Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science最新文献

This volume makes a notable contribution with a deep and extensive analysis to achieve the movement from Yoga Philosophy to Yoga Psychology for the promotion of integration with Modern Psychology, a task hitherto unrealized despite the burgeoning attention to Yoga. This commentary is constrained by my own limited knowledge of traditional Indian philosophy in making a thorough examination of Paranjpe's contribution beyond attention to selected concepts and sporadic illustrations from the original volume. Yoga practice is, Paranjpe informs us, just the tip of an immense consolidation of knowledge, deep intellectual thought and theoretical consideration about the embodied sense of self, health and well-being. Spirituality is foundational to the theory and practice of yoga. This volume has immense potential relevance for contemporary psychological theory and practice in an attempt to highlight embodied and spiritual considerations of human existence. With some notable exceptions, modern psychology has adopted the positivistic paradigm that systematically rejects traditional knowledge systems. Through intercultural translation (a concept I borrow from Santos, 2018), Paranjpe successfully transcends this divide and provides detailed possibilities about why and how this knowledge can relate to, inform and expand the science of human being and becoming that is inclusive, built for mutuality rather than domination; travelling on the path of dialogue between diverse knowledge systems.

This article aims to reconceptualize the replication crisis as not merely a problem of flawed methods, lack of scientific rigor, or questionable researcher conduct, but as a fundamentally epistemological and philosophical issue. While improved methodologies and scientific practices are necessary, they must be considered through the lens of the underlying epistemologies. Toward this end, a new paradigm for psychological research and practice, grounded in second-order cybernetics and transactional causality, is proposed as instrumental. Second-order cybernetics, as introduced by Heinz von Foerster, challenges traditional scientific methodologies that assume a strict separation between the observer and the observed. The core idea is that the observer, through the very act of observing, inevitably becomes part of the system they study, leading to a shift from linear to transactional causality. This epistemological shift has profound implications for the research practice and the responsibility of the psychology practitioner. Foerster's ethical imperative -act always so as to increase the number of choices- combined with the aesthetic imperative -If you desire to see, learn how to act- illuminates an alternative methodological landscape for the clinical practice. The replication crisis in psychology is examined in light of these theoretical shifts, allowing for a new constructive vision which integrates basic research with applied psychological practice. Second-order cybernetics encourages a participatory approach to research, emphasizing the catalyzing role of the observing practitioner. The article concludes by advocating for an epistemological superposition, where psychologists navigate multiple perspectives to enhance the integrity and applicability of their findings in the real world.

This article explores the embodied dimension of authoring life trajectories for individuals who have undergone heart transplantation. Confronting the radical otherness of existential finitude can create a rich context for examining the relationships between authorship, corporeality, and creative processes. By integrating Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body with Susanne Langer's theory of affective semiosis and presentational signs, this work aims to foster a productive dialogue between these perspectives, grounded in Semiotic Cultural Psychology, which meta-theoretically synthesizes a diverse range of knowledge on the transformative interaction between individuals and culture. The article presents three participants' cases, selected for their ideographic expressiveness, as empirical evidence that both enlivens and enriches this study's theoretical and epistemological foundations. The fragments of participants' elaborations were derived from individual interviews conducted at the IMIP heart transplant clinic between 2022 and 2023. IMIP is a university hospital located in Recife. The interviewees were adults who had undergone transplantation at least one year prior. The discussion of the reports highlights three interpretative axes: (a) embodied ambiguities and tensions experienced; (b) living metaphors and potential presentational signs regarding life trajectories; (c) ways of referencing the future and temporality of experiences felt intensely in the present and their methods of reconstructing the past. The interpretative analysis of participants' metaphors aims to shed light on the role of corporeality in the construction of meaning and, consequently, in the creative perspective of life and the sense of authorship when facing the alterity, in this case, specifically of illness and consecutive heart transplantation. This article seeks to contribute to studying affective semiosis and corporeality in Cultural Psychology by highlighting its hermeneutic relevance as a critical feature of the human cultural construction of the self, others, and the world.

This interview article explores how British anthropologist Tim Ingold's work can inspire innovation in mental health and the psy disciplines. Ingold critiques dominant biomedical and individualistic approaches, arguing for the importance of caring attentiveness and abolishing dichotomies like those between surface and depth, when engaging with people to understand and assist them. Instead, he suggests viewing human existence as correspondences with environmental, social, and relational others. The interview highlights the concept of "doing-undergoing," proposing that care is a reciprocal, relational process. Ingold's ideas suggest a shift towards practices that engage directly with the world and promote attentiveness to human and more-than-human relations. The article encourages practitioners, educators and students of mental health disciplines to rethink traditional models and adopt more humane approaches.

The paper analyzes current discussions concerning the so called "replicability crisis" - a notion describing difficulties in attempts to confirm existing research findings by their additional scrutiny or by new empirical studies. We propose interpretation that this "crisis" may be seen as a manifestation of the increasing inconsistency between, on the one hand, the outdated views on a human being and social structures dominating in the academic mainstream across various disciplines, including psychology and sociology, and, on the other hand, the reality of the emerging new stage of societal evolution, neo-structuration, which brings to the forefront individual agency. Our analysis suggests the possibilities for the future inter-disciplinary paradigmatic shift, which implies putting in the center of research not the idea of a constant or predictably developing individual in the context of solid external structures operating in line with a presumably sustainable "progress". Instead, under increasing neo-structuration, individual agency becomes, simultaneously, a manifestation of the essence of human nature (as cultural psychology argues) and the driving force for societal transformations, including solving most acute social problems, in the concrete historical period. It means a fundamentally new task for social sciences and humanities: to elaborate methodological solutions and theoretical frameworks to systematically comprehend the contextually conditioned human ability to create and transform - and not only to reproduce. Addressing more attention to agency manifestations in digital environment and, in particular, to those congruent to social activism or volunteering, seems especially fruitful for comprehending human activity in the neo-structurated world.

