Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

英文中文

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106065

Garth Baughman

Deadlines and fixed end dates are pervasive in matching markets. Deadlines drive fundamental non-stationarity and complexity in behavior, generating significant departures from the steady-state equilibria usually studied in the search and matching literature. I consider a two-sided matching market with search frictions where vertically differentiated agents attempt to form bilateral matches before a deadline. I give novel proofs of existence and uniqueness of equilibria, and show that all equilibria exhibit an “anticipation effect” where less attractive agents become increasingly choosy over time, preferring to wait for the opportunity to match with attractive agents who, in turn, become less selective as the deadline approaches. When agents are patient, a sharp characterization is available: at any point in time, the market segments into a first class of matching agents and a second class of waiting agents. This points to a different interpretation of unraveling.

截止日期和固定的结束日期在配对市场中普遍存在。最后期限驱动了行为的基本非平定性和复杂性，产生了与通常在搜索和匹配文献中研究的稳态平衡的重大偏离。我考虑一个具有搜索摩擦的双边匹配市场，垂直差异化的代理试图在截止日期之前形成双边匹配。我对均衡的存在性和唯一性给出了新颖的证明，并表明所有均衡都表现出一种“预期效应”，即随着时间的推移，吸引力较小的代理变得越来越挑剔，更愿意等待与有吸引力的代理匹配的机会，而有吸引力的代理随着最后期限的临近而变得不那么挑剔。当代理商有耐心时，一个清晰的特征是可用的：在任何时间点，市场细分为第一类匹配代理商和第二类等待代理商。这指向了对解体的另一种解释。

引用次数: 0

Unidirectional incentive compatibility 单向激励相容

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106051

Daniel Krähmer , Roland Strausz

We study unidirectional incentive compatibility which incentivizes truth-telling by an agent who can misrepresent private information in one direction only. In the canonical setting with quasi-linear preferences and continuous, one-dimensional private information, we show that unidirectional incentive compatibility imposes no restrictions on the allocation rule and revenue equivalence fails. Moreover, unidirectional incentive compatibility holds if and only if the change of the agent's information rent respects a lower bound based on the allocation rule's monotone envelope. With strong interdependent values or countervailing incentives, optimal screening contracts differ from optimal bidirectionally incentive compatible contracts, possibly displaying non-monotone allocations.

我们研究了单向激励兼容性，它激励一个只能在一个方向上歪曲私有信息的代理说真话。在具有准线性偏好和连续的一维私有信息的规范环境下，我们证明了单向激励相容对分配规则没有限制，收益等价失效。此外，单向激励相容当且仅当代理的信息租金变化遵循基于分配规则单调包络的下界时成立。由于具有强烈的相互依赖价值或反补贴激励，最优筛选合同不同于最优双向激励相容合同，可能表现出非单调分配。

引用次数: 0

Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations 具有延迟接受的市场设计：特征描述的配方

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106057

Battal Doğan , Kenzo Imamura , M. Bumin Yenmez

In matching markets, policymakers often pursue complex distributional objectives, such as promoting diversity in student populations. To this end, they embed these objectives into the choice rules of institutions, such as schools, and implement the deferred-acceptance (DA) mechanism based on those rules. Given the institutional choice rules, we introduce a method for characterizing the corresponding DA mechanism through the properties of these choice rules. Utilizing this method, we derive novel characterizations of DA mechanisms across various settings, including matching problems with enrollment guarantees and overlapping reserves—motivated by school choice in Chile—as well as environments with matroidal feasibility constraints or objectives. Our approach provides a unified framework for characterizing DA mechanisms that accommodate policy-relevant objectives.

在匹配市场中，政策制定者往往追求复杂的分配目标，例如促进学生群体的多样性。为此，他们将这些目标嵌入到学校等机构的选择规则中，并在这些规则的基础上实施延迟接受（DA）机制。在给定制度选择规则的情况下，我们引入了一种通过这些选择规则的性质来表征相应的数据支持机制的方法。利用这种方法，我们推导出了不同设置下数据处理机制的新特征，包括与入学保证和重叠储备的匹配问题（智利学校选择的动机）以及具有矩阵可行性约束或目标的环境。我们的方法为描述适应策略相关目标的数据处理机制提供了一个统一的框架。

引用次数: 0

Climate payments: A Coase theorem 气候支付：一个科斯定理

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106032

Prajit K. Dutta , Roy Radner

Climate-related payments have emerged as a contentious and complex issue in climate negotiations. Major questions remain on how this will be done and how effective payments will be. The paper studies transfers under a variety of timing possibilities. It is shown that outcome-contingent payments always lead to efficiency and a particular alignment of transfer and emission timings implies that the efficient equilibrium is the only equilibrium even when the horizon is infinite. The theoretical novelty is a multi-lateral Coase Theorem in a dynamic model. The policy prescription is for an enhanced role for transfers to solve the climate problem.

