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Assessing the objective function of the SEC against financial misconduct: A structural approach 评估美国证券交易委员会对金融不端行为的目标功能:一种结构方法
IF 6.8 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101794
Chuan Chen , Yanrong Jia , Xiumin Martin , Bernardo Silveira
We examine the objective function of the SEC against financial misconduct by estimating a structural model of the interactions between the SEC and a regulated firm. The SEC considers social costs, enforcement costs, and firms' compliance costs when making enforcement decisions. Identification exploits SOX as a shock to enforcement intensity. Four insights emerge from counterfactual analyses. First, marginal social costs have a greater impact on the SEC's perceived welfare than marginal enforcement costs. Second, the SEC's current enforcement mitigates earnings management to a level close to the first-best scenario. Third, a “hawkish” regulator, who perceives high social costs of financial misconduct, would impose excessive costs on society. Lastly, removing regulatory discretion would result in higher penalties and lower welfare, with little effect on earnings management.
我们通过估计SEC和被监管公司之间相互作用的结构模型来检验SEC对金融不端行为的目标函数。美国证券交易委员会在做出执法决定时考虑社会成本、执法成本和公司的合规成本。识别利用SOX作为对执行强度的冲击。从反事实分析中可以得出四个见解。首先,边际社会成本比边际执法成本对证交会感知福利的影响更大。其次,美国证交会目前的执法将盈余管理减轻到接近第一种最佳情况的水平。第三,认识到金融不端行为的高社会成本的“鹰派”监管者,将给社会带来过高的成本。最后,取消监管自由裁量权将导致更高的惩罚和更低的福利,对盈余管理几乎没有影响。
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引用次数: 0
Vocal delivery quality in earnings conference calls 收益电话会议的声音传递质量
IF 6.8 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101763
Bok Baik , Alex G. Kim , David S. Kim , Sangwon Yoon
We study the economic consequences of managers’ vocal delivery quality during earnings conference calls. We introduce a novel measure, vocal delivery quality, that captures the acoustic comprehensibility of audio information for an average listener. Our measure relies on a deep-learning algorithm applied to a large sample of earnings call audio files. Consistent with predictions from the psychology and accounting literatures, we find evidence that the quality of managers’ vocal delivery deteriorates when they deliver negative news, such as a decrease in earnings or negative narrative information, and positive but transitory earnings news. We show that the stock market reacts in real time to managers’ vocal delivery quality. We also document that the vocal delivery quality has an effect on information intermediaries such as analysts and the media. Overall, our findings underscore the role of vocal dimensions in corporate oral disclosures.
我们研究了经理人在财报电话会议中声音传递质量的经济后果。我们介绍了一个新的测量,声音传递质量,捕捉音频信息的声学可理解性为一个普通的听众。我们的测量方法依赖于一种深度学习算法,该算法应用于大量财报电话会议音频文件样本。与心理学和会计文献的预测一致,我们发现有证据表明,当管理者传递负面消息(如收益减少或负面叙事信息)和积极但短暂的收益消息时,他们的声音传递质量会恶化。我们的研究表明,股票市场会对经理人的声音传递质量做出实时反应。我们也证明了声音传递质量对信息中介如分析师和媒体有影响。总体而言,我们的研究结果强调了发声维度在企业口头披露中的作用。
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引用次数: 0
Signaling long-term information using short-term forecasts 用短期预报来传递长期信息
IF 6.8 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101768
Mirko S. Heinle , Chongho Kim , Daniel J. Taylor , Frank S. Zhou
This paper shows theoretically and empirically that the decision to disclose a short-term earnings forecast can reveal managers’ private information about long-term performance. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that the decision to disclose a short-term earnings forecast predicts long-term performance for up to three years. The relation strengthens when current period performance is poor, when managers have longer horizons, and when competitive threats are lower. Endogenizing the proprietary costs of disclosure, our analysis suggests that––despite the short horizon––the decision to provide an earnings forecast contains significant information about long-term performance and thus can entail proprietary costs.
本文从理论和实证两方面证明,披露短期盈余预测的决策可以揭示经理人关于长期业绩的私人信息。与我们模型的预测一致,我们发现披露短期盈利预测的决定可以预测长达三年的长期业绩。当当期业绩不佳、管理者有更长远的眼光、竞争威胁较低时,这种关系就会加强。将披露的专有成本内部化,我们的分析表明,尽管是短期的,但提供盈利预测的决定包含了有关长期业绩的重要信息,因此可能需要专有成本。
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引用次数: 0
The asset pricing and real implications of relationship intensity disclosure 关系强度披露的资产定价及其现实意义
IF 6.8 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101770
Xu Jiang , Jordi Mondria , Liyan Yang
Investors in financial markets are often uncertain about the relationship intensity between firms and have to rely on firms’ disclosure of such relationship intensity. We analytically study the asset pricing implications of this relationship intensity uncertainty and how such uncertainty affects firms’ incentives to form and disclose their relationship intensities (i.e., the real implications). We find that while such disclosure has a positive price impact by increasing the expected cash flow, it also has a negative impact by reducing the diversification benefit of investing in multiple firms that have more correlated cash flows. The price impact upon relationship intensity disclosure is therefore not monotone: it increases with the expected benefit of relationship and decreases with the risk of the underlying relationship. Our analysis implies that mandatory disclosure of firm relationship intensities may both destroy relationship development and reduce investor welfare, i.e., has adverse real consequences.
