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Submission of Manuscripts to the Econometric Society Monograph Series
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931SUM
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引用次数: 0
Minimum Wages, Efficiency, and Welfare
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21466
David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, Simon Mongey

Many argue that minimum wages can prevent efficiency losses from monopsony power. We assess this argument in a general equilibrium model of oligopsonistic labor markets with heterogeneous workers and firms. We decompose welfare gains into an efficiency component that captures reductions in monopsony power and a redistributive component that captures the way minimum wages shift resources across people. The minimum wage that maximizes the efficiency component of welfare lies below $8.00 and yields gains worth less than 0.2% of lifetime consumption. When we add back in Utilitarian redistributive motives, the optimal minimum wage is $11 and redistribution accounts for 102.5% of the resulting welfare gains, implying offsetting efficiency losses of −2.5%. The reason a minimum wage struggles to deliver efficiency gains is that with realistic firm productivity dispersion, a minimum wage that eliminates monopsony power at one firm causes severe rationing at another. These results hold under an EITC and progressive labor income taxes calibrated to the U.S. economy.

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引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 1
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931FM
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引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Secretary
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931SEC
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引用次数: 0
Persuasion Meets Delegation
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17051
Anton Kolotilin, Andriy Zapechelnyuk

A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single-crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochastic mechanisms, implying, in particular, the equivalence of deterministic delegation and monotone partitional persuasion. We also show that the monotonicity restriction is superfluous for linear persuasion and linear delegation, implying their equivalence on the set of all stochastic mechanisms. Finally, using tools from the persuasion literature, we characterize optimal delegation mechanisms, thereby generalizing and extending existing results in the delegation literature.

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引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Econometrica Referees 2023–2024
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931REF
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引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors 2023–2024
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931EDS
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引用次数: 0
Privacy-Preserving Signals 保护隐私的信号
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-11-21 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22017
Philipp Strack, Kai Hao Yang

A signal is privacy-preserving with respect to a collection of privacy sets if the posterior probability assigned to every privacy set remains unchanged conditional on any signal realization. We characterize the privacy-preserving signals for arbitrary state space and arbitrary privacy sets. A signal is privacy-preserving if and only if it is a garbling of a reordered quantile signal. Furthermore, distributions of posterior means induced by privacy-preserving signals are exactly mean-preserving contractions of that induced by the quantile signal. We discuss the economic implications of our characterization for statistical discrimination, the revelation of sensitive information in auctions and price discrimination.

如果在任何信号实现的条件下，分配给每个隐私集的后验概率保持不变，那么对于隐私集集合来说，该信号就是隐私保护信号。我们对任意状态空间和任意隐私集的隐私保护信号进行了描述。当且仅当一个信号是重新排序的量子信号的乱码时，它才是隐私保护信号。此外，隐私保护信号诱导的后验均值分布正是量化信号诱导的均值保护收缩。我们将讨论我们的描述对统计歧视、拍卖中敏感信息的揭示和价格歧视的经济影响。
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引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 6 经济计量学前沿》第 92 卷第 6 期6
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-11-21 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA926FM
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引用次数: 0
Adaptive, Rate-Optimal Hypothesis Testing in Nonparametric IV Models 非参数 IV 模型中的自适应、速率最优假设检验
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-11-21 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18602
Christoph Breunig, Xiaohong Chen

We propose a new adaptive hypothesis test for inequality (e.g., monotonicity, convexity) and equality (e.g., parametric, semiparametric) restrictions on a structural function in a nonparametric instrumental variables (NPIV) model. Our test statistic is based on a modified leave-one-out sample analog of a quadratic distance between the restricted and unrestricted sieve two-stage least squares estimators. We provide computationally simple, data-driven choices of sieve tuning parameters and Bonferroni adjusted chi-squared critical values. Our test adapts to the unknown smoothness of alternative functions in the presence of unknown degree of endogeneity and unknown strength of the instruments. It attains the adaptive minimax rate of testing in L2. That is, the sum of the supremum of type I error over the composite null and the supremum of type II error over nonparametric alternative models cannot be minimized by any other tests for NPIV models of unknown regularities. Confidence sets in L2 are obtained by inverting the adaptive test. Simulations confirm that, across different strength of instruments and sample sizes, our adaptive test controls size and its finite-sample power greatly exceeds existing non-adaptive tests for monotonicity and parametric restrictions in NPIV models. Empirical applications to test for shape restrictions of differentiated products demand and of Engel curves are presented.

我们针对非参数工具变量（NPIV）模型中结构函数的不等式（如单调性、凸性）和相等式（如参数、半参数）限制提出了一种新的自适应假设检验。我们的检验统计量基于受限筛法和非受限筛法两阶段最小二乘法估计值之间二次距离的修正留一样本类似方法。我们提供了计算简单、数据驱动的筛网调整参数选择和经 Bonferroni 调整的卡方临界值。在内生程度未知和工具强度未知的情况下，我们的检验能适应替代函数的未知平稳性。它在 L2 中达到了自适应最小检验率。也就是说，对于未知规律性的 NPIV 模型，其他任何检验方法都无法最小化复合空的 I 型误差上确值和非参数替代模型的 II 型误差上确值之和。通过反演自适应检验可以得到 L2 中的置信集。模拟证实，在不同的工具强度和样本大小下，我们的自适应检验可以控制规模，其有限样本的力量大大超过了现有的非自适应检验，可以检验 NPIV 模型的单调性和参数限制。本文还介绍了检验差异化产品需求和恩格尔曲线形状限制的经验应用。
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引用次数: 0
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