在气候谈判中，与气候相关的支付已成为一个有争议且复杂的问题。主要问题仍然是如何做到这一点，以及支付将如何有效。本文研究了多种时间可能性下的转移。结果或有支付总是导致效率，转移和排放时间的特定对齐意味着有效均衡是唯一的均衡，即使视界是无限的。该理论的新颖性是动态模型中的多边科斯定理。政策处方是增强转移支付在解决气候问题方面的作用。

引用次数: 0

Bargaining under liquidity constraints: Experimental evidence 流动性约束下的议价：实验证据

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106035

John Duffy , Lucie Lebeau , Daniela Puzzello

Bargaining is widely used in monetary, labor and finance models to determine terms of trade. The chosen bargaining solution can matter for welfare analysis, for example when agents are liquidity constrained. Here we report on an experiment in which buyers and sellers engage in semi-structured bargaining to determine the terms of trade with the aim of evaluating the empirical relevance of two bargaining solutions, the generalized Nash bargaining solution and Kalai's proportional bargaining solution. These bargaining solutions predict different outcomes when buyers are constrained in their money holdings. We first use the case when the buyer is not liquidity constrained to estimate the bargaining power parameter, which we find to be equal to 1/2. Then, imposing liquidity constraints on buyers, we find strong evidence in support of the Kalai proportional solution. Our findings have policy implications, e.g., for the welfare cost of inflation in search-theoretic models of money.

讨价还价被广泛应用于货币、劳动和金融模型中，以确定贸易条件。选择的讨价还价解决方案对福利分析很重要，例如当代理人流动性受限时。在这里，我们报告了一个实验，在这个实验中，买卖双方进行半结构化的议价来确定交易条件，目的是评估两种议价方案的经验相关性，即广义纳什议价方案和卡莱比例议价方案。当买家的资金持有量受到限制时，这些议价方案预测了不同的结果。我们首先使用买方不受流动性约束的情况来估计议价能力参数，我们发现它等于1/2。然后，对买家施加流动性约束，我们发现强有力的证据支持卡莱比例解决方案。我们的研究结果具有政策意义，例如，在货币的搜索理论模型中通货膨胀的福利成本。

引用次数: 0

New fertility patterns: The role of human versus physical capital 新的生育模式：人力资本与物质资本的作用

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106037

Nicolas Abad , Johanna Etner , Natacha Raffin , Thomas Seegmuller

We use an overlapping generations model with physical and human capital, and two reproductive periods to explore how fertility decisions may differ in response to economic incentives in early and late adulthood. In particular, we analyze the interplay between fertility choices—related to career opportunities—and wages, and investigate the role played by work experience and investment in both types of capital. We show that young adults postpone parenthood above a certain wage threshold and that late fertility increases with human capital. The long run trend is either to converge to a low productivity equilibrium, involving high early fertility, investment in physical capital and relatively low income, or to a high productivity equilibrium, where households postpone parenthood to invest in their human capital and work experience, with higher late fertility and higher levels of income. A convergence to the latest state would explain the postponement of parenthood and the mitigation or slight reversal of fertility decrease in some European countries in recent decades.

我们使用具有物质和人力资本的重叠代模型，以及两个生育期来探索生育决策在成年早期和晚期对经济激励的反应中可能存在的差异。特别是，我们分析了与职业机会相关的生育选择与工资之间的相互作用，并调查了工作经验和对这两种资本的投资所起的作用。我们表明，年轻人将生育推迟到一定的工资门槛以上，并且随着人力资本的增加，晚生育率也会增加。长期趋势是趋同于低生产率均衡，包括高早期生育率、对物质资本的投资和相对较低的收入，或者趋同于高生产率均衡，即家庭推迟生育以投资于其人力资本和工作经验，具有较高的晚期生育率和较高的收入水平。与最新状态的趋同可以解释近几十年来一些欧洲国家推迟生育和生育率下降的减缓或略有逆转。

引用次数: 0

Persuasion without ex-post commitment 没有事后承诺的劝说

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106058

Sophie Kreutzkamp , Yichuan Lou

We study a persuasion model with limited commitment in which the sender can commit to a signal ex ante but not to truthful reporting ex post. Sender-optimal signals exploit a key trade-off: although better-quality information allows the sender to communicate more precisely, it adversely affects the credibility of his messages. Building on this observation, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the sender to strictly benefit from obtaining an imperfect signal. Under linear preferences, we show that sender-optimal signals can take on a bi-pooling structure; if preferences are also convex, bi-pooling becomes necessary. Finally, we provide a full characterization of sender-optimal signals for the popular uniform-quadratic specification, which we use to quantify and compare the value of commitments.

