Ethnic defection has been identified as a potential game changer in conflicts. However, the factors that enable this process require further study. One factor that has been often overlooked is that of social identity and, more particularly, identity leadership. Ethnic defection is a social as much as it is a political process. Incumbents who can utilize this element may be more successful in encouraging a continuous and more persistent process of ethnic defection. A particularly useful tool for counterinsurgency (COIN) leaders to function as identity leaders is that of militias. Traditionally perceived in the literature as ad hoc outcomes of defection, this article demonstrates how militia recruitment can serve as a platform for recruiters to serve as identity leaders and create among recruits a distinct sense of identity that further distances them from other group members and strengthens their group identity. Success in enabling this group categorization could pave the way for more defectors to switch to the government side in a way less relevant than material incentives. The article illustrates this process by employing the case of Israel's recruitment of Shi‘a defectors into pro‐Israel militias in South Lebanon and the Security Belt during the 1980s and 1990s.
{"title":"Progovernment militias, identity leadership, and ethnic defection: Evidence from Israel's recruitment of the South Lebanese Army","authors":"Yaniv Voller","doi":"10.1111/pops.12963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12963","url":null,"abstract":"Ethnic defection has been identified as a potential game changer in conflicts. However, the factors that enable this process require further study. One factor that has been often overlooked is that of social identity and, more particularly, identity leadership. Ethnic defection is a social as much as it is a political process. Incumbents who can utilize this element may be more successful in encouraging a continuous and more persistent process of ethnic defection. A particularly useful tool for counterinsurgency (COIN) leaders to function as identity leaders is that of militias. Traditionally perceived in the literature as ad hoc outcomes of defection, this article demonstrates how militia recruitment can serve as a platform for recruiters to serve as identity leaders and create among recruits a distinct sense of identity that further distances them from other group members and strengthens their group identity. Success in enabling this group categorization could pave the way for more defectors to switch to the government side in a way less relevant than material incentives. The article illustrates this process by employing the case of Israel's recruitment of Shi‘a defectors into pro‐Israel militias in South Lebanon and the Security Belt during the 1980s and 1990s.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140262079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Loneliness is most often understood as resulting from individual deficits that shape poor social engagement and unsatisfying interactions. As a consequence, interventions to address loneliness most often focus on fixing the lonely individual, for example, by modifying their social appraisals and skills, or encouraging them to get out more. In this paper, we characterize and contribute to changing this dominant narrative by arguing that it is both unhelpful and incomplete. We explain that this dominant narrative (1) increases loneliness and makes people feel worse about this experience, (2) does not account for important predictors of loneliness, (3) guides us to interventions that do not produce sufficiently effective or sustainable change, and (4) hinders broader understandings of the societal impact of loneliness. In this way, we argue that the dominant narrative around loneliness contributes to further setting those who feel lonely apart from the rest of society. We propose that attention to individual factors needs to be complemented by the acknowledgement that loneliness is heavily determined by social and structural conditions that render it unequally distributed in society, a situation that qualifies loneliness as a social justice issue.
{"title":"Changing the narrative: Loneliness as a social justice issue","authors":"M. Barreto, David Matthew Doyle, Pamela Qualter","doi":"10.1111/pops.12965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12965","url":null,"abstract":"Loneliness is most often understood as resulting from individual deficits that shape poor social engagement and unsatisfying interactions. As a consequence, interventions to address loneliness most often focus on fixing the lonely individual, for example, by modifying their social appraisals and skills, or encouraging them to get out more. In this paper, we characterize and contribute to changing this dominant narrative by arguing that it is both unhelpful and incomplete. We explain that this dominant narrative (1) increases loneliness and makes people feel worse about this experience, (2) does not account for important predictors of loneliness, (3) guides us to interventions that do not produce sufficiently effective or sustainable change, and (4) hinders broader understandings of the societal impact of loneliness. In this way, we argue that the dominant narrative around loneliness contributes to further setting those who feel lonely apart from the rest of society. We propose that attention to individual factors needs to be complemented by the acknowledgement that loneliness is heavily determined by social and structural conditions that render it unequally distributed in society, a situation that qualifies loneliness as a social justice issue.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140262585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jenny Roth, Miriam Steinmann, J. Loughnane, Paula Devine, Orla Muldoon, Catriona Shelly, Wijnand A. P. van Tilburg, Melanie C. Steffens, Claire Campbell
Previous research has established that intergroup threat is pivotal to intergroup relations in divided societies. We used the Northern Ireland Assembly Elections in 2022 as a unique chance to investigate how elections can affect feelings of threat and intergroup relations between communities with a history of violent intergroup conflict. We argued that because of their conflicting goals, if Sinn Féin (i.e., a Republican party that promotes a united Ireland) gains more votes than the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP, i.e., a party promoting Northern Ireland's union with the United Kingdom), it would threaten DUP supporters and vice versa. We assessed whether participants supported Sinn Féin or DUP relatively to each other, intergroup threat, and intergroup bias before and after the elections (N = 285). Following an election outcome where Sinn Féin gained more votes than DUP, Sinn Féin supporters showed decreased feelings of threat which in turn decreased their intergroup bias. DUP supporters, the party that received fewer votes, showed no changes in their feelings of threat or intergroup bias. This research highlights how electoral results affect intergroup relations in postconflict societies.
