Inspired by Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), we develop an argument—the “Scriptural Argument Against Dogmatic Protestantism” (SAADP)—that Protestants who accept the doctrine of sola scriptura cannot reasonably hold that Catholic and Eastern churches are in doctrinal error. If sola scriptura is true and Catholic and Eastern Churches have fallen into error, it is improbable that any Protestant can reliably form true beliefs about controversial points of Christian doctrine, including sola scriptura or suggestions that Catholic and Eastern Christians are in error. We evaluate potential responses to SADDP, considering how SAADP should affect ecumenical doctrinal debates.
{"title":"Sola Scriptura and the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism","authors":"Gregory R. P. Stacey, Tyler McNabb","doi":"10.14428/thl.v9i1.79213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v9i1.79213","url":null,"abstract":"Inspired by Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), we develop an argument—the “Scriptural Argument Against Dogmatic Protestantism” (SAADP)—that Protestants who accept the doctrine of sola scriptura cannot reasonably hold that Catholic and Eastern churches are in doctrinal error. If sola scriptura is true and Catholic and Eastern Churches have fallen into error, it is improbable that any Protestant can reliably form true beliefs about controversial points of Christian doctrine, including sola scriptura or suggestions that Catholic and Eastern Christians are in error. We evaluate potential responses to SADDP, considering how SAADP should affect ecumenical doctrinal debates.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":"29 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140378417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The central focus of this article is to provide a new “Love Argument” for the necessary truth of the Latin' model' of the doctrine of the Trinity—termed “Latin Trinitarianism”—from an a priori standpoint. This new argument, called the Agápēic Argument, will be formulated in light of the metaphysical notions of a “trope,” introduced by D. C. Williams, and “multiple location,” posited by Antony Eagle, and the ethical concept of agápē, proposed by Alexander Pruss. Doing this will provide a specific argument that provides strong grounds for affirming the necessary truth of the Trinity, without, however, being subject to the primary objections that have been often raised against the existing versions of the argument.
{"title":"The Love Argument for the Trinity","authors":"Joshua Sijuwade","doi":"10.14428/thl.v9i1.80503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v9i1.80503","url":null,"abstract":"The central focus of this article is to provide a new “Love Argument” for the necessary truth of the Latin' model' of the doctrine of the Trinity—termed “Latin Trinitarianism”—from an a priori standpoint. This new argument, called the Agápēic Argument, will be formulated in light of the metaphysical notions of a “trope,” introduced by D. C. Williams, and “multiple location,” posited by Antony Eagle, and the ethical concept of agápē, proposed by Alexander Pruss. Doing this will provide a specific argument that provides strong grounds for affirming the necessary truth of the Trinity, without, however, being subject to the primary objections that have been often raised against the existing versions of the argument.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":" 20","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140212886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brian Leftow has argued in significant detail for a timeless conception of God. However, his work has been interacted with less than one might expect, especially given that some have contended that divine timelessness should be put to death and buried. Further, the work that has critically interacted with Leftow does a very poor job at discrediting it, or so I will contend. As we shall see, the main reason for this is either because what is central to Leftow’s view is not affected by the objection, or because Leftow provides another way of getting his theory off the ground. Why, then, do so many objections miss the mark? I suspect it’s because many struggle to understand Leftow’s view and what is central to it. As such, one of the main goals of this paper will be to make Leftow’s account more accessible and to elucidate the main elements of the theory, whilst also providing responses to the main objections raised against his view. The overall result of this, I hope, will be a more fruitful examination of Leftow’s view in the future.
{"title":"Timelessness à la Leftow","authors":"B. Page","doi":"10.14428/thl.v9i1.80543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v9i1.80543","url":null,"abstract":"Brian Leftow has argued in significant detail for a timeless conception of God. However, his work has been interacted with less than one might expect, especially given that some have contended that divine timelessness should be put to death and buried. Further, the work that has critically interacted with Leftow does a very poor job at discrediting it, or so I will contend. As we shall see, the main reason for this is either because what is central to Leftow’s view is not affected by the objection, or because Leftow provides another way of getting his theory off the ground. Why, then, do so many objections miss the mark? I suspect it’s because many struggle to understand Leftow’s view and what is central to it. As such, one of the main goals of this paper will be to make Leftow’s account more accessible and to elucidate the main elements of the theory, whilst also providing responses to the main objections raised against his view. The overall result of this, I hope, will be a more fruitful examination of Leftow’s view in the future.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":"53 39","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140230964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that the creation and freely chosen salvation and everlasting bliss of even just one person is a greater good than any finite amount of evil and suffering. Since it is extremely likely (if not certain) that, out of all possible individuals that could exist, some (or at least one) would only be freely saved through the contemplation and experience of evil and suffering, then God would be justified in creating a world with evil and suffering to allow for the salvation of such individuals, so long as no one else freely lost their salvation who otherwise would not have lost it because of the evil and suffering. Thus, the problem of evil dissipates, as a world with evil and suffering, even seemingly gratuitous evil and suffering, would be entirely expected given theism.