我们研究了一个有限承诺的说服模型，在这个模型中，发送者可以事先承诺一个信号，但不能事后承诺真实的报告。发送者最优信号利用了一个关键的权衡：尽管更高质量的信息使发送者能够更精确地沟通，但它对其信息的可信度产生了不利影响。在此观察的基础上，我们提供了充分和必要的条件，使发送方严格受益于获得不完全信号。在线性偏好下，我们证明了发送者最优信号可以采用双池结构；如果首选项也是凸的，则需要双池化。最后，我们为流行的均匀二次规范提供了发送者最优信号的完整表征，我们使用它来量化和比较承诺的价值。

引用次数: 0

Two time-consistent Paretian solutions to the intertemporal resource allocation problem 跨期资源分配问题的两个时间一致Paretian解

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106048

Yves Sprumont

We study the problem of aggregating individual geometric discounting (GD) preferences over infinite streams of consumption profiles into a system specifying, for each consumption history, a social ranking of the streams that follow that history. Such a system is time-consistent if and only if it is generated by a single underlying preference ordering over the lifetime streams. Under the Weak Pareto Principle, Neutrality, Anonymity, and Discounting Irrelevance (individual discount factors do not affect the ranking of constant streams), lifetime streams must be ranked by applying a fixed monotonic and symmetric ordering to the profiles of range-normalized GD utilities they yield (Theorem 1). History Independence singles out the range-normalized utilitarian rule (Theorem 2) whereas the range-normalized Nash rule is characterized by Independence of Infeasible Consumptions (the ranking of streams delivering consumption profiles in an interval from the origin does not depend on individual valuations outside that interval) or Valuation Irrelevance (the ranking of pure timing streams is independent of individual valuations) (Theorem 3).

我们研究的问题是将个人几何折扣（GD）偏好在无限的消费概况流中聚合到一个系统中，为每个消费历史指定一个遵循该历史的流的社会排名。这样的系统是时间一致的，当且仅当它是由生命周期流上的单个底层首选项排序生成的。在弱帕累托原则、中立性、匿名性和贴现无关性（单个贴现因素不影响恒定流的排名）下，生命周期流必须通过对它们产生的范围归一化GD效用的概况应用固定的单调和对称排序来排名（定理1）。历史独立性挑选出范围归一化的实用规则（定理2），而范围归一化的纳什规则的特点是不可行的消费独立性（从原点开始的间隔内提供消费概况的流的排名不依赖于该间隔之外的个人估值）或估值无关性（纯定时流的排名独立于个人估值）（定理3）。

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引用次数: 0

The rich are not like you and me: Income, price dispersion, and consumption 富人不像你我：收入、价格分散和消费

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106046

Eungsik Kim , Stephen Spear

This paper studies the impact of imperfect competition on life-cycle consumption profiles and consumption-risk sharing, along with its policy implications. We develop a framework by incorporating the Shapley-Shubik market game into a stochastic overlapping generations model. We characterize the inverse income-marginal price relationship under market power, where wealthy agents face lower prices for identical goods compared to a perfectly competitive economy. We present several novel findings due to the additional price effect channel arising from price dispersion. First, we show that income-dependent prices in an imperfectly competitive economy lead to a failure of consumption smoothing and generate hump-shaped consumption profiles without other frictions. We also demonstrate that the market power of agents increases consumption volatility and worsens consumption-risk sharing due to the double luck effect resulting from price dispersion caused by income shocks. The additional volatility from imperfect competition creates a complementary welfare loss. Lastly, we illustrate a severed link between fiscal and monetary policy in improving welfare in an imperfectly competitive economy, as monetary policies reinforce the inverse income-price relationship and adversely affect the poor, while fiscal policies do not.

本文研究了不完全竞争对全生命周期消费特征和消费风险分担的影响及其政策启示。我们通过将Shapley-Shubik市场博弈纳入随机重叠代模型，开发了一个框架。我们描述了市场力量下的反向收入-边际价格关系，在这种情况下，富有的代理人面对的相同商品的价格低于完全竞争经济。我们提出了由于价格分散引起的额外价格效应渠道的一些新发现。首先，我们表明，在不完全竞争经济中，收入依赖的价格导致消费平滑失败，并产生没有其他摩擦的驼峰型消费曲线。我们还证明了由于收入冲击导致的价格分散所产生的双重运气效应，代理商的市场力量增加了消费波动，恶化了消费风险分担。不完全竞争带来的额外波动造成了互补的福利损失。最后，我们说明了财政和货币政策在不完全竞争经济中改善福利方面的切断联系，因为货币政策加强了反向收入-价格关系并对穷人产生不利影响，而财政政策则没有。

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引用次数: 0

Information requirements for mechanism design 机构设计的信息需求

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106056

Richard P. McLean , Andrew Postlewaite

Standard mechanism design begins with a statement of the problem, including knowledge on the designer's part about the distribution of the characteristics (preferences and information) of the participants who are to engage with the mechanism. There is a large literature on robust mechanism design, much of which aims to reduce the assumed information the designer has about the participants. In this paper we provide an auction mechanism for interdependent value problems that performs well when there are many buyers, even though there is no prior distribution over the accuracy of buyers' information on the part of the designer or the participants.

标准的机制设计始于对问题的陈述，包括设计者对参与机制的参与者的特征分布（偏好和信息）的了解。关于稳健机制设计有大量的文献，其中大部分旨在减少设计者对参与者的假设信息。在本文中，我们为相互依赖的价值问题提供了一种拍卖机制，该机制在有许多买家时表现良好，即使设计师或参与者对买家信息的准确性没有先验分布。

引用次数: 0

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