{"title":"“Populism and Democracy.” A review of The Age of Discontent: Populism, Extremis and Conspiracy Theories in Contemporary Democracies By MathewRhodes‐Purdy, RachelNavaree and StephenUtych, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 2024. $34.99 (pbk); $110.00 (hbk); $110.00 (ebk)","authors":"Barbara Schmitter Heisler","doi":"10.1111/pops.12966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12966","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140233125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Laura Pareja Conto, Gabriel Velez, Angelica Restrepo, H. Recchia, Roberto Posada‐Gilede, Cecilia Wainryb
In the aftermath of intractable armed conflict, adolescents can play a critical role in the process of reconciliation and the construction of a culture of peace. The meanings they construct about these processes are a core aspect of their engagement (or lack thereof) in peace‐building initiatives. This study sought to document adolescents' perspectives on the Colombian armed conflict and the 2016 peace treaty, as well as their preferred resolutions to move forward after decades of harm and division. We interviewed 77 adolescents (39 girls, 38 boys) ranging from ages 14 to 19 years (M = 16.49, SD = .95) from two public schools in Bogotá, Colombia. We asked youth open‐ended questions about the history of the armed conflict, their position toward the peace accord, and their proposed optimal resolutions to address harms committed by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC). Using thematic analysis, we identified three overall themes in adolescents' responses: (1) cynicism toward peace and desires for retribution, (2) improving the lives of those they thought were most impacted, and (3) restoring relationships and ending cycles of violence. We discuss the implications of our findings for psychological scholarship, peace education, and politics of reconciliation in light of Colombia's current political and social climate.
{"title":"Urban Colombian youths' perspectives on the armed conflict and possibilities for ways forward","authors":"Laura Pareja Conto, Gabriel Velez, Angelica Restrepo, H. Recchia, Roberto Posada‐Gilede, Cecilia Wainryb","doi":"10.1111/pops.12962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12962","url":null,"abstract":"In the aftermath of intractable armed conflict, adolescents can play a critical role in the process of reconciliation and the construction of a culture of peace. The meanings they construct about these processes are a core aspect of their engagement (or lack thereof) in peace‐building initiatives. This study sought to document adolescents' perspectives on the Colombian armed conflict and the 2016 peace treaty, as well as their preferred resolutions to move forward after decades of harm and division. We interviewed 77 adolescents (39 girls, 38 boys) ranging from ages 14 to 19 years (M = 16.49, SD = .95) from two public schools in Bogotá, Colombia. We asked youth open‐ended questions about the history of the armed conflict, their position toward the peace accord, and their proposed optimal resolutions to address harms committed by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC). Using thematic analysis, we identified three overall themes in adolescents' responses: (1) cynicism toward peace and desires for retribution, (2) improving the lives of those they thought were most impacted, and (3) restoring relationships and ending cycles of violence. We discuss the implications of our findings for psychological scholarship, peace education, and politics of reconciliation in light of Colombia's current political and social climate.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140241049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Political incivility—that is, treating political opponents with disrespect—and its consequences are increasingly investigated. This article examines the effect of incivility on message persuasiveness and the moderating role of populist attitudes and personality traits. We test these relationships via original experimental data collected in Switzerland (Study 1, N = 1340) and the United States (Study 2, N = 1820, preregistered). In both studies, participants were asked their opinion about a controversial political issue, presented with persuasive information framed either civilly or uncivilly, and asked again their opinion about the issue to assess whether they changed their mind. Results of a between‐subject design show that incivility does not necessarily undermine the message's persuasiveness, contrary to what we expected. Notably, uncivil messages resonated more with those respondents exhibiting higher levels of populist attitudes (Study 2) and darker personality traits (both studies). Our results further suggest a connection between incivility, message congruence, and particularly cultural context, which warrants further investigations.
