Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101704
Amy D. Garman , Thomas R. Kubick
We use staggered enactments of state stakeholder constituency laws as a natural experiment to examine the effect of such laws on corporate pension risk shifting. Our analysis encompasses three components of pension risk shifting: funding risk, investment risk, and benefit risk. We observe a reduction in all three elements of pension risk shifting following the enactment of stakeholder orientation laws that promote greater consideration of stakeholder interests. We also find that the post-enactment reduction in pension risk-shifting is greater for firms with fewer investment opportunities. Overall, our results provide insight into how stakeholder constituency can mitigate an important form of risk-shifting.
{"title":"Mitigating risk-shifting in corporate pension plans: Evidence from stakeholder constituency statutes","authors":"Amy D. Garman , Thomas R. Kubick","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101704","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101704","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use staggered enactments of state stakeholder constituency laws as a natural experiment to examine the effect of such laws on corporate pension risk shifting. Our analysis encompasses three components of pension risk shifting: funding risk, investment risk, and benefit risk. We observe a reduction in all three elements of pension risk shifting following the enactment of stakeholder orientation laws that promote greater consideration of stakeholder interests. We also find that the post-enactment reduction in pension risk-shifting is greater for firms with fewer investment opportunities. Overall, our results provide insight into how stakeholder constituency can mitigate an important form of risk-shifting.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101704"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141329642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101706
Qiang Cheng , An-Ping Lin , Mengjie Yang
This study examines the effects of firms' green innovation on their future financial and environmental performance. If pollution is primarily a manifestation of wasted resources, then investments in pollution prevention technologies can both reduce the environmental impact of production and improve financial performance. In contrast, investments in pollution control technologies likely reduce the environmental impact of production without improving financial performance. Using green patents to capture firms' investments in these two types of technologies, we find that the value of a firm's pollution prevention patents is positively associated with its future financial and environmental performance, and that the positive impact on future financial performance is achieved through improvements in sales growth and cost efficiency. In contrast, the value of a firm's pollution control patents is not associated with its future financial or environmental performance. Overall, these findings shed light on the future implications of green innovation.
{"title":"Green innovation and firms’ financial and environmental performance: The roles of pollution prevention versus control","authors":"Qiang Cheng , An-Ping Lin , Mengjie Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101706","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101706","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the effects of firms' green innovation on their future financial and environmental performance. If pollution is primarily a manifestation of wasted resources, then investments in pollution <em>prevention</em> technologies can both reduce the environmental impact of production and improve financial performance. In contrast, investments in pollution <em>control</em> technologies likely reduce the environmental impact of production without improving financial performance. Using green patents to capture firms' investments in these two types of technologies, we find that the value of a firm's pollution prevention patents is positively associated with its future financial and environmental performance, and that the positive impact on future financial performance is achieved through improvements in sales growth and cost efficiency. In contrast, the value of a firm's pollution control patents is not associated with its future financial or environmental performance. Overall, these findings shed light on the future implications of green innovation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101706"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141397747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101705
Musaib Ashraf , Dain C. Donelson , John McInnis , Richard D. Mergenthaler
We examine the effect of fair value standards on firms' litigation risk. The discretion required by fair value allows plaintiffs to “second guess” managers' judgments, potentially increasing litigation risk. Alternatively, the complexity of fair value may decrease litigation risk if it's more difficult to demonstrate scienter. Our evidence suggests firms that rely more on fair value standards are relatively less likely to be sued. We find no evidence of a relation between fair value and the risk of misstatements or fraud, but do find evidence of a slight increase in firms' litigation risk via an increase in volatility. However, the primary effect of fair value standards in reducing litigation risk dominates the volatility effect. Finally, we find average litigation rates increase after the passage of new standards, but less so for fair value standards. On balance, our evidence suggests fair value is a relatively low litigation risk area in GAAP.