{"title":"Election results can decrease intergroup threat and through that positively affect intergroup relations","authors":"Jenny Roth, Miriam Steinmann, J. Loughnane, Paula Devine, Orla Muldoon, Catriona Shelly, Wijnand A. P. van Tilburg, Melanie C. Steffens, Claire Campbell","doi":"10.1111/pops.12960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12960","url":null,"abstract":"Previous research has established that intergroup threat is pivotal to intergroup relations in divided societies. We used the Northern Ireland Assembly Elections in 2022 as a unique chance to investigate how elections can affect feelings of threat and intergroup relations between communities with a history of violent intergroup conflict. We argued that because of their conflicting goals, if Sinn Féin (i.e., a Republican party that promotes a united Ireland) gains more votes than the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP, i.e., a party promoting Northern Ireland's union with the United Kingdom), it would threaten DUP supporters and vice versa. We assessed whether participants supported Sinn Féin or DUP relatively to each other, intergroup threat, and intergroup bias before and after the elections (N = 285). Following an election outcome where Sinn Féin gained more votes than DUP, Sinn Féin supporters showed decreased feelings of threat which in turn decreased their intergroup bias. DUP supporters, the party that received fewer votes, showed no changes in their feelings of threat or intergroup bias. This research highlights how electoral results affect intergroup relations in postconflict societies.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140433589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Combining research in political geography and social psychology, this article investigates lay theories of “place effects”—that is, ordinary citizens' beliefs about the effects that urban or rural places have on the individuals who live in them. We do so using a novel survey vignette embedded in a large‐scale survey of the Canadian public. Our results suggest that (1) citizens see rural identities as less malleable than urban identities, (2) lay theories of place effects depend on citizens' own place identities, and (3) lay theories of place effects are stronger for nonpolitical than for political place‐based characteristics. We also find that lay theories of place effects are associated with individual‐level characteristics that are connected to cosmopolitan‐communitarian divides, such as ideology and postsecondary education. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for the growing literature on urban–rural divides and for research on citizens' implicit theories of places and their political consequences.
{"title":"Lay theories of place effects","authors":"Sophie Borwein, Jack Lucas, Cameron D. Anderson","doi":"10.1111/pops.12959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12959","url":null,"abstract":"Combining research in political geography and social psychology, this article investigates lay theories of “place effects”—that is, ordinary citizens' beliefs about the effects that urban or rural places have on the individuals who live in them. We do so using a novel survey vignette embedded in a large‐scale survey of the Canadian public. Our results suggest that (1) citizens see rural identities as less malleable than urban identities, (2) lay theories of place effects depend on citizens' own place identities, and (3) lay theories of place effects are stronger for nonpolitical than for political place‐based characteristics. We also find that lay theories of place effects are associated with individual‐level characteristics that are connected to cosmopolitan‐communitarian divides, such as ideology and postsecondary education. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for the growing literature on urban–rural divides and for research on citizens' implicit theories of places and their political consequences.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140446905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tamar Gur, S. Ayal, Magnus Wagner, Eli Adler, E. Halperin
Affective polarization is defined as the tendency to dislike, distrust, and maintain hostile attitudes towards supporters of other political parties or ideologies. In its extreme form, affective polarization may pose a severe threat to these groups' cohesion, functionality, and existence. The current study explored the role of sadness, elicited by memorial days, in temporarily reducing affective polarization and protecting societies from its destructive outcomes. In a longitudinal study (517 participants), participants were surveyed prior to Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), during HMD, and after HMD. The findings suggest that affective polarization declined during HMD. This effect was partially mediated by an increase in sadness. It is argued that one main function of memorial days is to harness the power of sadness to maintain cohesion and integrity among national groups.
