Econometrica最新文献

We study how criminal organizations affect economic development. We exploit a natural experiment in El Salvador, where these criminal organizations emerged due to an exogenous shift in American immigration policy that led to the deportation of gang leaders from the United States to El Salvador. Using a spatial regression discontinuity design that focuses on the gang-created system of borders, we find that individuals in gang-controlled neighborhoods have less material well-being, income, and education than individuals living only 50 meters away but outside of gang territory. None of these discontinuities existed before the arrival of the gangs. A key mechanism behind the results is that gangs restrict individuals' mobility, affecting their labor-market options by preventing them from commuting to other parts of the city. The results are not determined by high rates of selective migration, differential exposure to extortion and violence, or differences in public goods provision.

Empirical research typically involves a robustness-efficiency tradeoff. A researcher seeking to estimate a scalar parameter can invoke strong assumptions to motivate a restricted estimator that is precise but may be heavily biased, or they can relax some of these assumptions to motivate a more robust, but variable, unrestricted estimator. When a bound on the bias of the restricted estimator is available, it is optimal to shrink the unrestricted estimator towards the restricted estimator. For settings where a bound on the bias of the restricted estimator is unknown, we propose adaptive estimators that minimize the percentage increase in worst-case risk relative to an oracle that knows the bound. We show that adaptive estimators solve a weighted convex minimax problem and provide lookup tables facilitating their rapid computation. Revisiting some well-known empirical studies where questions of model specification arise, we examine the advantages of adapting to—rather than testing for—misspecification.

We offer a theory of changing dimensions of political polarization based on endogenous social identity. We formalize voter identity as in Bonomi, Gennaioli, and Tabellini (2021), but add parties that compete on policy and spread stereotypes to persuade voters. Parties are historically connected to different social groups, whose members are more receptive to the party messages. An endogenous switch from class to cultural identity accounts for three major changes: (i) growing cultural conflict between voters and parties; (ii) dampening of redistributive conflict, despite rising inequality; (iii) a realignment of lower class voters from the left to the right. The incentive of parties to spread stereotypes is a key driver of identity-based polarization. Using survey data and congressional speeches, we show that—consistent with our model—there is evidence of (i) and (ii) in the voting realignment induced by the “China Shock” (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020)).

We develop a tractable small-open-economy framework to characterize the constrained efficient use of the monetary policy rate, foreign exchange (FX) intervention, capital controls, and domestic macroprudential measures. The model features dominant currency pricing, positive premia on local currency debt arising from financiers' portfolio constraints, and occasionally-binding external and domestic borrowing constraints. We characterize the conditions under which the traditional prescription—relying solely on the policy rate and exchange rate flexibility—remains sufficient, even in the presence of externalities. By contrast, to manage noise trader flows into and out of the local currency debt market, FX intervention and in some cases capital inflow taxes should be used instead of the traditional prescription. Moreover, if a country faces a mix of local currency premia and external borrowing constraints, we establish that certain regulations to limit FX mismatch may alleviate the external borrowing constraint but exacerbate the local currency premia. Finally, we show that capital controls may dominate domestic macroprudential measures in cases when external shocks trigger stress in domestic housing markets.

In low-income communities in both rich and poor countries, redistributive transfers within kin and social networks are frequent. Such arrangements may distort labor supply—acting as a “social tax” that dampens the incentive to work. We document that across countries, from the United States to Côte d'Ivoire, low-income groups report strong pressure to share earned income with others; in addition, social groups that undertake more interpersonal transfers work fewer hours. Using a field experiment, we enable piece-rate factory workers in Côte d'Ivoire to shield income using blocked savings accounts over 9 months. Workers may only deposit earnings increases, relative to baseline, mitigating income effects on labor supply. Offering Private accounts raises work attendance by 6.5% and earnings by 9.4%. These treatment effects are concentrated among workers who report higher redistributive pressure at baseline. To obtain further suggestive evidence on mechanisms, in a supplementary experiment, we vary whether blocked accounts are private or known to the worker's network. When accounts are private, take-up is substantively higher (60% vs. 14%), with a resultant 8.8% higher earnings. Outgoing transfers do not decline, indicating no loss in redistribution. The welfare benefits of informal redistribution may come at a cost, depressing labor supply and productivity.

Consumer surplus, the area between the demand curve and the price, plays a key role in many models of trade and growth. Quantifying it typically requires estimating and extrapolating demand curves. This paper provides an alternative approach to measuring consumer surplus by focusing on firms as consumers of inputs. We show that the elasticity of a downstream firm's marginal cost to supplier additions and separations measures the downstream firm's consumer surplus relative to its input costs. Using Belgian data and instrumenting for changes in supplier access, we find that for every 1% of suppliers gained or lost, the marginal cost of downstream firms falls or rises by roughly 0.3%. Our estimates are directly informative about the strength of love-of-variety effects and the gains from movements along quality ladders. We use our microeconomic estimates of consumer surplus to assess the macroeconomic importance of supplier additions and separations in a growth accounting framework. We find that supplier churn plausibly accounts for about half of aggregate productivity growth.