Pub Date : 2025-05-01Epub Date: 2025-04-30DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106018
Xuelin Li , Martin Szydlowski , Fangyuan Yu
We study dynamic Bayesian persuasion in an entry game. A sender publicly reveals information to an adopter and a competitor who decide when to irreversibly enter or exit a market. When the sender's loss from competition is small, the sender first provides information to attract the adopter, and then aims to reveal sufficiently negative information to deter the competitor. Otherwise, the optimal policy is reversed. The sender first aims to provide negative information to deter the competitor and then to reveal positive information to attract the adopter. We interpret the optimal policy as inducing hype cycles, and show that hype cycles are more severe in stagnant industries or with higher threat of competition.
{"title":"Dynamic information design in an entry game","authors":"Xuelin Li , Martin Szydlowski , Fangyuan Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106018","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study dynamic Bayesian persuasion in an entry game. A sender publicly reveals information to an adopter and a competitor who decide when to irreversibly enter or exit a market. When the sender's loss from competition is small, the sender first provides information to attract the adopter, and then aims to reveal sufficiently negative information to deter the competitor. Otherwise, the optimal policy is reversed. The sender first aims to provide negative information to deter the competitor and then to reveal positive information to attract the adopter. We interpret the optimal policy as inducing hype cycles, and show that hype cycles are more severe in stagnant industries or with higher threat of competition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106018"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143903889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01Epub Date: 2025-04-24DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106014
Marc Fleurbaey , Stéphane Zuber
How can social prospects be evaluated and compared when there may be a risk on i) the actual allocations that people will receive, ii) the existence of these future people, and iii) their preferences? This paper investigates this question, which can arise when considering policies, such as climate policy, that affect people who do not yet exist. We start from the observation that there is no social ordering that meets minimal requirements of fairness, social rationality, and respect for people's ex ante preferences. We explore three ways around this impossibility. First, if we drop the ex ante Pareto requirement, we can obtain fair ex post criteria that take an (arbitrary) expected utility of an equally-distributed equivalent level of well-being. Second, if the social ordering is not an expected utility, we can obtain fair ex ante criteria that evaluate uncertain individual prospects with a certainty-equivalent measure of well-being. Third, if we accept that interpersonal comparisons rely on VNM utility functions even in absence of risk, we can construct expected utility social orderings that satisfy a version of Pareto ex ante.
{"title":"Universal social welfare orderings and risk","authors":"Marc Fleurbaey , Stéphane Zuber","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How can social prospects be evaluated and compared when there may be a risk on i) the actual allocations that people will receive, ii) the existence of these future people, and iii) their preferences? This paper investigates this question, which can arise when considering policies, such as climate policy, that affect people who do not yet exist. We start from the observation that there is no social ordering that meets minimal requirements of fairness, social rationality, and respect for people's ex ante preferences. We explore three ways around this impossibility. First, if we drop the ex ante Pareto requirement, we can obtain fair ex post criteria that take an (arbitrary) expected utility of an equally-distributed equivalent level of well-being. Second, if the social ordering is not an expected utility, we can obtain fair ex ante criteria that evaluate uncertain individual prospects with a certainty-equivalent measure of well-being. Third, if we accept that interpersonal comparisons rely on VNM utility functions even in absence of risk, we can construct expected utility social orderings that satisfy a version of Pareto ex ante.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106014"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143891460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper introduces a novel mechanism driving endogenous business cycle fluctuations within a frictionless three-sector intertemporal equilibrium model. We emphasize the critical role of consumer preferences as a primary driver of cyclical dynamics by considering a consumption bundle composed of a pure consumption good and a mixed consumption-investment good that simultaneously serves as both a final consumption good and a capital-accumulating investment good. Endogenous fluctuations naturally arise from sectoral capital intensity differences, an intertemporal consumption trade-off between the two goods, or the interaction of both mechanisms. We offer a detailed characterization of the economy's dynamics, identifying the Hopf bifurcation conditions that trigger persistent cyclical behavior. Additionally, we explore the periodicity of the resulting limit cycles, providing insights into how shifts in preferences and sectoral complementarities can generate self-sustained macroeconomic fluctuations.
