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Sell-by-plan mandate and opportunistic insider selling: Evidence from China 按计划出售授权和机会主义的内幕抛售：来自中国的证据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101757
Pengfei Ye , Qingsheng Zeng , Cheng Zhang
We examine whether requiring insiders to sell their stock shares based on pre-disclosed plans can mitigate opportunistic insider selling activities and, more importantly, to what extent insiders can circumvent this regulation. Using China's mandate enacted in 2017 as the setting, we demonstrate that a sell-by-plan mandate can reduce opportunistic selling activities. However, insiders can circumvent this mandate by strategically initiating their plans before bad news. We find that this gaming practice is widespread in China. It is concentrated in firms with weak governance but largely absent in firms with strong governance. We also find that China's stock market cannot discern whether a plan is opportunistically motivated upon its announcement. Overall, this paper highlights a new form of opportunism in insider trading—opportunistic planning—and proposes a method to identify such plans. Our results also suggest that government regulation, without strong governance, could be ineffective in curbing corporate executives' opportunistic behaviors.
我们研究了要求内部人员根据预先披露的计划出售其股票是否可以减少机会主义的内部人员出售活动，更重要的是，内部人员可以在多大程度上规避这一规定。以中国2017年颁布的授权为背景，我们证明了按计划出售的授权可以减少投机买卖活动。然而，内部人士可以通过在坏消息之前战略性地启动他们的计划来规避这一要求。我们发现这种游戏行为在中国很普遍。它主要集中在治理薄弱的公司，而在治理强有力的公司则基本不存在。我们还发现，中国股市无法辨别一项计划是否出于机会主义动机。总之，本文强调了内幕交易中的一种新的机会主义形式——机会主义计划，并提出了一种识别这种计划的方法。我们的研究结果还表明，如果没有强有力的治理，政府监管在遏制企业高管机会主义行为方面可能是无效的。
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引用次数: 0
Tax havens and reputational costs 避税天堂和声誉成本
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-12-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101761
Adrienne DePaul , Frank Murphy , Mary E. Vernon
In 2017, the European Commission (EC) published a list of non-cooperative tax havens. We study whether country-level tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) change as a result of this list. Consistent with a reputational cost of the EC's “name and shame” campaign, there is a modest reduction in EU tourism among listed countries compared to unlisted ones. This relative reduction is concentrated among tourists from countries that view cheating on taxes as less justifiable. In contrast, listed countries experience a general increase in FDI following the list, a benefit potentially offsetting the costs of reduced tourism.
2017年，欧盟委员会（EC）公布了一份不合作避税天堂名单。我们研究了国家层面的旅游业和外国直接投资（FDI）是否会因为这个列表而改变。与欧共体“点名羞辱”运动的声誉成本相一致，与未列入名单的国家相比，欧盟旅游在列入名单的国家中略有减少。这种相对减少主要集中在那些认为偷税漏税不太合理的国家。相比之下，被列入名单的国家的外国直接投资普遍增加，这种好处可能抵消旅游业减少的成本。
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引用次数: 0
Sell-side analysts’ assessment of ESG risk 卖方分析师对ESG风险的评估
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101759
Min Park , Aaron Yoon , Tzachi Zach
We assess whether and how financial analysts incorporate information about downside ESG risk. Using a unique dataset on firm-day level negative ESG incidents, we find that analysts’ outputs (i.e., stock recommendations, EPS forecasts, and target prices) are associated with negative future ESG risk events, especially those that are financially material. Further investigation suggests that analysts incorporate ESG risk not only through adjusting future cash flow expectations (i.e. the “numerator”), but also through adjusting discount rates (i.e., the “denominator”). Overall, our results highlight the ability of financial analysts to synthesize and integrate ESG risk into their research.
我们评估金融分析师是否以及如何纳入有关ESG下行风险的信息。使用公司日负面ESG事件的独特数据集，我们发现分析师的产出（即股票建议，每股收益预测和目标价格）与未来负面ESG风险事件相关，特别是那些具有财务意义的事件。进一步的调查表明，分析师不仅通过调整未来现金流预期（即“分子”），还通过调整贴现率（即“分母”）来纳入ESG风险。总体而言，我们的研究结果突出了金融分析师综合和整合ESG风险的能力。
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引用次数: 0
FOMC news and segmented markets 联邦公开市场委员会新闻和细分市场
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101767
Benjamin Golez , Peter Kelly , Ben Matthies
A growing body of evidence suggests that Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements can affect private sector beliefs about near-term macroeconomic conditions. We measure the impact of central bank policy on index option trader beliefs about near-term economic conditions using the return of short-term dividend strips around each FOMC announcement (we term this short-term dividend strip return, “SDR”). Consistent with the idea that these announcements contain valuable information about macroeconomic conditions, we find that SDR predicts both future firm-level earnings and firm-level earnings announcement returns. Furthermore, using analyst earnings forecasts, we provide evidence of belief underreaction to FOMC announcements. We discuss how investor specialization and segmented markets can generate our empirical results.
