Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1353/rvm.2024.a929323
Ronald Loeffler
{"title":"The Metaphysics of Practice: Writings on Action, Community, and Obligation by Wilfrid Sellars (review)","authors":"Ronald Loeffler","doi":"10.1353/rvm.2024.a929323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a929323","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":507479,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"57 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141232417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1353/rvm.2024.a929316
Paul Gaffney
{"title":"Attitudes of Play by Gabor Csepregi (review)","authors":"Paul Gaffney","doi":"10.1353/rvm.2024.a929316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a929316","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":507479,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"39 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141277663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1353/rvm.2024.a929313
Katherine Withy
{"title":"The Politics of Attention and the Promise of Mindfulness by Lawrence Berger (review)","authors":"Katherine Withy","doi":"10.1353/rvm.2024.a929313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a929313","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":507479,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"41 15","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141275493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1353/rvm.2024.a929309
Patrick Brissey
Abstract: Descartes claims in the Discourse on Method (1637) to have devised a morale par provision in 1619–20, but, later, in the Conversation with Burman (1648), he divulged that he “does not like writing on ethics,” asserts that his morale was hastily written immediately before the publication of the Discourse , and, even more striking, adds that he was “compelled” to include this content due to “people like the Schoolmen.” These facts have led commentators to be skeptical whether Descartes created his morale during his early philosophy as he claims in Part 3 of the Discourse . In response, the author argues that he created a “lived morale ” during the early 1620s. Further, he argues that Descartes endorsed it throughout his lifetime and concludes that he advocated it from the Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1620s) to the Passions of the Soul (1648).
{"title":"Descartes’s Provisional Morality","authors":"Patrick Brissey","doi":"10.1353/rvm.2024.a929309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a929309","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Descartes claims in the Discourse on Method (1637) to have devised a morale par provision in 1619–20, but, later, in the Conversation with Burman (1648), he divulged that he “does not like writing on ethics,” asserts that his morale was hastily written immediately before the publication of the Discourse , and, even more striking, adds that he was “compelled” to include this content due to “people like the Schoolmen.” These facts have led commentators to be skeptical whether Descartes created his morale during his early philosophy as he claims in Part 3 of the Discourse . In response, the author argues that he created a “lived morale ” during the early 1620s. Further, he argues that Descartes endorsed it throughout his lifetime and concludes that he advocated it from the Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1620s) to the Passions of the Soul (1648).","PeriodicalId":507479,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"65 31","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141276884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1353/rvm.2024.a929328
{"title":"Volume LXXVII: September 2023—June 2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1353/rvm.2024.a929328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a929328","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":507479,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"48 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141280052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1353/rvm.2024.a929312
Evelien Van Beeck
Abstract: Charles Taylor in A Secular Age (2007) reopened the debate about the possibility of “reenchantment,” presupposing that “enchantment” once existed, but got lost, such that we arrived at a state of “disenchantment.” However, the no longer marginal debate on the possibility of a “re-enchantment,” is in my view chaotic and lacks precise definitions. In this article the author tries to clarify the concepts involved and put some order in the debate and investigate the possibilities for a kind of re-enchantment. Firstly, she discloses enchantment, disenchantment, and reenchantment as factors in an intellectual scheme, rather than as concepts describing an historical reality. Secondly, she shows that these terms are not applicable to epoque defining sociocultural constellations, a common conviction, defended by Taylor too, which has awkward ideology-related implications. Finally, she points out, in an analysis inspired by Ricoeur, that it rather is the domain of the individual life where the loss and the recovering of enchantment may take place, in a dynamic between the individual and the “call of reality,” having the enchanting capacity to inspire possible lives and give our lives its beacons.
{"title":"The Myths of (Re)Enchantment: Anthropological Reflections on a Mistaken Narrative","authors":"Evelien Van Beeck","doi":"10.1353/rvm.2024.a929312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a929312","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Charles Taylor in A Secular Age (2007) reopened the debate about the possibility of “reenchantment,” presupposing that “enchantment” once existed, but got lost, such that we arrived at a state of “disenchantment.” However, the no longer marginal debate on the possibility of a “re-enchantment,” is in my view chaotic and lacks precise definitions. In this article the author tries to clarify the concepts involved and put some order in the debate and investigate the possibilities for a kind of re-enchantment. Firstly, she discloses enchantment, disenchantment, and reenchantment as factors in an intellectual scheme, rather than as concepts describing an historical reality. Secondly, she shows that these terms are not applicable to epoque defining sociocultural constellations, a common conviction, defended by Taylor too, which has awkward ideology-related implications. Finally, she points out, in an analysis inspired by Ricoeur, that it rather is the domain of the individual life where the loss and the recovering of enchantment may take place, in a dynamic between the individual and the “call of reality,” having the enchanting capacity to inspire possible lives and give our lives its beacons.","PeriodicalId":507479,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"64 41","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141277300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1353/rvm.2024.a929321
Frederik M. Bjerregaard-Nielsen
{"title":"The Entanglement: How Art and Philosophy Make Us What We Are by Alva Noë (review)","authors":"Frederik M. Bjerregaard-Nielsen","doi":"10.1353/rvm.2024.a929321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a929321","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":507479,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"79 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141278295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1353/rvm.2024.a929311
Pantelis Golitsis
Abstract: McTaggart’s thesis about the unreality of time has puzzled and still puzzles philosophers of the metaphysics of time, who defend the existence of either McTaggart’s A series or McTaggart’s B series. McTaggart himself, however, was led through his analysis to view as real what he called the “C series,” which, unlike the temporal A and B series, is atemporal. The author argues that the ancient conception of time, especially of the Neoplatonist Damascius, reveals an important gap in McTaggart’s thought, namely, his overlooking the idea of an integral present (that is, a present that does not form a series), which allows to account for the B series as being generated from the C series without the involvement of the A series, which has been shown by McTaggart to have a contradictory nature. This comparative account enables us to see not only that Damascius was the first presentist in the history of the metaphysics of time, but also that McTaggart’s analysis rests upon the unreflected assumption that time, if it is real, progresses linearly.
