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Adapting to Climate Risk With Guaranteed Credit: Evidence From Bangladesh 利用担保信贷适应气候风险：孟加拉国的证据
IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19127
Gregory Lane

Climate change is increasing the frequency of extreme weather events, with low-income countries being disproportionately impacted. However, these countries often face market frictions that hinder their ability to adopt effective adaptation strategies. In this paper, I explore the role of credit market failures in limiting adaptation. To achieve this, I collaborate with a large microfinance institution and offer a randomly selected group of farmers access to guaranteed credit through an “Emergency Loan” following a negative climate shock. I document three key results. First, farmers who have access to the emergency loan make less costly adaptation choices and are less severely affected when a flood occurs. Second, I find no evidence of adverse spillover effects on households that did not receive the Emergency Loan. Finally, I demonstrate that providing the Emergency Loan is profitable for the microfinance institution, making it a viable tool for the private sector to employ in similar circumstances.

气候变化正在增加极端天气事件的频率，低收入国家受到的影响尤为严重。然而，这些国家往往面临市场摩擦，阻碍了它们采取有效适应战略的能力。在本文中，我探讨了信贷市场失灵在限制适应方面的作用。为此，我与一家大型小额信贷机构合作，通过 "紧急贷款 "的方式，为随机选择的一组农民提供在负面气候冲击后获得担保信贷的机会。我记录了三个关键结果。首先，获得紧急贷款的农民在洪灾发生时做出的适应性选择成本较低，受到的影响也较小。其次，我没有发现任何证据表明未获得紧急贷款的家庭会受到不利的溢出效应。最后，我证明了提供紧急贷款对小额贷款机构有利可图，使其成为私营部门在类似情况下使用的可行工具。
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引用次数: 0
Bargaining and Exclusion With Multiple Buyers 与多个买家讨价还价和排除法
IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19675
Dilip Abreu, Mihai Manea

A seller trades with q out of n buyers who have valuations a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ an > 0 via sequential bilateral bargaining. When q < n, buyer payoffs vary across equilibria in the patient limit, but seller payoffs do not, and converge to

卖方通过连续的双边讨价还价与 n 个买方中的 q 个进行交易，这些买方的估值为 a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ an > 0。当 q < n 时，买方的报酬在病人极限的各个均衡中会发生变化，但卖方的报酬不会，并且会收敛到
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引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 2 经济计量学前沿》（Frontmatter of Econometrica）第 92 卷第 2 期。2
IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA922FM
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引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series 计量经济学会年度报告 专著丛书编辑报告
IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA921MONO
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引用次数: 0
Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 1 Backmatter of Econometrica Vol.1
IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA921BM
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引用次数: 0
Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks 在网络的重复互动中学习
IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20806
Wanying Huang, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz

We study how long-lived, rational agents learn in a social network. In every period, after observing the past actions of his neighbors, each agent receives a private signal, and chooses an action whose payoff depends only on the state. Since equilibrium actions depend on higher-order beliefs, it is difficult to characterize behavior. Nevertheless, we show that regardless of the size and shape of the network, the utility function, and the patience of the agents, the speed of learning in any equilibrium is bounded from above by a constant that only depends on the private signal distribution.

我们研究的是长期存在的理性代理人如何在社会网络中学习。在每个时期，每个代理人在观察了其邻居过去的行动后，都会收到一个私人信号，并选择一个其收益只取决于状态的行动。由于均衡行动取决于高阶信念，因此很难描述行为特征。不过，我们的研究表明，无论网络的规模和形状、效用函数以及代理人的耐心如何，任何均衡状态下的学习速度都会受到一个常数的约束，而这个常数只取决于私人信号的分布。
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引用次数: 0
Do not Blame Bellman: It Is Koopmans' Fault 不要责怪贝尔曼：这是库普曼斯的错
IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20386
Gaetano Bloise, Cuong Le Van, Yiannis Vailakis

We provide a unified approach to stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility based on an elementary application of Tarski's fixed point theorem. We establish that the exclusive source of multiple values is the presence of multiple recursive utilities consistent with the given aggregator, each yielding a legitimate value of the recursive program. We also present sufficient conditions ensuring a unique value of the recursive program in some circumstances. Overall, acknowledging the unavoidable failure of uniqueness in general, we argue that the greatest fixed point of the Bellman operator should have a privileged position.

我们基于塔尔斯基定点定理的基本应用，为递归效用随机动态程序设计提供了一种统一的方法。我们确定，多重值的唯一来源是存在多个与给定聚合器一致的递归效用，每个效用都能产生递归程序的合法值。我们还提出了在某些情况下确保递归程序唯一值的充分条件。总之，在承认唯一性在一般情况下不可避免地失效的同时，我们认为贝尔曼算子的最大定点应享有特权地位。
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引用次数: 0
Drilling Deadlines and Oil and Gas Development 钻探截止日期与石油和天然气开发
IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18436
Evan Herrnstadt, Ryan Kellogg, Eric Lewis

Oil and gas leases between mineral owners and extraction firms typically specify a date by which the firm must either drill a well or lose the lease. These deadlines are known as primary terms. Using data from the Louisiana shale boom, we first show that well drilling is substantially bunched just before the primary term deadline. This bunching is not necessarily surplus-reducing: using an estimated model of firms' drilling and input choices, we show that primary terms can increase total surplus by countering the effects of leases' royalties, as royalties are a tax on revenue and delay drilling. These benefits are reduced, however, when production outcomes are sensitive to drilling inputs and when drilling one well indefinitely extends the period of time during which additional wells may be drilled. We enrich the model to consider mineral owners' lease offers and find small effects of primary terms on owners' revenue.

矿产所有者与开采公司之间的石油和天然气租约通常会规定一个日期，在该日期之前，开采公司要么钻井，要么失去租约。这些最后期限被称为主要条款。利用路易斯安那州页岩热潮的数据，我们首先表明，就在主要条款截止日期之前，钻井活动会大量集中。这种集中并不一定会减少盈余：利用对企业钻井和投入选择的估算模型，我们表明主要期限可以通过抵消租约特许权使用费的影响来增加总盈余，因为特许权使用费是一种收入税，会延迟钻井。然而，当生产结果对钻井投入敏感时，当钻一口井无限期地延长了可钻更多井的时间时，这些好处就会减少。我们丰富了模型，考虑了矿产所有者的租约提议，发现主要条款对所有者收入的影响较小。
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引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors 2022–2023 计量经济学会年度报告 2022-2023 年编辑报告
IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA921EDS
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引用次数: 0
Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits? 设计残疾保险改革：收紧资格规则还是减少福利？
IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica
Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19021
Andreas Haller, Stefan Staubli, Josef Zweimüller

This paper develops a sufficient statistics framework for analyzing the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI). We derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) eligibility rules and (ii) benefit levels. Applying this framework to two restrictive DI reforms in Austria, we find that tighter DI eligibility rules triggered higher fiscal cost savings and lower insurance losses. Hence, tighter DI eligibility rules dominate DI benefit reductions in scaling back the Austrian DI system.

本文建立了一个充分统计框架，用于分析伤残保险（DI）的福利效应。我们推导了两个主要的 DI 政策参数的社会最优条件：（i）资格规则和（ii）福利水平。将这一框架应用于奥地利的两项限制性 DI 改革，我们发现，更严格的 DI 资格规则会带来更高的财政成本节约和更低的保险损失。因此，在缩减奥地利的直接养老金制度时，更严格的直接养老金资格规则主导了直接养老金福利的减少。
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引用次数: 0
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