{"title":"Uncivil yet persuasive? Testing the persuasiveness of political incivility and the moderating role of populist attitudes and personality traits","authors":"Chiara Vargiu, Alessandro Nai, Chiara Valli","doi":"10.1111/pops.12969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12969","url":null,"abstract":"Political incivility—that is, treating political opponents with disrespect—and its consequences are increasingly investigated. This article examines the effect of incivility on message persuasiveness and the moderating role of populist attitudes and personality traits. We test these relationships via original experimental data collected in Switzerland (Study 1, N = 1340) and the United States (Study 2, N = 1820, preregistered). In both studies, participants were asked their opinion about a controversial political issue, presented with persuasive information framed either civilly or uncivilly, and asked again their opinion about the issue to assess whether they changed their mind. Results of a between‐subject design show that incivility does not necessarily undermine the message's persuasiveness, contrary to what we expected. Notably, uncivil messages resonated more with those respondents exhibiting higher levels of populist attitudes (Study 2) and darker personality traits (both studies). Our results further suggest a connection between incivility, message congruence, and particularly cultural context, which warrants further investigations.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140242912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Politics is increasingly a major source of social division, and party identities are theorized to be major drives of political hostility. However, parties often contain factions who are deeply hostile towards one another. Currently, we do not know whether hostility between factions within parties can be as intense as hostility between parties. In this article we compare, for the major parties in Britain (Ns = 522; 568) and the United States (N = 443), the affect that partisans feel towards factions within their own party and factions in rival parties. We find that within‐party affective polarization effects are large on average (d = 0.8) and sometimes very large (d > 1.2), that they are usually smaller than between‐party effects but can equal or exceed them, and, in several cases, factions prefer an out‐party faction over their in‐party rivals. These findings demonstrate that strong affective polarization can emerge between groups who share party identities, highlighting the importance of factions in political psychology and raising questions about the effect of party identities on affective polarization.
{"title":"Affective polarization within parties","authors":"David J. Young, Lee H. de‐Wit","doi":"10.1111/pops.12973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12973","url":null,"abstract":"Politics is increasingly a major source of social division, and party identities are theorized to be major drives of political hostility. However, parties often contain factions who are deeply hostile towards one another. Currently, we do not know whether hostility between factions within parties can be as intense as hostility between parties. In this article we compare, for the major parties in Britain (Ns = 522; 568) and the United States (N = 443), the affect that partisans feel towards factions within their own party and factions in rival parties. We find that within‐party affective polarization effects are large on average (d = 0.8) and sometimes very large (d > 1.2), that they are usually smaller than between‐party effects but can equal or exceed them, and, in several cases, factions prefer an out‐party faction over their in‐party rivals. These findings demonstrate that strong affective polarization can emerge between groups who share party identities, highlighting the importance of factions in political psychology and raising questions about the effect of party identities on affective polarization.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140246847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Concerns about affective polarization are on the rise globally, and it has been associated with negative outcomes such as diminished trust in government and discrimination against out‐partisans. While elected politicians are typically thought to be a major source of mass‐level affective polarization, and despite the policy and representation consequences of heightened partisan hostility in legislatures, existing research has focused almost exclusively on the measurement and explanation of affective polarization among citizens. As a result, we know far less about the magnitude and sources of elite affective polarization. Here, we take a step towards addressing this gap using an original survey of hundreds of Canadian local politicians, a setting uniquely situated for addressing the role of a host of individual‐level and institutional‐level predictors of affective polarization. We find that Canadian local politicians are, on average, less affectively polarized than the citizens they represent. However, levels of affective polarization among these politicians vary considerably, with higher levels of affective polarization among politicians who are ideologues, partisans, and who harbor strong progressive ambition. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for research on affective polarization and describe the need for comparative studies of affective polarization among political elites.
{"title":"What explains elite affective polarization? Evidence from Canadian politicians","authors":"Jack Lucas, Lior Sheffer","doi":"10.1111/pops.12974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12974","url":null,"abstract":"Concerns about affective polarization are on the rise globally, and it has been associated with negative outcomes such as diminished trust in government and discrimination against out‐partisans. While elected politicians are typically thought to be a major source of mass‐level affective polarization, and despite the policy and representation consequences of heightened partisan hostility in legislatures, existing research has focused almost exclusively on the measurement and explanation of affective polarization among citizens. As a result, we know far less about the magnitude and sources of elite affective polarization. Here, we take a step towards addressing this gap using an original survey of hundreds of Canadian local politicians, a setting uniquely situated for addressing the role of a host of individual‐level and institutional‐level predictors of affective polarization. We find that Canadian local politicians are, on average, less affectively polarized than the citizens they represent. However, levels of affective polarization among these politicians vary considerably, with higher levels of affective polarization among politicians who are ideologues, partisans, and who harbor strong progressive ambition. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for research on affective polarization and describe the need for comparative studies of affective polarization among political elites.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140250154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When conscience calls: Moral courage in times of confusion and despair By Kristen RenwickMonroe. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 2023. $30 (pbk); $99 (hbk); $29.99 (pdf)","authors":"James N. Druckman","doi":"10.1111/pops.12961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12961","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140251589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Iris M. Wang, Mallory K. Roman, Gabrielle Goldstein, Joshua M. Ackerman
In 2020, the growing COVID‐19 pandemic threatened engagement with the U.S. presidential election. Did this threat affect how people perceived the voting process and the means by which they voted? Four months before the election, 564 participants in several states viewed slideshows framing the pandemic primarily as a health or economic threat, then rated their impressions of voting environments and their attitudes about various voting methods. Following the general election, these data were matched to records indicating if and how participants voted. Exposure to the health consequences of COVID‐19 led people to judge socially dense polling places more negatively but had few effects on other voter outcomes. Instead, chronic aversion to germs predicted more negative responses to dense polling places as well as support for, and use of, socially distanced voting methods, even when accounting for other relevant factors such as partisanship and local COVID‐19 rates.