摘要:麦克塔格特关于时间非现实性的论断曾经并仍然困惑着时间形而上学的哲学家们,他们为麦克塔格特的 A 系列或麦克塔格特的 B 系列的存在进行辩护。然而,麦克塔格特本人却通过分析,将他所称的 "C 系列 "视为真实的,它与时间性的 A 系列和 B 系列不同,是无时间性的。作者认为,古代的时间概念,尤其是新柏拉图主义者大马士革的时间概念,揭示了麦克塔格特思想中的一个重要缺陷,即他忽略了一个整体的现在(即不形成系列的现在)的概念,而这个概念可以解释 B 系列是由 C 系列产生的,不需要 A 系列的参与,而 A 系列已被麦克塔格特证明具有矛盾的性质。通过这种比较说明,我们不仅可以看到大马士革是时间形而上学史上第一个现在论者,而且还可以看到麦克塔格特的分析建立在一个未经反思的假设之上,即时间(如果它是真实的)是线性发展的。
{"title":"McTaggart’s Series under the Critical Eye of the Ancient Philosophy of Time","authors":"Pantelis Golitsis","doi":"10.1353/rvm.2024.a929311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a929311","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: McTaggart’s thesis about the unreality of time has puzzled and still puzzles philosophers of the metaphysics of time, who defend the existence of either McTaggart’s A series or McTaggart’s B series. McTaggart himself, however, was led through his analysis to view as real what he called the “C series,” which, unlike the temporal A and B series, is atemporal. The author argues that the ancient conception of time, especially of the Neoplatonist Damascius, reveals an important gap in McTaggart’s thought, namely, his overlooking the idea of an integral present (that is, a present that does not form a series), which allows to account for the B series as being generated from the C series without the involvement of the A series, which has been shown by McTaggart to have a contradictory nature. This comparative account enables us to see not only that Damascius was the first presentist in the history of the metaphysics of time, but also that McTaggart’s analysis rests upon the unreflected assumption that time, if it is real, progresses linearly.","PeriodicalId":507479,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"35 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141280576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1353/rvm.2024.a929310
Elisa Magrì
Abstract: Hegel’s account of action in the Encyclopedia defies the standard belief–desire model of action in that he holds that having beliefs is not in itself normative, nor having desires or wishes. At the same time, he argues that our actions are expressive of our reasons to act, including beliefs and practical feelings. By drawing attention on the dialectic between deeds and practical feelings as well as on the role of interest, the author distinguishes two orders of moral motivation in Hegel’s theory of practical spirit: a first-order motivation concerned with self-realization, and a second-order motivation that expresses interest in shared commitments and obligations. Taken together, both types of interest delineate Hegel’s theory of responsive conduct. One upshot of this view is the reevaluation of moral action in terms of processes rather than events, which also makes room for a noncognitivist appraisal of action in Hegel.
{"title":"“Nothing Comes about without Interest”: On Hegel’s Account of Moral Motivation","authors":"Elisa Magrì","doi":"10.1353/rvm.2024.a929310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a929310","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Hegel’s account of action in the Encyclopedia defies the standard belief–desire model of action in that he holds that having beliefs is not in itself normative, nor having desires or wishes. At the same time, he argues that our actions are expressive of our reasons to act, including beliefs and practical feelings. By drawing attention on the dialectic between deeds and practical feelings as well as on the role of interest, the author distinguishes two orders of moral motivation in Hegel’s theory of practical spirit: a first-order motivation concerned with self-realization, and a second-order motivation that expresses interest in shared commitments and obligations. Taken together, both types of interest delineate Hegel’s theory of responsive conduct. One upshot of this view is the reevaluation of moral action in terms of processes rather than events, which also makes room for a noncognitivist appraisal of action in Hegel.","PeriodicalId":507479,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"81 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141278583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}