金融市场上的投资者通常无法确定公司之间的关系强度,只能依赖于公司对这种关系强度的披露。我们分析研究了这种关系强度不确定性对资产定价的影响,以及这种不确定性如何影响企业形成和披露其关系强度的动机(即实际影响)。我们发现,虽然这种披露会增加预期现金流,从而对价格产生积极影响,但同时也会减少投资于现金流相关性更高的多家公司的多样化收益,从而产生负面影响。因此,披露关系强度对价格的影响并不是单调的:它随关系的预期收益而增加,随潜在关系的风险而减少。我们的分析表明,强制披露公司关系强度既可能破坏关系发展,也可能降低投资者福利,即产生不利的实际后果。
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引用次数: 0
Tax enforcement and R&D credits 税收执法和研发信贷
IF 6.8 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101784
Mary Cowx
Tax enforcement deters noncompliance, increasing tax revenue, but may also discourage taxpayer investment in activities that policymakers aim to incentivize through tax credits and deductions. This paper investigates this investment-revenue trade-off through the lens of the research and development (R&D) tax credit, a federal tax incentive that is highly scrutinized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). My results suggest that expectations about IRS corporate tax scrutiny are negatively associated with both R&D tax credits and R&D investment, on average. I estimate each $1 of aggregate enforcement spending is associated with a reduction in R&D tax credits of $2.64. In terms of elasticities, a 1 % increase in my estimate of IRS corporate tax scrutiny is associated with a decline in R&D tax credits and R&D investment of 0.4 % and 0.2 %, respectively. A survey of 116 managers further supports that the risk of IRS scrutiny affects both R&D tax credit take-up and R&D investment decisions. Moreover, both the survey responses and archival evidence underscore the importance of internal information quality in claiming R&D tax credits, suggesting tax policy simplification as a means to address enforcement-related declines in R&D investment.
税收执法可以遏制违规行为,增加税收收入,但也可能阻碍纳税人对政策制定者旨在通过税收抵免和减免激励的活动进行投资。本文通过研究与开发(R&D)税收抵免这一受到美国国内税收署(IRS)高度关注的联邦税收激励措施来研究这种投资与收入之间的权衡。我的研究结果表明,对国税局企业税收审查的预期与研发税收抵免和研发投资平均呈负相关。我估计,每增加 1 美元的总体执法支出,研发税收抵免就会减少 2.64 美元。就弹性而言,我估计国税局企业税收审查每增加 1%,研发税收抵免和研发投资就会分别减少 0.4% 和 0.2%。对 116 位经理的调查进一步证明,国税局审查风险会影响研发税收抵免和研发投资决策。此外,调查答复和档案证据都强调了内部信息质量在申请研究与开发税收抵免中的重要性,这表明简化税收政策是解决与执法相关的研究与开发投资下降问题的一种手段。
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引用次数: 0
Preference dynamics and risk-taking incentives 偏好动态和冒险动机
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101739
Xiao Cen , Nan Li , Chao Tang , Juanting Wang
This study explores the relationship between executive compensation and the preference dynamics of managers and shareholders. Our analysis centers on the theoretical prediction that changes in firms' asset value can differentially affect the risk-taking preferences of the two groups, potentially influencing the optimal compensation policy. Utilizing local real estate price changes to identify variations in firms’ asset value, we find that a decrease in asset value leads to more risk-taking incentives in compensation, and this effect is more pronounced in firms that are more likely to be influenced by the hypothesized mechanisms. In the second empirical setting, we provide corroborating evidence using a natural experiment involving disaster-induced negative shocks to the firm fundamentals. Collectively, our findings suggest that the design of compensation contracts facilitates incentive alignment by incorporating the dynamic preferences of the contracting parties.
