Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science最新文献

In this philosophical-theoretical study of Lev Tolstoy's pedagogical legacy of his Yasnaya Polyana school in the Russian Empire (1859-1862), I raised three major questions: (1) was Lev Tolstoy a democratic educator, and if so, why can one claim that, (2) if so, what kind of a democratic educator was he, and (3) what kind of limitations to his democratic education have I observe and what were the sources of these limitations? My answer to the first question was unequivocally positive. I argue that Tolstoy was the conceptual founder of democratic non-coercive education and the first known practitioner of democratic education for children. In my view, his democratic education was based on educational offerings provided by the teachers. His democratic educational philosophy was based on non-coercion, naturalism, anarchism, liveliness, pragmatism, pedagogical experimentation, student responses, pedagogical self-reflection, and dialogism. At the same time, his democratic education was limited to his uncritical acceptance of conventionalism. Tolstoy's attraction to Progressive Education was facilitated by ignoring his enormous powers, both explicit and implicit, that he manifested exercised in the school and enacted through his "pervasive informality." In my judgment, Tolstoy overemphasized pedagogy over self-education and did not distinguish learning from education. Still, Tolstoy's pioneering work in democratic education, both in theory and practice, remains mostly unacknowledged and unanalyzed while continuing to be highly relevant and potentially influential.

In this article, we attempted to integrate and further develop theoretical ideas in the area of the small group research about all group activity levels (types of actors) - individual, informal subgroup, and group - and about connections among them. We have touched upon such issues as (a) modes of group activity represented by activities of each type of the actors; (b) structural and functional associations among the actors; (c) functions that each type of actors carries out with respect to another type of actors; (d) direct and indirect links among actors; (e) the influence of links between some actors on links among other actors; and (f) processes of integration and disintegration as the main mechanism for changing connections among actors. Special attention is paid to direct (immediate) personalized and depersonalized connections among actors, as well as to connections mediated by actors' connections with another actor or some object. Discussion of these issues leads to formulation of some specific propositions. Simultaneous research coverage of all three types of actors and various connections among them should allow for creating a more complete picture of small group activities and various psychological phenomena within it, including multifaceted and complex ones. It should also enable considering group structure and the essence of group dynamics differently. We conclude this article by presenting both theoretical and practical implications of the proposed integrative perspective and by posing some important questions in line with it for further discussion.

This article's goal is to understand innovation factors (e.g., job autonomy and knowledge sharing) through the lens of a neo-Aristotelian theory based on evolutionary science in order to show that this paradigm of analysis provides a richer understanding of this organizational phenomenon, and consequently better support for the deliberation on what measures to implement when the objective is to make the organization prone to innovate.

This article presents the concept of epistemological alienation in order to examine psychology's epistemological quantitative Paradigm and its connection to political reality. Politzer's work of how mainstream psychology turns the first-person language of the individual into a mechanistic third-person pseudoscience is thoroughly discussed. Consequently, through some marginalized voices within psychology, it is examined how psychologists disregard the subject's own voice, intentionality, meaning and judgment-forming mechanisms promoting instead a naturalistic and mechanistic language, based heavily on psychometric methodology and a false and altered account of psychology's history. Psychology's mechanistic language is compared to Marx's concept of alienation, various aspects of which are discussed. The case is made that epistemological alienation is an internal process in psychological research that stems from and reinforces, essentializes and "epistemologizes" the alienation and the individualization of the modern subject.

Studies regarding dysgraphia, an impairment in writing, have been receiving more attention in recent research. Most studies have broadly discussed the multiple cognitive mechanisms involved in writing and its disruption leading to dysgraphia. However, little attention has been paid to the involvement of different memory systems integral to writing and its disruption in individuals with dysgraphia. Orthographic long-term memory and orthographic working memory are the two memory systems predominantly involved in the production of written expressions, and the subsequent interruption of these memory systems often leads to varied deficit profiles of dysgraphia. These disruptions have resulted from damage in the brain caused by neural injuries, neurological disorders, or epigenetic factors. The existing studies did not probe into the nuances of the disruptions of these two memory systems in dysgraphia and associated neural pathways. In order to fill this gap, the review attempts to provide a comprehensive account of dysgraphia and its association with orthographic long-term memory and orthographic working memory by comparing and contrasting their workings and patterns of disruption in the deficit profiles of dysgraphia by probing into the underlying neural correlates. Such a detailed account brings insights into pertinent intervention strategies for improving memory systems and dysgraphia. It also helps identify the limitations of the existing intervention methods like CART, ACT, or Spell-Study-Spell, leading to the proposal of improvised neuro-targeted interventions for dysgraphia.

