Keisuke Kawata, Kenneth Mori McElwain, Masaki Nakabayashi
Abstract Survey experiments have shown mixed results about the effect of information provision on attitudes toward controversial policies. We argue that one reason is varied receptiveness to different modes of information. Prior research suggests that people selectively ignore factual, statistical information that contradicts prior beliefs but are more attentive to narrative information that describes individual experiences. We test this in the context of Japanese attitudes toward poverty relief programs, which are less popular than other welfare expenditures. Using a conjoint survey, we show that there is a “narrative premium”: Respondents who are shown a narrative story about the plight of a single mother are more likely to support higher expenditures on poverty relief than those who are shown statistical information about the share of single parents living in poverty. This premium is particularly effective in strengthening the convictions of those who are already aware of levels of societal poverty.
{"title":"Narrative premiums in policy persuasion","authors":"Keisuke Kawata, Kenneth Mori McElwain, Masaki Nakabayashi","doi":"10.1111/pops.12928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12928","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Survey experiments have shown mixed results about the effect of information provision on attitudes toward controversial policies. We argue that one reason is varied receptiveness to different modes of information. Prior research suggests that people selectively ignore factual, statistical information that contradicts prior beliefs but are more attentive to narrative information that describes individual experiences. We test this in the context of Japanese attitudes toward poverty relief programs, which are less popular than other welfare expenditures. Using a conjoint survey, we show that there is a “narrative premium”: Respondents who are shown a narrative story about the plight of a single mother are more likely to support higher expenditures on poverty relief than those who are shown statistical information about the share of single parents living in poverty. This premium is particularly effective in strengthening the convictions of those who are already aware of levels of societal poverty.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136062065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Though selective exposure is immensely important for the functioning of democracy, no consensus exists as to its cause. The most frequently assumed causal explanation is cognitive dissonance avoidance, but direct empirical tests of this explanation are incredibly rare and have generally not been supportive. Furthermore, although cognitive dissonance avoidance concerns regulation of emotional states, this explanation has not yet been integrated with the newest research on emotion‐regulation processes and their role in shaping political attitudes and behavior. I perform such a theoretical integration and derive testable implications of the emotion‐regulation account of the role of cognitive dissonance in shaping selective exposure. I test these together with expectations derived from an alternative explanation (informational utility), in two, original, preregistered survey experiments with 4864 U.S. adults combined. I consistently find support for the emotion‐regulation account in experimental tests and in two out of three observational analyses. The alternative explanation of informational utility finds support in observational analyses, but not in the experimental tests. The study provides the first experimental evidence linking emotion regulation and selective exposure and suggests that people do, indeed, select like‐minded sources to downregulate negative emotion.
{"title":"Looking for relief: Developing an testing the emotion‐regulation explanation of selective exposure to political information","authors":"Filip Kiil","doi":"10.1111/pops.12929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12929","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Though selective exposure is immensely important for the functioning of democracy, no consensus exists as to its cause. The most frequently assumed causal explanation is cognitive dissonance avoidance, but direct empirical tests of this explanation are incredibly rare and have generally not been supportive. Furthermore, although cognitive dissonance avoidance concerns regulation of emotional states, this explanation has not yet been integrated with the newest research on emotion‐regulation processes and their role in shaping political attitudes and behavior. I perform such a theoretical integration and derive testable implications of the emotion‐regulation account of the role of cognitive dissonance in shaping selective exposure. I test these together with expectations derived from an alternative explanation (informational utility), in two, original, preregistered survey experiments with 4864 U.S. adults combined. I consistently find support for the emotion‐regulation account in experimental tests and in two out of three observational analyses. The alternative explanation of informational utility finds support in observational analyses, but not in the experimental tests. The study provides the first experimental evidence linking emotion regulation and selective exposure and suggests that people do, indeed, select like‐minded sources to downregulate negative emotion.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135207936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Incidents of state repression and criminal violence trigger disparate public responses: Some cases elicit widespread citizen solidarity with victims while others do not. What explains these different reactions? Public debates surrounding civilian victimization vary in the extent to which they present victims as deserving of help, often engaging in victim‐blaming narratives. I argue that through the use of attributional evidence, individuals primarily determine their level of support for the victims based on whether or not they are deemed deserving of assistance, instead of focusing on alternative information such as their similarity with victims' demographic characteristics or the perpetrator's identity. I test this argument using various forms of evidence, including experimental, observational survey, and qualitative data from Mexico's War on Drugs—one of the most significant contemporary human rights crises that has nonetheless triggered only sporadic solidarity. Consistent with the argument, the results show that narratives characterizing people as responsible for their misfortune reduce prosocial behavior by eroding compassion and perceptions of social norms—whether helping victims is socially acceptable. In contrast, citizens are more likely to aid victims perceived to have little control over their situation. These findings suggest that elite and media discourses crucially shape public responses to violence.