{"title":"Crowding at the ballot box: Germ aversion and voting methods in the 2020 U.S. general election","authors":"Iris M. Wang, Mallory K. Roman, Gabrielle Goldstein, Joshua M. Ackerman","doi":"10.1111/pops.12976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12976","url":null,"abstract":"In 2020, the growing COVID‐19 pandemic threatened engagement with the U.S. presidential election. Did this threat affect how people perceived the voting process and the means by which they voted? Four months before the election, 564 participants in several states viewed slideshows framing the pandemic primarily as a health or economic threat, then rated their impressions of voting environments and their attitudes about various voting methods. Following the general election, these data were matched to records indicating if and how participants voted. Exposure to the health consequences of COVID‐19 led people to judge socially dense polling places more negatively but had few effects on other voter outcomes. Instead, chronic aversion to germs predicted more negative responses to dense polling places as well as support for, and use of, socially distanced voting methods, even when accounting for other relevant factors such as partisanship and local COVID‐19 rates.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140251580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aiden Hoyle, Thomas E. Powell, B. Doosje, Helma van den Berg, Charlotte Wagnsson
The effects of exposure to Russian propaganda have long been feared; however, academic research examining responses is scarce. This study aims to investigate the responses of Russian speakers in Latvia to a narrative propagated by the Kremlin‐sponsored media outlet Sputnik Latvia that narrates Latvian government policy as Russophobic. The potential to entrench existing ethnopolitical divisions has been highlighted as a possible effect of Russian speakers consuming this narration. We adopt a comprehensive, mixed‐method research approach, where we first provide an analysis of the content of Sputnik Latvia's Russophobia narrative in its recent output. Then, using this analysis, we examine how Russian‐speaking participants respond to this content in a preregistered survey experiment and a focus group. Theoretically, we orient around the rejection‐identification model. This predicts individuals to generally experience lower well‐being after perceiving group‐based discrimination, but that embracing the stigmatized identity can help maintain well‐being despite this perceived devaluation. Our results showed that even brief exposure to Sputnik Latvia's Russophobia narrative led to higher levels of perceived discrimination and group identification in Russian speakers. However, we found no significant effects on well‐being, which deviates from extant literature on discrimination. We discuss the reasons for this and suggest future directions.
{"title":"Weapons of mass division: Sputnik Latvia's Russophobia narratives and testing the rejection‐identification model in Russian speakers in Latvia","authors":"Aiden Hoyle, Thomas E. Powell, B. Doosje, Helma van den Berg, Charlotte Wagnsson","doi":"10.1111/pops.12964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12964","url":null,"abstract":"The effects of exposure to Russian propaganda have long been feared; however, academic research examining responses is scarce. This study aims to investigate the responses of Russian speakers in Latvia to a narrative propagated by the Kremlin‐sponsored media outlet Sputnik Latvia that narrates Latvian government policy as Russophobic. The potential to entrench existing ethnopolitical divisions has been highlighted as a possible effect of Russian speakers consuming this narration. We adopt a comprehensive, mixed‐method research approach, where we first provide an analysis of the content of Sputnik Latvia's Russophobia narrative in its recent output. Then, using this analysis, we examine how Russian‐speaking participants respond to this content in a preregistered survey experiment and a focus group. Theoretically, we orient around the rejection‐identification model. This predicts individuals to generally experience lower well‐being after perceiving group‐based discrimination, but that embracing the stigmatized identity can help maintain well‐being despite this perceived devaluation. Our results showed that even brief exposure to Sputnik Latvia's Russophobia narrative led to higher levels of perceived discrimination and group identification in Russian speakers. However, we found no significant effects on well‐being, which deviates from extant literature on discrimination. We discuss the reasons for this and suggest future directions.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140252159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Arceneaux, Bert N. Bakker, Neil Fasching, Yphtach Lelkes
Political psychologists often examine the influence of psychological dispositions on political attitudes. Central to this field is the ideological asymmetry hypothesis (IAH), which asserts significant psychological differences between conservatives and liberals. According to the IAH, conservatives tend to exhibit greater resistance to change, a stronger inclination to uphold existing social systems, and heightened sensitivity to threats and uncertainty compared with their liberal counterparts. Our review and reanalysis, however, question the empirical strength of the IAH. We expose major concerns regarding the construct validity of the psychological dispositions and political attitudes traditionally measured. Furthermore, our research reveals that the internal validity of these studies is often compromised by endogeneity and selection biases. External and statistical validity issues are also evident, with many findings relying on small effect sizes derived from nonrepresentative student populations. Collectively, these data offer scant support for the IAH, indicating that simply amassing similar data is unlikely to clarify the validity of the hypothesis. We suggest a more intricate causal model that addresses the intricate dynamics between psychological dispositions and political attitudes. This model considers the bidirectional nature of these relationships and the moderating roles of individual and situational variables. In conclusion, we call for developing more sophisticated theories and rigorous research methodologies to enhance our comprehension of the psychological underpinnings of political ideology.