越来越多的证据表明，联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）的公告可能会影响私营部门对近期宏观经济状况的看法。我们利用每次FOMC公告周围的短期股息带回报（我们将这种短期股息带回报称为“SDR”）来衡量央行政策对指数期权交易者对近期经济状况的影响。与这些公告包含有关宏观经济状况的有价值信息的观点一致，我们发现SDR既可以预测未来公司层面的收益，也可以预测公司层面的收益公告回报。此外，利用分析师的收益预测，我们提供了对联邦公开市场委员会公告反应不足的证据。我们讨论了投资者专业化和细分市场如何产生我们的实证结果。
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引用次数: 0
Client restatement announcement, audit office human capital investment, and audit quality improvements 客户重述公告，审计署人力资本投资，审计质量改进
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101741
Daniel Aobdia , Xuejiao Liu , Ke Na , Hong Wu
This paper examines audit offices’ human capital investment in response to client restatement announcements and the resulting effects on audit quality and audit office client base. We find that audit offices attempt to acquire human capital and talent by posting more audit-related job positions just after a client announces a restatement. The increase in job postings follows restatements with more negative announcement returns and restatements of annual financial statements, and is concentrated among more senior and experienced positions. Importantly, the increased job postings are not driven by replacement hiring due to individual auditor departures and reflect more auditors joining the office. These human capital investments reduce future client misstatements and losses in client portfolios, indicating improvements in actual and perceived audit quality. Audit offices are also more likely to replace audit managing partners and prevent the signing partners of the misstated financial statements from signing new audit reports after restatement announcements.
本文考察了审计机构为响应客户重述公告而进行的人力资本投资，以及由此对审计质量和审计机构客户群的影响。我们发现，在客户宣布重述后，审计机构会通过发布更多与审计相关的职位来获取人力资本和人才。招聘岗位的增加是在年度财务报表重述负面回报和重述之后出现的，并且集中在更高级和更有经验的职位上。重要的是，增加的招聘信息并不是由于个别审计员离职而导致的替代招聘，而是反映了更多的审计员加入办公室。这些人力资本投资减少了未来客户的错报和客户投资组合的损失，表明了实际和感知审计质量的改善。审计机关也更有可能更换审计管理合伙人，并阻止错报财务报表的签署合伙人在重述公告后签署新的审计报告。
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引用次数: 0
Does transparency about banks’ lending costs lower firms’ borrowing costs? Evidence from India 银行贷款成本的透明度会降低企业的借贷成本吗？印度的证据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-08-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101737
Prasanna Tantri , Nitin Vishen
We study the impact of transparency about banks’ costs on loan interest rates. The Indian Central Bank required banks to disclose a cost-based benchmark interest rate instead of the prime rate. The banks could price loans using any spread to the cost-based benchmark. We find that this change, which made banks’ cost structures more transparent, lowers the interest rates charged and leads to increases in debtor firms’ total borrowings and investments. We hypothesize that increased cost transparency reveals relationship rents to competitor banks and makes it difficult for incumbent banks to maintain high relationship rents because of increased threat of entry.
我们研究了银行成本透明度对贷款利率的影响。印度中央银行要求银行披露基于成本的基准利率，而不是最优惠利率。银行可以利用与基于成本的基准利率之间的任何利差为贷款定价。我们发现，这一变化使银行的成本结构更加透明，从而降低了贷款利率，并导致债务企业的借贷和投资总额增加。我们假设，成本透明度的提高向竞争银行揭示了关系租金，并使在位银行难以维持高关系租金，因为进入的威胁增加了。
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引用次数: 0
Generalist managers and firm innovation worldwide: The role of innovation-specific institutions 全球通才经理人与企业创新：创新机构的角色
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101755
Yue Rio Wu , Sterling Huang , Albert Tsang , Kun Tracy Wang
We examine how generalist CEOs influence innovation outcomes across 25 countries from 2001 to 2019. We assemble a novel, extended dataset of generalist CEOs and find that generalist CEOs positively affect innovation, particularly in countries with abundant innovation resources. This finding aligns with the notion that generalist CEOs leverage their broad knowledge and cross-industry experience to integrate resources across institutional environments, thereby fostering innovation activities. However, in countries with stricter patent systems, the increased need for specialized knowledge and resources limits the value that generalist CEOs can contribute, leading to decreased innovation activities. Our research highlights how institutional environments shape the efficacy of CEO human capital in driving innovation, thus offering insights for the design of innovation policies that maximize leadership potential across different institutional contexts.