{"title":"Fair value accounting standards and securities litigation","authors":"Musaib Ashraf , Dain C. Donelson , John McInnis , Richard D. Mergenthaler","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101705","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101705","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the effect of fair value standards on firms' litigation risk. The discretion required by fair value allows plaintiffs to “second guess” managers' judgments, potentially increasing litigation risk. Alternatively, the complexity of fair value may decrease litigation risk if it's more difficult to demonstrate scienter. Our evidence suggests firms that rely more on fair value standards are relatively less likely to be sued. We find no evidence of a relation between fair value and the risk of misstatements or fraud, but do find evidence of a slight increase in firms' litigation risk via an increase in volatility. However, the primary effect of fair value standards in reducing litigation risk dominates the volatility effect. Finally, we find average litigation rates increase after the passage of new standards, but less so for fair value standards. On balance, our evidence suggests fair value is a relatively low litigation risk area in GAAP.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101705"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141410071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101708
Felipe Cabezon
I report and analyze a recent “one-size-fits-all” trend in the structure of executive compensation plans. Since 2006, 24% of the variation in the distribution of CEO compensation across pay components — salary, bonus, stock awards, options, non-equity incentives, pensions, and perquisites — disappeared. This uniformity might come at the expense of optimal incentives, as increases in pay structure similarity translate into lower shareholder value. Using panel data regressions and plausibly exogenous shocks, I find that institutional investors’ influence, proxy advisors’ recommendations, and expanded compensation disclosure are salient drivers of this standardization. The findings highlight an unintended consequence of recent regulations enhancing shareholders’ participation and expanding compensation disclosure.
{"title":"Executive compensation: The trend toward one-size-fits-all","authors":"Felipe Cabezon","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101708","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101708","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I report and analyze a recent “one-size-fits-all” trend in the structure of executive compensation plans. Since 2006, 24% of the variation in the distribution of CEO compensation across pay components — salary, bonus, stock awards, options, non-equity incentives, pensions, and perquisites — disappeared. This uniformity might come at the expense of optimal incentives, as increases in pay structure similarity translate into lower shareholder value. Using panel data regressions and plausibly exogenous shocks, I find that institutional investors’ influence, proxy advisors’ recommendations, and expanded compensation disclosure are salient drivers of this standardization. The findings highlight an unintended consequence of recent regulations enhancing shareholders’ participation and expanding compensation disclosure.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101708"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141615127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101718
Bradford F. Hepfer , Hannah W. Judd , Sarah C. Rice
Using the IPO setting, we test whether firms signal the quality of their investments in innovation activities by claiming R&D tax credits. We find the presence and amount of the R&D credit are each associated with lower information asymmetry and with higher investor demand at IPO. Conservatively, we estimate that sample firms realize additional IPO proceeds of 32–45 percent of their creditable R&D expenditures, indicating economically significant non-tax benefits associated with the R&D credit. We verify the R&D credit signal by showing its positive association with firms’ future patenting activity, patent citations, and post-IPO stock returns. Results from these tests are concentrated among firms limited in their ability to obtain tax benefits from R&D credits, consistent with the R&D credit providing nontax benefits as a signal of innovation investment quality.
{"title":"Signaling innovation: The nontax benefits of claiming R&D tax credits","authors":"Bradford F. Hepfer , Hannah W. Judd , Sarah C. Rice","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101718","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101718","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using the IPO setting, we test whether firms signal the quality of their investments in innovation activities by claiming R&D tax credits. We find the presence and amount of the R&D credit are each associated with lower information asymmetry and with higher investor demand at IPO. Conservatively, we estimate that sample firms realize additional IPO proceeds of 32–45 percent of their creditable R&D expenditures, indicating economically significant non-tax benefits associated with the R&D credit. We verify the R&D credit signal by showing its positive association with firms’ future patenting activity, patent citations, and post-IPO stock returns. Results from these tests are concentrated among firms limited in their ability to obtain tax benefits from R&D credits, consistent with the R&D credit providing nontax benefits as a signal of innovation investment quality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101718"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143508659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101709
Ana Albuquerque , Mary Ellen Carter , Zhe (Michael) Guo , Luann J. Lynch
This paper examines complexity in CEO compensation contracts. We develop a measure of compensation complexity and provide empirical evidence that complexity has increased substantially over time. We document that complexity results not only from factors reflecting efficient contracting, but also from external pressures from compensation consultants, institutional investors, proxy advisors, and attempts to benchmark to peers, with these external factors having greater impact in more recent years. Examining consequences of contract complexity, we find an association with lower future firm performance that is related to the influence of external factors on compensation design. We further find this relation is partially mitigated when a contract's performance metrics are more highly correlated, consistent with information processing costs hampering decision-making. Collectively, these findings confirm concerns raised by investors and the media regarding compensation complexity and can inform boards in their design of CEO pay packages.
