Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106081
Chao Gu , Janet Hua Jiang , Liang Wang
We construct a New Monetarist model with labor market search and identify two channels that affect the long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment. First, inflation lowers wages through bargaining because unemployed workers rely more heavily on cash transactions and suffer more from inflation than employed workers; this wage-bargaining channel generates a downward-sloping Phillips curve without assuming nominal rigidity. Second, inflation increases firms' financing costs, which discourages job creation and increases unemployment; this cash-financing channel leads to an upward-sloping Phillips curve. We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy. The improvement in firm financing conditions can explain the observation that the slope of the long-run Phillips curve has switched from positive to negative post-2000.
{"title":"Credit conditions, inflation, and unemployment","authors":"Chao Gu , Janet Hua Jiang , Liang Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106081","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106081","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We construct a New Monetarist model with labor market search and identify two channels that affect the long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment. First, inflation lowers wages through bargaining because unemployed workers rely more heavily on cash transactions and suffer more from inflation than employed workers; this wage-bargaining channel generates a downward-sloping Phillips curve without assuming nominal rigidity. Second, inflation increases firms' financing costs, which discourages job creation and increases unemployment; this cash-financing channel leads to an upward-sloping Phillips curve. We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy. The improvement in firm financing conditions can explain the observation that the slope of the long-run Phillips curve has switched from positive to negative post-2000.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106081"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145120488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-26DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106092
Dawen Meng
This paper discusses a network game in a local-average setup, where players' payoffs depend on the social norms they confront. I focus on an optimal targeting intervention problem, where a planner aims to maximize social welfare by altering individual characteristics ex ante. First, I decompose orthogonally the optimal intervention into the eigenspaces of the social welfare matrix. In what follows, I present the limit forms of the optimal intervention as the budget approaches infinity or zero. I then identify the errors arising from approximating the optimal intervention by its various limit forms. Finally, this paper explores the intervention problem under incomplete information, where the planner switches from mean to variance intervention based on the comparison of their unit costs and the aggregate budget size.
{"title":"Targeting network intervention with social norm","authors":"Dawen Meng","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106092","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106092","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper discusses a network game in a local-average setup, where players' payoffs depend on the social norms they confront. I focus on an optimal targeting intervention problem, where a planner aims to maximize social welfare by altering individual characteristics ex ante. First, I decompose orthogonally the optimal intervention into the eigenspaces of the social welfare matrix. In what follows, I present the limit forms of the optimal intervention as the budget approaches infinity or zero. I then identify the errors arising from approximating the optimal intervention by its various limit forms. Finally, this paper explores the intervention problem under incomplete information, where the planner switches from mean to variance intervention based on the comparison of their unit costs and the aggregate budget size.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106092"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145227583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider the problem of funding public goods that are complementary in nature. Examples include charities handling different needs (e.g., protecting animals vs. providing healthcare), charitable donations to different individuals, or municipal units handling different issues (e.g., security vs. transportation). We model these complementarities by assuming Leontief preferences; that is, each donor seeks to maximize an individually weighted minimum of all contributions across the charities. Decentralized funding may be inefficient due to a lack of coordination among the donors; centralized funding may be undesirable as it ignores the preferences of individual donors. We present a mechanism that combines the advantages of both methods. The mechanism efficiently distributes each donor's contribution so that no subset of donors has an incentive to redistribute their donations. Moreover, it is group-strategyproof, satisfies desirable monotonicity properties, maximizes Nash welfare, returns a unique Lindahl equilibrium, and can be implemented via natural best-response spending dynamics.
{"title":"Coordinating charitable donations with Leontief preferences","authors":"Felix Brandt , Matthias Greger , Erel Segal-Halevi , Warut Suksompong","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106096","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106096","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider the problem of funding public goods that are complementary in nature. Examples include charities handling different needs (e.g., protecting animals vs. providing healthcare), charitable donations to different individuals, or municipal units handling different issues (e.g., security vs. transportation). We model these complementarities by assuming Leontief preferences; that is, each donor seeks to maximize an individually weighted minimum of all contributions across the charities. Decentralized funding may be inefficient due to a lack of coordination among the donors; centralized funding may be undesirable as it ignores the preferences of individual donors. We present a mechanism that combines the advantages of both methods. The mechanism efficiently distributes each donor's contribution so that no subset of donors has an incentive to redistribute their donations. Moreover, it is group-strategyproof, satisfies desirable monotonicity properties, maximizes Nash welfare, returns a unique Lindahl equilibrium, and can be implemented via natural best-response spending dynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106096"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145333501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106082
Kevin He , Jonathan Libgober
We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others' strategies. In equilibrium, each agent adopts the feasible belief that best fits their data and plays optimally given their beliefs. We define the stability of the resident model by comparing its equilibrium payoff with that of the entrant model, and provide conditions under which the correctly specified resident model can only be destabilized by misspecified entrant models that contain multiple feasible beliefs (that is, entrant models that permit inference). We also show that entrants may do well in their matches against the residents only when the entrant population is large, due to the endogeneity of misspecified beliefs. Applications include the selection of demand-elasticity misperception in Cournot duopoly and the emergence of analogy-based reasoning in centipede games.