{"title":"Defeating the Problem of Evil with Evil","authors":"R. Miksa","doi":"10.14428/thl.v9i1.74123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v9i1.74123","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that the creation and freely chosen salvation and everlasting bliss of even just one person is a greater good than any finite amount of evil and suffering. Since it is extremely likely (if not certain) that, out of all possible individuals that could exist, some (or at least one) would only be freely saved through the contemplation and experience of evil and suffering, then God would be justified in creating a world with evil and suffering to allow for the salvation of such individuals, so long as no one else freely lost their salvation who otherwise would not have lost it because of the evil and suffering. Thus, the problem of evil dissipates, as a world with evil and suffering, even seemingly gratuitous evil and suffering, would be entirely expected given theism.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":"61 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139775086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that the creation and freely chosen salvation and everlasting bliss of even just one person is a greater good than any finite amount of evil and suffering. Since it is extremely likely (if not certain) that, out of all possible individuals that could exist, some (or at least one) would only be freely saved through the contemplation and experience of evil and suffering, then God would be justified in creating a world with evil and suffering to allow for the salvation of such individuals, so long as no one else freely lost their salvation who otherwise would not have lost it because of the evil and suffering. Thus, the problem of evil dissipates, as a world with evil and suffering, even seemingly gratuitous evil and suffering, would be entirely expected given theism.
{"title":"Defeating the Problem of Evil with Evil","authors":"R. Miksa","doi":"10.14428/thl.v9i1.74123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v9i1.74123","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that the creation and freely chosen salvation and everlasting bliss of even just one person is a greater good than any finite amount of evil and suffering. Since it is extremely likely (if not certain) that, out of all possible individuals that could exist, some (or at least one) would only be freely saved through the contemplation and experience of evil and suffering, then God would be justified in creating a world with evil and suffering to allow for the salvation of such individuals, so long as no one else freely lost their salvation who otherwise would not have lost it because of the evil and suffering. Thus, the problem of evil dissipates, as a world with evil and suffering, even seemingly gratuitous evil and suffering, would be entirely expected given theism.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":"217 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139834519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theistic religions differ in their conceptions of the nature of God. One philosophical-theological position, the Christian Trinity, stands out as unique amongst theistic religions. If such a position were demonstrated, it would significantly narrow the philosophical-theological gap in discussions of God’s nature. I proposed that such an argument in favor of the Christian Trinity can be found in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. It is argued that language is an essentially social phenomenon and that God is a language user requiring God to be an essentially social being. As a result, either polytheism or the Christian Trinity is true. I argue that this divine social nature is best explained by the Christian Trinity.
{"title":"Wittgenstein, Language, and the Trinity","authors":"Graham Floyd","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.74063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.74063","url":null,"abstract":"Theistic religions differ in their conceptions of the nature of God. One philosophical-theological position, the Christian Trinity, stands out as unique amongst theistic religions. If such a position were demonstrated, it would significantly narrow the philosophical-theological gap in discussions of God’s nature. I proposed that such an argument in favor of the Christian Trinity can be found in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. It is argued that language is an essentially social phenomenon and that God is a language user requiring God to be an essentially social being. As a result, either polytheism or the Christian Trinity is true. I argue that this divine social nature is best explained by the Christian Trinity.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140489610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can a materialist look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come? Dean Zimmerman’s Falling Elevator Model is a speculative account of how persons, understood as material beings, might survive in a post-mortem resurrected state—a just-so story. It assumes endurantism, the doctrine that persons and other ordinary objects are three-dimensional beings which are wholly present at every time they exist. I argue that neither endurantism, nor purdurantism, according to which persons are four-dimensional ‘worms’ who have proper temporal parts at every time that they exist, provides a plausible account of personal survival. If you want to be a Christian materialist you should embrace exdurantism, the ‘stage theory’, according which persons are instantaneous stages and are not identical to their temporal successors either in this world or in any world to come. Exdurantism provides a plausible account of survival in ordinary cases and extraordinary cases of this-worldly fission, and of post-mortem survival.