{"title":"Prosocial behavior amid violence: The deservingness heuristic and solidarity with victims","authors":"Natán Skigin","doi":"10.1111/pops.12926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12926","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Incidents of state repression and criminal violence trigger disparate public responses: Some cases elicit widespread citizen solidarity with victims while others do not. What explains these different reactions? Public debates surrounding civilian victimization vary in the extent to which they present victims as deserving of help, often engaging in victim‐blaming narratives. I argue that through the use of attributional evidence, individuals primarily determine their level of support for the victims based on whether or not they are deemed deserving of assistance, instead of focusing on alternative information such as their similarity with victims' demographic characteristics or the perpetrator's identity. I test this argument using various forms of evidence, including experimental, observational survey, and qualitative data from Mexico's War on Drugs—one of the most significant contemporary human rights crises that has nonetheless triggered only sporadic solidarity. Consistent with the argument, the results show that narratives characterizing people as responsible for their misfortune reduce prosocial behavior by eroding compassion and perceptions of social norms—whether helping victims is socially acceptable. In contrast, citizens are more likely to aid victims perceived to have little control over their situation. These findings suggest that elite and media discourses crucially shape public responses to violence.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135741547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to Do subtle linguistic interventions priming a social identity as a voter have outsized effects on voter turnout? Evidence from a new replication experiment","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/pops.12931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12931","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135981507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sandra Penić, Karsten Donnay, Ravi Bhavnani, Guy Elcheroth, Mai Albzour
Abstract How does residing in the proximity of surveillance infrastructure—i.e., checkpoints, the separation barrier, and military installations—affect support for cooperative and confrontational forms of collective action? Cooperative actions involve engagement with outgroups to advance the ingroup cause (e.g., negotiations, joint actions, and peace movements), whereas confrontational actions involve unilateral tactics to weaken the outgroup (e.g., boycott, armed resistance). In the context of West Bank and Jerusalem, we combine geo‐coded data on the surveillance infrastructure with a representative survey of the adult population from 49 communities ( N = 1,000). Our multilevel analyses show that surveillance does not affect support for confrontational actions but instead decreases support for cooperative actions. Moreover, we identify a new, community‐level mechanism whereby surveillance undermines cooperative actions through weakening inclusive norms that challenge dominant us‐versus‐them perspectives. These effects are empirically robust to various individual‐ and community‐level controls, as well as to the potential of reverse causality and residential self‐selection. Our findings illustrate how cooperative voices and the fabric of social communities become the first casualties of exposure to surveillance. They also speak to the importance of considering structural factors, with broader implications for the socio‐psychological study of collective action.
