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Adaptive Maximization of Social Welfare 社会福利的适应性最大化
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22351
Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Roberto Colomboni, Maximilian Kasy

We consider the problem of repeatedly choosing policies to maximize social welfare. Welfare is a weighted sum of private utility and public revenue. Earlier outcomes inform later policies. Utility is not observed, but indirectly inferred. Response functions are learned through experimentation.

We derive a lower bound on regret, and a matching adversarial upper bound for a variant of the Exp3 algorithm. Cumulative regret grows at a rate of T2/3. This implies that (i) welfare maximization is harder than the multiarmed bandit problem (with a rate of T1/2 for finite policy sets), and (ii) our algorithm achieves the optimal rate. For the stochastic setting, if social welfare is concave, we can achieve a rate of T1/2 (for continuous policy sets), using a dyadic search algorithm.

We analyze an extension to nonlinear income taxation, and sketch an extension to commodity taxation. We compare our setting to monopoly pricing (which is easier), and price setting for bilateral trade (which is harder).

我们考虑反复选择政策以使社会福利最大化的问题。福利是私人效用和公共收入的加权总和。早期的结果会影响后来的政策。效用不是观察到的,而是间接推断出来的。反应函数是通过实验来学习的。我们为Exp3算法的一个变体导出了遗憾的下界和匹配的对抗上界。累积的后悔以T2/3的速度增长。这意味着(i)福利最大化比多武装强盗问题(有限策略集的比率为T1/2)更难,并且(ii)我们的算法实现了最优比率。对于随机设置,如果社会福利是凹的,我们可以使用二进搜索算法实现T1/2的比率(对于连续的政策集)。我们分析了非线性所得税的推广,并概述了商品税的推广。我们将我们的设定与垄断定价(比较容易)和双边贸易定价(比较困难)进行比较。
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引用次数: 0
Soaking up the Sun: Battery Investment, Renewable Energy, and Market Equilibrium 吸收阳光:电池投资、可再生能源和市场平衡
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20411
R. Andrew Butters, Jackson Dorsey, Gautam Gowrisankaran

Renewable energy and battery storage are seen as complementary technologies that can together facilitate reductions in carbon emissions. We develop and estimate a framework to calculate the equilibrium effects of large-scale battery storage. Using data from California, we find that the first storage unit breaks even by 2024 without subsidies when the renewable energy share reaches 50%. Equilibrium effects are important: the first 5000 MWh of storage capacity would reduce wholesale electricity prices by 5.6%, but an increase from 25,000 to 50,000 MWh would only reduce these prices by 2.6%. Large-scale batteries will reduce revenues to both dispatchable generators and renewable energy sources. The equilibrium effects lead battery adoption to be virtually non-existent until 2030, without a storage mandate or subsidy. A 30% capital cost subsidy—such as the one in the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act—achieves 5000 MWh of battery capacity by 2024, similar to the level required under California's storage mandate.

可再生能源和电池存储被视为互补的技术,可以共同促进减少碳排放。我们开发并估计了一个框架来计算大规模电池存储的平衡效应。利用加州的数据,我们发现,到2024年,当可再生能源份额达到50%时,第一个储能单元在没有补贴的情况下实现收支平衡。平衡效应很重要:第一个5000兆瓦时的储能容量将使批发电价降低5.6%,但从2.5万兆瓦时增加到5万兆瓦时,只会使批发电价降低2.6%。大型电池将减少可调度发电机和可再生能源的收入。平衡效应导致电池的采用在2030年之前几乎不存在,因为没有储能授权或补贴。30%的资本成本补贴——比如美国《通货膨胀减少法案》中的补贴——到2024年实现5000兆瓦时的电池容量,这与加州储能要求的水平相似。
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引用次数: 0
Insurance and Inequality With Persistent Private Information 持久私人信息下的保险与不平等
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20404
Alexander W. Bloedel, R. Vijay Krishna, Oksana Leukhina