{"title":"A group that grieves together stays together: Examining the impact of Holocaust Memorial Day in Israel on affective polarization","authors":"Tamar Gur, S. Ayal, Magnus Wagner, Eli Adler, E. Halperin","doi":"10.1111/pops.12956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12956","url":null,"abstract":"Affective polarization is defined as the tendency to dislike, distrust, and maintain hostile attitudes towards supporters of other political parties or ideologies. In its extreme form, affective polarization may pose a severe threat to these groups' cohesion, functionality, and existence. The current study explored the role of sadness, elicited by memorial days, in temporarily reducing affective polarization and protecting societies from its destructive outcomes. In a longitudinal study (517 participants), participants were surveyed prior to Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), during HMD, and after HMD. The findings suggest that affective polarization declined during HMD. This effect was partially mediated by an increase in sadness. It is argued that one main function of memorial days is to harness the power of sadness to maintain cohesion and integrity among national groups.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139841383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tamar Gur, S. Ayal, Magnus Wagner, Eli Adler, E. Halperin
Affective polarization is defined as the tendency to dislike, distrust, and maintain hostile attitudes towards supporters of other political parties or ideologies. In its extreme form, affective polarization may pose a severe threat to these groups' cohesion, functionality, and existence. The current study explored the role of sadness, elicited by memorial days, in temporarily reducing affective polarization and protecting societies from its destructive outcomes. In a longitudinal study (517 participants), participants were surveyed prior to Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), during HMD, and after HMD. The findings suggest that affective polarization declined during HMD. This effect was partially mediated by an increase in sadness. It is argued that one main function of memorial days is to harness the power of sadness to maintain cohesion and integrity among national groups.
{"title":"A group that grieves together stays together: Examining the impact of Holocaust Memorial Day in Israel on affective polarization","authors":"Tamar Gur, S. Ayal, Magnus Wagner, Eli Adler, E. Halperin","doi":"10.1111/pops.12956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12956","url":null,"abstract":"Affective polarization is defined as the tendency to dislike, distrust, and maintain hostile attitudes towards supporters of other political parties or ideologies. In its extreme form, affective polarization may pose a severe threat to these groups' cohesion, functionality, and existence. The current study explored the role of sadness, elicited by memorial days, in temporarily reducing affective polarization and protecting societies from its destructive outcomes. In a longitudinal study (517 participants), participants were surveyed prior to Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), during HMD, and after HMD. The findings suggest that affective polarization declined during HMD. This effect was partially mediated by an increase in sadness. It is argued that one main function of memorial days is to harness the power of sadness to maintain cohesion and integrity among national groups.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139781552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"(Mis)perception, institutions, humanismReview of BlairSackett and AnnetteLareau's We Thought It Would Be Heaven: Refugees in an Unequal America (Oakland: University of California Press, 2023).","authors":"Paa‐Kwesi Heto","doi":"10.1111/pops.12957","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12957","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139601628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What emotions do affectively polarized individuals report, and how? While affect is a broad term, research suggests that different emotions predict distinct political behaviors. Therefore, it is vital to understand what emotions partisans report. However, as research on motivated reasoning suggests that people process information consistent with their partisan mind, I argue that they may not necessarily report the emotions they feel. Instead, they may ascribe normatively desirable emotions to their ingroup and normatively undesirable emotions to opposing outgroups. Doing so makes their ingroup distinct from and superior to outgroups. This article develops and showcases this argument. I analyze data in which affective polarization was likely high—interviews with radical‐right voters conducted before a major election—to illustrate what emotions partisans report and how. The discussion invites future research to test how affective polarization correlates with single emotions and whether partisans strengthen polarization by how they talk about emotions.
{"title":"We love, they hate: Emotions in affective polarization and how partisans may use them","authors":"P. L. Versteegen","doi":"10.1111/pops.12955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12955","url":null,"abstract":"What emotions do affectively polarized individuals report, and how? While affect is a broad term, research suggests that different emotions predict distinct political behaviors. Therefore, it is vital to understand what emotions partisans report. However, as research on motivated reasoning suggests that people process information consistent with their partisan mind, I argue that they may not necessarily report the emotions they feel. Instead, they may ascribe normatively desirable emotions to their ingroup and normatively undesirable emotions to opposing outgroups. Doing so makes their ingroup distinct from and superior to outgroups. This article develops and showcases this argument. I analyze data in which affective polarization was likely high—interviews with radical‐right voters conducted before a major election—to illustrate what emotions partisans report and how. The discussion invites future research to test how affective polarization correlates with single emotions and whether partisans strengthen polarization by how they talk about emotions.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139526079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Given the ingroup bias in children's prosocial behaviors, understanding what characterizes and predicts children's prosocial behaviors directed at outgroups has implications for more harmonious intergroup relations. We conducted a systematic review outlining the important theoretical frameworks that drive research in this area and examined the targets, types, and predictors surrounding prosocial behavior toward socially relevant outgroups among children ages 3–12 years. A total of 24 studies were included in the narrative synthesis. A range of targets of prosocial behavior (i.e., who was the intended recipient of the act) was observed and included both individual outgroup members and the collective outgroup. The studies also varied in the types of outgroup prosocial behavior assessed, including resource allocation, helping intentions, and collective prosocial behavior. Predictors of prosocial behavior occurred at two levels: individual and contextual. Individual predictors included contact, outgroup stereotypes, essentialist beliefs, empathy and mentalization, and fairness. Contextual factors included geographic proximity, reciprocity and collaboration, cost of helping, structural inequality, and intergroup conflict. Finally, we focus on age‐related changes to map the developmental trajectory of both the characteristics and predictors of prosocial behaviors. In a divided world, the implications for future research on outgroup prosocial behavior during childhood are discussed. We also reflect on the need for future longitudinal and culturally embedded research.
