Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science最新文献

This paper aims to foster a conceptual synthesis between enactivist theories of memory and cultural-historical activity theory, exploring their shared rejection of internalist models of cognition. By comparing these frameworks, we argue that both converge on a socially embedded, ecologically grounded understanding of memory as a dynamic, mediated activity rather than a static mental repository. Central to this integration is the dialectical interplay of internalization and externalization, through which psychological functions emerge via engagement with tools, signs, and social practices. We highlight how the activity-theoretical concept of functional organs parallels enactivist notions of embodied and extended cognition, situating memory within historically structured environments and practical activity. Further, we incorporate levels of processing theory to show that cognitive depth arises not from abstract effort alone, but through meaningful, socially mediated interaction. Labor is examined as a paradigmatic form of sense-making, demonstrating how memory becomes sedimented in material culture through cooperative activity and ecological norm development. Ultimately, this cross-theoretical dialogue reveals memory as historically constituted and ecologically distributed, emerging from the reciprocal relationship between embodied agents and their socio-material worlds.

Crises are everywhere - from environmental collapses, wars, and skyrocketing inequalities to ageing populations and pandemics, yet there is no universal way that individuals respond to these. What can be said about these? This is an invitation for us, loosely defined as social, cultural and developmental psychologists, to stop and think: we emphasise the role crises play in human and cultural development. Our starting point is that, to consider the relevance of crises for human societies and individuals, one needs to address them in time, that is, developmentally; and that one cannot understand development without understanding of crises. Furthermore, a sociocultural psychological perspective is particularly suited for teasing out people's diverse experiences and perspectives on similar events, and how crises emerge, develop, and resonate in unique ways across life courses. This article first retraces the etymology of the terms crises and development, and then reviews how crises and development have been articulated in the history of psychology. From there, we turn to the question of crises in development. We present three epistemological principles of our sociocultural stance for studying crises and developments: temporalities and spatialities matters; experiences are dialogical and perspectival; and an idiographic approach offers fertile ground for capturing their complexity.

What is the relationship between our theories of rupture (which view it as a basis for learning and development) and narratives of rupture (myths, novels, films, etc.)? On the one hand there are striking convergences. Both entail a variant of the following sequence: steady state, breach, crisis, and resolution or transformation. But, on the other hand, there are important differences. Narratives are multi-functional: they allow us to approach our fears, be entertained, pre-imagine crises, and they can become symbolic resources within crises, helping us to navigate ruptures. We argue that, rather than being mirrors of rupture, narratives of rupture are help us to navigate ruptures. This is formalized in model that shows how narratives enable us to pre-imagine ruptures, identify the early warning signs of a rupture, support our problem-solving, and subsequently narrate our rupture experiences. The model emphasizes the limits of narratives as symbolic resources within ruptures. Narrative guidance can fail, canalizing and constraining semiotic mediation in unhelpful ways. Due to inherent limitations of narratives as resources for ruptures, we propose that narratives also often provide meta-cultural guidance to ignore cultural guidance.

In this chapter, I draw inspiration from American psychologist Jim Lamiell to explore the original meanings of the terms "idiographic" and "nomothetic" as conceptualized by Wilhelm Windelband in 1894. Windelband critiqued the traditional division between natural and human sciences, proposing instead a new classification system that distinguishes scientific inquiries into idiographic and nomothetic fields. According to Windelband, scientific endeavors should be categorized based on the researcher's goals: if the aim is to discover general, invariant laws governing physical and mental phenomena, the approach is nomothetic. In contrast, if the goal is to understand the uniqueness and depth of individual experiences, literature, or national moods-among other psychophysically neutral phenomena-the research is idiographic. This chapter demonstrates that historically, idiographic and nomothetic research were intended to complement and enrich each other. In the latter part of the paper, I contrast Windelband's historical interpretation with modern views that often equate quantitative, statistical research (generalizations from samples to populations) with nomothetic research and single-case qualitative research with idiographic. I argue that this modern interpretation diverges from Windelband's original concepts and suggest, in line with Lamiell, that population generalization may be more sensitive to cultural and historical contexts, thus aligning more closely with idiographic research than commonly assumed. Building on this analysis, I introduce the concept of synthography as a novel methodological framework aimed at integrating nomothetic and idiographic perspectives into a more comprehensive and culturally grounded approach to psychological inquiry.