{"title":"How does the geography of surveillance affect collective action?","authors":"Sandra Penić, Karsten Donnay, Ravi Bhavnani, Guy Elcheroth, Mai Albzour","doi":"10.1111/pops.12925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12925","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How does residing in the proximity of surveillance infrastructure—i.e., checkpoints, the separation barrier, and military installations—affect support for cooperative and confrontational forms of collective action? Cooperative actions involve engagement with outgroups to advance the ingroup cause (e.g., negotiations, joint actions, and peace movements), whereas confrontational actions involve unilateral tactics to weaken the outgroup (e.g., boycott, armed resistance). In the context of West Bank and Jerusalem, we combine geo‐coded data on the surveillance infrastructure with a representative survey of the adult population from 49 communities ( N = 1,000). Our multilevel analyses show that surveillance does not affect support for confrontational actions but instead decreases support for cooperative actions. Moreover, we identify a new, community‐level mechanism whereby surveillance undermines cooperative actions through weakening inclusive norms that challenge dominant us‐versus‐them perspectives. These effects are empirically robust to various individual‐ and community‐level controls, as well as to the potential of reverse causality and residential self‐selection. Our findings illustrate how cooperative voices and the fabric of social communities become the first casualties of exposure to surveillance. They also speak to the importance of considering structural factors, with broader implications for the socio‐psychological study of collective action.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":"309 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136023565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Given the deficiencies of traditional government capacity indicators and cultural factors (e.g., individualism) in explaining the discrepancies of different agents' responses to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic, the present study proposed and examined the role of neoliberalism, a novel cultural tradition of knowledge emphasizing the principles of free markets and self‐governance, as an additional explanation of the discrepancies in the governmental and individual responses to the pandemic. Analyzing policy responses of 106 nations and personal responses from 105,203 individuals in 104 nations during the first wave of the pandemic, we found that nation‐level neoliberalism (delineated by the economic freedom index) negatively predicted the nonlinear trajectories of government policy responses to contain the pandemic. Specifically, in more neoliberal countries, stringent containment policy responses showed a sharper decline in the later stage of the first wave of the pandemic. Moreover, nation‐level neoliberalism negatively predicted individuals' pandemic‐protective attitudes and behaviors. All these effects are independent of and incremental to those of nation‐level individualism. In conclusion, this study sheds light on how neoliberalism could lead to negative consequences during large‐scale, long‐lasting public threats, offering practical guidance for adjusting public crisis management in the future.
{"title":"Neoliberalism and governmental and individual responses to the COVID‐19 pandemic: A cross‐national analysis","authors":"Yuanze Liu, Zhongda Wu, Yuying Wang, Zhiwen Dong, Zhaoyang Sun, Yiqun Gan","doi":"10.1111/pops.12927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12927","url":null,"abstract":"Given the deficiencies of traditional government capacity indicators and cultural factors (e.g., individualism) in explaining the discrepancies of different agents' responses to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic, the present study proposed and examined the role of neoliberalism, a novel cultural tradition of knowledge emphasizing the principles of free markets and self‐governance, as an additional explanation of the discrepancies in the governmental and individual responses to the pandemic. Analyzing policy responses of 106 nations and personal responses from 105,203 individuals in 104 nations during the first wave of the pandemic, we found that nation‐level neoliberalism (delineated by the economic freedom index) negatively predicted the nonlinear trajectories of government policy responses to contain the pandemic. Specifically, in more neoliberal countries, stringent containment policy responses showed a sharper decline in the later stage of the first wave of the pandemic. Moreover, nation‐level neoliberalism negatively predicted individuals' pandemic‐protective attitudes and behaviors. All these effects are independent of and incremental to those of nation‐level individualism. In conclusion, this study sheds light on how neoliberalism could lead to negative consequences during large‐scale, long‐lasting public threats, offering practical guidance for adjusting public crisis management in the future.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48171066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Bentall, Azzam Alsuhibani, K. Bennett, M. Braddick, S. Butter, P. Hyland, O. McBride, R. McKay, M. Shevlin, Thomas V. A. Stocks, T. Hartman
Following the 2016 EU referendum on Britain's membership in the European Union, many people described themselves as “Leavers” or “Remainers.” Here, we examine the emotional responses associated with Brexit identities using survey data collected from two nationally representative samples of the British public in 2019 (N = 638) and 2021 (N = 2,058). Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that many in both samples had coherent Leave or Remain identities. Remain and, to a lesser extent, Leave identities (regardless of how people actually voted in the referendum) predicted distress about Brexit‐related events and clinical symptoms of depression and anxiety at both time points. Structural equation models suggested that the effect of identities on symptoms was largely mediated by distress about Brexit‐related events. We demonstrate a lasting impact of Brexit on the mental health of UK citizens and show that the formation of novel political identities has been more important in this process than voting behavior.
