Econometrica最新文献

This paper theoretically and empirically studies the interaction of search and application approval in credit markets. Risky borrowers internalize the probability that their application is rejected and behave as if they had high search costs. Thus, “overpayment” may be a poor proxy for consumer sophistication since it partly represents rational search in response to rejections. Contrary to standard search models, our model implies (1) endogenous adverse selection through the search and application approval process, (2) a possibly non-monotone or non-decreasing relationship between search and realized interest, default, and application approval rates, and (3) search costs estimated from transaction prices alone are biased. We find support for the model's predictions using a unique data set detailing search behavior of mortgage borrowers. Estimating the model, we find that screening is informative and search is costly. Counterfactual analyses reveal that tightening lending standards and discrimination through application rejection both increase equilibrium interest rates. This increase in realized interest rates is in part due to strategic complementarity in bank rate setting.

This paper investigates how tax rates and tax enforcement jointly impact fiscal capacity in low-income countries. We study a policy experiment in the D.R. Congo that randomly assigned 38,028 property owners to the status quo tax rate or to a rate reduction. This variation in tax liabilities reveals that the status quo rate lies above the revenue-maximizing tax rate (RMTR). Reducing rates by about one-third would maximize government revenue by increasing tax compliance. We then exploit two sources of variation in enforcement—randomized enforcement letters and random assignment of tax collectors—to show that the RMTR increases with enforcement. Including an enforcement message on tax letters or replacing tax collectors in the bottom quartile of enforcement capacity with average collectors would raise the RMTR by about 40%. Tax rates and enforcement are thus complementary levers. Jointly optimizing tax rates and enforcement would lead to 10% higher revenue gains than optimizing them independently. These findings provide experimental evidence that low government enforcement capacity sets a binding ceiling on the revenue-maximizing tax rate in some developing countries, thereby demonstrating the value of increasing tax rates in tandem with enforcement to expand fiscal capacity.

We use high-frequency data on fine particulate matter air pollution (PM 2.5) at the locality level to study the effects of high pollution on daily labor supply decisions in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. We document a negative, non-linear relationship between PM 2.5 and same-day labor supply, with strong effects on days with extremely high pollution levels. On these days, the average worker experiences a reduction of around 7.5% of working hours. Workers partially compensate for lost hours by increasing their labor supply on days that follow high-pollution days. We find that low-income workers reduce their labor supply significantly less than high-income workers. Unequal responses to high pollution along other dimensions (job quality, flexibility, gender) matter, but less than income. We provide suggestive evidence that reductions in labor supply due to high pollution are consistent with avoidance behavior.