{"title":"Who, how, and when do children help? A systematic review of children's outgroup prosocial behavior","authors":"Deidre Moran, Vivian Liu, Laura Taylor","doi":"10.1111/pops.12948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12948","url":null,"abstract":"Given the ingroup bias in children's prosocial behaviors, understanding what characterizes and predicts children's prosocial behaviors directed at outgroups has implications for more harmonious intergroup relations. We conducted a systematic review outlining the important theoretical frameworks that drive research in this area and examined the targets, types, and predictors surrounding prosocial behavior toward socially relevant outgroups among children ages 3–12 years. A total of 24 studies were included in the narrative synthesis. A range of targets of prosocial behavior (i.e., who was the intended recipient of the act) was observed and included both individual outgroup members and the collective outgroup. The studies also varied in the types of outgroup prosocial behavior assessed, including resource allocation, helping intentions, and collective prosocial behavior. Predictors of prosocial behavior occurred at two levels: individual and contextual. Individual predictors included contact, outgroup stereotypes, essentialist beliefs, empathy and mentalization, and fairness. Contextual factors included geographic proximity, reciprocity and collaboration, cost of helping, structural inequality, and intergroup conflict. Finally, we focus on age‐related changes to map the developmental trajectory of both the characteristics and predictors of prosocial behaviors. In a divided world, the implications for future research on outgroup prosocial behavior during childhood are discussed. We also reflect on the need for future longitudinal and culturally embedded research.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139529899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A series of new conceptualizations of left‐wing authoritarianism have recently been proposed to counterbalance the traditional focus on right‐wing authoritarianism in political psychology. This article scrutinizes conceptual confusions in the literature on authoritarianism that have been exacerbated by these new conceptualizations, including a pseudo‐debate about the existence of left‐wing authoritarianism; a conflation of the psychological phenomenon of authoritarianism with the more general category of all antidemocratic predispositions; and a number of logical, conceptual, and statistical fallacies that obscure psychological differences between antidemocratic predispositions on the right and the left. It proposes that antidemocratic predispositions on the right typically involve an authoritarian adherence to established norms along with violence and repression directed at perceived threats to, or deviations from, these norms, whereas those that occur on the left more commonly involve a motivation to overthrow the established authority along with violence and repression directed at perceived threats to superordinate ideological values. It concludes with a call for a broadened and reinvigorated program of research that studies the complexity and diversity of antidemocratic predispositions on the left, the right, and beyond, and their causal impact on antidemocratic attitudes and actions, drawing on insights from multiple traditions and fields of research.
{"title":"Antidemocratic tendencies on the left, the right, and beyond: A critical review of the theory and measurement of left‐wing authoritarianism","authors":"Artur Nilsson","doi":"10.1111/pops.12951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12951","url":null,"abstract":"A series of new conceptualizations of left‐wing authoritarianism have recently been proposed to counterbalance the traditional focus on right‐wing authoritarianism in political psychology. This article scrutinizes conceptual confusions in the literature on authoritarianism that have been exacerbated by these new conceptualizations, including a pseudo‐debate about the existence of left‐wing authoritarianism; a conflation of the psychological phenomenon of authoritarianism with the more general category of all antidemocratic predispositions; and a number of logical, conceptual, and statistical fallacies that obscure psychological differences between antidemocratic predispositions on the right and the left. It proposes that antidemocratic predispositions on the right typically involve an authoritarian adherence to established norms along with violence and repression directed at perceived threats to, or deviations from, these norms, whereas those that occur on the left more commonly involve a motivation to overthrow the established authority along with violence and repression directed at perceived threats to superordinate ideological values. It concludes with a call for a broadened and reinvigorated program of research that studies the complexity and diversity of antidemocratic predispositions on the left, the right, and beyond, and their causal impact on antidemocratic attitudes and actions, drawing on insights from multiple traditions and fields of research.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139533470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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