We study the implications of optimal insurance provision for long-run welfare and inequality in economies with persistent private information. A principal insures an agent whose private type follows an ergodic, finite-state Markov chain. The optimal contract always induces immiseration: the agent's consumption and utility decrease without bound. Under positive serial correlation, it also backloads high-powered incentives: the sensitivity of the agent's utility with respect to his reports increases without bound. These results extend—and help elucidate the limits of—the hallmark immiseration results for economies with i.i.d. private information. Numerically, we find that persistence yields faster immiseration, higher inequality, and novel short-run distortions. Our analysis uses recursive methods for contracting with persistent types and allows for binding global incentive constraints.

我们研究了具有持久私人信息的经济体中最优保险提供对长期福利和不平等的影响。委托人为私有类型遵循遍历有限状态马尔可夫链的代理人投保。最优契约总是会导致代理人的消费和效用无限制地减少。在正序列相关下,它还会反向加载高功率激励:代理的效用相对于他的报告的敏感性会不受约束地增加。这些结果扩展并有助于阐明具有私人信息的经济体的标志性贫困结果的局限性。从数值上看,我们发现持续性会导致更快的贫困、更严重的不平等和新的短期扭曲。我们的分析使用递归方法与持久类型签订契约,并允许绑定全局激励约束。
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引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 3 《计量经济学》第93卷第3期
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA933FM
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引用次数: 0
The Cost of Consumer Collateral: Evidence From Bunching 消费者抵押品的成本:来自聚类的证据
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22303
Benjamin L. Collier, Cameron M. Ellis, Benjamin J. Keys

How do collateral requirements impact consumer borrowing behavior? Using administrative loan application and performance data from the U.S. Federal Disaster Loan Program, we exploit a loan amount threshold above which households must post their residence as collateral. Our bunching estimates suggest that the median borrower is willing to give up 40% of their loan amount to avoid posting collateral. Exploiting time variation in the threshold, we estimate collateral causally reduces default rates by 36%. Finally, we structurally estimate households' attachment to their homes, net of any equity, and find a median value of $11,000. Attachment creates a wedge between lender and borrower valuation of collateral of 15%. Our results explain high perceived default costs in the mortgage market, and document the importance of collateral for reducing moral hazard in consumer credit markets.

抵押品要求如何影响消费者的借贷行为?使用来自美国联邦灾难贷款计划的行政贷款申请和绩效数据,我们利用了一个贷款金额门槛,超过该门槛的家庭必须将其住宅作为抵押品。我们的聚类估计表明,中位数借款人愿意放弃40%的贷款金额,以避免提供抵押品。利用阈值的时间变化,我们估计抵押品会使违约率降低36%。最后,我们从结构上估计了家庭对房屋的依恋,扣除任何权益,并发现中值为11,000美元。附加条款在贷款方和借方之间制造了一个楔子,对抵押品的估值为15%。我们的研究结果解释了抵押贷款市场的高感知违约成本,并记录了抵押品对降低消费信贷市场道德风险的重要性。
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引用次数: 0
Auctioning Control and Cash-Flow Rights Separately 拍卖控制权和现金流权分开
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21343
Tingjun Liu, Dan Bernhardt

We consider a classical auction setting in which an asset/project is sold to buyers who privately receive signals about expected payoffs, and payoffs are more sensitive to a bidder's signal if he runs the project than if another bidder does. We show that a seller can increase revenues by sometimes allocating cash-flow rights and control to different bidders, for example, with the highest bidder receiving cash flows and the second-highest receiving control. Separation reduces a bidder's information rent, which depends on the importance of his private information for the value of his awarded cash flows. As project payoffs are most sensitive to a bidder's information if he controls the project, allocating cash flow to another bidder lowers bidders' informational advantage. As a result, when signals are close, the seller can increase revenues by splitting rights between the top two bidders.