{"title":"Business cycles fluctuations in three-sector intertemporal equilibrium models","authors":"Kazuo Nishimura , Florian Pelgrin , Alain Venditti","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper introduces a novel mechanism driving endogenous business cycle fluctuations within a frictionless three-sector intertemporal equilibrium model. We emphasize the critical role of consumer preferences as a primary driver of cyclical dynamics by considering a consumption bundle composed of a pure consumption good and a mixed consumption-investment good that simultaneously serves as both a final consumption good and a capital-accumulating investment good. Endogenous fluctuations naturally arise from sectoral capital intensity differences, an intertemporal consumption trade-off between the two goods, or the interaction of both mechanisms. We offer a detailed characterization of the economy's dynamics, identifying the Hopf bifurcation conditions that trigger persistent cyclical behavior. Additionally, we explore the periodicity of the resulting limit cycles, providing insights into how shifts in preferences and sectoral complementarities can generate self-sustained macroeconomic fluctuations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106010"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143855388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01Epub Date: 2025-04-17DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106012
Jean-Pierre Dubé , Joonhwi Joo , Kyeongbae Kim
We establish the integrability of demand for a broad class of discrete/continuous choice, additive, homothetic random-utility models of individual consumer behavior with perfect substitutes preferences (linear indifference curves) and divisible goods. We derive the corresponding indirect utility function and then establish a representative consumer formulation for this entire class of models. The representative consumer is always normative, facilitating aggregate welfare analysis. These findings should be of interest to the literature in macro, trade, industrial organization, labor, and ideal price index measurement that use representative consumer models, such as CES and its variants. Our results generalize such representative consumer formulations to the broad, empirically-relevant class of models of behavior that are routinely used in the discrete/continuous choice analysis of micro data, including specifications that do not suffer from the IIA property and that allow for heterogeneous consumer preferences and incomes. These flexible discrete/continuous choice formulations also overcome many of the known limitations of CES and its variants for equilibrium prices and markups, trade liberalization effects and welfare analysis. We also discuss quasi-linear integrability in the case where products are indivisible and integrability no longer holds. If we relax homotheticity, we find that integrability generically fails to hold except in the special case of IIA preferences.
{"title":"Discrete/continuous choice models and representative consumer theory","authors":"Jean-Pierre Dubé , Joonhwi Joo , Kyeongbae Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We establish the integrability of demand for a broad class of <em>discrete/continuous choice,</em> additive, homothetic random-utility models of individual consumer behavior with perfect substitutes preferences (linear indifference curves) and divisible goods. We derive the corresponding indirect utility function and then establish a representative consumer formulation for this entire class of models. The representative consumer is always normative, facilitating aggregate welfare analysis. These findings should be of interest to the literature in macro, trade, industrial organization, labor, and ideal price index measurement that use representative consumer models, such as CES and its variants. Our results generalize such representative consumer formulations to the broad, empirically-relevant class of models of behavior that are routinely used in the discrete/continuous choice analysis of micro data, including specifications that do not suffer from the IIA property and that allow for heterogeneous consumer preferences and incomes. These flexible discrete/continuous choice formulations also overcome many of the known limitations of CES and its variants for equilibrium prices and markups, trade liberalization effects and welfare analysis. We also discuss quasi-linear integrability in the case where products are indivisible and integrability no longer holds. If we relax homotheticity, we find that integrability generically fails to hold except in the special case of IIA preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106012"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143855387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-01Epub Date: 2025-02-12DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105979
Zhihao Xu , Changhua Yu
This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a multisector economy with input-output linkages and distortions. Our model incorporates both the supply side and the demand side effects of monetary policy. We derive a tractable sufficient statistic for the supply side effect, which comprises two reallocation channels resulting from substitution between sectoral products for households and firms, and substitution between labor and intermediate inputs in production. The optimal monetary policy induces an inflation bias that stems from both an aggregate wedge and the supply side effect, and targets an inflation index by assigning higher weights to (i) larger sectors, (ii) sectors with stickier prices, and (iii) sectors with less distortions. Our quantitative results indicate that production networks play a crucial role in generating both the supply and demand effects of monetary policy.
