Memory & Cognition最新文献

Observers can determine whether they have previously seen hundreds of images with more than 80% accuracy. This “massive memory” for WHAT we have seen is accompanied by smaller but still massive memories for WHERE and WHEN the item was seen (spatial & temporal massive memory). Recent studies have shown that certain images are more easily remembered than others (higher “memorability”). Does memorability influence spatial massive memory and temporal massive memory? In two experiments, viewers saw 150 images presented twice in random order. These 300 images were sequentially presented at random locations in a 7 × 7 grid. If an image was categorized as old, observers clicked on the spot in the grid where they thought they had previously seen it. They also noted when they had seen it: Experiment 1—clicking on a timeline; Experiment 2—estimating the trial number when the item first appeared. Replicating prior work, data show that high-memorability images are remembered better than low-memorability images. Interestingly, in both experiments, spatial memory precision was correlated with image memorability, while temporal memory precision did not vary as a function of memorability. Apparently, properties that make images memorable help us remember WHERE but not WHEN those images were presented. The lack of correlation between memorability and temporal memory is, of course, a negative result and should be treated with caution.

If retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) is to play a role in the formation of collective memories, it should be long lasting. Although several studies have found that RIF is short-lived, there is other evidence to suggest that repeated selective practice schedules with a temporal gap between each practice trial may increase the durability of RIF. We tested this possibility in three experiments, focusing on socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting (SSRIF). In two experiments, participants studied scientific or story materials, then listened to someone selectively recall the material repeatedly, either in rapid succession or over an extended time period, and finally recalled the original materials either immediately, after a 1-week delay, or after a 3-week delay. A third experiment examined selective practice in free-flowing conversations. In each instance, RIF was found with repeated selective practice with a temporal gap between trials. The results are discussed in terms of the role RIF might play in the formation of collective memory.

Individuals can take on various roles in conversation. Some roles are more active, with the participant responsible for guiding that conversation in pursuit of the group's goals. Other roles are more passive, like when one is an overhearer. Classic accounts posit that overhearers do not form conversational common ground because they do not actively participate in the communication process. Indeed, empirical findings demonstrate that overhearers do not comprehend conversation as well as active participants. Little is known, however, about long-term memory for conversations in overhearers. Overhearers play an important role in legal settings and dispute resolution, and it is critical to understand how their memory differs in quality and content from active participants in conversation. Here we examine - for the first time - the impact of one's conversational role as a speaker, addressee, or overhearer on subsequent memory for conversation. Data from 60 participants recalling 60 conversations reveal that after a brief delay, overhearers recall significantly less content from conversation compared to both speakers and addressees, and that the content they do recall is less accurately sourced to its actual contributor. Mnemonic similarity is higher between active conversational participants than between active participants and overhearers. These findings provide key support for the hypothesis that the process of forming common ground in interactive conversation shapes and supports memory for that conversation.

Individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) are correlated with long-term memory (LTM) differences. Whether this is because high-WMC individuals encode more effectively, resulting in better LTM storage, or because they better retrieve information from LTM is debated. In two experiments, we used Bayesian-hierarchical multinomial modeling to correlate participant-level storage and retrieval processes from LTM recall to WMC abilities estimated from operation and symmetry complex span tasks. In Experiment 1, we presented participants with 20 consecutive words, including semantically associated pairs (e.g., knife and fork), to assess LTM processes. Participants received standard (n = 242) or associative-storage instructions (n = 222) and then completed a free recall task. In Experiment 2, we instructed participants (N = 239) to memorize 40 cue-target words as pairs before completing free and cued recall tasks. Correlations with WMC emerged with storage and retrieval processes and only when an associative storage strategy was instructed (Experiment 1). When associative processing was inherent to the task (Experiment 2), only the associative storage, not the retrieval advantage, replicated. The strategy reports suggest that high-WMC individuals use associative encoding strategies more effectively, resulting in better storage in LTM.

Observing others performing an action can lead to false memories of self-performance-the observation-inflation effect. Previous research has indicated that this phenomenon might impact the memory of actions in real-world interactions. However, whether direct observation without interaction can lead to observation inflation remains unclear. In Experiment 1, participants passively observed the experimenter performing actions live. In subsequent memory tests, they indeed reported false memories regarding their performances. Building on this, Experiment 2 investigated the causes of the observation-inflation effect induced by "real" actions. Participants underwent imitation-inhibition training with the individuals they observed previously. The results revealed that participants who completed imitation-inhibition training reported fewer false memories in memory tests than those who completed imitation training. These findings suggest that even passive observation of "real" actions can lead to observation inflation, and the simulation of others' actions by individuals may be a potential underlying cause of their occurrence in real-life situations.

People are often overconfident about their ability to explain how everyday phenomena and artifacts work (devices, natural processes, historical events, etc.). However, the metacognitive mechanisms involved in this bias have not been fully elucidated. The aim of this study was to establish whether the ability to perform deliberate and analytic processes moderates the effect of informational cues such as the social desirability of knowledge on the Illusion of Explanatory Depth (IOED). To this purpose, the participants' cognitive load was manipulated as they provided initial estimates of causal understanding of national historical events in the standard IOED paradigm. The results showed that neither the social desirability of specific causal knowledge nor the cognitive load manipulations had direct effects on the IOED. However, subsequent exploratory analyses indicated that high cognitive load was related to lower performance on concurrent memory tasks, which in turn was associated with a higher IOED magnitude. Higher analytical processing was also related to lower IOED. Implications for both dual-process models of metacognition and the design of task environments that help to reduce this bias are discussed.