我们考虑一个经典的拍卖环境,其中资产/项目被出售给私下接收预期收益信号的买家,如果竞标者运行项目,那么收益对竞标者的信号比另一个竞标者更敏感。我们表明,卖方有时可以通过将现金流权利和控制权分配给不同的投标人来增加收入,例如,出价最高的投标人获得现金流,第二高的投标人获得控制权。分离降低了竞标者的信息租金,这取决于他的私人信息对他获得的现金流价值的重要性。当投标人控制项目时,项目收益对投标人的信息最为敏感,将现金流分配给其他投标人会降低投标人的信息优势。因此,当信号接近时,卖方可以通过将权利分配给出价最高的两家竞标者来增加收入。
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引用次数: 0
Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence From Auctioned Cab Rides 个性化定价和时间价值:来自拍卖出租车的证据
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18838
Nicholas Buchholz, Laura Doval, Jakub Kastl, Filip Matejka, Tobias Salz

We recover valuations of time using detailed data from a large ride-hail platform, where drivers bid on trips and consumers choose between a set of rides with different prices and wait times. Leveraging a consumer panel, we estimate demand as a function of both prices and wait times and use the resulting estimates to recover heterogeneity in the value of time across consumers. We study the welfare implications of personalized pricing and its effect on the platform, drivers, and consumers. Taking into account drivers' optimal reaction to the platform's pricing policy, personalized pricing lowers consumer surplus by 2.5% and increases overall surplus by 5.2%. Like the platform, drivers benefit from personalized pricing. By conditioning prices on drivers' wait times and not on consumers' data, the platform can capture a significant portion of the profits garnered from personalized pricing, and simultaneously benefit consumers.

我们使用来自大型叫车平台的详细数据来恢复时间估值,在这个平台上,司机对行程进行竞标,消费者在一组价格和等待时间不同的行程中进行选择。利用消费者面板,我们将需求作为价格和等待时间的函数进行估计,并使用结果估计来恢复消费者时间价值的异质性。我们研究了个性化定价的福利含义及其对平台、司机和消费者的影响。考虑到司机对平台定价政策的最佳反应,个性化定价使消费者剩余减少2.5%,使总剩余增加5.2%。与该平台一样,司机也从个性化定价中受益。通过根据司机的等待时间而不是消费者的数据来调整价格,该平台可以从个性化定价中获得很大一部分利润,同时让消费者受益。
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引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society 2024 Annual Report of the President 计量经济学会2024年总统年度报告
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA933PRES
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引用次数: 0
Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 2 计量经济学背景,第93卷第2期
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA932BM
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引用次数: 0
On (Constrained) Efficiency of Strategy-Proof Random Assignment 无策略随机分配的(约束)效率
IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22762
Christian Basteck, Lars Ehlers

We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents, when each agent is to receive one object and has strict preferences over the objects. Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Answering a longstanding open question, we show that RSD is not characterized by those properties—there are other mechanisms satisfying equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategy-proofness which are not welfare-equivalent to RSD. On the other hand, we show that RSD is not Pareto dominated by any mechanism that is (i) strategy-proof and (ii) boundedly invariant. Moreover, the same holds for all mechanisms that are ex post efficient, strategy-proof, and boundedly invariant: no such mechanism is dominated by any other mechanism that is strategy-proof and boundedly invariant.

我们研究了一组智能体中不可分割对象的随机分配,当每个智能体接收一个对象并且对对象有严格的偏好时。随机序列独裁(RSD)满足平等对待、事后效率和策略验证。回答一个长期存在的开放性问题,我们表明RSD不以这些属性为特征——还有其他机制满足平等对待、事后效率和策略验证,这些机制与RSD的福利不相等。另一方面,我们证明RSD不是由任何机制(i)策略证明和(ii)有界不变的帕累托支配。此外,这同样适用于所有事后高效、防策略和有界不变的机制:没有这样的机制被任何其他防策略和有界不变的机制所支配。
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Econometrica
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