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Do signatory auditors with tax expertise facilitate or curb tax aggressiveness? 具有税务专业知识的签字审计员会促进还是抑制税收积极性？
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101715
Mark DeFond , Baolei Qi , Yi Si , Jieying Zhang
Prior research concludes that tax-expert auditors facilitate tax aggressiveness. However, these studies examine auditors who also provide non-audit tax services to their clients, creating conflicting incentives. We predict that tax-expert auditors, who do not provide non-audit tax services, reduce tax aggressiveness, because tax aggressiveness imposes costs on them. We test our prediction using Chinese data, allowing us to identify Certified Tax Agents as tax-expert auditors. We find that companies are less tax aggressive when their signatory auditor is a tax-expert who does not provide non-audit tax services. Consistent with a causal relation, a decrease in tax rates, which reduces clients’ incentives to be tax aggressive, weakens the effect of tax-expertise on tax aggressiveness. Moreover, tax-expert auditors attenuate the type of tax aggressiveness that results in tax-related misstatements. Overall, by examining auditors who do not provide non-audit tax services, we find that tax-expert auditors curb tax aggressiveness, contrary to prior research.
先前的研究得出结论，税务专家审计师促进了税收侵略性。然而，这些研究考察的审计人员也为其客户提供非审计税务服务，从而产生相互矛盾的激励。我们预测，不提供非审计税务服务的税务专家审计师会降低税收侵略性，因为税收侵略性会给他们带来成本。我们使用中国的数据来检验我们的预测，从而确定注册税务师是税务专家审计人员。我们发现，当公司的签约审计师是不提供非审计税务服务的税务专家时，公司的税收侵略性会降低。与因果关系一致的是，税率的降低降低了客户积极纳税的动机，削弱了税收专业知识对积极纳税的影响。此外，税务专家审计人员削弱了导致税务相关错报的税收侵略性。总体而言，通过检查不提供非审计税务服务的审计师，我们发现税务专家审计师抑制了税收侵略性，这与先前的研究相反。
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引用次数: 0
Measuring firm exposure to government agencies 衡量公司与政府机构的关系
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101703
Daphne M. Armstrong, Stephen Glaeser, Jeffrey L. Hoopes
We use textual analysis of mandatory accounting filings to develop firm-level, time-varying measures of exposure to individual government agencies including the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The measures vary predictably across industries and with agency-specific events such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act at the SEC and budget cuts at the IRS. The measures positively relate to undisclosed agency investigations and financial statement downloads. Firms' total exposure across government agencies negatively relates to their profitability, consistent with exposure to government agencies imposing net costs. Consistent with a causal interpretation of these results, the positive stock market reaction to the surprise election of Donald Trump, who promised to reduce the power of government agencies, positively varies with firms' exposure to government agencies. As initial applications of our measures, we demonstrate that expanded SEC oversight increases firms' stock liquidity and reduced IRS oversight decreases firms’ effective tax rates.
我们使用强制性会计文件的文本分析来开发公司层面的、随时间变化的暴露于各个政府机构的措施，包括证券交易委员会（SEC）和美国国税局（IRS）。可以预见，不同行业的措施会有所不同，也会随着SEC的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》（Sarbanes - Oxley Act）和IRS的预算削减等特定机构的事件而有所不同。这些措施与未公开的机构调查和财务报表下载呈正相关。企业在政府机构的总敞口与其盈利能力呈负相关，与施加净成本的政府机构敞口一致。与对这些结果的因果解释一致，股市对唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）意外当选的积极反应与公司对政府机构的敞口呈正相关。特朗普承诺减少政府机构的权力。作为我们措施的初步应用，我们证明了扩大的SEC监管增加了公司的股票流动性，减少的IRS监管降低了公司的有效税率。
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引用次数: 0
Mitigating risk-shifting in corporate pension plans: Evidence from stakeholder constituency statutes 减轻企业养老金计划中的风险转移：利益相关者选区规约的证据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101704
Amy D. Garman , Thomas R. Kubick
We use staggered enactments of state stakeholder constituency laws as a natural experiment to examine the effect of such laws on corporate pension risk shifting. Our analysis encompasses three components of pension risk shifting: funding risk, investment risk, and benefit risk. We observe a reduction in all three elements of pension risk shifting following the enactment of stakeholder orientation laws that promote greater consideration of stakeholder interests. We also find that the post-enactment reduction in pension risk-shifting is greater for firms with fewer investment opportunities. Overall, our results provide insight into how stakeholder constituency can mitigate an important form of risk-shifting.