{"title":"Complexity of CEO compensation packages","authors":"Ana Albuquerque , Mary Ellen Carter , Zhe (Michael) Guo , Luann J. Lynch","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101709","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101709","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines complexity in CEO compensation contracts. We develop a measure of compensation complexity and provide empirical evidence that complexity has increased substantially over time. We document that complexity results not only from factors reflecting efficient contracting, but also from external pressures from compensation consultants, institutional investors, proxy advisors, and attempts to benchmark to peers, with these external factors having greater impact in more recent years. Examining consequences of contract complexity, we find an association with lower future firm performance that is related to the influence of external factors on compensation design. We further find this relation is partially mitigated when a contract's performance metrics are more highly correlated, consistent with information processing costs hampering decision-making. Collectively, these findings confirm concerns raised by investors and the media regarding compensation complexity and can inform boards in their design of CEO pay packages.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101709"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141556930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101707
Kathy Rupar , Sean Wang , Hayoung Yoon
We find that the adverse impact of bad news on analysts’ valuations is 57% larger when the CEO is Non-White, resulting in more pessimistic valuations for Non-White CEOs relative to their White counterparts. Non-White CEO firms are more likely to surpass analysts’ valuation targets in the subsequent 12 months, suggesting that this racial gap lacks economic justification. To provide further evidence of a racial bias: (1) we triangulate our empirical findings with corroborating evidence from a controlled experiment and (2) we provide evidence that analysts’ valuation disparities towards Non-White CEO firms become larger when race relations are worse. Increases in CEO familiarity attenuate these disparities, suggesting the bias we document appears to be subconscious. Our findings suggest that resources allocated towards educating a firm’s stakeholders about the potential impact of implicit racial biases and increasing self-awareness may be impactful in promoting equality within capital markets.
{"title":"Do sell-side analysts react too pessimistically to bad news for minority-led firms? Evidence from target price valuations","authors":"Kathy Rupar , Sean Wang , Hayoung Yoon","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101707","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101707","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We find that the adverse impact of bad news on analysts’ valuations is 57% larger when the CEO is Non-White, resulting in more pessimistic valuations for Non-White CEOs relative to their White counterparts. Non-White CEO firms are more likely to surpass analysts’ valuation targets in the subsequent 12 months, suggesting that this racial gap lacks economic justification. To provide further evidence of a racial bias: (1) we triangulate our empirical findings with corroborating evidence from a controlled experiment and (2) we provide evidence that analysts’ valuation disparities towards Non-White CEO firms become larger when race relations are worse. Increases in CEO familiarity attenuate these disparities, suggesting the bias we document appears to be subconscious. Our findings suggest that resources allocated towards educating a firm’s stakeholders about the potential impact of implicit racial biases and increasing self-awareness may be impactful in promoting equality within capital markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101707"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141931485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101732
Michael Minnis , Andrew G. Sutherland , Felix W. Vetter
Using a dataset covering 3 million commercial borrower financial statements, we document a substantial, nearly monotonic decline in banks’ use of attested financial statements (AFS) in lending over the past two decades. Two market forces help explain this trend. First, technological advances provide lenders with access to a growing array of borrower information sources that can substitute for AFS. Second, banks are increasingly competing with nonbank lenders that rely less on AFS in screening and monitoring. Our results illustrate how technology adoption and changes in credit market structure can render AFS less efficient than alternative information sources for screening and monitoring.
{"title":"Financial statements not required","authors":"Michael Minnis , Andrew G. Sutherland , Felix W. Vetter","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101732","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101732","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using a dataset covering 3 million commercial borrower financial statements, we document a substantial, nearly monotonic decline in banks’ use of attested financial statements (AFS) in lending over the past two decades. Two market forces help explain this trend. First, technological advances provide lenders with access to a growing array of borrower information sources that can substitute for AFS. Second, banks are increasingly competing with nonbank lenders that rely less on AFS in screening and monitoring. Our results illustrate how technology adoption and changes in credit market structure can render AFS less efficient than alternative information sources for screening and monitoring.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 2","pages":"Article 101732"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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