{"title":"The emotional consequences of novel political identities: Brexit and mental health in the United Kingdom","authors":"R. Bentall, Azzam Alsuhibani, K. Bennett, M. Braddick, S. Butter, P. Hyland, O. McBride, R. McKay, M. Shevlin, Thomas V. A. Stocks, T. Hartman","doi":"10.1111/pops.12923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12923","url":null,"abstract":"Following the 2016 EU referendum on Britain's membership in the European Union, many people described themselves as “Leavers” or “Remainers.” Here, we examine the emotional responses associated with Brexit identities using survey data collected from two nationally representative samples of the British public in 2019 (N = 638) and 2021 (N = 2,058). Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that many in both samples had coherent Leave or Remain identities. Remain and, to a lesser extent, Leave identities (regardless of how people actually voted in the referendum) predicted distress about Brexit‐related events and clinical symptoms of depression and anxiety at both time points. Structural equation models suggested that the effect of identities on symptoms was largely mediated by distress about Brexit‐related events. We demonstrate a lasting impact of Brexit on the mental health of UK citizens and show that the formation of novel political identities has been more important in this process than voting behavior.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41727151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adrian Lueders, Robin Wollast, Armelle Nugier, S. Guimond
Experiences with jihadist terrorism sparked debates about the boundaries of religious expression within secular societies. Standpoints majority members hold in such discussions may be inclusive or exclusive towards religious minorities and inform wider intergroup perceptions. The present research explores these relationships in the context of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks in Paris, France. Using longitudinal data from a diverse French sample (N = 558) collected before and after the attacks, we test whether within‐person changes in exclusionary and inclusionary interpretations of the French Laïcité principle can account for changes in public perceptions of context‐relevant minorities. Meta‐analytical findings suggest a small significant conservative shift after experiences with terrorism. Previous research conducted in the context of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks departed from this pattern, however, without identifying underlying psychological mechanisms. Accordingly, the present data suggests a small but significant opinion shift in favor of context‐relevant minorities. This shifting was partially explained through an increased endorsement of an inclusionary interpretation of the Laïcité principle that stresses the freedom of religious expression. We offer a contextualized interpretation of our data, suggesting that the collective coping dynamics that followed the events (i.e., republican marches, #JeSuisCharlie) have been critical for the observed effects.
{"title":"Psychological responses to jihadist terrorism: Exploring a small but significant opinion shift towards minority inclusion among French citizens in response to the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks","authors":"Adrian Lueders, Robin Wollast, Armelle Nugier, S. Guimond","doi":"10.1111/pops.12916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12916","url":null,"abstract":"Experiences with jihadist terrorism sparked debates about the boundaries of religious expression within secular societies. Standpoints majority members hold in such discussions may be inclusive or exclusive towards religious minorities and inform wider intergroup perceptions. The present research explores these relationships in the context of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks in Paris, France. Using longitudinal data from a diverse French sample (N = 558) collected before and after the attacks, we test whether within‐person changes in exclusionary and inclusionary interpretations of the French Laïcité principle can account for changes in public perceptions of context‐relevant minorities. Meta‐analytical findings suggest a small significant conservative shift after experiences with terrorism. Previous research conducted in the context of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks departed from this pattern, however, without identifying underlying psychological mechanisms. Accordingly, the present data suggests a small but significant opinion shift in favor of context‐relevant minorities. This shifting was partially explained through an increased endorsement of an inclusionary interpretation of the Laïcité principle that stresses the freedom of religious expression. We offer a contextualized interpretation of our data, suggesting that the collective coping dynamics that followed the events (i.e., republican marches, #JeSuisCharlie) have been critical for the observed effects.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47366813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We establish the prevalence of partisan schadenfreude—that is, taking “joy in the suffering” of partisan others. Analyzing attitudes on health care, taxation, climate change, and the coronavirus pandemic, we find that a sizable portion of the American mass public engages in partisan schadenfreude and that these attitudes are most expressed by those who are ideologically extreme. Additionally, we find that a sizable portion of the American public is more likely than not to vote for candidates who promise to pass policies that “disproportionately harm” supporters of the opposing political party, and we demonstrate experimental evidence of demand/preference for candidates who promise cruelty among those who exhibit high amounts of schadenfreude. In sum, our results suggest that partisan schadenfreude is widespread and has disturbing implications for American political behavior.