我们研究了2001年至2019年25个国家的多面手ceo对创新成果的影响。我们收集了一个新的、扩展的多面手ceo数据集，发现多面手ceo对创新有积极影响，特别是在创新资源丰富的国家。这一发现与通才型ceo利用其广博的知识和跨行业的经验来整合跨机构环境的资源，从而促进创新活动的概念相一致。然而，在拥有更严格专利制度的国家，对专业知识和资源需求的增加限制了通才首席执行官所能贡献的价值，导致创新活动减少。我们的研究强调了制度环境如何塑造CEO人力资本在推动创新方面的功效，从而为设计创新政策提供了见解，从而在不同的制度背景下最大限度地发挥领导潜力。
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引用次数: 0
New accounting standards and the performance of quantitative investors 新会计准则与量化投资者的表现
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101740
Travis Dyer , Nicholas Guest , Elisha Yu
We examine quantitative investors’ ability to navigate a common and occasionally material change to the financial data generating process: new accounting standards. Returns of quantitative mutual funds temporarily decrease relative to funds that rely more heavily on human discretion following the implementation of a few standards that significantly change key financial statement variables; however, other standards do not appear to have a differential effect. Our result is stronger for quantitative funds using more accounting terminology in their prospectuses and using value strategies, which leverage accounting signals. Excess portfolio turnover following the implementation of accounting standards appears to be a driving factor of the quant underperformance. Additional evidence connects the fund-level results to the specific stocks that were affected by the accounting standards. Overall, our results suggest quant funds are generally proficient at adapting to accounting changes, although material changes occasionally put them at a temporary disadvantage relative to discretionary investors.
我们研究了量化投资者驾驭财务数据生成过程中常见且偶尔会出现的重大变化的能力：新会计准则。在几项显著改变财务报表关键变量的准则实施后，量化共同基金的回报率相对于更依赖人为裁量权的基金暂时下降；然而，其他准则似乎并没有产生不同的影响。对于在招股说明书中使用更多会计术语和采用价值策略的量化基金而言，我们的结果更为显著，因为它们利用了会计信号。会计准则实施后过高的投资组合周转率似乎是量化基金表现不佳的一个驱动因素。其他证据将基金层面的结果与受会计准则影响的特定股票联系起来。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，量化基金一般都能很好地适应会计变化，尽管重大变化偶尔会使它们暂时处于相对于全权投资者的不利地位。
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引用次数: 0
Board risk oversight and environmental and social performance 董事会风险监督以及环境和社会绩效
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101754
Hami Amiraslani , Carolyn Deller , Christopher D. Ittner , Thomas Keusch
We examine the relation between board risk oversight and environmental and social (E&S) performance. Our study is motivated by heightened awareness of E&S risks and growing calls for their inclusion in the purview of board risk oversight. Using a novel proprietary dataset on board risk oversight for an international sample, we find that firms with more extensive board risk oversight are more likely to institute E&S compensation, set environmental (but not social) targets, adopt policies that address E&S risks and opportunities, and issue an E&S report. Our exploratory evidence also shows that more extensive board risk oversight is associated with better environmental outcomes, specifically lower monetized environmental costs, but worse social outcomes, namely lower monetized employee benefits and a higher likelihood of social risk incidents. Our results suggest that risk oversight is analogous to a constrained optimization problem whereby risk exposures are prioritized and receive different degrees of oversight consideration by the board.
我们研究了董事会风险监督与环境和社会绩效之间的关系。我们的研究的动机是提高了对e&&s风险的认识，并越来越多地呼吁将其纳入董事会风险监督的范围。通过对国际样本使用新颖的专有数据集进行董事会风险监督，我们发现董事会风险监督更广泛的公司更有可能制定e&&s薪酬，设定环境（但不是社会）目标，采取应对e&&s风险和机遇的政策，并发布e&&s报告。我们的探索性证据还表明，更广泛的董事会风险监督与更好的环境结果相关，特别是更低的货币化环境成本，但更差的社会结果，即更低的货币化员工福利和更高的社会风险事件的可能性。我们的研究结果表明，风险监督类似于约束优化问题，即风险暴露被优先考虑，并得到董事会不同程度的监督考虑。
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引用次数: 0
Comply-or-explain regulation and investor protection 遵守或解释法规和投资者保护
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Accounting & Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101765
Thomas Bourveau , Xingchao Gao , Rongchen Li , Frank S. Zhou
We investigate a 2012 comply-or-explain regulation implemented by China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange. The regulation requires eligible firms to pay 30% of their current-year profits as cash dividends or explain the reasons why they do not meet this requirement through a public conference call. Using firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a control group, our difference-in-differences estimates suggest that firms subject to the regulation decreased tunneling, irrespective of whether they complied by paying or disclosing. Further analyses suggest that the reduction in tunneling is partially attributed to enhanced regulatory monitoring over explaining firms and the constraint on excess cash of paying firms. These findings offer novel policy insights into how a flexible comply-or-explain form of regulation can mitigate agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders in a weak institutional environment.
我们调查了中国上海证券交易所2012年实施的“不合规即解释”规定。该法规要求符合条件的公司将其当年利润的30%作为现金股息支付，或者通过公开电话会议解释他们不符合这一要求的原因。以在深圳证券交易所上市的公司作为对照组，我们的差异估计表明，受监管的公司减少了隧道行为，无论他们是否通过支付或披露来遵守监管。进一步的分析表明，隧道行为的减少部分归因于对解释公司的监管监督和对支付公司过剩现金的约束。这些发现为在薄弱的制度环境下，灵活的“服从或解释”监管形式如何降低控股股东和小股东之间的代理成本提供了新的政策见解。
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