本研究探讨了高管薪酬与经理人和股东偏好动态之间的关系。我们的分析集中在理论预测上,即企业资产价值的变化会对两类人的冒险偏好产生不同的影响,从而潜在地影响最优薪酬政策。利用当地房地产价格变化来识别企业资产价值的变化,我们发现资产价值的下降导致薪酬中更多的冒险激励,并且这种效应在更容易受到假设机制影响的企业中更为明显。在第二个实证设置中,我们使用自然实验提供了确凿的证据,该实验涉及灾害引起的对公司基本面的负面冲击。总的来说,我们的研究结果表明,薪酬合同的设计通过纳入合同各方的动态偏好来促进激励对齐。
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引用次数: 0
Global evidence on profit shifting within firms and across time 企业内部和不同时期利润转移的全球证据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101744
Fotis Delis , Manthos D. Delis , Luc Laeven , Steven Ongena
We provide estimates of profit shifting for over 2 million firm-year observations in 100 countries over the period 2009–2020. Employing nonparametric estimation techniques within a mainstay model of profit shifting, we examine how the profits of both parent and subsidiary firms within a multinational group respond to marginal changes in the composite tax indicator. The key advantage of this approach is that it yields firm-year estimates of profit shifting. Multinational firms engage in extensive profit shifting by maintaining affiliates in low-tax countries and zero-tax havens. Multinational groups with an ultimate tax-haven owner exhibit the largest profit response to tax incentives. Our new database opens important avenues for analyzing the sources and effects of profit shifting.
我们提供了 2009-2020 年间 100 个国家 200 多万个企业年观测值的利润转移估计值。我们在利润转移的主要模型中采用了非参数估计技术,考察了跨国集团中母公司和子公司的利润如何对综合税收指标的边际变化做出反应。这种方法的主要优势在于它能得出利润转移的公司年度估计值。跨国公司通过在低税率国家和零避税地设立分支机构进行广泛的利润转移。拥有最终避税港所有者的跨国集团对税收优惠政策的利润反应最大。我们的新数据库为分析利润转移的来源和影响开辟了重要途径。
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引用次数: 0
Contract contingencies and uncertainty: Evidence from product market contracts 合同意外情况和不确定性:产品市场合同的证据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101743
Kai Wai Hui , Jun Oh , Guoman She , P. Eric Yeung
We study contingencies written in firms' material product market contracts, focusing on the theoretical prediction of uncertainty as an important determinant. We identify contract contingencies from firms’ public regulatory filings and examine the effects of general business uncertainty and specific innovation-related uncertainty. To enhance causal inference, we utilize two major business shocks (i.e., the 2008 Financial Crisis and the COVID pandemic) and the diffusion of 29 disruptive innovation shocks (Bloom et al., 2021). We also explore the effects of re-negotiation costs and writing costs. Overall, our empirical results are consistent with predictions from dynamic models of incomplete contracting.
我们研究了企业重大产品市场合同中的或有事项,重点关注不确定性作为重要决定因素的理论预测。我们从企业的公共监管文件中识别合同中的或有事项,并研究一般商业不确定性和特定创新相关不确定性的影响。为了加强因果推论,我们利用了两大商业冲击(即 2008 年金融危机和 COVID 大流行)和 29 个破坏性创新冲击的扩散(Bloom 等人,2021 年)。我们还探讨了重新谈判成本和书面成本的影响。总体而言,我们的实证结果与不完全契约动态模型的预测一致。
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引用次数: 0
Do personal income taxes affect corporate tax-motivated profit shifting? 个人所得税会影响企业税收驱动的利润转移吗?
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101758
Antonio De Vito , Lisa Hillmann , Martin Jacob , Robert Vossebürger
This paper examines the role of personal income taxes on multinationals' corporate tax-induced profit shifting. As mandated in most OECD countries, firms need economic substance in low corporate-tax countries to justify profit shifting to these countries. Because high personal income taxes raise labor costs and thus the cost of providing economic substance, we predict that personal income taxes mute profit shifting. Using data from 26 European countries, we find that personal income taxes substantially reduce profit shifting to low corporate-tax jurisdictions, particularly when parent countries impose strict substance requirements. We also find that firms use employees to justify economic substance and that the effect of the personal income tax is related to its incidence falling partly on firms. Our results show important interactions between personal and corporate income taxes that reduce multinationals’ profit-shifting activities when substance requirements are implemented as in the European Union or many OECD countries.
本文考察了个人所得税在跨国公司税收诱导利润转移中的作用。正如大多数经合组织国家规定的那样,企业需要在低公司税国家的经济实体来证明利润转移到这些国家的合理性。由于高个人所得税提高了劳动力成本,从而提高了提供经济物质的成本,我们预测个人所得税抑制了利润转移。使用来自26个欧洲国家的数据,我们发现个人所得税大大减少了利润向低公司税管辖区的转移,特别是当母国实施严格的实质要求时。我们还发现,企业利用员工来证明经济实体的合理性,个人所得税的影响与其部分落在企业身上的发生率有关。我们的研究结果表明,当欧盟或许多经合组织国家实施实质要求时,个人所得税和公司所得税之间的重要相互作用减少了跨国公司的利润转移活动。
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引用次数: 0
Acknowledgement 确认
IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101786
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引用次数: 0
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Journal of Accounting & Economics
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