{"title":"Partisan schadenfreude and candidate cruelty","authors":"Steven W. Webster, Adam Glynn, Matthew P. Motta","doi":"10.1111/pops.12922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12922","url":null,"abstract":"We establish the prevalence of partisan schadenfreude—that is, taking “joy in the suffering” of partisan others. Analyzing attitudes on health care, taxation, climate change, and the coronavirus pandemic, we find that a sizable portion of the American mass public engages in partisan schadenfreude and that these attitudes are most expressed by those who are ideologically extreme. Additionally, we find that a sizable portion of the American public is more likely than not to vote for candidates who promise to pass policies that “disproportionately harm” supporters of the opposing political party, and we demonstrate experimental evidence of demand/preference for candidates who promise cruelty among those who exhibit high amounts of schadenfreude. In sum, our results suggest that partisan schadenfreude is widespread and has disturbing implications for American political behavior.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46445681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Increasing expression of antagonism toward immigrants has turned immigration into one of the most polarizing issues in many countries, among them Finland, dividing people into those who favor and those who oppose immigration. But while affective polarization of the kind exemplified by widespread responses to immigration has recently received increasing attention from political psychologists, little attention has been paid to how affective polarization develops through the mutual reinforcement of opposing discourses. The application of critical discursive psychology to interviews with lay Finns reveals this mutual reinforcement in progress. In our interviews, Finns across the political spectrum construct five subject positions by attributing blame for immigration‐related challenges. Both sides blame some “other” for the challenges while exempting themselves from blame. Our study makes three contributions to political psychology: exploring how blame attribution helps to generate affective polarization, illustrating the ability of (critical) discursive psychology to illuminate processes of affective polarization in individuals, and bringing the concept of affective polarization drawn from survey research into dialogue with the concept of subject positions constructed by blame attribution drawn from discursive studies of populism.
{"title":"Who's to blame for failed integration of immigrants? Blame attributions as an affectively polarizing force in lay discussions of immigration in Finland","authors":"Helena Rovamo, Katarina Pettersson, Inari Sakki","doi":"10.1111/pops.12917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12917","url":null,"abstract":"Increasing expression of antagonism toward immigrants has turned immigration into one of the most polarizing issues in many countries, among them Finland, dividing people into those who favor and those who oppose immigration. But while affective polarization of the kind exemplified by widespread responses to immigration has recently received increasing attention from political psychologists, little attention has been paid to how affective polarization develops through the mutual reinforcement of opposing discourses. The application of critical discursive psychology to interviews with lay Finns reveals this mutual reinforcement in progress. In our interviews, Finns across the political spectrum construct five subject positions by attributing blame for immigration‐related challenges. Both sides blame some “other” for the challenges while exempting themselves from blame. Our study makes three contributions to political psychology: exploring how blame attribution helps to generate affective polarization, illustrating the ability of (critical) discursive psychology to illuminate processes of affective polarization in individuals, and bringing the concept of affective polarization drawn from survey research into dialogue with the concept of subject positions constructed by blame attribution drawn from discursive studies of populism.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42145928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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