Metaphors, such as lawyers are sharks, are seemingly incomprehensible when reversed (i.e. sharks are lawyers). For this reason, Kintsch (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 7(2), 257-266, 2000) argued that computational models of metaphor processing need to account for the non-reversibility of metaphors, and demonstrated success with his computational model, the "predication algorithm," in simulating metaphor comprehension in a way that is consistent with human cognition. Predication is an ostensibly directional algorithm because its equation is asymmetric such that semantic properties of the vehicle (e.g., sharks) are added to the topic (e.g., lawyers) rather than vice versa. Although predication has been accepted as a viable algorithm for simulating metaphor processing, one of its core assumptions - that the semantic processing of metaphor is directional - has not been systematically tested, nor has it been systematically tested against multiple rival algorithms in simulating metaphor comprehension. To that end, we tested the predication algorithm's performance and that of a set of rival algorithms in simulating metaphor comprehension and distinguishing between canonical (e.g., lawyers are sharks) and reversed (e.g., sharks are lawyers) metaphors. Our findings indicate (1) the predication algorithm is comparable to simpler, rival algorithms in simulating metaphor comprehension, and (2) despite the beliefs about the directionality of the predication algorithm, it produces surprisingly similar simulations for canonical metaphors and their topic-vehicle reversals. These findings argue against predication, at least as implemented in Kintsch's (2000) algorithm, as a viable model of metaphor processing. Implications for computational and psycholinguistic approaches to metaphor are discussed.

The present study tests the hypothesis that the directionality of reading habits (left-to-right or right-to-left) impacts individuals' representation of nonspatial events. Using the blank screen paradigm, we examine whether eye movements reflect culture-specific spatial biases in processing temporal information, specifically, grammatical tense in Russian and Hebrew. Sixty-two native speakers of Russian (a language with a left-to-right reading and writing system) and 62 native speakers of Hebrew (a language with a right-to-left reading and writing system) listened to verbs in the past or future tense while their spontaneous gaze positions were recorded. Following the verb, a visual spatial probe appeared in one of the five locations of the screen, and participants responded manually to indicate its position. While participants' response latencies to the spatial probe revealed no significant effects, their gaze positions along the horizontal axis for past- and future-tensed verbs aligned with the reading and writing direction in their language. These results provide novel evidence that eye movements during auditory processing of grammatical tense are influenced by culturally specific reading and writing conventions, shifting leftward or rightward on the horizontal plane depending on the stimuli's time reference (past or future) and the participants' language (Russian or Hebrew). This spatial bias indicates a common underlying cognitive mechanism that uses spatial dimensions to represent temporal constructs.

In practicing a new task, the initial performance gains, across consecutive trials, decrease; in the following phase, performance tends to plateau. However, after a long delay additional performance improvements may emerge (delayed/ "offline" gains). It has been suggested that the attainment of the plateau phase is a necessary condition for the triggering of skill consolidation processes that lead to the expression of delayed gains. Here we compared the effect of a long-delay (24-48 h) interval following each of the two within-session phases, on performance in a simple motor task, the finger-tapping sequence learning (FTSL), and in a conceptually complex task, the Tower of Hanoi puzzle (TOHP). In Experiment 1 we determined the amount of practice leading to the plateau phase within a single practice session (long practice), in each task. Experiment 2 consisted of three consecutive sessions with long-delay intervals in between; in the first session, participants underwent a short practice without attaining the plateau phase, but in the next two sessions, participants received long practice, attaining the plateau phase. In the FTSL, short practice resulted in no delayed gains after the long delay, but after 24-48 h following long practice, task performance was further improved. In contrast, no delayed gains evolved in the TOHP during the 24- to 48-h delay following long practice. We propose that the attainment of a plateau phase can indicate either the attainment of a comprehensive task solution routine (achievable for simple tasks) or a preservation of work-in-progress task solution routine (complex tasks); performance after a long post-practice interval can differentiate these two states.

In addressing human reasoning biases, "easy-fix" attentional focus interventions have shown that we can prompt reasoners to align responses with logico-mathematical principles. The current study aimed to test the impact of such interventions on both intuitive and deliberate responses on base-rate items. Using a two-response paradigm, participants provided initial intuitive responses under time constraints and cognitive load, followed by deliberate responses. During the intervention, we used attentional focus manipulations with base-rate items that aimed to redirect participants' attention toward the "logical" base-rate cue (i.e., the logical intervention) or toward the "heuristic" descriptive cue (i.e., the heuristic intervention). The results indicate that the logical intervention led to improved alignment with logico-mathematical principles in both intuitive and deliberate responses, albeit with a modest effect size. Conversely, the heuristic intervention had no discernible impact on accuracy. This indicates that our attentional focus manipulation is more effective at getting reasoners to respect rather than to override base-rates.