{"title":"Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability","authors":"Kevin He , Jonathan Libgober","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106082","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106082","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others' strategies. In equilibrium, each agent adopts the feasible belief that best fits their data and plays optimally given their beliefs. We define the stability of the resident model by comparing its equilibrium payoff with that of the entrant model, and provide conditions under which the correctly specified resident model can only be destabilized by misspecified entrant models that contain multiple feasible beliefs (that is, entrant models that permit inference). We also show that entrants may do well in their matches against the residents only when the entrant population is large, due to the endogeneity of misspecified beliefs. Applications include the selection of demand-elasticity misperception in Cournot duopoly and the emergence of analogy-based reasoning in centipede games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106082"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145108580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-08DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106100
Thomas Jungbauer, Michael Waldman
For many signaling applications, the real-world scenario fails to match the model setup. Actions are often unobservable but combine with the sender's type to determine an observable signal. Introducing a theory of generalized signaling, we show the nature of equilibria can fundamentally differ from the canonical signaling model. In fact, we find both over- and under-investment arise in important signaling environments. Our model extends to multiple actions and signal jamming environments with incomplete sender information. We present results for equilibrium construction and show that uninformed sender behavior may be more efficient than a fully informed sender's.
{"title":"Actions and signals","authors":"Thomas Jungbauer, Michael Waldman","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106100","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106100","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For many signaling applications, the real-world scenario fails to match the model setup. <em>Actions</em> are often unobservable but combine with the sender's type to determine an observable <em>signal</em>. Introducing a theory of <em>generalized signaling</em>, we show the nature of equilibria can fundamentally differ from the canonical signaling model. In fact, we find both <em>over</em>- and <em>under</em>-investment arise in important signaling environments. Our model extends to multiple actions and signal jamming environments with incomplete sender information. We present results for equilibrium construction and show that uninformed sender behavior may be more efficient than a fully informed sender's.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145333502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-09DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106099
Isa E. Hafalir , Fuhito Kojima , M. Bumin Yenmez
Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Such a mechanism need not exist in general. We introduce a new notion of discrete concavity, which we call pseudo M♮-concavity, and construct a mechanism with the desirable properties when the distributional objective satisfies this notion. We provide several practically relevant distributional objectives that are pseudo M♮-concave.
在给定代理类型分配的初始匹配和政策目标的情况下，研究了一种弱改进分配目标并满足约束效率、个体理性和策略证明的机制的存在性。一般来说，这种机制并不需要存在。我们引入了离散凹性的一个新概念，我们称之为伪M - h -凹性，并构造了一个当分布目标满足该概念时具有理想性质的机制。我们提供了几个实际相关的分布目标，这些目标是伪M - h -凹。
{"title":"Market design with distributional objectives: Efficiency, incentives, and property rights","authors":"Isa E. Hafalir , Fuhito Kojima , M. Bumin Yenmez","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Such a mechanism need not exist in general. We introduce a new notion of discrete concavity, which we call pseudo M<sup>♮</sup>-concavity, and construct a mechanism with the desirable properties when the distributional objective satisfies this notion. We provide several practically relevant distributional objectives that are pseudo M<sup>♮</sup>-concave.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106099"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-01Epub Date: 2025-08-21DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106067
Andrés Perea
Within dynamic games we are interested in conditions on the players' preferences that imply dynamic consistency and the existence of sequentially optimal strategies. The latter means that the strategy is optimal at each of the player's information sets, given his beliefs there. To explore these properties we assume, following Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) and Perea (2025a), that every player holds a conditional preference relation – a mapping that assigns to every probabilistic belief about the opponents' strategies a preference relation over his own strategies. We identify sets of very basic conditions on the conditional preference relations that guarantee dynamic consistency and the existence of sequentially optimal strategies, respectively. These conditions are implied by, but are much weaker than, assuming expected utility. Moreover, it is shown that non-expected utility is compatible with dynamic consistency and consequentialism in our framework.