{"title":"Optimal monetary policy in production networks with distortions","authors":"Zhihao Xu , Changhua Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105979","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105979","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a multisector economy with input-output linkages and distortions. Our model incorporates both the supply side and the demand side effects of monetary policy. We derive a tractable sufficient statistic for the supply side effect, which comprises two reallocation channels resulting from substitution between sectoral products for households and firms, and substitution between labor and intermediate inputs in production. The optimal monetary policy induces an inflation bias that stems from both an aggregate wedge and the supply side effect, and targets an inflation index by assigning higher weights to (i) larger sectors, (ii) sectors with stickier prices, and (iii) sectors with less distortions. Our quantitative results indicate that production networks play a crucial role in generating both the supply and demand effects of monetary policy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105979"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143429756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-01Epub Date: 2025-03-12DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105995
Hung-Chi Chang , Yiting Li
This paper revisits Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) (GSW) to study screening in a competitive search market with adverse selection. GSW show that there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which each type applies to a different contract, and their key sorting assumption involves a single-crossing property on agents' preferences. We show that GSW's main results hold under a weaker assumption on preference heterogeneity, called generalized sorting, and weakening the sorting assumption relies on explicitly considering the screening role of market tightness. The assumption can be weakened further if we assume that agents' matching probability strictly increases in market tightness. In addition to providing theoretical insights, we study examples to demonstrate how generalized sorting facilitates the study of market imperfections under search and informational frictions. In our examples, indivisibility, price limits, and the minimum wage violate GSW's sorting assumption but remain tractable under generalized sorting. Thus, an additional contribution of this paper is the expansion in applicability of GSW's approach.
本文回顾了Guerrieri， Shimer, and Wright (2010) （GSW）在逆向选择竞争搜索市场中的筛选研究。GSW表明存在一种独特的分离均衡，其中每种类型适用于不同的契约，其关键排序假设涉及代理偏好的单交叉特性。我们发现，GSW的主要结果是在偏好异质性较弱的假设下成立的，即广义排序假设，而弱化排序假设依赖于明确考虑市场紧缩的筛选作用。如果我们假设代理的匹配概率在市场紧俏时严格增加，则可以进一步削弱这一假设。除了提供理论见解外，我们还研究了一些例子，以证明广义分类如何有助于研究搜索和信息摩擦下的市场不完善性。在我们的例子中，不可分割性、价格限制和最低工资违反了GSW的分类假设，但在广义分类下仍然是可处理的。因此，本文的另一个贡献是扩展了GSW方法的适用性。
{"title":"The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection","authors":"Hung-Chi Chang , Yiting Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105995","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105995","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper revisits Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) (GSW) to study screening in a competitive search market with adverse selection. GSW show that there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which each type applies to a different contract, and their key sorting assumption involves a single-crossing property on agents' preferences. We show that GSW's main results hold under a weaker assumption on preference heterogeneity, called generalized sorting, and weakening the sorting assumption relies on explicitly considering the screening role of market tightness. The assumption can be weakened further if we assume that agents' matching probability strictly increases in market tightness. In addition to providing theoretical insights, we study examples to demonstrate how generalized sorting facilitates the study of market imperfections under search and informational frictions. In our examples, indivisibility, price limits, and the minimum wage violate GSW's sorting assumption but remain tractable under generalized sorting. Thus, an additional contribution of this paper is the expansion in applicability of GSW's approach.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105995"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143644113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-01Epub Date: 2025-03-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105996
Daniel Bougt , Gagan Ghosh , Heng Liu
We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or ‘pay-as-bid’ auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the ‘highest losing bid’ pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend to some open auction formats.