Basic values are the core element of culture, explaining many important differences in social, economic and political effects. Yet the nature and the composition of cultural value systems remains highly debatable. An emerging field of cultural neuroscience promises to shed light on how societies differ in their value systems and on the low-level mechanisms through which they operate. A systematic review of 47 experimental studies using different brain research methods is conducted to identify neural systems and processes, which can be associated with specific values, irrespective of interpretations given by the authors of original studies. Key findings were extracted and systematized according to Hofstede's and some other (Trompenaars' and Gelfand's) models of national cultures. From the perspective of existing accounts of cultural value systems, existing literature provides only a very fragmented and biased view of the neural processing of values. Absolute majority of existing evidence (37 studies) of cultural differences in the brain functions can be associated with individualism-collectivism value dimension. Affectivity-Neutrality is identified in 11 studies, Tightness-Looseness - 6, Power Distance - 3; Indulgence, Long-Term Orientation and Universalism - 2, and Uncertainty Avoidance - 1. Other value dimensions from the applied models of culture are not represented at all. Key problems limiting the contribution of the contemporary culture neuroscience to the comparative studies of cultural values include: researchers' theoretical framing within the independence-interdependence paradigm, resulting in the loss of a broader perspective and alternative interpretations of findings, the lack of focus on the direct comparison of values and value dimensions, insufficiently representative and biased samples.

Abri & Boll (2022) proposed the "Actional Model of Older People´s Coping with Health-Related Declines" to explain the use of various action alternatives of older persons for dealing with diseases, functional declines, activity limitations, and participation restrictions. It draws on a broad knowledge base: an action-theoretical model of intentional self-development, models of the use of assistive technologies (ATs) and medical services, qualitative studies on reasons for using or not-using ATs, and quantitative studies on older people's health-related goals. The present study aims to gather evidence to further refine this model by additionally relying on expert knowledge from professional caregivers serving older people. Six experienced geriatric nurses working in mobile care services or residential care facilities were interviewed about key components of the above model in relation to 17 older people aged 70 to 95 with stroke, arthrosis, or mild dementia. The results revealed additional goals of reducing or preventing health-related discrepancies beyond those already included in the model (e.g., moving without pain, doing things alone, driving a car again, social return). Moreover, new motivating or demotivating goals for using certain action possibilities were found (e.g., to be at home, to be alone, to rest, to motivate other older people). Finally, some new factors were identified from the biological-functional (e.g., illness, fatigue), technological (e.g., pain inducing ATs, maladaptive devices), and social contexts (e.g., lack of staff time) that are likely to promote or hinder the use of certain action possibilities. Implications for refining the model and future research are discussed.

In this paper, we articulate a functional approach to cognitive capacities. It is a restricted functionalism for various reasons, but especially because it does not claim that all cognitive (and/or mental) entities and processes are functional in the sense of a systemic capacities approach. One of the central aims of a cognitive theory consists in providing explanations of behavioral phenomena of (human and non-human) animals, and of the phenomena that are involved in those explanations. We accept that part of what lies at the heart of these explanations are certain functional entities -we call them "cognitive functional systems" -which in our view stand for most of the cognitive capacities of an organism; that is, systems that are individuated primarily by the main cognitive functions they undertake. Additionally, in the paper, we go into further detail concerning these functional systems, their internal organization, the nature of their causal interactions, etc. We also argue that some of these classes of cognitive functional systems (i.e., cognitive capacities) can be construed as "natural kinds" whenever their kinds of functional organizations are understood as kinds of hierarchically ordered classes of information processing events that are related among each other in regular (often complex) ways.

In this paper, I grapple with the question of why we, at times, experience ourselves as not free. In doing so I outline a crude theory of agency (and our experience of ourselves as free) as a dynamic process happening in irreversible time. In attempting to answer this question, I define agency as the ability to pursue our desires, and I claim that we experience ourselves as free as long as we can do this - with the caveat that the ability to reason is a necessary criterion. I show that agency is a sociocultural development that manifests as the ability to reason gradually develops through social interaction during infancy and into adulthood. Crucially, I point out that reason is a double-edged sword: It allows us to question our actions and desires and whether they are worth pursuing, which is what elevates us to agentic beings. However, it also allows us to alienate ourselves from our actions and desires, and thus rob ourselves of our experience of freedom. Lastly, I show how our subjective freedom is lost and gained in a constant process, generated by a reflexive-relating-to ourselves. As we act, we continually encounter constraints (physical and psychological) that bar us from acting upon our desires. This compels us to reflect on our actions and desires, and so, our feeling of freedom evaporates. However, through a retrospective forgetting, or reconstruction, of the constraints we encounter, we may regain our experience of being free.