唯物主义者能否期待死后复活和未来世界的生命？迪恩-齐默尔曼（Dean Zimmerman）的 "坠落电梯模型"（Falling Elevator Model）是一个推测性的故事，描述了作为物质存在的人如何在死后复活的状态下生存。它假定人和其他普通物体是三维的存在物，在它们存在的每一个时刻都是完全存在的。我认为，无论是 "终结论"（endurantism），还是 "净化论"（purdurantism）（根据后者，人是四维的 "蠕虫"，在其存在的每一时刻都有适当的时间部分），都没有为人的生存提供合理的解释。如果你想成为一名基督教唯物主义者，你就应该接受 "阶段论"（exdurantism），根据这种理论，人是瞬间的阶段，在这个世界或未来的任何世界都不会与他们的时间继任者完全相同。外在论为普通情况下的生存、非同寻常的现世裂变以及死后生存提供了合理的解释。
{"title":"Personal Persistence and Post-Mortem Survival","authors":"Harriet E. Baber","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i2.82213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i2.82213","url":null,"abstract":"Can a materialist look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come? Dean Zimmerman’s Falling Elevator Model is a speculative account of how persons, understood as material beings, might survive in a post-mortem resurrected state—a just-so story. It assumes endurantism, the doctrine that persons and other ordinary objects are three-dimensional beings which are wholly present at every time they exist. I argue that neither endurantism, nor purdurantism, according to which persons are four-dimensional ‘worms’ who have proper temporal parts at every time that they exist, provides a plausible account of personal survival. If you want to be a Christian materialist you should embrace exdurantism, the ‘stage theory’, according which persons are instantaneous stages and are not identical to their temporal successors either in this world or in any world to come. Exdurantism provides a plausible account of survival in ordinary cases and extraordinary cases of this-worldly fission, and of post-mortem survival.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":"45 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139446275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) is arguably the most influential philosophical mystic in Islam. He is also a presentist. This paper responds to the arguments of contemporary philosophers, Norman Kretzmann, William Lane Craig, Garrett DeWeese, and Alan Padgett, who argue that divine atemporality and temporal presentism are incompatible, through the temporal ontology of Ibn ‘Arabī. Ibn ‘Arabī asserts that all entities in the universe are loci of manifestation of God’s most beautiful Names. These divine Names constitute sensible reality. The principal response of Ibn ‘Arabī to the arguments of contemporary scholars is that the divine Names as they are manifested in the cosmos cannot be conflated with the divine Names as they are in themselves, which, in turn, cannot be conflated with God in His numinous essence. This allows him to simultaneously maintain the atemporality of God and temporal presentism.
穆赫伊-丁-伊本-阿拉比（Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn 'Arabī，卒于 638/1240 年）可以说是伊斯兰教最有影响力的神秘主义哲学家。他也是一位现世主义者。当代哲学家诺曼-克雷兹曼（Norman Kretzmann）、威廉-莱恩-克雷格（William Lane Craig）、加勒特-德韦斯（Garrett DeWeese）和艾伦-帕吉特（Alan Padgett）认为神的无时间性与时间现时论是不相容的，本文通过伊本-阿拉比的时间本体论对这些论点做出了回应。伊本-阿拉比断言，宇宙中的所有实体都是上帝最美之名的显现之地。这些神名构成了可感的现实。伊本-阿拉比对当代学者论点的主要回应是，在宇宙中显现的神名不能与神名本身混为一谈，而神名本身又不能与神的本体混为一谈。这使他能够同时坚持上帝的无时间性和时间的当下主义。
{"title":"Ibn ‘Arabī on Divine Atemporality and Temporal Presentism","authors":"Ismail Lala","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.69673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.69673","url":null,"abstract":"Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) is arguably the most influential philosophical mystic in Islam. He is also a presentist. This paper responds to the arguments of contemporary philosophers, Norman Kretzmann, William Lane Craig, Garrett DeWeese, and Alan Padgett, who argue that divine atemporality and temporal presentism are incompatible, through the temporal ontology of Ibn ‘Arabī. Ibn ‘Arabī asserts that all entities in the universe are loci of manifestation of God’s most beautiful Names. These divine Names constitute sensible reality. The principal response of Ibn ‘Arabī to the arguments of contemporary scholars is that the divine Names as they are manifested in the cosmos cannot be conflated with the divine Names as they are in themselves, which, in turn, cannot be conflated with God in His numinous essence. This allows him to simultaneously maintain the atemporality of God and temporal presentism.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":"47 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139390149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article constructively retrieves St. Anselm of Canterbury’s theory of retributive justice and provides a defense of what can be called the retributive model of hell. In the first part of this article, we develop the place of retributive punishment in Anselm’s thinking and discuss how and when retributive punishment is a good thing. In the second part, we apply Anselm’s thinking on retributive justice to the problem of hell and provide a defense of how hell, defined as a state of receiving retributive, damnatory, and irreversible punishment, is good. We then address a series of objections. Despite some criticism that both Anselm and the retributive model of hell receive in the contemporary literature, Anselm’s account of retributive justice can make unique and constructive contributions to the contemporary discussion of hell; by retrieving and applying Anselm’s thought to the problem of hell, we intend to kill two birds with one stone.