我们利用交错颁布的州利益相关者选区法作为自然实验，研究此类法律对企业养老金风险转移的影响。我们的分析包括养老金风险转移的三个组成部分：资金风险、投资风险和福利风险。我们观察到，在促进更多考虑利益相关者利益的利益相关者导向法颁布后，养老金风险转移的所有三个要素都有所减少。我们还发现，对于投资机会较少的公司来说，颁布法律后养老金风险转移的减少幅度更大。总之，我们的研究结果让我们深入了解了利益相关者如何减轻一种重要的风险转移形式。
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引用次数: 0
Green innovation and firms’ financial and environmental performance: The roles of pollution prevention versus control 绿色创新与企业财务和环境绩效：污染预防与控制的作用
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101706
Qiang Cheng , An-Ping Lin , Mengjie Yang
This study examines the effects of firms' green innovation on their future financial and environmental performance. If pollution is primarily a manifestation of wasted resources, then investments in pollution prevention technologies can both reduce the environmental impact of production and improve financial performance. In contrast, investments in pollution control technologies likely reduce the environmental impact of production without improving financial performance. Using green patents to capture firms' investments in these two types of technologies, we find that the value of a firm's pollution prevention patents is positively associated with its future financial and environmental performance, and that the positive impact on future financial performance is achieved through improvements in sales growth and cost efficiency. In contrast, the value of a firm's pollution control patents is not associated with its future financial or environmental performance. Overall, these findings shed light on the future implications of green innovation.
本研究考察了企业绿色创新对其未来财务和环境绩效的影响。如果污染主要是资源浪费的表现，那么对污染预防技术的投资既可以减少生产对环境的影响，又可以改善财务绩效。相比之下，对污染控制技术的投资可能会减少生产对环境的影响，而不会改善财务业绩。利用绿色专利捕捉企业在这两种技术上的投资，我们发现企业污染防治专利的价值与其未来财务和环境绩效呈正相关，并且对未来财务绩效的积极影响是通过销售增长和成本效率的改善来实现的。相比之下，公司污染控制专利的价值与其未来的财务或环境绩效无关。总的来说，这些发现揭示了绿色创新对未来的影响。
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引用次数: 0
Fair value accounting standards and securities litigation 公允价值会计准则与证券诉讼
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101705
Musaib Ashraf , Dain C. Donelson , John McInnis , Richard D. Mergenthaler
We examine the effect of fair value standards on firms' litigation risk. The discretion required by fair value allows plaintiffs to “second guess” managers' judgments, potentially increasing litigation risk. Alternatively, the complexity of fair value may decrease litigation risk if it's more difficult to demonstrate scienter. Our evidence suggests firms that rely more on fair value standards are relatively less likely to be sued. We find no evidence of a relation between fair value and the risk of misstatements or fraud, but do find evidence of a slight increase in firms' litigation risk via an increase in volatility. However, the primary effect of fair value standards in reducing litigation risk dominates the volatility effect. Finally, we find average litigation rates increase after the passage of new standards, but less so for fair value standards. On balance, our evidence suggests fair value is a relatively low litigation risk area in GAAP.
我们考察了公允价值准则对公司诉讼风险的影响。公允价值要求的自由裁量权允许原告“事后猜测”管理者的判断，潜在地增加了诉讼风险。另一方面，公允价值的复杂性可能会降低诉讼风险，如果它更难以证明科学。我们的证据表明，更多依赖公允价值标准的公司被起诉的可能性相对较小。我们没有发现公允价值与错报或欺诈风险之间存在关系的证据，但确实发现了通过波动性增加而略微增加公司诉讼风险的证据。然而，公允价值准则在降低诉讼风险方面的主要作用大于波动性效应。最后，我们发现新准则通过后，平均诉讼率有所上升，但公允价值准则的平均诉讼率则有所下降。总的来说，我们的证据表明公允价值在GAAP中是一个相对较低的诉讼风险领域。
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引用次数: 0
Executive compensation: The trend toward one-size-fits-all 高管薪酬：一刀切的趋势
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101708
Felipe Cabezon
I report and analyze a recent “one-size-fits-all” trend in the structure of executive compensation plans. Since 2006, 24% of the variation in the distribution of CEO compensation across pay components — salary, bonus, stock awards, options, non-equity incentives, pensions, and perquisites — disappeared. This uniformity might come at the expense of optimal incentives, as increases in pay structure similarity translate into lower shareholder value. Using panel data regressions and plausibly exogenous shocks, I find that institutional investors’ influence, proxy advisors’ recommendations, and expanded compensation disclosure are salient drivers of this standardization. The findings highlight an unintended consequence of recent regulations enhancing shareholders’ participation and expanding compensation disclosure.
我报告并分析了最近高管薪酬计划结构中“一刀切”的趋势。自2006年以来，CEO薪酬在薪酬组成部分（工资、奖金、股票奖励、期权、非股权激励、养老金和额外津贴）分布上的24%的差异消失了。这种一致性可能会以牺牲最佳激励为代价，因为薪酬结构相似性的增加会转化为股东价值的降低。利用面板数据回归和似是而非的外生冲击，我发现机构投资者的影响力、代理顾问的建议和扩大的薪酬披露是这种标准化的显著驱动因素。这些发现突显了近期监管规定的一个意想不到的后果，这些规定加强了股东的参与，扩大了薪酬披露。
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引用次数: 0
EDITORIAL DATA 编辑数据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101766
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引用次数: 0
Signaling innovation: The nontax benefits of claiming R&D tax credits 信号创新：申请研发税收抵免的非税收利益
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101718
Bradford F. Hepfer , Hannah W. Judd , Sarah C. Rice
Using the IPO setting, we test whether firms signal the quality of their investments in innovation activities by claiming R&D tax credits. We find the presence and amount of the R&D credit are each associated with lower information asymmetry and with higher investor demand at IPO. Conservatively, we estimate that sample firms realize additional IPO proceeds of 32–45 percent of their creditable R&D expenditures, indicating economically significant non-tax benefits associated with the R&D credit. We verify the R&D credit signal by showing its positive association with firms’ future patenting activity, patent citations, and post-IPO stock returns. Results from these tests are concentrated among firms limited in their ability to obtain tax benefits from R&D credits, consistent with the R&D credit providing nontax benefits as a signal of innovation investment quality.