{"title":"A critical evaluation and research agenda for the study of psychological dispositions and political attitudes","authors":"K. Arceneaux, Bert N. Bakker, Neil Fasching, Yphtach Lelkes","doi":"10.1111/pops.12958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12958","url":null,"abstract":"Political psychologists often examine the influence of psychological dispositions on political attitudes. Central to this field is the ideological asymmetry hypothesis (IAH), which asserts significant psychological differences between conservatives and liberals. According to the IAH, conservatives tend to exhibit greater resistance to change, a stronger inclination to uphold existing social systems, and heightened sensitivity to threats and uncertainty compared with their liberal counterparts. Our review and reanalysis, however, question the empirical strength of the IAH. We expose major concerns regarding the construct validity of the psychological dispositions and political attitudes traditionally measured. Furthermore, our research reveals that the internal validity of these studies is often compromised by endogeneity and selection biases. External and statistical validity issues are also evident, with many findings relying on small effect sizes derived from nonrepresentative student populations. Collectively, these data offer scant support for the IAH, indicating that simply amassing similar data is unlikely to clarify the validity of the hypothesis. We suggest a more intricate causal model that addresses the intricate dynamics between psychological dispositions and political attitudes. This model considers the bidirectional nature of these relationships and the moderating roles of individual and situational variables. In conclusion, we call for developing more sophisticated theories and rigorous research methodologies to enhance our comprehension of the psychological underpinnings of political ideology.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140252935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Diana Gómez, J. D. López, Luz S. Giraldo, David A. Huepe, Adolfo M. García, Natalia Trujillo
As armed conflict can influence social behavior, exposed individuals would experience modulated executive functioning, crucial to regulating aggressive responses. Since it is still unclear whether there is an association, this study examines the relationship between performance in executive functions and expression of reactive and proactive aggression, measured using the Reacting Proactive Aggression Questionnaire. The sample includes 128 civilians and ex‐combatants with different levels of exposure to the Colombian armed conflict. The study found that reactive aggression was directly linked to conflict exposure and was also influenced by age and monitoring ability. This suggests that an updated working memory and age play a role in reactive aggression. In contrast, proactive aggression was directly linked to conflict exposure but not to specific executive functions. In conclusion, individuals with less monitoring who live in high‐conflict regions present an increased likelihood of reactive aggression. Additionally, reasonable executive control of thoughts and actions, which involves updating past experiences, appears to be crucial in social contexts, especially violent ones. These findings shall inform interventions and public policies that address the psychosocial risks of aggressive behaviors.
{"title":"Exposure to armed conflict and monitoring as predictors of aggression in a population immersed in a long‐term conflict","authors":"Diana Gómez, J. D. López, Luz S. Giraldo, David A. Huepe, Adolfo M. García, Natalia Trujillo","doi":"10.1111/pops.12972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12972","url":null,"abstract":"As armed conflict can influence social behavior, exposed individuals would experience modulated executive functioning, crucial to regulating aggressive responses. Since it is still unclear whether there is an association, this study examines the relationship between performance in executive functions and expression of reactive and proactive aggression, measured using the Reacting Proactive Aggression Questionnaire. The sample includes 128 civilians and ex‐combatants with different levels of exposure to the Colombian armed conflict. The study found that reactive aggression was directly linked to conflict exposure and was also influenced by age and monitoring ability. This suggests that an updated working memory and age play a role in reactive aggression. In contrast, proactive aggression was directly linked to conflict exposure but not to specific executive functions. In conclusion, individuals with less monitoring who live in high‐conflict regions present an increased likelihood of reactive aggression. Additionally, reasonable executive control of thoughts and actions, which involves updating past experiences, appears to be crucial in social contexts, especially violent ones. These findings shall inform interventions and public policies that address the psychosocial risks of aggressive behaviors.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140257668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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