In their understanding of extremism, social psychologists discuss the processes of social identity formation, self-categorization and categorization of the other. In this paper, we posit that these processes are related to basic, primitive unconscious mechanisms which have been overlooked in the literature on extremism. A bi-disciplinary model for the understanding of the extremist mindset is crafted, integrating the similarities between social psychology constructs and psychoanalytical themes. The proposed model rests on the assumption that there is no competition between the two paradigms.

This article introduces the concept of protoexistence-a pre-reflective, affective layer of experience that resists narrative integration and challenges conventional frameworks of temporality and subjectivity. Drawing on foundational insights from Husserl's internal time-consciousness (1998) and Merleau-Ponty's later reflections on the visible and the invisible (1969), this article explores how certain dimensions of lived experience emerge not through articulated meaning but through rupture, silence, bodily intensity, and incoherence. Protoexistence, as theorized here, resonates with Marion's (1997) saturated phenomenon, Levinas's (1978) il y a, and Henry's (2011) conception of life as affectively self-revealing, prior to intentional thought. Building on recent developments in affective and embodied phenomenology (Zahavi, 2016; Fuchs, 2018; Ratcliffe, 2022), the article critiques the tendency of qualitative research to prioritize coherence and thematic unity, often excluding affective gaps, somatic dislocations, and temporal suspensions. While the main contribution lies in the conceptual elaboration of protoexistence, the article also proposes an extension of the method of Phenomenological Mapping (PM) (Pacheco & Fossa, 2025), adapting it to trace these unstable phenomena. Through methodological innovations-such as mapping corporeal disruptions, listening to the unsaid, and preserving temporal incoherence-PM is shown to offer a fertile ground for exploring the ungraspable residues of experience. This reconceptualization challenges dominant assumptions about subjectivity and expands the epistemological horizons of phenomenological inquiry.

Young people who travel across national borders as unaccompanied minors have become central figures in modern narrations about the 'migration crisis'. At the macrosocial level, legal and policy frameworks intended to protect unaccompanied minors at times explicitly, or inadvertently, create everyday 'crises' at the microsocial level as part of asylum and welfare provision for children. In this paper, we use sociocultural approaches and dialogical theorising to examine how everyday 'crisis' are created at the psychological level, through misalignments in the self-other relationship between unaccompanied minors and professional adults. To do so, we add to these theoretical ideas the concepts of misrecognition and dialogical approaches to trust, to examine the forms of sense-making in both parties. We illustrate our theoretical points by drawing on data from the Children caring on the Move (CCoM) project. A dialogical analysis was undertaken on 112 semi-structured interviews with adults from several sectors (e.g. social worker, law, NGOs, healthcare, education, accommodation services, policy) and participatory approaches involving 75 interviews with 38 unaccompanied young people, including care object interviews and day-in-the-life interviews. The self-other misalignments discussed are 'I-as-agentic-self' as misaligned with 'They-as-savvy-users-of-the-system', and 'I-as-detective/truth-seeker' as misaligned with 'They-are-testing-you'. We argue that both young people and adults can get caught in a dialogical loop of misrecognition, leading to the development of mistrust.

Perspective-taking-the capacity to understand others' thoughts and feelings from their point of view-is foundational to effective social interaction. Recent conceptualizations in relational frame theory (RFT) offer a rigorous framework for training perspective-taking through deictic relational frames. However, existing RFT-based interventions often fall short in terms of ecological validity. Moreover, their individualistic orientation is not grounded in social interaction, and they tend to underestimate emotional processes. This limits their generalizability to real-life interpersonal contexts. This review identifies two primary limitations of current RFT-based approaches: (1) underestimation and insufficient integration of emotional (empathic) processes and (2) training protocols that diverge from naturalistic social settings. I utilized the organizational model (Davis, 1994), which highlights dynamic reciprocal interactions between cognitive perspective-taking and emotional empathy, to address these limitations. Drawing from empirical research across clinical, educational, and organizational domains, I outline conceptual and methodological strategies for integrating emotional resonance and real-world contextualization into RFT-based training. This perspective aims to bridge the gap between theoretical precision and practical relevance, fostering interventions that more faithfully mirror human social functioning.