This theoretical paper offers an in-depth examination of the intersection between Theory of Mind (ToM) and artificial intelligence (AI), drawing on developmental psychology and philosophical analysis. By investigating the key developmental stages at which children begin to understand that others have distinct mental states, the paper provides a framework for assessing the cognitive boundaries of AI systems. It critically interrogates the pervasive human inclination to anthropomorphize machines, particularly through the attribution of complex mental states like "knowing," "thinking," or "believing" to AI entities that lack subjective experience. The paper argues that AI, while capable of simulating cognitive processes, operates without the conscious awareness that defines human cognition, raising profound epistemological and ethical questions. It explores the broader implications of this projection for society, considering how our conceptualization of AI affects both technological development and social structures. Ultimately, this interdisciplinary inquiry calls for a more nuanced understanding of the distinctions between human and machine cognition, advocating for responsible approaches to AI as its capabilities evolve.

In this article, the authors aim to offer a perspective on self-compassion capable of becoming part of a unified psychology; however not "from scratch", but based on what Neff (2003a, b) proposed. This is through the analysis and refinement of her theory in two stages. First, they check whether the supposed six factors exist in the constitution of self-compassion using the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) technique in a collected sample for this study (249 participants, 69.8% women ranging in age from 18 to 65, median = 22). In the second stage, they analyze and refine Neff's theory based on the results of the EFA, and in light of an evolutionary perspective and Aristotle's philosophy, following, respectively, the suggestions proposed by Zagaria et al. (2020); Osmo and Borri (2024a) that aim to unify psychological science.

The present paper treats the issue of methodological assumptions in mainstream neuropsychology and, as counter-concepts, in Vygotsky's approach and Holzkamp's critical psychology. The analysis identifies four main assumptions concerning the methodology of mainstream neuropsychology, which are contrasted with the positions of other approaches. The methodologies of the mainstream neuropsychology vs. Holzkamp's and Vygotsky's approach assume: (1) mechanistic vs. dialectical materialism; (2) formal vs. dialectical logic; (3) decomposition into elements vs. units; (4) reductionism of psychic processes to the brain vs. activity as a unity of environmental and organism-pole. Despite the vast coincidence in their main assumptions, we also discuss nuances of difference between Holzkamp's and Vygotsky's approaches. The former, possibly due to its reference to cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) and its theoretical neglection of the organism-pole of psychic functions, falls short of structural considerations in its accounts on phylogenetic emergence. On the other hand, Vygotsky's neuropsychology does not fully explore the phylogenetic emergence of basic units of functional psychic organisation. This might be due to certain implications of Vygotsky's initial accounts, which seem to highlight cultural development to the detriment of phylogenetic one.

The paper critically analyses cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) in two most important aspects - the basic unit of analysis (i.e., in essence, the subject of the theory) and the main epistemological and methodological principles. It is shown with several examples that the concepts and principles that CHAT took from Vygotsky's theory are absent in Vygotsky's theory and are ascribed to him by misunderstanding and misinterpretation. One may agree or disagree that cultural-historical theory and activity theory are different theories, despite their historical connections, but Leontiev's theory has no activity (and the concept of activity! ) as a unit of analysis, because the principle of the unity of consciousness and activity theory represents a completely different logic of analysis, which does not need units of analysis at all.

Exploring the nuanced and often elusive realm of pre-reflective consciousness presents a methodological challenge, as it involves capturing experiences that arise prior to reflective thought and language. This article introduces Phenomenological Mapping, an innovative research method designed to systematically study the pre-reflective dimensions of human experience. Grounded in the foundational theories of Edmund Husserl (2012), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2013), and Martin Heidegger (1992, 2008), the approach also integrates contemporary perspectives from Dan Zahavi (1999, Contemporary Phenomenology and Qualitative Research 5(1), 1-17, 2021), Shaun Gallagher (2006, 2017), and Evan Thompson (2010, 2017). Drawing upon advancements in neurophenomenology, embodied cognition, and intersubjectivity, Phenomenological Mapping provides a structured framework for accessing and analyzing pre-reflective consciousness. This methodology guides researchers through a sequence of eleven phases, from initial preparation and contextualization to data collection, analysis, and integration. It employs Husserl's phenomenological reduction, Merleau-Ponty's concept of embodied perception, and Heidegger's exploration of being-in-the-world. The approach is further enriched by Zahavi's intersubjectivity, Gallagher's work on embodiment, and Thompson's continuum of consciousness. By utilizing multisensory data collection techniques-such as visual diaries, audio recordings, and experiential practices-Phenomenological Mapping offers a multi-dimensional approach to analyzing subjective experience. This research contributes a novel methodological tool to phenomenology, facilitating an empirical investigation that remains faithful to the philosophical foundations of pre-reflective consciousness while bridging empirical and theoretical domains.