{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA921MONO","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA921MONO","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 1","pages":"305-307"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study how long-lived, rational agents learn in a social network. In every period, after observing the past actions of his neighbors, each agent receives a private signal, and chooses an action whose payoff depends only on the state. Since equilibrium actions depend on higher-order beliefs, it is difficult to characterize behavior. Nevertheless, we show that regardless of the size and shape of the network, the utility function, and the patience of the agents, the speed of learning in any equilibrium is bounded from above by a constant that only depends on the private signal distribution.
{"title":"Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks","authors":"Wanying Huang, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20806","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how long-lived, rational agents learn in a social network. In every period, after observing the past actions of his neighbors, each agent receives a private signal, and chooses an action whose payoff depends only on the state. Since equilibrium actions depend on higher-order beliefs, it is difficult to characterize behavior. Nevertheless, we show that regardless of the size and shape of the network, the utility function, and the patience of the agents, the speed of learning in any equilibrium is bounded from above by a constant that only depends on the private signal distribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 1","pages":"1-27"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide a unified approach to stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility based on an elementary application of Tarski's fixed point theorem. We establish that the exclusive source of multiple values is the presence of multiple recursive utilities consistent with the given aggregator, each yielding a legitimate value of the recursive program. We also present sufficient conditions ensuring a unique value of the recursive program in some circumstances. Overall, acknowledging the unavoidable failure of uniqueness in general, we argue that the greatest fixed point of the Bellman operator should have a privileged position.
{"title":"Do not Blame Bellman: It Is Koopmans' Fault","authors":"Gaetano Bloise, Cuong Le Van, Yiannis Vailakis","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20386","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We provide a unified approach to stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility based on an elementary application of Tarski's fixed point theorem. We establish that the exclusive source of multiple values is the presence of multiple recursive utilities consistent with the given aggregator, each yielding a legitimate value of the recursive program. We also present sufficient conditions ensuring a unique value of the recursive program in some circumstances. Overall, acknowledging the unavoidable failure of uniqueness in general, we argue that the greatest fixed point of the Bellman operator should have a privileged position.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 1","pages":"111-140"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20386","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Oil and gas leases between mineral owners and extraction firms typically specify a date by which the firm must either drill a well or lose the lease. These deadlines are known as primary terms. Using data from the Louisiana shale boom, we first show that well drilling is substantially bunched just before the primary term deadline. This bunching is not necessarily surplus-reducing: using an estimated model of firms' drilling and input choices, we show that primary terms can increase total surplus by countering the effects of leases' royalties, as royalties are a tax on revenue and delay drilling. These benefits are reduced, however, when production outcomes are sensitive to drilling inputs and when drilling one well indefinitely extends the period of time during which additional wells may be drilled. We enrich the model to consider mineral owners' lease offers and find small effects of primary terms on owners' revenue.
{"title":"Drilling Deadlines and Oil and Gas Development","authors":"Evan Herrnstadt, Ryan Kellogg, Eric Lewis","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18436","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>Oil and gas leases between mineral owners and extraction firms typically specify a date by which the firm must either drill a well or lose the lease. These deadlines are known as primary terms. Using data from the Louisiana shale boom, we first show that well drilling is substantially bunched just before the primary term deadline. This bunching is not necessarily surplus-reducing: using an estimated model of firms' drilling and input choices, we show that primary terms can increase total surplus by countering the effects of leases' royalties, as royalties are a tax on revenue and delay drilling. These benefits are reduced, however, when production outcomes are sensitive to drilling inputs and when drilling one well indefinitely extends the period of time during which additional wells may be drilled. We enrich the model to consider mineral owners' lease offers and find small effects of primary terms on owners' revenue.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 1","pages":"29-60"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA18436","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139655121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors 2022–2023","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA921EDS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA921EDS","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 1","pages":"289-294"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139655122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper develops a sufficient statistics framework for analyzing the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI). We derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) eligibility rules and (ii) benefit levels. Applying this framework to two restrictive DI reforms in Austria, we find that tighter DI eligibility rules triggered higher fiscal cost savings and lower insurance losses. Hence, tighter DI eligibility rules dominate DI benefit reductions in scaling back the Austrian DI system.
本文建立了一个充分统计框架，用于分析伤残保险（DI）的福利效应。我们推导了两个主要的 DI 政策参数的社会最优条件：（i）资格规则和（ii）福利水平。将这一框架应用于奥地利的两项限制性 DI 改革，我们发现，更严格的 DI 资格规则会带来更高的财政成本节约和更低的保险损失。因此，在缩减奥地利的直接养老金制度时，更严格的直接养老金资格规则主导了直接养老金福利的减少。
{"title":"Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?","authors":"Andreas Haller, Stefan Staubli, Josef Zweimüller","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19021","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>This paper develops a sufficient statistics framework for analyzing the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI). We derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) eligibility rules and (ii) benefit levels. Applying this framework to two restrictive DI reforms in Austria, we find that tighter DI eligibility rules triggered higher fiscal cost savings and lower insurance losses. Hence, tighter DI eligibility rules dominate DI benefit reductions in scaling back the Austrian DI system.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 1","pages":"79-110"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports. Report of the Treasurer","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA921TREAS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA921TREAS","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 1","pages":"275-287"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We formulate an order over constraint sets , called the parallelogram order, which guarantees that argmin{p ⋅ x:x ∈ A} increases in the product order as A increases in the parallelogram order, for any vector . Using this result, we characterize the utility/production functions that lead to normal demand as well as the closely related class of production functions with marginal costs that increase with factor prices. By generalizing the concept of supermodularity, we also characterize the class of production functions for which factors are complements. In the context of decision-making under uncertainty, our new set order leads to natural generalizations of first-order stochastic dominance in multi-prior models.
{"title":"Comparative Statics With Linear Objectives: Normality, Complementarity, and Ranking Multi-Prior Beliefs","authors":"Paweł Dziewulski, John K.-H. Quah","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19738","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We formulate an order over constraint sets , called the <i>parallelogram order</i>, which guarantees that argmin{<i>p</i> ⋅ <i>x</i>:<i>x</i> ∈ <i>A</i>} increases in the product order as <i>A</i> increases in the parallelogram order, for any vector . Using this result, we characterize the utility/production functions that lead to normal demand as well as the closely related class of production functions with marginal costs that increase with factor prices. By generalizing the concept of supermodularity, we also characterize the class of production functions for which factors are complements. In the context of decision-making under uncertainty, our new set order leads to natural generalizations of first-order stochastic dominance in multi-prior models.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 1","pages":"167-200"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19738","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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