{"title":"Revenue effects of ambiguity in multi-unit auctions","authors":"Daniel Bougt , Gagan Ghosh , Heng Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105996","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105996","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or ‘pay-as-bid’ auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the ‘highest losing bid’ pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend to some open auction formats.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105996"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143687244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-01Epub Date: 2025-03-12DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105994
Hiroshi Goto , Yan Ma , Nobuyuki Takeuchi
We develop a two-sector model to explore how skill distribution affects trade in final goods and offshoring. We show that when countries differ in skill abundance, wage disparities create opportunities for offshoring. In contrast, when countries vary in skill diversity but share the same median skill, symmetric skill distributions render offshoring infeasible. We also find that offshoring can result in the relative price under offshoring being lower than each country's autarky relative price if the gap between the median skill levels of the two countries is sufficiently large. Finally, we demonstrate that an individual's industry of employment primarily determines how they are affected by trade in final goods, whereas their occupation (tasks) shapes how they are impacted by offshoring.
{"title":"Offshoring and the distribution of skills","authors":"Hiroshi Goto , Yan Ma , Nobuyuki Takeuchi","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105994","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105994","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a two-sector model to explore how skill distribution affects trade in final goods and offshoring. We show that when countries differ in skill abundance, wage disparities create opportunities for offshoring. In contrast, when countries vary in skill diversity but share the same median skill, symmetric skill distributions render offshoring infeasible. We also find that offshoring can result in the relative price under offshoring being lower than each country's autarky relative price if the gap between the median skill levels of the two countries is sufficiently large. Finally, we demonstrate that an individual's industry of employment primarily determines how they are affected by trade in final goods, whereas their occupation (tasks) shapes how they are impacted by offshoring.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105994"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143706398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-01Epub Date: 2025-03-04DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105991
Andrei Savochkin , Alexander Shklyaev , Alexey Galatenko
We study the Smooth Ambiguity decision criterion in the dynamic setting to understand when it can satisfy the Dynamic Consistency and Consequentialism properties. These properties allow one to rewrite the decision criterion recursively and solve for optimal decisions by Dynamic Programming. Our result characterizes the possibility of having these properties through a condition that resembles Epstein and Schneider's (2003) rectangularity condition for the maxmin model. At the same time, we show that Dynamic Consistency and Consequentialism can be achieved for Smooth Ambiguity preferences in a narrower set of scenarios than one would hope for.
{"title":"Dynamic consistency and rectangularity for the smooth ambiguity model","authors":"Andrei Savochkin , Alexander Shklyaev , Alexey Galatenko","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105991","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105991","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the Smooth Ambiguity decision criterion in the dynamic setting to understand when it can satisfy the Dynamic Consistency and Consequentialism properties. These properties allow one to rewrite the decision criterion recursively and solve for optimal decisions by Dynamic Programming. Our result characterizes the possibility of having these properties through a condition that resembles <span><span>Epstein and Schneider</span></span>'s (<span><span>2003</span></span>) rectangularity condition for the maxmin model. At the same time, we show that Dynamic Consistency and Consequentialism can be achieved for Smooth Ambiguity preferences in a narrower set of scenarios than one would hope for.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105991"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143600777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-01Epub Date: 2025-03-07DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105993
Andreas Asseyer
This paper studies information orders in screening models. I amend a general screening problem with a signal about the agent's type. The principal prefers one signal to another for any preferences of principal and agent if and only if the signals are ranked by Blackwell's order. Under a standard regularity condition, a novel information order – the hazard rate spread (HRS) order – characterizes a robust ranking of signals by the principal. I relate the HRS order to well-known information orders and provide sufficient conditions for other welfare measures than the principal's payoff to increase or decrease in the HRS order.
{"title":"Information orders in screening problems","authors":"Andreas Asseyer","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105993","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105993","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies information orders in screening models. I amend a general screening problem with a signal about the agent's type. The principal prefers one signal to another for any preferences of principal and agent if and only if the signals are ranked by Blackwell's order. Under a standard regularity condition, a novel information order – the hazard rate spread (HRS) order – characterizes a robust ranking of signals by the principal. I relate the HRS order to well-known information orders and provide sufficient conditions for other welfare measures than the principal's payoff to increase or decrease in the HRS order.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105993"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143579206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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