{"title":"Anselmian Defense of Hell","authors":"T. P. Haratine, Kevin A. Smith","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.67653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.67653","url":null,"abstract":"This article constructively retrieves St. Anselm of Canterbury’s theory of retributive justice and provides a defense of what can be called the retributive model of hell. In the first part of this article, we develop the place of retributive punishment in Anselm’s thinking and discuss how and when retributive punishment is a good thing. In the second part, we apply Anselm’s thinking on retributive justice to the problem of hell and provide a defense of how hell, defined as a state of receiving retributive, damnatory, and irreversible punishment, is good. We then address a series of objections. Despite some criticism that both Anselm and the retributive model of hell receive in the contemporary literature, Anselm’s account of retributive justice can make unique and constructive contributions to the contemporary discussion of hell; by retrieving and applying Anselm’s thought to the problem of hell, we intend to kill two birds with one stone.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":"105 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139174778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper begins by briefly engaging critically—on theological grounds—with Dean Zimmerman’s defense of Peter van Inwagen’s Christian Materialist idea that we are identical with our bodies, and so survive bodily death by not actually undergoing bodily death. Next, I consider the view of the mind-body relation that Dean himself is tempted by, namely Emergent Substance Dualism, arguing that it is best seen as a fig leaf that at most works to avoid offending contemporary anti-theistic “traducian” sensibilities. In displacing Emergent Substance Dualism, I set out a Neo-Aristotelian account of essence and embodiment that allows for—indeed entails—the possibility of our surviving the death of our bodies. Along the way a characterization of ontological reductionism is given, which avoids the incoherent thought that reduction goes by way of identity. The characterization makes evident why mental events and states are not reducible to physical events. Finally, two non-reductive relations between mental and physical events, namely subserving and implementing, are defined, and then used to characterize the relation of embodiment, and explain how certain mental acts can be “difference-makers” in the physical realm. I only aim to show that given the manifest failure of psycho-physical ontological reduction, this new account of survival adds no further mystery to the mind-body problem.
本文首先从神学角度对齐默尔曼博士为彼得-范因瓦根（Peter van Inwagen）的基督教唯物主义观点所做的辩护进行了简短的批判，他的观点认为我们与我们的身体是相同的，因此我们并没有经历身体的死亡，而是在身体死亡后存活了下来。接下来，我将探讨迪安本人也受到诱惑的心身关系观点，即新兴物质二元论，并认为最好将其视为一种挡箭牌，最多只能避免冒犯当代反神学的 "传统 "情感。在取代新兴物质二元论的过程中，我提出了一种新亚里士多德式的本质与体现论，这种论述允许--事实上也包含--我们在肉体死亡后存活下来的可能性。在此过程中，我给出了本体论还原论的特征，避免了还原是通过同一性来实现的这种不连贯的想法。这一特征说明了为什么心理事件和状态不能还原为物理事件。最后，定义了精神事件与物理事件之间的两种非还原关系，即 "服务"（subserving）和 "实施"（implementing），并以此来描述 "体现"（embodiment）关系，解释某些精神行为如何成为物理领域的 "差异制造者"。我的目的只是想说明，鉴于心理-物理本体论还原的明显失败，这种关于生存的新解释并没有给心身问题增添更多的神秘色彩。
{"title":"Surviving Death, Again","authors":"Mark Johnston","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i2.82033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i2.82033","url":null,"abstract":"The paper begins by briefly engaging critically—on theological grounds—with Dean Zimmerman’s defense of Peter van Inwagen’s Christian Materialist idea that we are identical with our bodies, and so survive bodily death by not actually undergoing bodily death. Next, I consider the view of the mind-body relation that Dean himself is tempted by, namely Emergent Substance Dualism, arguing that it is best seen as a fig leaf that at most works to avoid offending contemporary anti-theistic “traducian” sensibilities. In displacing Emergent Substance Dualism, I set out a Neo-Aristotelian account of essence and embodiment that allows for—indeed entails—the possibility of our surviving the death of our bodies. Along the way a characterization of ontological reductionism is given, which avoids the incoherent thought that reduction goes by way of identity. The characterization makes evident why mental events and states are not reducible to physical events. Finally, two non-reductive relations between mental and physical events, namely subserving and implementing, are defined, and then used to characterize the relation of embodiment, and explain how certain mental acts can be “difference-makers” in the physical realm. I only aim to show that given the manifest failure of psycho-physical ontological reduction, this new account of survival adds no further mystery to the mind-body problem.","PeriodicalId":507361,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology","volume":"20 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139176579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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