punish politicians who propose cuts to programs for even stereotypically high‐deserving groups.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140380345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francois Alexi Martel, Philip Moniz, A. Ashokkumar, William B. Swann
The recent surge in political authoritarianism has triggered interest in the factors that regulate its rise and fall. We explored these phenomena in the time around the January 6, 2021, insurrection in the United States. Identity fusion (synergistic union) with Trump predicted the perception that Democrats represented an existential threat to the American way of life; higher perceived threat, in turn, predicted endorsement of authoritarian actions against Democrats. Biden supporters did not display analogous effects. Among Trump supporters and, to a lesser extent, Biden supporters, fusion with the United States negatively predicted both the perception that out‐party members represented an existential threat and endorsement of authoritarian actions against them. These findings provide unique insight into the role of identity in the nation's closest brush with authoritarian takeover in over a century.
{"title":"Identity fusion and support for political authoritarianism: Lessons from the U.S. insurrection of 2021","authors":"Francois Alexi Martel, Philip Moniz, A. Ashokkumar, William B. Swann","doi":"10.1111/pops.12979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12979","url":null,"abstract":"The recent surge in political authoritarianism has triggered interest in the factors that regulate its rise and fall. We explored these phenomena in the time around the January 6, 2021, insurrection in the United States. Identity fusion (synergistic union) with Trump predicted the perception that Democrats represented an existential threat to the American way of life; higher perceived threat, in turn, predicted endorsement of authoritarian actions against Democrats. Biden supporters did not display analogous effects. Among Trump supporters and, to a lesser extent, Biden supporters, fusion with the United States negatively predicted both the perception that out‐party members represented an existential threat and endorsement of authoritarian actions against them. These findings provide unique insight into the role of identity in the nation's closest brush with authoritarian takeover in over a century.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140382734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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