使用IPO设置，我们测试公司是否通过申请研发税收抵免来表明其在创新活动中的投资质量。我们发现研发信贷的存在和数量都与较低的信息不对称和较高的IPO投资者需求相关。保守地说，我们估计样本公司实现的额外IPO收益占其研发信贷支出的32 - 45%，这表明与研发信贷相关的经济上显著的非税收益。我们通过显示其与企业未来专利活动、专利引用和ipo后股票回报的正相关来验证研发信用信号。这些测试的结果集中在那些从研发抵免中获得税收优惠的能力有限的公司中，这与研发抵免作为创新投资质量的一个信号提供的非税收优惠是一致的。
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引用次数: 0
Complexity of CEO compensation packages 首席执行官薪酬方案的复杂性
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101709
Ana Albuquerque , Mary Ellen Carter , Zhe (Michael) Guo , Luann J. Lynch
This paper examines complexity in CEO compensation contracts. We develop a measure of compensation complexity and provide empirical evidence that complexity has increased substantially over time. We document that complexity results not only from factors reflecting efficient contracting, but also from external pressures from compensation consultants, institutional investors, proxy advisors, and attempts to benchmark to peers, with these external factors having greater impact in more recent years. Examining consequences of contract complexity, we find an association with lower future firm performance that is related to the influence of external factors on compensation design. We further find this relation is partially mitigated when a contract's performance metrics are more highly correlated, consistent with information processing costs hampering decision-making. Collectively, these findings confirm concerns raised by investors and the media regarding compensation complexity and can inform boards in their design of CEO pay packages.
本文探讨了首席执行官薪酬合同的复杂性。我们制定了薪酬复杂性的衡量标准，并提供了随着时间推移复杂性大幅增加的经验证据。我们发现，复杂性不仅源于反映合同效率的因素，也源于薪酬顾问、机构投资者、代理顾问的外部压力，以及试图以同行为基准的尝试，而这些外部因素在最近几年的影响更大。在研究合同复杂性的后果时，我们发现公司未来业绩下降与外部因素对薪酬设计的影响有关。我们进一步发现，当合同的绩效指标关联度较高时，这种关系会得到部分缓解，这与阻碍决策的信息处理成本是一致的。总之，这些发现证实了投资者和媒体对薪酬复杂性的担忧，并为董事会设计首席执行官薪酬方案提供了参考。
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引用次数: 0
Do sell-side analysts react too pessimistically to bad news for minority-led firms? Evidence from target price valuations 卖方分析师是否对少数股权公司的坏消息反应过于悲观？来自目标价估值的证据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101707
Kathy Rupar , Sean Wang , Hayoung Yoon
We find that the adverse impact of bad news on analysts’ valuations is 57% larger when the CEO is Non-White, resulting in more pessimistic valuations for Non-White CEOs relative to their White counterparts. Non-White CEO firms are more likely to surpass analysts’ valuation targets in the subsequent 12 months, suggesting that this racial gap lacks economic justification. To provide further evidence of a racial bias: (1) we triangulate our empirical findings with corroborating evidence from a controlled experiment and (2) we provide evidence that analysts’ valuation disparities towards Non-White CEO firms become larger when race relations are worse. Increases in CEO familiarity attenuate these disparities, suggesting the bias we document appears to be subconscious. Our findings suggest that resources allocated towards educating a firm’s stakeholders about the potential impact of implicit racial biases and increasing self-awareness may be impactful in promoting equality within capital markets.
我们发现，当首席执行官是非白人时，坏消息对分析师估值的不利影响要大 57%，导致非白人首席执行官的估值比白人首席执行官更悲观。非白人首席执行官的公司在随后的 12 个月中更有可能超过分析师的估值目标，这表明这种种族差距缺乏经济上的合理性。为了进一步证明种族偏见：(1) 我们用一个对照实验的确凿证据对我们的经验发现进行了三角测量；(2) 我们提供的证据表明，当种族关系恶化时，分析师对非白人首席执行官公司的估值差距会变得更大。首席执行官熟悉程度的提高会减弱这些差异，这表明我们记录的偏见似乎是下意识的。我们的研究结果表明，为教育公司的利益相关者了解隐性种族偏见的潜在影响和提高自我意识而分配的资源，可能会对促进资本市场的平等产生影响。
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引用次数: 0
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