Econometrica最新文献

There has been a call for caution regarding the standard procedure for Bayesian inference in set-identified structural vector autoregressions on the grounds that the common practice of using a uniform prior over the set of orthogonal matrices induces a non-uniform prior for individual impulse responses or other quantities of interest. This paper challenges this call by formally showing that when the focus is on joint inference, the uniform prior over the set of orthogonal matrices is not only sufficient but also necessary for inference based on a uniform joint prior distribution over the identified set for the vector of impulse responses. In addition, we show how to conduct inference based on a uniform joint prior distribution for the vector of impulse responses.

While the mechanism design paradigm emphasizes notions of efficiency based on agent preferences, policymakers often focus on alternative objectives. School districts emphasize educational achievement, and transplantation communities focus on patient survival. It is unclear whether choice-based mechanisms perform well when assessed based on these outcomes. This paper evaluates the assignment mechanism for allocating deceased donor kidneys on the basis of patient life-years from transplantation (LYFT). We examine the role of choice in increasing LYFT and compare realized assignments to benchmarks that remove choice. Our model combines choices and outcomes in order to study how selection affects LYFT. We show how to identify and estimate the model using instruments derived from the mechanism. The estimates suggest that the design in use selects patients with better post-transplant survival prospects and matches them well, resulting in an average LYFT of 9.29, which is 1.75 years more than a random assignment. However, the maximum aggregate LYFT is 14.08. Realizing the majority of the gains requires transplanting relatively healthy patients, who would have longer life expectancies even without a transplant. Therefore, a policymaker faces a dilemma between transplanting patients who are sicker and those for whom life will be extended the longest.

Welfare depends on the quantity, quality, and range of goods consumed. We use trade data, which report the quantities and prices of the individual goods that countries exchange, to learn about how the gains from trade and growth break down into these different margins. Our general equilibrium model, in which both quality and quantity contribute to consumption and to production, captures (i) how prices increase with importer and exporter per capita income, (ii) how the range of goods traded rises with importer and exporter size, and (iii) how products traveling longer distances have higher prices. Our framework can deliver a standard gravity formulation for total trade flows and for the gains from trade. We find that growth in the extensive margin contributes to about half of overall gains. Quality plays a larger role in the welfare gains from international trade than from economic growth due to selection.

The Mussa (1986) puzzle is the observation of a sharp and simultaneous increase in the volatility of both nominal and real exchange rates following the end of the Bretton Woods System of pegged exchange rates in 1973. It is commonly viewed as a central piece of evidence in favor of monetary non-neutrality because it is an instance in which a change in the monetary regime caused a dramatic change in the equilibrium behavior of a real variable—the real exchange rate—and is often further interpreted as direct evidence in favor of models with nominal rigidities in price setting. This paper shows that the data do not support this latter conclusion because there was no simultaneous change in the properties of the other macro variables, nominal or real; an extended set of Mussa facts falsifies both conventional flexible-price RBC models and sticky-price New Keynesian models. We present a resolution to the broader Mussa puzzle based on a model of segmented financial market, in which the bulk of the nominal exchange rate risk is held by financial intermediaries and is not shared smoothly throughout the economy, emphasizing the importance of monetary transmission via the risk premium channel.