{"title":"Dynamic consistency in games without expected utility","authors":"Andrés Perea","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106067","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106067","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Within dynamic games we are interested in conditions on the players' preferences that imply <em>dynamic consistency</em> and the existence of <em>sequentially optimal strategies</em>. The latter means that the strategy is optimal at each of the player's information sets, given his beliefs there. To explore these properties we assume, following <span><span>Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003)</span></span> and <span><span>Perea (2025a)</span></span>, that every player holds a <em>conditional preference relation</em> – a mapping that assigns to every probabilistic belief about the opponents' strategies a preference relation over his own strategies. We identify sets of very basic conditions on the conditional preference relations that guarantee dynamic consistency and the existence of sequentially optimal strategies, respectively. These conditions are implied by, but are much weaker than, assuming expected utility. Moreover, it is shown that non-expected utility is compatible with dynamic consistency and consequentialism in our framework.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106067"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144926092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-01Epub Date: 2025-08-25DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106068
Kemal Kıvanç Aköz , Arseniy Samsonov
We define a (cooperative) informational bargaining problem, where several agents have to agree on the persuasion of a receiver. The bargaining set includes payoff vectors that can be generated by information structures and disagreement leads to an exogenous benchmark that may involve full or no information. We characterize the existence of an agreement that benefits all agents when preferences are state-independent. Our characterization yields conditions that depend only on the payoff structure but are independent of the prior beliefs in some cases. We analyze Pareto efficient information structures in two applications: selection environments, where the receiver picks the best agent, and the bargaining between a retailer platform and a regulator on consumer privacy regulation.
{"title":"Information agreements","authors":"Kemal Kıvanç Aköz , Arseniy Samsonov","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106068","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106068","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We define a (cooperative) informational bargaining problem, where several agents have to agree on the persuasion of a receiver. The bargaining set includes payoff vectors that can be generated by information structures and disagreement leads to an exogenous benchmark that may involve full or no information. We characterize the existence of an agreement that benefits all agents when preferences are state-independent. Our characterization yields conditions that depend only on the payoff structure but are independent of the prior beliefs in some cases. We analyze Pareto efficient information structures in two applications: selection environments, where the receiver picks the best agent, and the bargaining between a retailer platform and a regulator on consumer privacy regulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106068"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144903699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-01Epub Date: 2025-09-03DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106077
Titan Alon , Daniel Fershtman
This paper generalizes the canonical model of human capital accumulation through schooling to endogenize the process of academic specialization. It provides the solution to a class of dynamic investment problems with switching and stopping under sequential uncertainty. Under mild assumptions, the model's optimal policy has a particularly simple form that can be reduced to the comparison of independent indices. The optimal policy implies that schooling should begin with a period of general education, common to all students, followed by a period of gradual academic specialization before graduation. At the microeconomic level, it is consistent with the dynamics of student course taking observed in the data and the outcomes of educational interventions studied in the literature. At the macroeconomic level, its predictions are consistent with models of how education should adapt to changes in the speed and scope of technological change in labor markets.
{"title":"A dynamic Roy model of academic specialization","authors":"Titan Alon , Daniel Fershtman","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106077","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106077","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper generalizes the canonical model of human capital accumulation through schooling to endogenize the process of academic specialization. It provides the solution to a class of dynamic investment problems with switching and stopping under sequential uncertainty. Under mild assumptions, the model's optimal policy has a particularly simple form that can be reduced to the comparison of independent indices. The optimal policy implies that schooling should begin with a period of general education, common to all students, followed by a period of gradual academic specialization before graduation. At the microeconomic level, it is consistent with the dynamics of student course taking observed in the data and the outcomes of educational interventions studied in the literature. At the macroeconomic level, its predictions are consistent with models of how education should adapt to changes in the speed and scope of technological change in labor markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106077"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145019734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-01Epub Date: 2025-08-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106062
Rumen Kostadinov , Francisco Roldán
We study the optimal design of inflation targets by a planner who lacks commitment and exerts imperfect control over inflation. By comparing realized inflation to the targets, the public forms beliefs about the government's commitment. Such reputation is valuable as it helps curb inflation expectations. However, plans that are more tempting to break lead to faster reputational losses in the ensuing equilibrium. The planner's optimal announcement balances low inflation promises with incentives to enhance credibility. We find that, despite the absence of private sources of inflation inertia, a gradual disinflation is preferred even in the zero-reputation limit.
{"title":"Reputation and the credibility of inflation plans","authors":"Rumen Kostadinov , Francisco Roldán","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106062","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106062","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the optimal design of inflation targets by a planner who lacks commitment and exerts imperfect control over inflation. By comparing realized inflation to the targets, the public forms beliefs about the government's commitment. Such reputation is valuable as it helps curb inflation expectations. However, plans that are more tempting to break lead to faster reputational losses in the ensuing equilibrium. The planner's optimal announcement balances low inflation promises with incentives to enhance credibility. We find that, despite the absence of private sources of inflation inertia, a gradual disinflation is preferred even in the zero-reputation limit.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106062"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144865207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号